No Invasion of Sicily during WW2

How about Corsica then west Italy and Trieste at the same time. When these two fronts meet up, rest of Italy basically does on the limb.
...
Is this feasable?

Feasible it is. But for sure, it isn't optimal. Exposed supply lines, far closer to German bases which means better defense, also, North Italy isn't that small and you could expect far more resistance from such an invasion.
All in all, it is a pretty bad deal.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The question in the Allied high command at the time was not whether or not to invade Sicily, but whether or not to invade mainland Italy afterwards. Invading Sicily was obvious, since the sea route through the Mediterranean would remain vulnerable unless and until Sicily was secured. After that, then convoys could run through from Suez to Gibraltar without any problem. Foregoing the enormous long transit around Africa was the equivalent of adding enormous numbers of merchant ships to the Allied fleet, which would prove vital to the success (indeed, the feasibility) of Overlord.

The importance of merchant shipping has never been given its due in the historiography of the war. It was one of the most vital factors in the eventual Allied victory.
 
The question in the Allied high command at the time was not whether or not to invade Sicily, but whether or not to invade mainland Italy afterwards. Invading Sicily was obvious, since the sea route through the Mediterranean would remain vulnerable unless and until Sicily was secured. After that, then convoys could run through from Suez to Gibraltar without any problem. ...

Allied cargo ships were passing the Sicillian Strait without problem before Sicilly was invaded. Allied Warships were transiting unmolested in May & Convoys started in June. Operation Husky was executed in mid July. The Axis attempted to contest the air over Sicilly & the adjacent seas, & failed. During June & July the losses were unsustainable and bomber missions steadily decreasing in effectiveness. At the end of the Tunisian battle Allied airforces in the Med musters some 6,000 operational combat aircraft. The Axis together were hard presses to restore 3,000 as combat and operating losses exceeded the delivery of replacement aircraft. This was also when the decline in pilot quality had taken hold. The German air groups had to choose between extended stand downs in combat operations and spending limited fuel to continue training of rookie pilots, or sending them out on increasingly urgent and desperate missions. The Axis fleet was out of fuel and driven north by bombing its ports. Only the submarines could still interfere & those were not based in Sicily.

Bottom line is Sicily was convient for the Allies cargo shipping, but not essential. Brooke did see it as essential but the numbers for Axis air and sea offensive capability based in Sicily do not support the necessity.
 
... Now, nine divisions were sent out of the Mediterranean and to England for participation in Overlord (though I can't recall if it was just before Sicily or just before Salerno).

They were moved individually over 4-6 months. You can find the transfer dates in the individual unit histories.

To move the rest, the U.S. 5th (or 7th) Army and the British 8th Army, out of the Mediterranean and to Britain would make an already immense logistical undertaking even larger. It would require use of the shipping and port facilities that were already overstretched moving the troops already tasked to Overlord from the United States to Britain, so the end result would have been moving the army out of North Africa, but leaving an equivalent number of troops and supplies sitting idly in the United States for want of shipping and port allocation. Better to make use of them where they were. Moreover, once it became clear that the Allies were moving their resources out of the Mediterranean and back to Britain, Germany would respond by doing the same thing, so any advantage would be negated.

The US was sending units from the US to the Med while it was transferring others from the Med to the UK.

A large and usually ignored shipping consumer from September 1943 was the cargo space used to sustain the Italian population. Massive quantities of food, coal, medical supplies were found to be essential to prevent mass deaths in Sicilly and Southern Italy. Restoration of the south italian ports, railways, and automotive roads suck up yet more shipping. Between infrastructure restoration and keeping the south Italians alive the Allies lost a large portion of the cargo shipping gain from reopening the Mediteranean route.
 
So an invasion of Corsica would have made more sense? It could have lead to the invasion of Southern France in 1943 or even the Tuscan region of Italy.

The Joint Chiefs originally proposed a Sardinian/Corsican invasion at the 'Symbol' conference in January 1943. It was proposed the Brit 1st Army, then in Algeria & Tunisia, execute this operation (Brimstone) in March 1943. They must have been thinking big at this point. A look at the map shows how the Sardinian/Corsican islands outflank the entire Axis Tunisia-Sicillian-Italian position. After thinking this one over Brooke insisted on securing Tunisia, Sicilly, Italy in sequence & persuaded Churchill this was the optimal route. This was also the same conference where Brooke altered Churchills support for the previously accepted 1943 invasion of NW Europe..

Later as SACMED Eisenhower revived the Brimstone operation concept. It was executed in October with a mixed bag of underarmed French units, barely a corps in strength.
 

the Balkans had a third the combined port and transport capacity of France.

What is your source for this?

My estimate gleaned from assorted war time and later data on ports and railway capacity. Its a step above a back of the envelope calculate, but if someone has deeper research I'd love to add it to my collection.

Interested in knowing this too. I would have assumed that the Balkans would have about 10-20% of the port capacity of France.

I was comparing the port capacity of just western France and railway capacity of northern France. Being generous as it were. Sorry this was not clear.
 
It's also an issue of on the job training. When the Allies invaded Normandy in June 1944 they had the benefit of making all manner of mistakes during the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. All of the lessons learned from the mistakes made during those operations led to success on June 6th.

Yes and no. Some lessons were transferred over, some not. Note that both US 1st Army corps commanders were Pacific veterans with no experience in the Med. Bradley & his staff had just one round at a amphib op in the Med, with II Corps. Oddly clark who had been training at amphib ops since 1939 & had planned or commanded five combat landings remained in the Med. Patton who had two combat landings under his belt remained out of Op Neptune, while Bradleys Deputy Hodges had less experience. You can go down the list of staff officers in the Army & corps HQ & see the same thing. I used to get paid to do amphibious warfare stuff, & when I look over the details of the US 1st Army planning the lessons not learned show.
 
Is Greece worthwhile for a post-North Africa op if it is absolutely certain an Allied show of strength here will persuade Turkey to join in on the Allied side? (Possibly the Turks may not do much fighting, but they make their airfields available and open the Dardenelles to any and all Allied shipping to the Black Sea.)
 
My memory is dim, but from the books of 30-40 years ago the idea of Turkey as a active player was not much supported. The costs in national treasure way exceeded the benefits for the Turks.

In terms of the Greeks & the Balkans the only operation I can see of any value would be seizing Crete or similar island 1942 or early 43 to enhance air attacks on Rumanian oil industry. Also a base for raids and assisting partisans. Usefull, but you don't want to expend a lot acquiring it.
 
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How about Corsica then west Italy and Trieste at the same time. When these two fronts meet up, rest of Italy basically does on the limb.

Overlord is now secondary.

As divisions are placed in Italy or southern France as soon as they are ready.

Can drive once the two are connected can drive north in France and also to Austria from Trieste.

Channel coast could be used as Dragon was and Germans are trapped in France between the main southern force driving north and then east and the landings in the north.

Meanwhile the other front can pick Vienna or Budapest from Trieste.

Main ports are Trieste, Pola, Venice on the East and Southern France and Genoa in the West.

Is this feasable?

Short answer is yes. But I'd focus on building up in South France. Leave operations in Italy as a holding & diversionary action. The reason is North Italy represented maybe 15% of the industrial capacity in German possession in late 43. The real prize is the Rhur, which depending on how you count is 35% to 50% of the Reichs industrial capacity. Vienna & Austria in general are not any better a goal than Italy. If instead of a short hook to Rome as Operation Shingle was intended you send the attack to the Riviera, and make it stick by drawing sufficient forces from Italy & the US, this from the start of 1944. This allows the build up of a strong army group through the winter and spring & the possession of the super port complex of the Marsailles/Toulon group. It then puts the Germans & a dilemma. iIf they commit their reserves to suppress the Riviera lodgment then NW France is weakened. Keeping strong reserves in the north, or in Italy means the Allied army group expands into the spring until the German Army Group G pops like a balloon.

Even if Op Neptune is reduced and the initial Overlord operation build up is reduced the Germans have a impossible choice coping with it. This in essence creates the situation faced by the Germans in early September 1944, but 3-4 months early.

The thing about NW Europe is its direct path to the Ruhr. Short, no mountain ranges, many good ports, best railway/highway/river/cannal infrastructure in Europe, Friendly population with lots of skilled labor, a population willing to serve to rebuild the ranks of a Allied army. South France is not quite as perfect, but is still fairly close to the Ruhr, has decent rail connections and ports, the Central Massif does not compare to the mountain ranges of Italy, Austria, or the Balkans. As a route to Germanys industrial heart it has its attractions.
 
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That would be the P-40F I presume?

Yes, mostly F series. Those were the model first used by the AAF in the Med I'm unsure when the L series appeared in the Med.

From P-40D on, all P-40s were 'rangy' enough for the needs of MTO. The range with drop tank (52 or 75 gals) was 1000-1100 miles, with allovance of 20-33 gals (for warm up, take off and climb to 15000 ft). A very rough rule of thumb is that radius, with combat included, is 1/3rd of range, so we're talking of 350 miles of radius. P-40 has a problem vs. Bf 109F/G, Fw 190, MC.202.
The best aircraft for Sardinia job was probably the Spitfire VIII - much improved range over the Spitfire IX, excellent rate of climb, competitive speed and dive, very useful armament, no vices. Other choices were the P-38 (has range, firepower, speed and RoC; problematic are size, rate of roll, only one generator despite two engines, not a competitive diver), A-36 (was used as escort for B-25s vs. Sicily, has range and low level performance, does not have a good performnce over 10000 ft), indeed the P-47 with at least 75 gal drop tank (= at least 375 miles radius per OTL; it might be a tad too late for Sardinia).
 
Here is one proposed alternative Med campaign for the Allies with a PoD of January 1943. Basically it tries to dodge a Italian campaign like OTL in trade for a early invasion of S France.

January. Decision made to execute a Tunisian campaign as diversion & holding action - economy of force emphisized. Brit 1st Army prepares for invading Sardinia/Corsica in March. British prepare a corps for operations against Crete. US Army HQ activated to control residual Allied forces in northern Tunisia, 8th Army continues its mission in South Tunisia less any detachments for the Crete operation.

March. Operations Brimstone & Firebrand started with invasion of Sardinia. US AAF prepares large air base infrastructure on these two islands, to allow fighters and shorter ranged medium bombers to rove across northern Italy, Sicilly, and south France. Heavy bombers can use this as a staging/refueling point for attacking Germany & the Balkans

April. Crete operation is executed. Allies rebuild air base infrastructure on Crete for operations against Rumania oil industry. Allies start preparations for a major amphib op. Two basic plans are prepared. 1. vs S Italy & Scilly if German remain in Tunisia, object is to reopen the Sicillian Strait to Allied cargo ships. 2. Invasion of S France.

April. Hitler makes a decision on Tunisian bridgehead and Italy. He either insists on holding Tunisia (the more likely I think) or evacuation.

No African Evacuation

May - July Allies execute invasion of S Italy & Sicilly. Axis Army Africa must make a emergency evacuation or be trapped. Diversionary commando raids in the Balkans & against N Italy/S France.

August - September consolidation of Allied position in Tunisia Sicilly/S Italy. Object is to establish Allied army there as a economy of force diversion & holding action. Preparations continue for South France operation with a target of Jan 44 & establishment of 15 Ground combat divisions in S France by April 1944.

African Evacuation
April-June. Allies consolidate position in Tunisia. air/naval offensive vs Sicilly & Italy to nuetralize Axis threat to Mediteranean sea route. Sicily invaded only as a last resort. Preparations continue for a S France invasion targeted for November 1943. Target of 25 ground combat divisions in S France by April 1944.

Invasion of NW Europe targeted for May 1944. No delay prefered even if it means a smaller initial attack.
 
Here is one proposed alternative Med campaign for the Allies with a PoD of January 1943. Basically it tries to dodge a Italian campaign like OTL in trade for a early invasion of S France.

Interesting idea.

I have some doubts:

Tunisia - you're diverting the British 1st Army, for a March invasion so they will need to withdrawn from the frontline by the end of January, or mid February at the latest for amphibious training. That will require a much bigger commitment from the US to fill the frontline, and gives the possibility of a much bigger defeat at Kasserine. Diverting a British invasion to Crete should be possible because of the limits on how many troops could be supported at the front for 8th Army.

Allied air forces will now be dispersed rather than achieving air superiority over Tunisia, and similarly naval strength will also be dispersed running convoys to Sardinia and Crete, rather than stopping supplies to Tunisia.

I can't see Tunisia being evacuated in this scenario, and I'm not sure the Allies have the strength to defeat the Axis in Tunisia and fight all the other battles, without more US resources being committed to the Mediterranean. The Allies would also have to accept the Mediterranean remaining closed to shipping traffic, and US concerns about the threat through Spain would remain.

Sicily - invading Sicily without occupying all of Tunisia looks highly risky. Dispersion of Allied air forces would mean air superiority is uncertain, Italy would still be fighting to protect its forces in Tunisia, and the logistics of an invasion without Tunisian ports look horrendous. On the other hand German resources would be spread much thinner to honour the Allied threats all over the Mediterranean.
 
I could see Sardinia without Tunis if the allies could use the Bizerte airfields.
Sicily without Tunis will have a lot heavier logistics requirements.
 
I could see Sardinia without Tunis if the allies could use the Bizerte airfields.
Sicily without Tunis will have a lot heavier logistics requirements.

Allied logistics for Op Husky & the Sicillian campaign were not based in Tunisia. The naval component did use the estuaries near Bizerte to park the light weight landing craft, but that was a convinence not a necessity & other options are practical. The entire 8t Army was embarked from ports in Lybia & Egypt, & its logistics base was in Alexandria. The US 7th Army was embarked from Algerian & Morrocan ports & the logistics hub was spread across the Algerian ports. 8th Army components, the Canadian Div & some separate supporting units were embarked in the UK and went directly to the invasion beaches. The US 45th ID came from the US, with a 48 hour rembarkation stop in Algeria.

The Axis made a effort to demolish the Bizerte, Tunis, & Sfax port facilities & two months were not enough for the Allies to both repair those ports & establish their main logistics base in Tunisia. As planned they used already established ports/depots.

Allied fighter planes were based in Tunisia to support Op Husky & some of the medium bomber groups. They were also based in Malta & the heavy bomber bases were in Algeria & Lybia. With Sardinia secured in March it is available as a airbase for operations against Sicily & as are its ports for forward bases.

Andersons 1st Army had been training for amphibious ops at least since Op Gymnast had been on the table. Possiblly earlier, but I dont have specific evidence. They had also participated in Op Torch in November. Sardinia at the time was defended by a single Italian corps of two understrength infantry divisions & the usual Italian militia. Its not like the entire 1st Army is going to make a operation Husky or Neptune size assualt. OTL a single ad Hoc French corps was sufficient to secure both islands.

I can't see Tunisia being evacuated in this scenario, and I'm not sure the Allies have the strength to defeat the Axis in Tunisia and fight all the other battles, without more US resources being committed to the Mediterranean.

Defeat of the Axis position in Tunisia does not have to occur through direct ground assualt. The ground battle is best regulated to a holding action. OTL the Axis ground and air forces in Tunisia were defeated through Allied airpower interdicting their supplies. That can occur with Allied airforces based in Algeria as OTL and with the airbases in Sardinia/Corsica allowing the Allied medium bomber groups larger acess to the Italian ports & railways.

The Allies would also have to accept the Mediterranean remaining closed to shipping traffic, and US concerns about the threat through Spain would remain.

Once the Axis air forces were defeated in the central Med, which occured April-May OTL the Allies were able to send ships though the Sicilian straits with acceptable losses (actually nearly no losses). As noted earlier the Brits started cargo ship convoys through the central Med before Sicily was invaded. If it is useful to invade Sicilly then the Sardinian airbase adds the practicality of a north coast invasion while the possesion of Malta keeps open the exposure of the SE coast. This complicates the defense for the Axis as they must prepare for two likely approaches. The Axis defense problem is also complicated if the bulk of their ground forces are still in Tunisia. The OTL defense of Sicilly depended on mobile forces rebuilt from those evacuated from Tunisia. If there is no evacuation the ground forces in Italy are less, and they must cover a larger front as southern Italy can be just as vulnerable with a Allied controlled Sardinia.

Stratigically it makes more sense for the Axis to evacuate Tunisia once Sardinia is in Allied hands. Its a stratigic dead end & extremely vulnerable to isolation. Every battalion there leaves a beach in Sicilly or Italy undefended. However we are limited to Hitlers decisions here, which were not informed by stratigic good sense or solid logic as we understand it. I'd predict the usual Hitler half measure from a desire to have things both ways, with a corps or two removed from Tunisia, but over 200,000 Axis soldiers still at risk of being cut off.

OTL the threat from Spain was finally dismissed. Reinforcements were sent to Tunisia from the US I Armored Corps, & 7th Army planning for follow on Ops like Op Husky removed the remainder of I Corps after March.
 
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thorr97

Banned
I've a related question here.

With all this effort and with all these forces already in the Med, how come the Allies didn't go for an Operation Dragoon instead of Overlord?

Even with the various deceptions to throw the Germans off the Allies knew they'd still be attacking into the teeth of a very well prepared enemy who was expecting such an attack in that overall area.

Rather than playing into Germany's hands, why not go for the French Mediterranean coast instead Hitler's "Atlantic Wall?"

Yes, we'd still have to neutralize Sicily and the various other islands as well as destroying the Italian air forces and navy. But by the time we put ashore and Anzio we'd already largely done that. So, why not jump into France where the Axis was least prepared to deal with it?
 
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