What if, instead of a reformist like Gorbachev, the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party went to another Brezhnevite unwilling to rock the boat? Would the Soviet system's inherent flaws have caused its collapse as in OTL, or could the USSR have lurched on as it had for decades into the 21st century? What of the Eastern Block? Absent any moves towards liberalization, do the mass protests and subsequent fall of the communist regimes still happen? Would a hardline General Secretary have reacted similarly as to Hungary or Czechoslovakia?
No Gorbachev: How long does the USSR and the Eastern Block last?
- Thread starter Southpaw
- Start date
By the early 1980s I don't think a Brezhnev style leader would be accepted for very long.
Gorbachev didn't rock the boat because of economics it was by suggesting the CPSU shouldn't have a monopoly on power. Many old hardliners were willing to liberalise the economy due to the Brezhnev decline but not allow democracy.
However Russia isn't China, Deng-style reforms wont see the Soviet Union's economy go into overdrive, not by the 1980s but it might keep the country moving a little longer. A liberalised farming sector alone would rapidly see the USSR become a net exporter.
Moscow might attempt what they did IOTL post-communism, patch up relations with China and facilitate both their economic growth with the Russians providing raw materials and the Chinese providing workers.
I still see the Soviets falling soon due to the Warsaw Pact nations. I imagine such 'Deng' style leaders would attempt to woo Eastern Bloc citizens with bread and circuses*, while clamping down on protests.
*Also known as Coca-Cola and blue jeans
Gorbachev didn't rock the boat because of economics it was by suggesting the CPSU shouldn't have a monopoly on power. Many old hardliners were willing to liberalise the economy due to the Brezhnev decline but not allow democracy.
However Russia isn't China, Deng-style reforms wont see the Soviet Union's economy go into overdrive, not by the 1980s but it might keep the country moving a little longer. A liberalised farming sector alone would rapidly see the USSR become a net exporter.
Moscow might attempt what they did IOTL post-communism, patch up relations with China and facilitate both their economic growth with the Russians providing raw materials and the Chinese providing workers.
I still see the Soviets falling soon due to the Warsaw Pact nations. I imagine such 'Deng' style leaders would attempt to woo Eastern Bloc citizens with bread and circuses*, while clamping down on protests.
*Also known as Coca-Cola and blue jeans
As you say, enacting market-based reforms is much easier in a country like China, which in the late '70s was a predominately agricultural economy and could build a modern industrial base "from scratch", as it were. By comparison, the 1980s USSR has a large and inefficient industrial sector which is going to have to be painfully reformed in any case, which is going to cause quite a bit of dissent.
It would have collapsed. The price of oil was dropping and with it its hard currency reserves, which were needed for food imports. Defense spending was something like 20% of GDP. Consumer goods were only about 20% of production. Alcoholism, absenteeism and corruption were rampant. It was falling behind in high technology, specifically semiconductors, and couldnt afford to make the catch up investments. And all the Brezhnevites at senior levels were idiots. Maybe a literal reincarnation of Stalin could hold on. But short of that, the state collapses.
The only way the USSR survives is if oil prices stay high and a powerful reformer is in to power with an iron grip over both the military and KGB. Maybe if Andropov lives another 10 years and oil prices stay above $30/barrel throughout the 80's. Even then it is at best a coin flip.
The only way the USSR survives is if oil prices stay high and a powerful reformer is in to power with an iron grip over both the military and KGB. Maybe if Andropov lives another 10 years and oil prices stay above $30/barrel throughout the 80's. Even then it is at best a coin flip.
Spare Change
Banned
Alternate History the only hobby where some unusual but important Historical event makes something go from 'totally ASB' to 'inevitable, it had to happen' in the blink of an eye.
When the Soviet Union collapsed it was totally unlooked for. It was even an unexpected event, but a few now predicted it, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989!
What was widely predicted was that Gorbachev was going to be overthrown by hardliners. That did happen. Nobody predicted that the Soviet Hardliners who had an excellent reputation for competence would mess up the coup and destroy the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev was different because he was not willing, except under duress, to shoot civilians to preserve the Soviet empire.
Every other dictorial regime has been able to do that. Most obviosily China is still run by Mao's successors. Now China is special case because of its growing standard of living, but even communist/extreme regimes that fail to deliver the goods are still around. That is why Cuba, North Korea, Iran, etc. are still around. Any regime in Eastern Europe doesn't count since all these regimes were backstopped by Soviet power which was suddenly and unexpectely removed.
A much more common prediction was that if the Soviet Union ever found itself in real economic trouble, it would go for broke and try to use its one real asset- a giant and world class military in order to get it out of its jam.
The three scenarios suggested. The first was a surprise invasion of Western Europe using conventional arms. Red Army by Ralph Peters shows us that scenario with a Soviet Victory, where at the urging of West German politicians the West signs an armistice on Soviet terms rather than risk a Nuclear war after a convential victory of arms by the Soviets.
The other two were an invasion of Iran, which is on the Soviet border. If Soviet forces were on the Persian gulf this would change everything. A nuclear first strike at rival China was also suggested.
Now back to the posts claiming the Soviets had to collapse because of low oil prices and that they couldn't make an iPad.
When the Soviet Union collapsed it was totally unlooked for. It was even an unexpected event, but a few now predicted it, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989!
What was widely predicted was that Gorbachev was going to be overthrown by hardliners. That did happen. Nobody predicted that the Soviet Hardliners who had an excellent reputation for competence would mess up the coup and destroy the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev was different because he was not willing, except under duress, to shoot civilians to preserve the Soviet empire.
Every other dictorial regime has been able to do that. Most obviosily China is still run by Mao's successors. Now China is special case because of its growing standard of living, but even communist/extreme regimes that fail to deliver the goods are still around. That is why Cuba, North Korea, Iran, etc. are still around. Any regime in Eastern Europe doesn't count since all these regimes were backstopped by Soviet power which was suddenly and unexpectely removed.
A much more common prediction was that if the Soviet Union ever found itself in real economic trouble, it would go for broke and try to use its one real asset- a giant and world class military in order to get it out of its jam.
The three scenarios suggested. The first was a surprise invasion of Western Europe using conventional arms. Red Army by Ralph Peters shows us that scenario with a Soviet Victory, where at the urging of West German politicians the West signs an armistice on Soviet terms rather than risk a Nuclear war after a convential victory of arms by the Soviets.
The other two were an invasion of Iran, which is on the Soviet border. If Soviet forces were on the Persian gulf this would change everything. A nuclear first strike at rival China was also suggested.
Now back to the posts claiming the Soviets had to collapse because of low oil prices and that they couldn't make an iPad.
ok, I'll bite.
First, I have a tendency to express things as certainties when they are only highly, highly likely. So my bad as saying the Soviet Union's collapse was inevitable when it was only just shy of inevitable.
That said, why are you evaluating likely outcomes based on what was believed at the time? One of the primary benefits of history is the ability to aggregate dispersed sources of information not widely known at the time. That people at that time believed the collapse of the Soviet Union was highly unlikely says more about what people did not know at the time than what was actually likely to occur.
With regards to Gorbachev not shooting people, you are correct. Had he chosen to start shooting, the Soviet Union might have survived. I acknowledged that in my post. Of course, the credibility of the Party would be totally undermined and it would devolve into a pure police state with only the faintest hint of communist ideals. But, it might survive.
As to the likelihood of such an event occurring, civilian massacres are hardly an obvious outcome. People generally dont like to shoot friends or family. Places where massacres occur usually feature class or ethnic divisions that can be exploited. Rural Chinese peasants in the army and urban students in Beijing, or example. And even there, there was nearly a revolt by one of the generals. The Soviet Union, by the 1980's had fewer obvious divisions conducive to massacres. And, perhaps more importantly, it had few leaders with the ability to do so and survive a protest from fellow leaders.
I cant speak to people after 87ish, but in the 82-85 time frame, there were no competent conservatives. The Breshnevites were sycophants, empty headed ideologues, and corrupt extortionists whose primary skills were appealing to Brezhnev and Suslov. Grishin was Gorbachev's primary competitor in 85 and the KGB blocked his ascension. He was a glorified mob boss and Chebrikov didnt want him in power. Some of the Andropov protege's might have had some ability but they were largely reformers. So, if you are going to make claims about competent conservatives in the Soviet hierarchy, please name names. None of them had the ability to rally the army and the KGB to perform such a crackdown. If they did, they would have. This is almost self evident.
Finally, with regards to oil and electronics (and I should have included consumer goods), where do I begin? Oil, like now, was the basis of their economy. Something like 15% of their agricultural consumption in the early 80's was imported. No petrodollars and no food. Eventually people get sick of not having basic goods and then they protest. And then it comes down to the army firing on its people, which we've addressed.
With electronics, that is purely a matter of keeping up with the West with regards to defense capabilities. Marshals Ogarkov and Ahkromeyev were well aware of technological trends and the capabilities that smart bombs, communications and related technologies would provide to the West. And, in fact, the technocrats were aware of these trends long before but competing interests blocked needed R&D. Ultimately, a war like Desert Storm would have exposed the military's shortcomings just as consumer goods exposed the inefficiencies of the Soviet economy.
As to military action such as that promoted by Peters, Hackett, and Clancy, most records coming out after the fact point out to the unlikeliness of such an event. The military leadership showed little interest in starting a war. Who's going to do this and how are they going to gain the credibility to motivate the military and the KGB. I dont know of anyone who could have pulled it off short of ISOTing Putin.
So, those are a few of my reasons for believing the Soviet Union was almost certain to collapse, even if it wasnt known at the time. Perhaps there were a few people in 88 or 89 that could have pulled of a right wing save of the Soviet Union. But it failed in 91 and I know of no reason why it would have been different in 88 or 89. But if you want to hold on to what you believed true in 1985, more power to you.
I am not sure on it myself.
But is it impossible for incompetent stubborn strongmen to keep the SU together? You think that a Gorbachev that might start shooting could have perhaps lead to a surviving SU.
After all a lot of backwards regimes keep going on despite great inefficiencies and incompetence.
Gorbachev, no. And anyone else needs to get the support of the KGB and military. Which means they need to consolidate power and place loyalists in key places fairly quickly. Is it possible? Sure. Hard to do though. It took Stalin years to gain that kind of control. And the people in the 80s had a vested interest in not allowing a new Stalin or Beria emerge lest they turn out like Trotsky.
Communism was held out to be superior to capitalism. What do you do when you lose your credibility on this? Mugabe, Amin, Assad, and the like arent using ideology to justify their existence. North Korea and Cuba have barely held on and are rather unique dont you think?
I think you guys will get a kick out of this one..... After perestroika in the late 80's, the Komsomol was charged with teaching people how to be socially responsible capitalists...**I think that should give you a general direction as to where things were headed. 
With an economy organized around five-year plans, the 12th (1986-1990) gives some indications of the trajectory the Soviets wanted take with a traditional conservative regime in place. The 12th Pyatiletka was conceptualized and drafted while Chernenko was Gen-Sec but approved by Gorbachev shortly after he came into office, which explains why the plan is so radically different from the reforms that were actually implemented in that period.
In the document*Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period to the Year 2000, the principal tasks of the Twelfth Five Year Plan were declared to be "to enhance the pace and efficiency of economic development by accelerating scientific and technical progress, retooling and adapting production, intensively using existing production potential, and improving the managerial system and accounting mechanism, and, on this basis, to further raise the standard of living of the Soviet people."
Industrial/Construction:
* Plans for an 80% increase in investment over the previous Pyatiletka in the sectors producing machine tools, electrical equipment, chemicals, and agricultural machinery, which was set to increase machine-building output by 40-45% during the five year period.
* Plans for a 23% rise in capital investment, with roughly half of those funds to be spent on retooling of existing capacity, concurrently with an acceleration in the retirement of obsolete equipment.
* Plans for a near doubling of the contribution of synthetic resins and plastics to the construction industry by the year 2000, which could replace metals used in machinery, construction materials, engines, and pipe.
* Plans for the improvement in availability, quality and service life of individual components and spare parts for machinery in order to reduce downtime.
* Plans for an increase in the use of computer program control mechanization and automation in assembly lines, which would reduce the use of unskilled labor and increase speed and precision of production.
* A call for increased efficiency in R&D procedures and processes in order to shorten the time between research breakthroughs and their industrial application, based on new organizational structures which would combine elements of research, design and production facilities into one unit.
* Plans for locating and constructing new industries which require high energy inputs in locations close to energy sources (i.e. Siberia), and simultaneously increasing the number of workplaces in regions with the requisite manpower resources (i.e. Central Asia) by focusing on services, light industry, and other sectors requiring fewer raw materials.
* Plans for special focus on the development of infrastructure in Siberia and the Soviet Far East.
* Plans for a 240% increase in the production of computers during the period 1986-1990.
* Plans for a 5.4% rise in the production of nonfood consumer goods and a 5.4-7% rise in consumer services through the period. Consumer goods targeted included light industry items such as radios, televisions, tape recorders, sewing machines, washing machines, refrigerators, printed matter, clothing, and furniture.
* The continuation of a long-term cooperative program with other Comecon members to develop new ideas for streamlining the Soviet machine-building industry.
Energy:
* Plans for increasing production of primary energy by 3.6% per year, compared with 2.6% per year in the previous Pyatiletka, based largely on major growth in nuclear power capacity, whose capacity in 1990 was expected to be 1.5 times its 1985 level (which would result in nuclear power displacing hydroelectric to become the second largest electricity source in the Soviet Union, at 21% of the national power balance). Additionally, plans called for the construction of ninety new hydroelectric stations in the period between 1990 and 2000.
* A plan to connect the Unified Electrical Power System with the Central Asian Power System by 1990, bringing 95% of the country's power production into a single distribution network.
Agriculture & Forestry:
* Plans to raise agricultural production by the following percentages over the average of the previous Pyatiletka by 1990: Grain by 2.7%; potatoes by 2.5%; sugar beets by 3.9%; vegetables by 6.8%; fruits, berries and grapes by 11.2%; meat by 18.7%; milk by 4.2%; eggs by 10.2%; raw cotton by 3.6%.
* Plans for the wider use of contract brigades in agricultural production, based on brigades of ten to thirty farm workers who managed a piece of land leased by the kolkhoz or sovkhoz under terms giving them responsibility for the entire production cycle, with the workers receiving a predetermined price for the contracted amount plus generous bonuses for any excess production.
* Plans to raise production of pulp by 15-18%, paper by 11-15%, and fiberboard by 17-20%.
Other:
* The 12th Pyatiletka placed special attention and focus on individual productivity and discipline in the workplace, and called for making demotion or dismissal of corrupt or inefficient workers and managers easier.
* The 12th Pyatiletka also placed special attention and focus on the conservation of raw materials, the efficient use of fuels, energy, raw materials, metal, and other materials, and focused on the reduction of waste in production, transportation and storage.
* Plans to furnish high schools with at least 500,000 computers by 1990, and projecting that 5,000,000 computers would be distributed to schools by the year 2000. A 1985 law also required all ninth and tenth graders to learn computer fundamentals.
* The targets of the plan posited an average growth rate in national income of 4% yearly, based mainly on increases in labour productivity, with national income projected to double by the year 2000 and labour productivity growing by 6.5-7.4% per year in the 1990s. The overall ratio of expenditure on material inputs and energy to national income was set to decrease by 4-5% in the plan period. Projected modernization of the workplace would release 20 million people from unskilled work by the year 2000.
Sources:
http://www.guma.oglib.ru/bgl/2431.html
*- Materials from the 27th Congress of the CPSU, including the document “Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period to the Year 2000”
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12708.html
*- A Western summation of the Five Year Plan’s goals.
With an economy organized around five-year plans, the 12th (1986-1990) gives some indications of the trajectory the Soviets wanted take with a traditional conservative regime in place. The 12th Pyatiletka was conceptualized and drafted while Chernenko was Gen-Sec but approved by Gorbachev shortly after he came into office, which explains why the plan is so radically different from the reforms that were actually implemented in that period.
In the document*Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period to the Year 2000, the principal tasks of the Twelfth Five Year Plan were declared to be "to enhance the pace and efficiency of economic development by accelerating scientific and technical progress, retooling and adapting production, intensively using existing production potential, and improving the managerial system and accounting mechanism, and, on this basis, to further raise the standard of living of the Soviet people."
Industrial/Construction:
* Plans for an 80% increase in investment over the previous Pyatiletka in the sectors producing machine tools, electrical equipment, chemicals, and agricultural machinery, which was set to increase machine-building output by 40-45% during the five year period.
* Plans for a 23% rise in capital investment, with roughly half of those funds to be spent on retooling of existing capacity, concurrently with an acceleration in the retirement of obsolete equipment.
* Plans for a near doubling of the contribution of synthetic resins and plastics to the construction industry by the year 2000, which could replace metals used in machinery, construction materials, engines, and pipe.
* Plans for the improvement in availability, quality and service life of individual components and spare parts for machinery in order to reduce downtime.
* Plans for an increase in the use of computer program control mechanization and automation in assembly lines, which would reduce the use of unskilled labor and increase speed and precision of production.
* A call for increased efficiency in R&D procedures and processes in order to shorten the time between research breakthroughs and their industrial application, based on new organizational structures which would combine elements of research, design and production facilities into one unit.
* Plans for locating and constructing new industries which require high energy inputs in locations close to energy sources (i.e. Siberia), and simultaneously increasing the number of workplaces in regions with the requisite manpower resources (i.e. Central Asia) by focusing on services, light industry, and other sectors requiring fewer raw materials.
* Plans for special focus on the development of infrastructure in Siberia and the Soviet Far East.
* Plans for a 240% increase in the production of computers during the period 1986-1990.
* Plans for a 5.4% rise in the production of nonfood consumer goods and a 5.4-7% rise in consumer services through the period. Consumer goods targeted included light industry items such as radios, televisions, tape recorders, sewing machines, washing machines, refrigerators, printed matter, clothing, and furniture.
* The continuation of a long-term cooperative program with other Comecon members to develop new ideas for streamlining the Soviet machine-building industry.
Energy:
* Plans for increasing production of primary energy by 3.6% per year, compared with 2.6% per year in the previous Pyatiletka, based largely on major growth in nuclear power capacity, whose capacity in 1990 was expected to be 1.5 times its 1985 level (which would result in nuclear power displacing hydroelectric to become the second largest electricity source in the Soviet Union, at 21% of the national power balance). Additionally, plans called for the construction of ninety new hydroelectric stations in the period between 1990 and 2000.
* A plan to connect the Unified Electrical Power System with the Central Asian Power System by 1990, bringing 95% of the country's power production into a single distribution network.
Agriculture & Forestry:
* Plans to raise agricultural production by the following percentages over the average of the previous Pyatiletka by 1990: Grain by 2.7%; potatoes by 2.5%; sugar beets by 3.9%; vegetables by 6.8%; fruits, berries and grapes by 11.2%; meat by 18.7%; milk by 4.2%; eggs by 10.2%; raw cotton by 3.6%.
* Plans for the wider use of contract brigades in agricultural production, based on brigades of ten to thirty farm workers who managed a piece of land leased by the kolkhoz or sovkhoz under terms giving them responsibility for the entire production cycle, with the workers receiving a predetermined price for the contracted amount plus generous bonuses for any excess production.
* Plans to raise production of pulp by 15-18%, paper by 11-15%, and fiberboard by 17-20%.
Other:
* The 12th Pyatiletka placed special attention and focus on individual productivity and discipline in the workplace, and called for making demotion or dismissal of corrupt or inefficient workers and managers easier.
* The 12th Pyatiletka also placed special attention and focus on the conservation of raw materials, the efficient use of fuels, energy, raw materials, metal, and other materials, and focused on the reduction of waste in production, transportation and storage.
* Plans to furnish high schools with at least 500,000 computers by 1990, and projecting that 5,000,000 computers would be distributed to schools by the year 2000. A 1985 law also required all ninth and tenth graders to learn computer fundamentals.
* The targets of the plan posited an average growth rate in national income of 4% yearly, based mainly on increases in labour productivity, with national income projected to double by the year 2000 and labour productivity growing by 6.5-7.4% per year in the 1990s. The overall ratio of expenditure on material inputs and energy to national income was set to decrease by 4-5% in the plan period. Projected modernization of the workplace would release 20 million people from unskilled work by the year 2000.
Sources:
http://www.guma.oglib.ru/bgl/2431.html
*- Materials from the 27th Congress of the CPSU, including the document “Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period to the Year 2000”
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12708.html
*- A Western summation of the Five Year Plan’s goals.
RousseauX
Donor
Indefinitely, as long as the political elite in the East Bloc remain confident in their own ability to govern the East Bloc stays afloat.
Regimes are always at their weakests when reforms are attempted, a regime which refuses to regime are seldom vulnerable to revolution.
life in it might get very unpleasant though (see North Korea), though even assuming complete economic stagnation the Soviet Union had a reasoanbly high GDP per capita in the 80s so life isn't going to get -that- bad.
Last edited:
Sabot Cat
Banned
Perhaps someone to the left of Gorbachev makes the USSR a socialist market economy, following the Yugoslav model? That should help them out a little.
RousseauX
Donor
The Yugoslav model faced pretty much the exact same problems as the rest of the Soviet Bloc so there is that.