35. Campaign of 1709
Interlude:
In March 1709 Philipp Ludwig Wenzel von Sinzendorf, Obersthofkanzler of the Hapsburg Empire sent an ambassador to Moscow with an offer of mediation in the ongoing war. Taking into an account the Austrian behavior at Karlowitz, Peter was not enthusiastic to get them involved and then some details of their intended position became known: return of the Crimea and other Russian conquest to the Ottomans. Which was the last nail in a coffin. An ambassador was allowed a ceremonial audience with the Tsar (kissing the hand and questions regarding the Emperor’s and Tsar’s health) but everything else had to be discussed with Prince Vasily Golityn who politely came with a counter-offer of the Russian mediation in the Hapsburg conflict with the King of France. Demagoguery regarding the Russian recognition as an “European state” fall on the deaf ears. Golitsyn declared that Russia is already recognized as such by everyone it cares about and the Hapsburgs are not on that list. Taking into an account an absence of any realistic leverages, the Austrians had to drop the whole thing (but 3,000,000 piasters never had been returned). 😜
By May 23 1709 a part of the Moldavian army crossed the Danube at Fetesti - Cernavoda and joined the former Bessarabian Army which now became Bauer’s corps of Moldavian army. The crossing, guarded by the Danube flotilla was quite uneventful because most of the “meaningful” Ottoman river craft (cannon boats) had been captured at Braila leaving Vizier mostly with the small rowing boats. All together, on the right bank of the Danube Sheremetev had approximately 50,000 with approximately 15,000 more on the left bank.
At that time, according to the data obtained from the captured Turks, the enemy’s forces had been allocated the following way: in and around Silistra - 35,000; in Ruse - 15,000; in Varna - 6,000 and in Bazardjik [1] - 20,000 under command of Numan Pasha and Vizier was in Shumen with 10,000.
Following the “rules of war” [2], Sheremetev would have to start with attacking a well-fortified Silistra, simultaneously guardingooo himself from the Ottoman attacks coming from Ruse and/or Bazardjik. Which would most probably result in an expensive and very bloody mess with the losses forcing him, even in the case of success at Silistra, to get back to the left bank of the Danube simply because he would not have enough forces to continue his offensive [3]. So, instead of trying to break a wall with his head, he opted for a principle: “if the enemy occupies a very strong position, take care that he will remain in it” [4]: as long as the Ottomans are sticking to their position at Silistra, he is free to destroy their forces at Bazardjik, Varna and Shumen. If they get out of Silistra, then on the open they are doomed. The Russian troops on the right bank of the Danube will force them not to leave Ruse because if they do, it will be easily taken (or, as an option, the corps on the right bank will simply cross the Danube upriver forcing the garrison to turn back).
The Ottomans did not disappoint him: when the Army of Moldavia marched to cut communication between Silistra and Bazardjik, its vanguard under general Weisman intercepted Numan Pasha who made camp near Kaynardzha village, approximately 20 km from Silistra.
Weisman had approximately 5,600 troops with 45 guns and Numan Pasha up to 20,000. In what by now became a standard behavior, Weisman sent the light troops to keep the Ottoman cavalry off, marched his vanguard for 1.5km through a narrow defile and entered an open place in front of the Ottoman camp after which arranged his infantry into a square and took position on a high ground opposite to the enemy’s camp. The Ottoman artillery opened fire from a distance of 2km, which was pretty much useless. The main Russian force arrived and, due to the narrowness of a valley, arranged a square with a narrow front and stretched in depth. Cavalry remained in the marching columns. The troops had been advancing in that order when the Ottomans launched a counter-attack. Their cavalry on the left broke the Russian cavalry which was partially dispersed and partially retreated behind the vanguard square. The following charges of the Ottoman cavalry against vanguard square had been repelled. At the same time the Ottoman infantry attacked the Russian main square but had been beaten off by the artillery firing grapeshot and infantry fire. After this the Ottoman infantry launched a second attack in its usual mob-like style and had been beaten off again. At that point Weisman had been killed but, after two failed attacks the Ottomans had been dispirited and counter-attack of the Russian cavalry, which by that time reformed behind the right flank, won the day. Infantry charged with the bayonets and the Ottomans run. Being extremely pissed off by the death of their popular commander, the Russians were not taking prisoners killing more than 5,000 with a loss of 19 killed and 161 wounded [5].
Vizier found himself forced to advance from Shumen to protect Varna. With the leftovers of the Numan Pasha’s army he had up to 20,000 [6] and called for 3,000 more from Varna garrison. These forces had been placed under command of Reis Effendi [7] Hadji Abdul Rezak. Sheremetev sent against him a corps of 17,000 under command of Michael Golitsyn. The battle itself was interesting only by the geographic obstacles (forest and narrow defile) through which the Russian troops had to pass. After this it was business as usual: the battalion squares in the first line with the columns in a reserve and artillery at the front. When, after 3 hours of shooting, the Ottoman fire weakened, Golitsyn ordered his infantry to advance but the Ottomans did not oblige waiting for the bayonet charge and fled to Shumla leaving artillery and the camp. The Ottoman losses were rather small, 500 killed and 100 taken prisoners but, after Shumla was surrounded, it became obvious to the Ottomans that the further resistance is hopeless.
Vizier asked for the armistice and sent his representatives to Kaynardzha for signing the peace. Sheremetev gave him 5 days for the discussion after which he was going to continue the offensive. On July 21 peace was signed.
The main conditions were:
The Ottoman Empire recognized loss of the Crimea and the borders by the Dniester and Kuban rivers.
Russia got a right to hold a fleet on the Black Sea with a right of a free passage through the Straits.
Russian merchant ships and the merchants were getting the same rights as the French and British.
The Ottoman Empire had to pay Russia 7.5 millions piasters of the war contribution.
Russia would not prevent the Crimean and Nogay Tatars from moving into the Ottoman territories and the Ottoman Empire would permit the same to its Christian subjects.
In the future communications the Ottomans will address a Tsar as “Padishah” [8].
The Ottomans are getting a preferable treatment in purchasing salt from the Crimea.
There was nothing about the Russian protectorate over the parts of the Ottoman territories or any other form of intervention into their internal affairs.
________________
[1] Now Dobrich (on the map)
[2] Some kind of a delusion popular at that time. For example, Louis XIV warned Marshal Catinat that Prince Eugene is a dangerous opponent because he is not following the “rules of war”.
[3] Which is what Rumyantsev did during his first offensive in 1773, with the results outlined above.
[4] Stolen from Pratchett 😂
[5] At least this was officially reported.
[6] When you are reading description of the war of 1768-74, the first impression is that the Ottoman soldiers were not just growing on the trees but that the new “fruits” were getting ripe few times per year. The Numan Pasha had 20,000 but when it came to the battle, the number grew to 30,000. Vizier had 10,000 at Shumla but in a battle of Kozludzha, to quote wiki, “The Ottoman forces are estimated at about 40,000” with the Russian forces being only 8,000. To the credit of the Russian wiki, they had a decency to make the Russian 24,000 but both are confused regarding a general in charge: Suvorov, of course, more famous but Kamensky was in charge as one with a greater seniority in promotion (Potemkin issued a specific order on this subject). Being very free with the Ottoman numbers was a modus operandi of both Western and Russian generals and historians. 😂
[7] Why would a bureaucrat in charge of the foreign affairs be placed at the head of an army is beyond my understanding.
[8] Creating an opening to the future assumption of the imperial title.
Interlude:
In March 1709 Philipp Ludwig Wenzel von Sinzendorf, Obersthofkanzler of the Hapsburg Empire sent an ambassador to Moscow with an offer of mediation in the ongoing war. Taking into an account the Austrian behavior at Karlowitz, Peter was not enthusiastic to get them involved and then some details of their intended position became known: return of the Crimea and other Russian conquest to the Ottomans. Which was the last nail in a coffin. An ambassador was allowed a ceremonial audience with the Tsar (kissing the hand and questions regarding the Emperor’s and Tsar’s health) but everything else had to be discussed with Prince Vasily Golityn who politely came with a counter-offer of the Russian mediation in the Hapsburg conflict with the King of France. Demagoguery regarding the Russian recognition as an “European state” fall on the deaf ears. Golitsyn declared that Russia is already recognized as such by everyone it cares about and the Hapsburgs are not on that list. Taking into an account an absence of any realistic leverages, the Austrians had to drop the whole thing (but 3,000,000 piasters never had been returned). 😜
By May 23 1709 a part of the Moldavian army crossed the Danube at Fetesti - Cernavoda and joined the former Bessarabian Army which now became Bauer’s corps of Moldavian army. The crossing, guarded by the Danube flotilla was quite uneventful because most of the “meaningful” Ottoman river craft (cannon boats) had been captured at Braila leaving Vizier mostly with the small rowing boats. All together, on the right bank of the Danube Sheremetev had approximately 50,000 with approximately 15,000 more on the left bank.
At that time, according to the data obtained from the captured Turks, the enemy’s forces had been allocated the following way: in and around Silistra - 35,000; in Ruse - 15,000; in Varna - 6,000 and in Bazardjik [1] - 20,000 under command of Numan Pasha and Vizier was in Shumen with 10,000.
Following the “rules of war” [2], Sheremetev would have to start with attacking a well-fortified Silistra, simultaneously guardingooo himself from the Ottoman attacks coming from Ruse and/or Bazardjik. Which would most probably result in an expensive and very bloody mess with the losses forcing him, even in the case of success at Silistra, to get back to the left bank of the Danube simply because he would not have enough forces to continue his offensive [3]. So, instead of trying to break a wall with his head, he opted for a principle: “if the enemy occupies a very strong position, take care that he will remain in it” [4]: as long as the Ottomans are sticking to their position at Silistra, he is free to destroy their forces at Bazardjik, Varna and Shumen. If they get out of Silistra, then on the open they are doomed. The Russian troops on the right bank of the Danube will force them not to leave Ruse because if they do, it will be easily taken (or, as an option, the corps on the right bank will simply cross the Danube upriver forcing the garrison to turn back).
The Ottomans did not disappoint him: when the Army of Moldavia marched to cut communication between Silistra and Bazardjik, its vanguard under general Weisman intercepted Numan Pasha who made camp near Kaynardzha village, approximately 20 km from Silistra.
Weisman had approximately 5,600 troops with 45 guns and Numan Pasha up to 20,000. In what by now became a standard behavior, Weisman sent the light troops to keep the Ottoman cavalry off, marched his vanguard for 1.5km through a narrow defile and entered an open place in front of the Ottoman camp after which arranged his infantry into a square and took position on a high ground opposite to the enemy’s camp. The Ottoman artillery opened fire from a distance of 2km, which was pretty much useless. The main Russian force arrived and, due to the narrowness of a valley, arranged a square with a narrow front and stretched in depth. Cavalry remained in the marching columns. The troops had been advancing in that order when the Ottomans launched a counter-attack. Their cavalry on the left broke the Russian cavalry which was partially dispersed and partially retreated behind the vanguard square. The following charges of the Ottoman cavalry against vanguard square had been repelled. At the same time the Ottoman infantry attacked the Russian main square but had been beaten off by the artillery firing grapeshot and infantry fire. After this the Ottoman infantry launched a second attack in its usual mob-like style and had been beaten off again. At that point Weisman had been killed but, after two failed attacks the Ottomans had been dispirited and counter-attack of the Russian cavalry, which by that time reformed behind the right flank, won the day. Infantry charged with the bayonets and the Ottomans run. Being extremely pissed off by the death of their popular commander, the Russians were not taking prisoners killing more than 5,000 with a loss of 19 killed and 161 wounded [5].
Vizier found himself forced to advance from Shumen to protect Varna. With the leftovers of the Numan Pasha’s army he had up to 20,000 [6] and called for 3,000 more from Varna garrison. These forces had been placed under command of Reis Effendi [7] Hadji Abdul Rezak. Sheremetev sent against him a corps of 17,000 under command of Michael Golitsyn. The battle itself was interesting only by the geographic obstacles (forest and narrow defile) through which the Russian troops had to pass. After this it was business as usual: the battalion squares in the first line with the columns in a reserve and artillery at the front. When, after 3 hours of shooting, the Ottoman fire weakened, Golitsyn ordered his infantry to advance but the Ottomans did not oblige waiting for the bayonet charge and fled to Shumla leaving artillery and the camp. The Ottoman losses were rather small, 500 killed and 100 taken prisoners but, after Shumla was surrounded, it became obvious to the Ottomans that the further resistance is hopeless.
Vizier asked for the armistice and sent his representatives to Kaynardzha for signing the peace. Sheremetev gave him 5 days for the discussion after which he was going to continue the offensive. On July 21 peace was signed.
The main conditions were:
The Ottoman Empire recognized loss of the Crimea and the borders by the Dniester and Kuban rivers.
Russia got a right to hold a fleet on the Black Sea with a right of a free passage through the Straits.
Russian merchant ships and the merchants were getting the same rights as the French and British.
The Ottoman Empire had to pay Russia 7.5 millions piasters of the war contribution.
Russia would not prevent the Crimean and Nogay Tatars from moving into the Ottoman territories and the Ottoman Empire would permit the same to its Christian subjects.
In the future communications the Ottomans will address a Tsar as “Padishah” [8].
The Ottomans are getting a preferable treatment in purchasing salt from the Crimea.
There was nothing about the Russian protectorate over the parts of the Ottoman territories or any other form of intervention into their internal affairs.
________________
[1] Now Dobrich (on the map)
[2] Some kind of a delusion popular at that time. For example, Louis XIV warned Marshal Catinat that Prince Eugene is a dangerous opponent because he is not following the “rules of war”.
[3] Which is what Rumyantsev did during his first offensive in 1773, with the results outlined above.
[4] Stolen from Pratchett 😂
[5] At least this was officially reported.
[6] When you are reading description of the war of 1768-74, the first impression is that the Ottoman soldiers were not just growing on the trees but that the new “fruits” were getting ripe few times per year. The Numan Pasha had 20,000 but when it came to the battle, the number grew to 30,000. Vizier had 10,000 at Shumla but in a battle of Kozludzha, to quote wiki, “The Ottoman forces are estimated at about 40,000” with the Russian forces being only 8,000. To the credit of the Russian wiki, they had a decency to make the Russian 24,000 but both are confused regarding a general in charge: Suvorov, of course, more famous but Kamensky was in charge as one with a greater seniority in promotion (Potemkin issued a specific order on this subject). Being very free with the Ottoman numbers was a modus operandi of both Western and Russian generals and historians. 😂
[7] Why would a bureaucrat in charge of the foreign affairs be placed at the head of an army is beyond my understanding.
[8] Creating an opening to the future assumption of the imperial title.
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