33. Campaign of 1708 (cont)
[To make understanding of what is where easier, here is a link to this map of Romania
https://ezilon.com/maps/images/europe/physical-map-of-Romania.gif ]
In the early May of 1708 a brand new Grand Vizier [1] accompanied by a brand new Khan [2] at the head of a brand new army was crossing the Danube into Walachia at Zimnicea. To provide loyalty of the local population, the taxes had been cancelled for 5 years. His plan was to march to Bucharest and from there to the North via Buzau and Focsani, cross Prut at Ryabaya Mogila [3] and then attack Sheremetev’s army stretched from Bender to Khatin.
A separate corps, should be sent Southward to block (and try to destroy) Menshikov’s army which was spread on both sides of the low Danube garrisoning Isaccea, Ismail, Kiliya and Tulcha and patrolling the coast all the way to the Dniestrovskyy Lyman.
The plan was solid and quite realistic providing the enemy is going to cooperate by staying still. Even better if he is going to implement a cordon system spreading his forces over each and every village and town along the front and leaving them here expecting that the attacking opponent is going to do the same. In other words, there was more than one scenario in which this plan was doomed to be successful but enemy’s cooperation was a key element for the success. 😜
The Moldavian army
Crossing the Prut happened in the late June without problems but within few days the Tatar-Ottoman a camp of the vanguard led by the Khan Mehmed Giray (approximately 75,000 including 15, 000 Ottomans) had been attacked by the Russian force of 38,000 and, under the threat of being surrounded, was forced to retreat South to the Lagra River. The event itself was rather insignificant and the losses on both sides negligible (Mehmed Giray lost 400, the Russians - 46) but the important thing was in the tactical details. Instead of a traditional solid line, Sheremetev had been attacking in the battalion squares, dropped usage of the chevaux de frise and used artillery for protecting his infantry against the Tatar cavalry. Usage of the numerous squares (instead of a single army-wide formation) allowed a greater freedom of a maneuver threatening enemy’s encirclement [4].
Mehmed Giray positioned his troops behind the Lagra River with its right flank, unprotected by the river, being fortified by the earthworks. Few thousands of his troops tried twice to attack the approaching enemy but had been repelled. On July 7th the Russian came the camp and launched the attack. The main force was going against the Khan’s right flank with detachment under command of Michael Golitsyn should be demonstrating against the left flank. After the main force took the earthworks by storm, Golitsyn led hos troops across the Larga forcing the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortifications and the camp. The Tatar cavalry tried to cover the retreat but had been broken by the Russian heavy cavalry. The Russians captured 33 Turkish guns and the whole camp. The Ottoman losses amounted to 1,000 killed and 2,000 POWs while the Russian were 29 killed and 61 wounded. To be fair, in both battles the Russian had an overwhelming advantage in artillery: 160 against 33 [5].
At the news of the Tatar defeat at the the Vizier decided to act offensively. The corps sent to block Menshikov was recalled to the main army and joined it at Vulkanesty and the forces of Mehmed Giray were placed nearby ready to attack the Russian supply train coming to the army. In total Vizier had up to 120,000 troops (out of which up to 70,000 cavalry) and 140 artillery pieces.
To guarantee safety of the coming supply train and his army’s rear Sheremetev had to detach more than 6,000 to secure this direction. As a result, immediately for the battle he had approximately 20,000 infantry, 5,000 regular and irregular cavalry, 144 guns and only 2-4 days worth of the food. It would be prudent to retreat toward the coming supply train and to wait for Vizier’s attack in a chosen position. However, the dominating principle was “not to tolerate the enemy’s presence without attacking him”.
The advanced Ottoman army made its camp within 7km from the Russians on the left bank the Kagul river. After the reconnaissance, the Vizier formulated the plan of attack: imitating attack on the Russian center, attack the left flank with the main force. At the sound of the artillery fire the Khan had to cross the Salcha river and attack the Russians at the rear. The Ottoman attack was planned on July 21th.
At 1AM of the 21st the Russians quietly left their position and marched toward the Ottoman camp in the square formations with artillery at the front. When the Ottomans saw them Vizier ordered his cavalry to attack the whole Russian front [7]. The cavalry charged but was repulsed by the Russian artillery. When attack on the center failed, the Ottoman cavalry shifted to attack the Russian right flank and, using a hollow between two columns, surrounded them. Part of the cavalry, using another hollow attacked another Russian square at the rear. Sheremetev sent reserves to cut their retreat route and the Ottomans had to flee to their retrenchment under the grapeshots. The rest of the Ottoman cavalry followed the suit and one of the Russian columns attacked and took a battery of 25 guns and then retrenchment with 93 guns.
By 8AM the Russians marched toward the main retrenchment of the Ottoman camp. 10,000 Janissary rushed out of the camp, attacked one of the squares and broke into it. Some soldiers panicked but this did not last for long: Russian battery opened fire at the Janissary and simultaneously they had been attacked on two sides by the Russian cavalry and on the third by a jager battalion sent from the column which entered the retrenchment. A grenadier regiment from a neighbor column launched a bayonet charge and the Janissary fled, pursued by the cavalry. The flank columns had been approaching from the rear and by 9AM the Ottomans fled. Halil Pasha, sword in hand, tried to stop his troops but to no avail.
Russian infantry was exhausted and could chase the fleeing enemy for more than 5km after which a further chase had been done by the cavalry. The next day pursuit continued and on 23rd the Russians reached the Ottoman crossing at the point where the Prut flows into the Danube. The Ottomans had more than 300 boats but the crossing was chaotic and Russian attack turned it into a disaster with the loss of all baggage train and 30 guns.
Russian trophies amounted to 140 artillery pieces and all Ottoman baggage train [8]. Ottoman estimated losses amounted to approximately 20,000.
Sheremetev got St. George 1st class (the 1st awarded) and also became the 1st Russian count [9].
The Bessarabian Army
To avoid being annihilated piecemeal by the Ottomans, Menshikov arranged rendezvous of his troops at Akkerman leaving the garrisons only in the well-fortified and supplies Isaccea and Ismail thus securing the Danube crossings. At the news of the Sheremetev’s victories he led his, finally assembled army, back, crossed the Danube at Isaccea and marched South along the right bank of the Danube toward the port of Constanta, which he captured in the early August providing an important supply terminal for the future operations.
Menshikov got St. George of the 2nd class for capturing Constanta.
The naval affairs
Battle at the Kerch Strait
The Ottoman fleet under its new Kapudan Pasha sailed out of the Bosphorus toward the Ottoman fortress Anapa when it took the troops for landing in the Crimea. The Ottoman fleet had 10 ships of the line, 8 frigates and 36 transport ships.
On July 8th the Black Sea fleet under command of the rear-admiral Feodor Ushakov (10 ships of the line, 6 frigates and 16 small ships) took position at the Kerch Strait and around 9:30AM saw the approaching enemy. At 12PM the Ottomans opened fire from a ling distance. Ushakov took 6 frigates out if his battle line [10] and formed a “reserve corps”. Approximately at 3PM change of a wind allowed Ushakov to close at the the grapeshot distance of less than 100 meters, which allowed the “reserve corp” to advance and putvthe Ottomans between the two fires. At 16PM the Ottomans started turning under the Russian fire, suffering the considerable losses among the landing troops they had been carrying, and fled using their speed advantage. The Ottomans lost a single small ship but suffered enough losses to abort planned landing in the Crimea. They sailed to Varna to wait for the reinforcements.
Battle of Tendra
On September 5 Ushakov’s fleet of 10 ships of the line, 6 frigates and small craft sailed from Balaklava to Kherson. At 6AM on 8 September it encountered the Ottoman fleet of 14 battleships, 8 frigates and 23 small craft at anchor near Tendra. As the Ottomans formed into a battle line, the Russian fleet sailed toward the tail end of the Ottoman line in 3 parallel lines, forming into one line as they did so. The Ottoman admiral,
Hussein Pasha, seeing his tail threatened, turned north and came back parallel to the Russians, who followed suit so the two fleets ended up on paralleled tracks, heading north-east. This was completed by about 2 p.m.. Ushakov ordered 3 frigates to the off-battle side of the van to guard against an Ottoman doubling of the Russian line, leaving 13 ships of 710 guns in his line, opposed to 14 with 900 guns. Ushakov then turned toward the Ottoman ships and firing began at about 3 p.m.. By 6PM the Ottomans were in a full retreat. A higher speed allowed them to get away though, and soon after 8 p.m. firing ceased and the Russians anchored. The next day, 2 damaged Ottoman ships, the Kapitana (Vice Admiral's ship) and Melike Bahri were seen close by, and the Russians attacked. Melike Bahri surrendered without resistance, but the "Kapitana" put up a stout resistance even after it was fully surrounded. Ushakov in “Rozhdestvo Christovo” shot away all her masts and placed his ship across her bows, and at 3 p.m. she surrendered. Unfortunately she was seen to be on fire, and blew up after only 20 men, including Said Bey and her captain, had been taken off. Only 101 men were saved out of 800 on board. Russian privateers later brought in 3 small craft.
On their way to the Bosphorus one more Ottoman ship of the line sunk due to the received damage.
Ushakov’s squadron sailed to Khadjibey [11].
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[1] Ivazzade Halil Pasha, if you don’t mind. If you do, substitute with a name of one who was holding this position in OTL 1708. Would not make too much difference because he is not going to keep this office for too long: Sultan Ahmed III was a firm believer in a principle “the cadres are all important” which, in his case probably sounded as “only the cadres are important”. Definition of the “cadres” was limited to those in the top positions.
[2] Mehmed Giray finally got promoted. Not that this promotion was going to result in any miracles.
[3] A popular place from crossing the Prut. Seems to be approximately at the level of Bender.
[4] Sorry, no schemas of this and the following battles: the maps have the “wrong” names and dates. 😂
[5] Based upon the experience of previous year campaign, a number of the field artillery was considerably increased: Sheremetev got 3 additional brigades of the field artillery, which almost doubled what he had previously.
[6] Which were falling into two major categories: (a) the huge cannons firing the stone balls of 50-70kg and (b) the tiny pieces shooting the balls of 1/2 or 1/4 pound.
[7] Which was, more or less the death warrant to his plan.
[8] Vizier’s coffers had been looted by the Cossacks before the commanders could take measures 😉
[9] Russia did not have this (or any other, except for “knyaz”) title so usually Peter had to appeal to the HRE Emperor for issue such a patent. Now, he decided to become completely independent in this area.
[10] On a long distance their small caliber guns were inefficient.
[11] Location of the modern Odessa.