232. Things are getting hot
«…гладко было на бумаге, да забыли про овраги…»
Лев Толстой [1]
“Die erste Kolonne marschiert, die zweite Kolonne marschiert...”
Weyrother [2]
“It's the same thing in love and war: the fortress negotiating is half taken.”
Margaret of Navarre Valois
“Report. Developing the offensive, we burned several more villages. The surviving residents gave our troops an enthusiastic meeting.”
Karel Čapek
Galicia.
The Polish army marching into Galicia did not expect major problems and with a good reasons (or at least
seemingly good reasons):
- The local nobility was predominantly Polish and disliked the Austrians who were consistently working on germanization of the region.
- Galicia was, for all practical purposes, pretty much cut off from the Austrian lands by rebelling Hungary and hardly could count upon the reinforcements.
- In the big cities, especially Lemberg, there was a noticeable Polish pro-reform/anti-germanization movement which, with a high probability, will side with the coming Polish army. In Lemberg there was even some kind of a Polish National Guard, unfortunately, pretty much unarmed and lacking any military training.
Both these considerations were, of course, correct but ignored few inconvenient facts:
- In 1846 there was a massive uprising of the peasants in Western (predominantly Polish) Galicia. Galician peasants who rebelled against the Polish landowners actually turned out to be allies of the Austrian government. The Galician uprising began on February 19, 1846. Armed bands of peasants ravaged and destroyed more than 500 estates within a few weeks of February-March 1846 (in the Tarnów area, more than 90% of the estates were destroyed). Killed, often in the most cruel way, from 1,200 to 3,000 people, almost exclusively representatives of the Polish gentry, officials, Catholic priests. Allegedly, the Austrians had been paying premiums per head. Of course, after enough of a destruction had been done, the Austrians suppressed the uprising but the point was that these peasants were not expecting anything good from the coming liberators.
- The peasants of the Eastern Galicia were predominantly not Polish and tended to consider they Polish landowners as the oppressors while the Austrian authorities, being oppressors of the oppressors, were viewed more positively.
- While there was only limited Austrian military presence in Galicia, the Austrian government took care about strongly fortifying two strategically important points, Lemberg (Lwov, Lviv) and Przemyśl.
Lemberg. The citadel of Lemberg was built in 1842-1844 and is a structure consisting of four round towers and a V-shaped barracks with two square towers at the edges. The diameter of the northern towers is 36 meters, the smaller southern ones - 18 meters. Below is the original construction plan. The citadel is located on the hill, which was formed by three small mountains - Mount Shembek (Vronovsky), Mount Poznanskaya (Pelchinskaya) and Zhebratskaya (Kalich, that is, beggar) mountain. Artillery placed on the heights was easily controlling the city and the steep slopes defended the hills from attacks on three sides. A pond below would serve as a source of water for the garrison. The approaches to the citadel were strengthened by three trench systems at a distance of 1.3 km from the center of the citadel.
Politically, when the revolutions of 1848 started, on March 19 a mass demonstration in support of the revolution was held in Lemberg, during which a program of the national movement of Galicia was adopted, designed in the form of an address to Emperor Ferdinand I. Among the requirements of this program were the abolition of serfdom and the elimination of serfdom, the autonomy of Galicia and the introduction of the Polish language in schools and public administration, the removal of foreign officials, the proclamation of democratic freedoms, the introduction of equality of citizens before the law and the reorganization of the provincial Sejm. The address was signed by about 12 thousand residents of Lemberg, which accounted for almost a sixth of the total population of the city. Governor of Galicia Franz Varthausen Stadium made concessions to revolutionaries, authorizing the formation of the National Guard and removing hated officials from the government. On March 21, when the governor tried to ban meetings in Lemberg, an uprising broke out but was speedily suppressed.
So the Polish army could expect a warm greeting from the Polish part of the city population but most probably its Jewish population (approximately a quarter of the city population) would be less excited and the German population even less so. Dealing with the citadel was going to be a separate issue unless the Austrian garrison decided to capitulate.
Przemyśl. Located on the San river, the city was considered something of the “gates” between Western and Eastern Galicia. Initial plans for the construction of 41 earth fortifications were developed at the beginning of the XIX century and by 1830 19 of the 41 initially planned earth fortifications were completed, another nine were under construction the barracks, weapons depots and access roads were already built. By 1849 the temporary earth defense fortifications have been converted into solid long-term brick fortifications. A garrison consisting of five battalions of infantry, artillery and sappers was located in the fortress but when hostilities started it was strengthened by the Austrian troops retreating under the fortress’ protection from the less secure places of the Western Galicia raising the defenders numbers to at least 15,000.
Campaign of the Polish army started along the lines of expected best-case scenario. Under the leadership of King Joseph II (with general Chlopicki as an advisor) the troops entered Western Galicia and had been proceeding in pretty much a triumph march from one town to another being greeted and feted by the cheering population and the landowners. The supply problems were, so far, rather minor even if there already was a growing need for the requisitions because the already dirt poor peasants sometimes were reluctant to provide their liberators with the necessities. With almost complete absence of the Austrian resistance the main obstacle to the speedy march were, so far, celebrations on the way and a need to make arrangements for a new administration, meet delegations, confirm the existing privileges and grant the new ones, etc. So only in the late May of 1849 the army reached Przemyśl. The garrison rejected capitulation offer and the military council was assembled to discuss the options. Basically, there were two:
- Cross the San river either on the South at Sanok or on the North at Jaroslaw and proceed eastward leaving a blockade force at Przemyśl.
- To lay siege on Przemyśl, take it and after that advance eastward with no threats at the rear.
A prevailing wisdom coming from the geriatric Chlopicki and supported by a majority was that leaving a major fortress with a powerful garrison in a rear is just too risky. The army was assembled fast with the reserves practically not being mobilized and now, with a need to leave garrisons in the Western Galicia, out of the initial 35,000 less than 30,000 had been available. A blockade force has to be big enough to securely protect both sides of the river, which means that it should be at least 15 - 20,000 and this would leave only 10 - 15,000 for the future campaign, which is extremely risky. Ignoring the fortress altogether also is a risky idea because its garrison will be free to act on the Polish communications cutting supply line and forcing to re-orient the whole logistics to the sector between the San and Bug or to make the arrangements with the Russians regarding supplies from Volhynia and Podolia which, even with the Russian Empire being so far friendly neutral, had its own problems.
So the prudent decision seems to be to start the siege. This will give time to complete mobilization of the Polish reserves (and probably to raise some troops in the Western Galicia as well) and to bring a heavy siege train from Warsaw. By that time the garrison maybe starved into the submission or, if not, after arrival of the heavy artillery, surrender was going to be just a matter of a regular siege. In a meantime, some cavalry detachments can be sent to the East of the San River to raise enthusiasm among the locals and collect some supplies.
Hungary.
Artúr Görgei de Görgő et Toporc was born in 1818 and by 1848 he was a chemist with the European name recognition. When the revolution started he changed profession, joined the Hungarian army and within few months made a career from captain to general. Before the hostilities started he was sent to Istanbul,
Wiener Neustadt and to Prague to buy percussion caps,
primers and weapons for the newly raised troops. He first met Kossuth on 30 August 1848, when he proposed building a factory to produce percussion caps and primers, for which the politician promised to obtain funds. On 11 September 1848, when the troops of Jelačić crossed the Dráva river to enter Hungary, Görgei's national guards were ordered to come from Szolnok to
Csepel Island to keep an eye on the movements of Croatian supplies. Here, Görgei organized the villagers from the region to observe and capture the envoys and supply carriages sent from Croatia to Jelačić and back. He was successful in both tasks culmination of which was capture, court-martial and execution of a pro-Hapsburg Hungarian noble whom Jelačić sent to inform his subordinate Croatian commanders about his plan to attack Buda and Pest.
Later in 1848, as a commander of 2,500 trained troops supported by 16,500 peasant militia he proposed to his superior commander a plan of actions against the Croatian troops that resulted in capture of 9,000 prisoners, together with their weapons and ammunition, including 12 guns.
On 1 November, Görgei, only 32, was named general and appointed commander of the army of the Upper Danube, being charged with protecting Hungary's western frontier against the imperial army's imminent attack. While he waited for the attack, which ultimately came on 14 December 1848, Görgei reorganized his army, sending home the national guards and the peasant militias, who were the least reliable units, and increased the number of the battalions of the Hungarian Honvéd army, training them for future battles. At that point his first debate with Kossuth took place and as a result he was forced to accept the plan of the troops’ allocation against which he argued and which proved to be wrong: holding the border with 28,000 inexperienced soldiers against Windisch-Grätz's 55,000 imperial troops was a pure idiocy even if “fighting for every inch of Hungarian territory” was a catchy political demagoguery. As a result, an isolated army of Mor Percel (one more “political commander”) was defeated by the Croatians thus leaving Görgei alone in a hopeless struggle against a vastly superior Austrian army. Görgei conducted generally successful retreat from the border to Pest and on January 2 1849 convinced the military council that there was no other choice than to retreat from the Hungarian capitals. The government went to Debrecen. Görgei chose to retreat eastward, through the northern
Gömör-Szepes Oreand
Tátra mountain ranges, and to conduct operations on his own initiative, forcing the Austrian commander Windisch-Grätz to send troops in pursuit as well as keep the bulk of his army around Buda and Pest, to prevent Görgei turning to the west and attacking Vienna, thus preventing the Austrians from attacking the provisional capital of Debrecen, and providing time for the Hungarian troops east of
Tisza to reorganize. He also sent needed money and ore supplies from mining towns such as
Körmöcbánya,
Selmecbánya, and
Besztercebánya to Debrecen.
In the harsh winter, marching in the mountains, several times Görgei and his troops escaped encirclement by the Austrian troops and on 5 February 1849, they broke through the mountain pass of
Branyiszkó, defeated General Deym in the
Battle of Branyiszkó, and united with the Hungarian troops led by
György Klapka on the Hungarian plains.
By that time Kossuth was considering Görgei too independent and to everybody’s surprise appointed as a commander in chief the Polish general
Henryk Dembiński remarkable mostly by any noticeable talent and indecisiveness. True to his reputation Dembinski first ordered a retreat allowing the Austrian troops of General
Franz Schlik to escape from their encirclement and On 25–27 February 1849, Dembiński, after making mistake after mistake, lost the
Battle of Kápolna. He had a general advantage in the numbers but failed to concentrate them on a battlefield, the units had been acting on their own, two Hungarian divisions were forced to capitulate, the advancing troops had been ordered to retreat and after the battle Hungarian troops rebelled and Dembinski was relieved of his command [3]. Görgei was
elected as commander-in-chief by the troops and government’s representative confirmed this appointment. Kossuth, by hearing about this was angered and rushed to the military camp, thinking that Görgei was its organizer and declaring that he would order Görgei executed for this revolt. But when he arrived at Tiszafüred and saw that the majority of the officers supported Görgei, Kossuth was forced to accept the situation. However, he declared that the final decision about who would be the commander would be announced after he presented the facts to the Parliament. In Debrecen, Kossuth and his political supporters ignored the wishes of the Hungarian generals to name Görgei and designated
Antal Vetter as commander-in-chief [4]. This military giant started with planning a campaign for chasing Windisch-Grätz and his troops out of Hungary but then got the second thoughts and ordered the general retreat after which conveniently fall ill and left the army [5]. By that time Görgei was the only Hungarian commander who achieved the noticeable success forcing the Austrian commander to take a defensive position, and thus ceding the initiative to the Hungarians before the start of their Spring Campaign. Kossuth, running out of the nincompoop commanders, planned to led the army personally [6] but faced opposition of all corps commanders who declared that Görgei was the ablest commander for that job. Thus, Görgei became acting head only a few days before the start of the spring campaign.
The spring campaign of April - May 1849 was brilliantly executed and even if it failed to achieve a major encirclement the numerous Hungarian victories forced Austrian forces to evacuate almost all of Hungary, except for a narrow strip of land in the west, Croatia, and a few land pockets and forts including fortress of Buda. On 3 April 1849, Kossuth, who still disliked him, wrote: "
He don't envy the glory of others, but offers occasions for others to achieve glory – [despite this] he enforces fully his authority; he is not power-mad and readily accepts ideas from others."
Also playing an important role in the liberation of the country were the troops of
Józef Bem, who liberated
Transylvania, and Mór Perczel, who liberated much of southern Hungary, except for
Croatia.
Görgei achieved his successes with a numerically and technologically inferior army (47,500 Hungarian soldiers, having 198 cannons, vs 55,000 Austrian soldiers with 214 cannons and rockets), which lacked heavy cavalry (relying almost completely on the light
Hussar cavalry), and having relatively very few soldiers fighting in the other types of units common in the armies of that period (
chasseurs,
grenadiers,
lancer cavalry,
dragoons,
cuirassiers), and
with constant shortages of weapons and ammunition. Several times these shortages caused the Hungarian infantry to not engage in long shooting duels with the Austrians, but to employ
bayonet charges, which were repeated if the initial attempt to break through was unsuccessful, causing the Hungarian infantry heavy casualties.
Of course, these trifles meant little for the politicians who got excited and demanded advance into the Austrian lands. However, Görgei opted for a more cautious strategy making his immediate task capture of Buda while trying to improve the critical situation with the weapons and ammunition. The problem was an almost complete absence of the arms and munitions production in Hungary. Even creation of the percussion caps factory promised by Kossuth in 1848 did not materialize. Before the war began the purchases had been made in Czechia and Austria but now these sources were out of question. Which was leaving Istanbul. Görgei’s mission there in 1848 did no produce any results because the people he could contact proved to be unreliable. However, the fact that the Hungarians managed to survive through the winter was not missed and conclusions had been made. The government was approached by the merchants of not quite clear origin who offered a significant and consistent supply of the modern weaponry and ammunition to be delivered to Szeged or, if the Danube is under Hungarian control, to any point on the Danube, payment strictly upon delivery and inspection. Besides the unbelievably low prices, the promissory notes from the Hungarian government could cover up to 90% of a bill with the rest, as it was explained, being need to pay for the coal and, crew salaries and “administrative expenses”. The deliveries will start as soon as the Danube becomes safe to navigate after the spring flooding.
The proposal looked more than a little bit insane but the risk was zero so why not? To everybody’s pleasant surprise the first caravan arrived at Szeged at the late April escorted by 2 strange contraptions that did not look like any normal ships. After the merchandise was unloaded and checked the caravan left and two weeks later a new one, with the similar escort, brought more supplies. The merchant ships had been displaying the Ottoman flags, even if most of them clearly were not Turkish, but their escorts had St.Andrew flags of the Russian imperial navy.
While the spring campaign was going on, at the parliament in Debrecen, Kossuth formally proposed the dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty, which the parliament accepted, declaring the total independence of Hungary on 14 April 1849. The act was a pure hot air as far as Franz Joseph was involved but not everybody shared his point of view: there was an opinion, shared by some influential people here and there, that now Hungary has some promising potential. An open question was how to realize this potential in a most satisfactory way and to a big degree this depended on the mental capacities of thr Hungarian government.
The caravans kept arriving and finally, representatives of not too mysterious “supplying company” arrived to talk to the Hungarian government and a separate group with the distinctly military bearings went to talk to the commander in chief to discuss the “military issues”.
The spring campaign was over and both sides had been readying themselves for the summer or fall campaign with the Hungarians making preparations for storming Buda.
________
[1] “… [the plan] looked good on paper but the ravines had been forgotten…”. From the song written about the Russian plan for the battle of Chyornaya River (CW) and its implementation.
[2] “… the first column is marching, the second column is marching…” from the allied battle plan for Austerlitz.
[3] In OTL soon enough he was back in charge again and after being, again, dismissed just before the critical battle just screwed up his successor, Joseph Bem, by “forgetting” to tell him that he sent away the artillery supply train. Kossuth was, of course, a great patriot but….
[4] One more military genius of Kossuth’s choice. I’m wondering if he
really was
that dumb or just had retaining his own power as a primary goal (which would also make him dumb because the lost war would mean loss of the power).
[5] I’m not saying that he wasn’t ill but it strongly reminds “Military aphorisms”: “If both your flanks are unreliable, declare yourself sick.” 😂
[6] Even Robespierre was not delusional to such a degree.
