I think the best course of action for Russia is sigh a non aggression treaty and border line agreement with Japan if we sign a treaty of alliance Japan might bring Russia to war with America in future or any other great power.
No GNW (or “Peter goes South”)
- Thread starter alexmilman
- Start date
Going diplomatic … #2
348. Going diplomatic … #2
Paranoia or being realistic? Getting a little bit back in time.
With a big volume of information coming from the Far East, this was a serious question warranting research both by the General Staff and the Naval General Staff and their conclusions made in 1905 were also on “alarmist” side. Both, plus the reports received from the military leadership of the Priamursky Military District assumed that Japan may attack Russia, not other way around.
The Naval General Staff (NGS) in its assessment of the situation in a case of potential war came to a reasonable conclusion that the main theater would be on the seas because Japan will have to move its armies to the continent and as a result needed control of the sea. That is why if Russia "manages to take possession of the sea" by seizing the maritime communications of the Japanese army, it will be able to cut their supply from the metropolis, and thus "predefine the fate of the war" at once. Thus, the land theater would become important for Russia only if the naval phase failed and preparations with the exclusive stress on the land operations will be a strategic mistake. Besides, a failure to prevail on the sea will put the whole Russian Pacific coast in danger.
The problem was that in 1905 Russian Pacific Fleet was in no position not only to get an upper hand but even to perform the coastal defense function efficiently. After the Boxer Rebellion Russia had to make a gesture to somewhat diffuse the (mostly British and American) indignation with its breaking a principle of China’s territorial integrity. To demonstrate an absence of the further expansionistic intentions, Russia moved a big part of the Pacific Fleet, which it strengthened just before the Rebellion, back to the Black Sea. As a result, the Pacific Fleet amounted to two rather old battleships with a good artillery but inadequate armor, low speed and short range of the operations. There also were three light cruisers, few cannon-boats, and 37 destroyers of various types.
Then was also Siberian Flotilla, which consisted of the light ships patrolling the islands between Asia and Alaska, and Amur River flotilla of the monitors which in theory could operate in the coastal waters but did not have a heavy artillery. In Vladivostok there was an ongoing construction of 7 new big destroyers. Nothing even remotely comparable to the Japanese fleet.
It was also noticed that an active buildup of the railroads in Korea and Liaondong will allow, in the case of war, a fast transportation of the Japanese troops from ports to Mukden.
Fearing that a piecemeal move of the ships to the Pacific may provoke Japan’s attack, the Naval General Staff was proposing to build and move the whole fleet at once. Few possible routes had been discussed:
The longest route via Cape Horn had an advantage of an ability to use the friendly ports on the way, including San Francisco, and to completely bypass Japan. OTOH, the route by the Suez also would allow to use the friendly ports including the Russian base on the Red Sea and French and German bases on the way; on a negative side, the final segment of its trip would be through the Japanese-controlled waters. Of course, this assumed a possibility of Japanese preventive attack on a sailing squadron on the conditions generally favoring them. The obvious answer to this was to have an overwhelming force that would force Japan just to swallow the fact. Acceleration of the Russian naval program was going to provide such an advantage because all Japanese battleships were of the old types and Japan had to complete the ongoing projects which would produce already obsolete ships.
The General Staff (GS) was perhaps even gloomier in its assessments.
According to the General Staff, the number of military personnel in Japan has reached: "completely trained" - 852,139.; "low-trained" - 1,743,000 people; a total of 2,595,139 people. This accounted for about 4.8% of the total population of the island empire, which was exactly twice as high percentage as in Russia, where there were 1,175,898 people in the army, 2,525,175 in reserve, total 3,701,073 or 2.4% of the population.
It was assumed that Japan can put against Russia 19 field and 19 reserve divisions, 1,002,173 people with 1,722 field guns and 96 howitzers (by estimates of the NGS, 1,905 field guns and 168 heavy field guns). Presumably, Japan could mobilize 800,000 completely trained troops in two weeks and then increase it to 1,000,000. By the assessments of the NGS Japan’s commercial fleet had the means to carry 10 divisions, counting each division of 19.319 people and 4,993 horses. Which was well below needed capacity. However, it was expected that Japan could deliver 6 divisions to their destination in the Liaodg district and 6 in the direction of Vladivostok on the 11th day of mobilization and that it would take Japan 6 months to fully concentrate its forces in Manchuria.
In six months, 256 battalions, 96 squadrons, 1,000 guns could be delivered from the European part of the empire. Taking into account the troops of the three Siberian districts, Russia would manage to put up 466 battalions, 219 squadrons, 1,868 guns and border guards against Japan by this time. At the same time, the total limit of reinforcements that were considered possible to be sent from the European part of Russia was 10 - 11 army corps with the appropriate number of reserve and cavalry divisions. The question was if the 3 border military districts would be able to mobilize and hold their positions long enough. Taking into an account the huge distances and limited number of the railroads, situation was not looking good and there was no option but to agree with the assessment of the NGS about the naval factor being the top priority.
So, in general, assessments of the GS and NGS were rather realistic than paranoid. OTOH, information coming from Priamursky MD was much more paranoid than realistic all the way to the stories about tens thousands of Chinese being trained to fight on the Japanese side and Qing government being ready to join Japan in a coming attack on Russia.
Commander of that district, general P. Unterberger, was too busy sending reports about the Japanese plans to pay proper attention to the ongoing construction of fortifications in Vladivostok and Harbin (both were lagging behind the schedule) and to do some other things necessary to improve readiness of his MD. During 1906, the leadership of the Amur Territory used every opportunity to inform both the central authorities and the country's public about the actual inevitability of the imminent Japanese aggression against Russia. The result was an increase in tensions that already prevailed among the military and public circles of the Far East: officers began to send their families to the European part of the country, and large companies began to curtail operations, citing statements by local authorities about the proximity of war with Japan.
The panicky mode was spreading and could not be ignored. The issue was discussed by the Cabinet and decision had been made regarding strengthening of the Far East defenses. However, it was clear to those better informed that (a) international situation changed and (b) that Japan’s actual target was China, not Russia. At that point position of a naval and military establishment became more paranoid than practical and Unterberger, strictly speaking, started looking as a candidate for a mental institution.
1907. So far, Japan enjoyed good relations with the US and Britain which meant that it was taking their money and they expected that to reciprocate Japan will maintain the Open Door policy on the territories it controlled, meaning that the “benefactors” with their stronger industries will be getting most of the advantages in the Southern Manchuria while the Japanese would be satisfied with a knowledge that this is their zone of interests. However, Japan had different ideas on the subject. The Russian-Japanese agreements of 1907 clearly indicated the desire of the two empires to turn Manchuria into a zone of their key interests, and to prevent other "players" from entering it. Germany and France had no concessions or other rights in this area, so the course of St. Petersburg and Tokyo to divide the Northeast of China was not directly related to these states and could not produce their objections. Britain had interests in the region but it found itself too preoccupied with a naval race with Germany to resist Japanese activities. Thus, the only power left without compensation and, accordingly, particularly dissatisfied with the assertion of monopoly management of Russia and Japan in the north-eastern regions of China, remained the United States of America. The Russian Foreign Ministry closely followed the development of Japanese-American contacts, the analysis of the state of which was of great importance for determining the foreign policy towards Japan. Attempts of the American capital to get “in” and Japanese policy to keep them “out” resulted in a deterioration of the Japanese-American relations.
Subsequently, this trend intensified, although the calls of the American government to comply with the principle of "open doors" in north-eastern China in different degrees concerned both Russia and Japan, the main object of American interests was the industrialized Southern Manchuria, and the main purpose of criticism of Washington was the policy of the Japanese cabinet.
At the same time, the anti-Japanese sentiment that spread on the American Pacific coast also had a negative impact on bilateral contacts. After a series of pogroms of Japanese stores in California, the situation became even more complicated. Under these circumstances, the U.S. administration decided to move the main base of the fleet from the east coast to the Pacific Ocean, as well as to demonstrate its military power by sending a squadron of the U.S. Navy to the coast of China.
Russian Ambassador in the US to Russian Foreign Minister:
“The decision to transfer the main forces of the American fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean is undoubtedly of paramount political importance. Not foretelling at all the proximity, not even the possibility of a rupture between the United States and Japan, this step, testified to President Roosevelt's awareness of the error of the extremely Japanese-philic direction of American policy in recent years.”
It was decided to send the squadron to the Far East through the Strait of Magellan in December 1907, including 16 "best battleships" of the Atlantic Fleet, as well as several destroyers and transports. The country's public began to be noticeably nervous about the extent of the American Navy approaching Japan. As the consul in Nagasaki Z.M. Polyanovsky reported in February 1908, in the military, administrative and commercial circles of the city there was a lot of talk about the inevitability of war with America. According to the observation of Russian diplomats, alarming expectations also affected the government spheres of Tokyo. Thus, the envoy Bakhmetyev reported in a secret dispatch that in Japanese-American relations "something is wrong and that the air is already... not the same as it was two years ago." Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, talking about the attacks of the American press on Japan's activities in Manchuria, told the Russian envoy: "I don't understand Americans at all. What they want from us and what they are looking for themselves." Officially, the Japanese government continued to talk about the "unshakable friendship" with the Americans, but decided to carry out larger fleet maneuvers just in case than in 1907. However, the economic ties with the US still were too important for Japan to be easily broken.
The fleet was invited to visit Japan and the Ruth-Takahir agreement proclaimed recognition of the status quo in the Far East, allowing the possibility of both powers to act together in defense of the current situation in the region. But this agreement did not fix the conflicts of interests and meant little. The main point of contention remained: the US government was trying to deprive Russia and Japan of their privileged position in Manchuria thus pushing their governments to each other to preserve these positions.
A strong American naval presence on the Pacific, combined with the rhetorics regarding Monroe Doctrine, was posing a potential thereat to the Russian possessions on the other side of the Pacific forcing acceleration of the plan presented by NGS. Russian-American relations were already rather cold (successive governments of TR and Taft had been too heavy in teaching everybody else the moral values) and growing even colder and, unlike situation with Japan, the economic ties were not significant even in the best times.
Even the head of the GS, Palitsyn, revised his position and began to be more skeptical about the immediate military threat emanating from Japan. Now the adherents of the “panic mode” had been causing irritation of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the facts showed that Japan did not plan an attack on Russia in the coming years after the 1907 agreements - Japanese military and shipbuilding programs were stretched to a later date, and a number of arms were indeed reduced. In late 1907 - early 1908, Envoy Bakhmetyev reported in his reports that the Japanese financial department had fundamentally decided "within 6 years to reduce the cost of reinforced weapons of the army and navy by 120 million yen", and although in 1908 emergency expenditures were reduced only by a 11 millionsyen (8.5 million for the army and 2.5 million for the navy) the general amount of the cuts was decided to keep on 120 millions. Japanese newspapers kept talking about friendship and mutual interests. What’s more important, there was “official unofficial” proposal made by the Japanese Ambassador in Pekin to his Russian colleague regarding “desirability to establish coordination of activities on the Manchurian railroads”. As the latter reported to St.Petersburg, “With full coordination of the actions of Russia and Japan, outside interference in Manchu affairs can have no actual impact on the course of recent events.” The direct proposal to the Russian Foreign Ministry had been made soon afterwards and, besides the issue of “coordinated activities” it contain a very desirable economic proposal regarding establishing mutually-acceptable tariff for transporting the Japanese silk by TransSib. [2] Transportation of silk from Yokohama to Marseille by sea, then by land to Moscow took 75 to 90 days and cost 4 r. 60 kopecks per pood. At the same time, the transportation of silk from Yokohama to Moscow through Siberia could last about 30 days and cost a maximum of 6 rubles 50 kopecks per pood, and the minimum threshold was determined at 5 p. 88 kopecks per pood. Both sides found this proposal beneficial. An idea of the coordination produced even greater enthusiasm because so far both interested sides (China did not matter) felt themselves somewhat “isolated” and, taking into an account that in both cases the railroads had been based on the identical concessional acts, coincidence of the interests looked natural: the common enemy was China government of which, with the American and British support, was trying to regain the lost rights in the North-Eastern China (wasn’t it nasty?). Thus, despite the alarmist reports of the Amur Governor-General and part of the military leadership, the top leadership of Russia was loyal to the issue of rapprochement with Tokyo in the autumn of 1909. According to Kokovtsov, Unterberger's first notes initially made a "very strong impression" on Stolypin, who, after each new dispatch from Khabarovsk, was immediately summonning Izvolsky and the Minister of Finance, "with great concern" asking what measures were taken "to prevent the impending new threat", but then the head of government changed his mind.
Probably the most convincing argument was presented by the Japanese Ambassador who in conversation with the Emperor disclosed what the Japanese knew about weakness of the Russian defenses and commented that if there was any desire to attack Russian Far East, why wouldn’t Japan do it while the area is vulnerable? In Emperor’s opinion this deep knowledge of the situation was the best argument against Unterberger’s reports.
Emperor to Kokovtsev (Russian Finance Minister):
“I share the opinion of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and yours that this venerable general is in a state of panic and does not understand the information that all sorts of random informants bring to him, especially since on my requests to him to indicate from which sources he draws them, I received some common places that these sources are.”
The Amur Governor-General received a serious reprimand. In a letter to Unterberger dated November 26 (3), 1909, the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed to the positive nature of relations with Japan, stressing that "anxiety bordering on panic", manifested not only by the Far Eastern press, but also by the top officials of the administration, "does not meet our dignity and may have the most harmful image" negatively affecting Russia’s international position.
Continued pressure from State Secretary Knox provided an additional stimulus to improve the relations and even the “military party” in Japan was now almost completely supporting closer relations with Russia considering them a serious factor in success of a future expansion and a necessary condition for standing up to Washington. On the Russian side Knox plan of “commercial neutralization” also did not generate any enthusiasm: Izvolsky stated that change of the status quo can be supported only if it is profitable for Russia, which this plan is not. Moreover, if the Japanese are “stopped” in Southern Manchuria, they may start looking at the Northern one. After agreeing on the provisions of Russian and Japanese notes and receiving approval from Paris and London, the documents were demonstratively handed over to the U.S. ambassadors to Russia and Japan on the same day, January 21 (8), 1910.
In a few of the newly-established brotherly love, Japanese government started testing water regarding the Russian plans on returning the railroads to China after the contract time expires. Of course, so far this was a rather theoretical question, just as the “speculations” regarding potential future partition of China but the solid part was that “Russia and Japan, which spent so much effort in Manchuria, should hold on to each other firmly”. The diplomats had been actively working upon a new, more extensive agreement.
On this background, arrival of the squadron of modern Russian warships to Vladivostok did not raise any hackles: “holding to each other” is more effective when both sides are strong.
___________
[1] This diplomatic term is borrowed from “Overboard” 😂
[2] With large industrial-size supplies, more importance was attached not to the tariff for transportation, but to interest for the "freezing" of working capital.
“I'm taking courses to combat paranoia. Everyone here is kind of moody, they seem to be up to something.”
“I'm not paranoid - I just know the truth before others.”
“Paranoia is the only disease with 100% correct self-diagnosis.”
“The main thing in the war is not to win, but not to participate.”
Unknown authors
“Treaties exist to be implemented by a weaker one."
Karel Čapek
"The verbal agreement is not worth the paper on which it is written."
Samuel Goldwyn
"The treaty is valid if it is supported by guns. If the contract is not supported by force, it worth nothing."
N.S. Khrushchev
“I'm not paranoid - I just know the truth before others.”
“Paranoia is the only disease with 100% correct self-diagnosis.”
“The main thing in the war is not to win, but not to participate.”
Unknown authors
“Treaties exist to be implemented by a weaker one."
Karel Čapek
"The verbal agreement is not worth the paper on which it is written."
Samuel Goldwyn
"The treaty is valid if it is supported by guns. If the contract is not supported by force, it worth nothing."
N.S. Khrushchev
Paranoia or being realistic? Getting a little bit back in time.
With a big volume of information coming from the Far East, this was a serious question warranting research both by the General Staff and the Naval General Staff and their conclusions made in 1905 were also on “alarmist” side. Both, plus the reports received from the military leadership of the Priamursky Military District assumed that Japan may attack Russia, not other way around.
The Naval General Staff (NGS) in its assessment of the situation in a case of potential war came to a reasonable conclusion that the main theater would be on the seas because Japan will have to move its armies to the continent and as a result needed control of the sea. That is why if Russia "manages to take possession of the sea" by seizing the maritime communications of the Japanese army, it will be able to cut their supply from the metropolis, and thus "predefine the fate of the war" at once. Thus, the land theater would become important for Russia only if the naval phase failed and preparations with the exclusive stress on the land operations will be a strategic mistake. Besides, a failure to prevail on the sea will put the whole Russian Pacific coast in danger.
The problem was that in 1905 Russian Pacific Fleet was in no position not only to get an upper hand but even to perform the coastal defense function efficiently. After the Boxer Rebellion Russia had to make a gesture to somewhat diffuse the (mostly British and American) indignation with its breaking a principle of China’s territorial integrity. To demonstrate an absence of the further expansionistic intentions, Russia moved a big part of the Pacific Fleet, which it strengthened just before the Rebellion, back to the Black Sea. As a result, the Pacific Fleet amounted to two rather old battleships with a good artillery but inadequate armor, low speed and short range of the operations. There also were three light cruisers, few cannon-boats, and 37 destroyers of various types.
Then was also Siberian Flotilla, which consisted of the light ships patrolling the islands between Asia and Alaska, and Amur River flotilla of the monitors which in theory could operate in the coastal waters but did not have a heavy artillery. In Vladivostok there was an ongoing construction of 7 new big destroyers. Nothing even remotely comparable to the Japanese fleet.
It was also noticed that an active buildup of the railroads in Korea and Liaondong will allow, in the case of war, a fast transportation of the Japanese troops from ports to Mukden.
Fearing that a piecemeal move of the ships to the Pacific may provoke Japan’s attack, the Naval General Staff was proposing to build and move the whole fleet at once. Few possible routes had been discussed:
- Through Cape Horn (8,700 nautical miles).
- Cape of Good Hope (6,200 miles).
- Suez Canal (2,500 miles).
- Northwest Passage (allong the northern coast of America, 8.400 miles).
- Northeast Passage (alway along the northern shores of Asia, 7.700 miles)
The longest route via Cape Horn had an advantage of an ability to use the friendly ports on the way, including San Francisco, and to completely bypass Japan. OTOH, the route by the Suez also would allow to use the friendly ports including the Russian base on the Red Sea and French and German bases on the way; on a negative side, the final segment of its trip would be through the Japanese-controlled waters. Of course, this assumed a possibility of Japanese preventive attack on a sailing squadron on the conditions generally favoring them. The obvious answer to this was to have an overwhelming force that would force Japan just to swallow the fact. Acceleration of the Russian naval program was going to provide such an advantage because all Japanese battleships were of the old types and Japan had to complete the ongoing projects which would produce already obsolete ships.
The General Staff (GS) was perhaps even gloomier in its assessments.
According to the General Staff, the number of military personnel in Japan has reached: "completely trained" - 852,139.; "low-trained" - 1,743,000 people; a total of 2,595,139 people. This accounted for about 4.8% of the total population of the island empire, which was exactly twice as high percentage as in Russia, where there were 1,175,898 people in the army, 2,525,175 in reserve, total 3,701,073 or 2.4% of the population.
It was assumed that Japan can put against Russia 19 field and 19 reserve divisions, 1,002,173 people with 1,722 field guns and 96 howitzers (by estimates of the NGS, 1,905 field guns and 168 heavy field guns). Presumably, Japan could mobilize 800,000 completely trained troops in two weeks and then increase it to 1,000,000. By the assessments of the NGS Japan’s commercial fleet had the means to carry 10 divisions, counting each division of 19.319 people and 4,993 horses. Which was well below needed capacity. However, it was expected that Japan could deliver 6 divisions to their destination in the Liaodg district and 6 in the direction of Vladivostok on the 11th day of mobilization and that it would take Japan 6 months to fully concentrate its forces in Manchuria.
In six months, 256 battalions, 96 squadrons, 1,000 guns could be delivered from the European part of the empire. Taking into account the troops of the three Siberian districts, Russia would manage to put up 466 battalions, 219 squadrons, 1,868 guns and border guards against Japan by this time. At the same time, the total limit of reinforcements that were considered possible to be sent from the European part of Russia was 10 - 11 army corps with the appropriate number of reserve and cavalry divisions. The question was if the 3 border military districts would be able to mobilize and hold their positions long enough. Taking into an account the huge distances and limited number of the railroads, situation was not looking good and there was no option but to agree with the assessment of the NGS about the naval factor being the top priority.
So, in general, assessments of the GS and NGS were rather realistic than paranoid. OTOH, information coming from Priamursky MD was much more paranoid than realistic all the way to the stories about tens thousands of Chinese being trained to fight on the Japanese side and Qing government being ready to join Japan in a coming attack on Russia.
Commander of that district, general P. Unterberger, was too busy sending reports about the Japanese plans to pay proper attention to the ongoing construction of fortifications in Vladivostok and Harbin (both were lagging behind the schedule) and to do some other things necessary to improve readiness of his MD. During 1906, the leadership of the Amur Territory used every opportunity to inform both the central authorities and the country's public about the actual inevitability of the imminent Japanese aggression against Russia. The result was an increase in tensions that already prevailed among the military and public circles of the Far East: officers began to send their families to the European part of the country, and large companies began to curtail operations, citing statements by local authorities about the proximity of war with Japan.
The panicky mode was spreading and could not be ignored. The issue was discussed by the Cabinet and decision had been made regarding strengthening of the Far East defenses. However, it was clear to those better informed that (a) international situation changed and (b) that Japan’s actual target was China, not Russia. At that point position of a naval and military establishment became more paranoid than practical and Unterberger, strictly speaking, started looking as a candidate for a mental institution.
1907. So far, Japan enjoyed good relations with the US and Britain which meant that it was taking their money and they expected that to reciprocate Japan will maintain the Open Door policy on the territories it controlled, meaning that the “benefactors” with their stronger industries will be getting most of the advantages in the Southern Manchuria while the Japanese would be satisfied with a knowledge that this is their zone of interests. However, Japan had different ideas on the subject. The Russian-Japanese agreements of 1907 clearly indicated the desire of the two empires to turn Manchuria into a zone of their key interests, and to prevent other "players" from entering it. Germany and France had no concessions or other rights in this area, so the course of St. Petersburg and Tokyo to divide the Northeast of China was not directly related to these states and could not produce their objections. Britain had interests in the region but it found itself too preoccupied with a naval race with Germany to resist Japanese activities. Thus, the only power left without compensation and, accordingly, particularly dissatisfied with the assertion of monopoly management of Russia and Japan in the north-eastern regions of China, remained the United States of America. The Russian Foreign Ministry closely followed the development of Japanese-American contacts, the analysis of the state of which was of great importance for determining the foreign policy towards Japan. Attempts of the American capital to get “in” and Japanese policy to keep them “out” resulted in a deterioration of the Japanese-American relations.
Subsequently, this trend intensified, although the calls of the American government to comply with the principle of "open doors" in north-eastern China in different degrees concerned both Russia and Japan, the main object of American interests was the industrialized Southern Manchuria, and the main purpose of criticism of Washington was the policy of the Japanese cabinet.
At the same time, the anti-Japanese sentiment that spread on the American Pacific coast also had a negative impact on bilateral contacts. After a series of pogroms of Japanese stores in California, the situation became even more complicated. Under these circumstances, the U.S. administration decided to move the main base of the fleet from the east coast to the Pacific Ocean, as well as to demonstrate its military power by sending a squadron of the U.S. Navy to the coast of China.
Russian Ambassador in the US to Russian Foreign Minister:
“The decision to transfer the main forces of the American fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean is undoubtedly of paramount political importance. Not foretelling at all the proximity, not even the possibility of a rupture between the United States and Japan, this step, testified to President Roosevelt's awareness of the error of the extremely Japanese-philic direction of American policy in recent years.”
It was decided to send the squadron to the Far East through the Strait of Magellan in December 1907, including 16 "best battleships" of the Atlantic Fleet, as well as several destroyers and transports. The country's public began to be noticeably nervous about the extent of the American Navy approaching Japan. As the consul in Nagasaki Z.M. Polyanovsky reported in February 1908, in the military, administrative and commercial circles of the city there was a lot of talk about the inevitability of war with America. According to the observation of Russian diplomats, alarming expectations also affected the government spheres of Tokyo. Thus, the envoy Bakhmetyev reported in a secret dispatch that in Japanese-American relations "something is wrong and that the air is already... not the same as it was two years ago." Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, talking about the attacks of the American press on Japan's activities in Manchuria, told the Russian envoy: "I don't understand Americans at all. What they want from us and what they are looking for themselves." Officially, the Japanese government continued to talk about the "unshakable friendship" with the Americans, but decided to carry out larger fleet maneuvers just in case than in 1907. However, the economic ties with the US still were too important for Japan to be easily broken.
The fleet was invited to visit Japan and the Ruth-Takahir agreement proclaimed recognition of the status quo in the Far East, allowing the possibility of both powers to act together in defense of the current situation in the region. But this agreement did not fix the conflicts of interests and meant little. The main point of contention remained: the US government was trying to deprive Russia and Japan of their privileged position in Manchuria thus pushing their governments to each other to preserve these positions.
A strong American naval presence on the Pacific, combined with the rhetorics regarding Monroe Doctrine, was posing a potential thereat to the Russian possessions on the other side of the Pacific forcing acceleration of the plan presented by NGS. Russian-American relations were already rather cold (successive governments of TR and Taft had been too heavy in teaching everybody else the moral values) and growing even colder and, unlike situation with Japan, the economic ties were not significant even in the best times.
Even the head of the GS, Palitsyn, revised his position and began to be more skeptical about the immediate military threat emanating from Japan. Now the adherents of the “panic mode” had been causing irritation of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the facts showed that Japan did not plan an attack on Russia in the coming years after the 1907 agreements - Japanese military and shipbuilding programs were stretched to a later date, and a number of arms were indeed reduced. In late 1907 - early 1908, Envoy Bakhmetyev reported in his reports that the Japanese financial department had fundamentally decided "within 6 years to reduce the cost of reinforced weapons of the army and navy by 120 million yen", and although in 1908 emergency expenditures were reduced only by a 11 millionsyen (8.5 million for the army and 2.5 million for the navy) the general amount of the cuts was decided to keep on 120 millions. Japanese newspapers kept talking about friendship and mutual interests. What’s more important, there was “official unofficial” proposal made by the Japanese Ambassador in Pekin to his Russian colleague regarding “desirability to establish coordination of activities on the Manchurian railroads”. As the latter reported to St.Petersburg, “With full coordination of the actions of Russia and Japan, outside interference in Manchu affairs can have no actual impact on the course of recent events.” The direct proposal to the Russian Foreign Ministry had been made soon afterwards and, besides the issue of “coordinated activities” it contain a very desirable economic proposal regarding establishing mutually-acceptable tariff for transporting the Japanese silk by TransSib. [2] Transportation of silk from Yokohama to Marseille by sea, then by land to Moscow took 75 to 90 days and cost 4 r. 60 kopecks per pood. At the same time, the transportation of silk from Yokohama to Moscow through Siberia could last about 30 days and cost a maximum of 6 rubles 50 kopecks per pood, and the minimum threshold was determined at 5 p. 88 kopecks per pood. Both sides found this proposal beneficial. An idea of the coordination produced even greater enthusiasm because so far both interested sides (China did not matter) felt themselves somewhat “isolated” and, taking into an account that in both cases the railroads had been based on the identical concessional acts, coincidence of the interests looked natural: the common enemy was China government of which, with the American and British support, was trying to regain the lost rights in the North-Eastern China (wasn’t it nasty?). Thus, despite the alarmist reports of the Amur Governor-General and part of the military leadership, the top leadership of Russia was loyal to the issue of rapprochement with Tokyo in the autumn of 1909. According to Kokovtsov, Unterberger's first notes initially made a "very strong impression" on Stolypin, who, after each new dispatch from Khabarovsk, was immediately summonning Izvolsky and the Minister of Finance, "with great concern" asking what measures were taken "to prevent the impending new threat", but then the head of government changed his mind.
Probably the most convincing argument was presented by the Japanese Ambassador who in conversation with the Emperor disclosed what the Japanese knew about weakness of the Russian defenses and commented that if there was any desire to attack Russian Far East, why wouldn’t Japan do it while the area is vulnerable? In Emperor’s opinion this deep knowledge of the situation was the best argument against Unterberger’s reports.
Emperor to Kokovtsev (Russian Finance Minister):
“I share the opinion of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and yours that this venerable general is in a state of panic and does not understand the information that all sorts of random informants bring to him, especially since on my requests to him to indicate from which sources he draws them, I received some common places that these sources are.”
The Amur Governor-General received a serious reprimand. In a letter to Unterberger dated November 26 (3), 1909, the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed to the positive nature of relations with Japan, stressing that "anxiety bordering on panic", manifested not only by the Far Eastern press, but also by the top officials of the administration, "does not meet our dignity and may have the most harmful image" negatively affecting Russia’s international position.
Continued pressure from State Secretary Knox provided an additional stimulus to improve the relations and even the “military party” in Japan was now almost completely supporting closer relations with Russia considering them a serious factor in success of a future expansion and a necessary condition for standing up to Washington. On the Russian side Knox plan of “commercial neutralization” also did not generate any enthusiasm: Izvolsky stated that change of the status quo can be supported only if it is profitable for Russia, which this plan is not. Moreover, if the Japanese are “stopped” in Southern Manchuria, they may start looking at the Northern one. After agreeing on the provisions of Russian and Japanese notes and receiving approval from Paris and London, the documents were demonstratively handed over to the U.S. ambassadors to Russia and Japan on the same day, January 21 (8), 1910.
In a few of the newly-established brotherly love, Japanese government started testing water regarding the Russian plans on returning the railroads to China after the contract time expires. Of course, so far this was a rather theoretical question, just as the “speculations” regarding potential future partition of China but the solid part was that “Russia and Japan, which spent so much effort in Manchuria, should hold on to each other firmly”. The diplomats had been actively working upon a new, more extensive agreement.
On this background, arrival of the squadron of modern Russian warships to Vladivostok did not raise any hackles: “holding to each other” is more effective when both sides are strong.
___________
[1] This diplomatic term is borrowed from “Overboard” 😂
[2] With large industrial-size supplies, more importance was attached not to the tariff for transportation, but to interest for the "freezing" of working capital.
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I wonder if it would make sense to double the TSR, build the post 1930 additions and finish the BAM etc much earlier. When I look at the wiki image below you'd estimate they could make a much more robust capability to the east. The purple one exists right? The bottom half of the T is Japanese I suppose? So it's mainly the red left of Omsk, the red from the point the purple one starts, the black and the green that are missing?
Two big problems though:
Still, given the Gold in Amur, the valuable trade with Japan, maybe some trade with the US (though there doesn't seem to be much of it right now) and China (well, someday) might loosen some purses. Might even have a railroadboom because of a general public interest in the exotic East and the rumor of easy money in soy and the East in general. I've heard more stupid and unlikely reasons 😉.
I also am thinking about Alaska. Gold (Klondike, Nome & Fairbanks Gold Rushes) and Oil though the latter is exploited only much later and the former also didn't move millions.
Two big problems though:
- Who will pay for it? Biggest problem of them all
- What will it do in peacetime to earn for itself.
Still, given the Gold in Amur, the valuable trade with Japan, maybe some trade with the US (though there doesn't seem to be much of it right now) and China (well, someday) might loosen some purses. Might even have a railroadboom because of a general public interest in the exotic East and the rumor of easy money in soy and the East in general. I've heard more stupid and unlikely reasons 😉.
I also am thinking about Alaska. Gold (Klondike, Nome & Fairbanks Gold Rushes) and Oil though the latter is exploited only much later and the former also didn't move millions.
AFAIK, and I may be pessimistic, BAM ended up as one of the most expensive infrastructure projects in the SU and did not quite live to the expectations. It is in a high seismic activity area combined with permafrost and is crossing 11 big rivers (and total of 3,500 rivers), 7 big mountain ridges and involves a tunnel over 15km long . It would (as was expected) make economic sense if the brand-new industrial cities would be built along the route, which did not happen under the SU and unlikely would happen ITTL due to the lousy conditions of the existence and the huge investments needed. In OTL, AFAIK, more often than not BAM was losing money even with the technology much more modern than what was available in the early 1900s.
The East China RR (purple) had been enormously expensive to construct (among other issues, it had to cross the Big Hingham Ridge) and its exploitation, which included development of infrastructure along the road had been requiring big annual subsidies from the state. The reason for its construction and abandoning almost complete TransSib was not as much a shorter route but mostly Witte’s grand idea of the “peaceful penetration” into China. The line was a subject of never-ending attacks from the honghuzi and caused more than one military confrontation with the Chinese authorities. Plus, instead of promoting development of the Russian territory, huge sums of money had been spent and lost on development of the territories which were eventually lost in OTL and would be lost anyway when concession expired. ITTL does not make too much sense comparing to the lines Harbin-Vladivostok (OTL) and ITTLHarbin-Khabarovsk and Harbin-Blagovechensk: while avoiding the major mountains, the first two provide communications within Russian-owned “Sungari Triangle” and the third is going through the populated part of the Northern Manchuria and reasonably secure simply because, concessions or not, government of China and everybody else would have “interesting time” trying to get there through the gap between the Sungari and Mongolia. Combination of these roads allows to control the soybean export from the Russian-owned and Chinese parts of the Northern Manchuria (either to Vladivostok or by the Japanese South Manchuria RR).
Trade with the Central China goes by TransMongolian RR: Verhneudinsk (Улан Удэ) - Urga - Pekin.
The “black line”, actually, a set of the lines, does exist.
Trade with Japan is covered by the existing RRs. The US even in OTL was not a big partner and ITTL, with a smaller Pacific coast, probably even smaller. Anyway, the Atlantic route is much more important by the obvious geographic reasons.Two big problems though:
- Who will pay for it? Biggest problem of them all
- What will it do in peacetime to earn for itself.
Still, given the Gold in Amur, the valuable trade with Japan, maybe some trade with the US (though there doesn't seem to be much of it right now) and China (well, someday) might loosen some purses.
RE had almost never-ending RR boom but Witte’s policy was much more supportive of the state-owned RRs.
I wonder what any of these places has to do with TransSib. Anyway, why would one go all the way there when there was active gold digging in Blagoveschensk, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, on the Lena River, etc. Klondike is in Canada so there could be some interest in the Alaska gold but this is hardly relevant for RR construction. 😜
I figured most of this, but OTL might not be the best analog, as the relationship with Japan is much superior and they need a lot of goods Russia could transfer like steel, coal, etc etc. Not sure if OTLs Russo Japanese War, WW1, Russian Civil War and then Soviet - Japanese tension resulted in a lot of Trade.
More draw to the east. If Alaska is more worthwhile to hold and trade in then OTL and Japan is a big trade partner, developing the infrastructure to trade east is more attractive. Or will they sell Alaska to the USA ITTL as well? I'd add a part of the profit of resources found clause in that case.
Please don't sell Alaska because if Russia control Alaska they have more than the half of the dominant positions in northern hemisphere of north pole.
All this has little to do with BAM. No matter what, the construction itself was doomed to be extremely expensive: permafrost, seismic zone, mountains, numerous rivers, etc. And it is practically impossible to create an extensive infrastructure along the route: people tend to be unwilling to live in these conditions. BAM was expected to trigger development of the regional natural resources but, AFAIK, mostly failed and maintaining it cost big amounts of money. ITTL, even with a greater Russian-Japanese trade its profitability would be questionable because this would be mostly transit “from A to Z” with no or too little of short distance traffic but a need to support infrastructure along the route almost completely on the resources brought from outside the region which had no agriculture and no industry. IMO, rather dubious enterprise. Anyway, construction of TransSib was preceded by a thorough research and if a shorter route on the North was not even chosen, there probably were valid reasons.
Alaska may be valuable without its gold (there were numerous sources much closer). Coal, fishing (in OTL salmon export to the main part of the US was quite substantial) and geography allowing to organize …er… “defensive perimeter” (😉) from coast to coast. “Defensive” mostly against all types of the poachers. Convenient site for a naval base, etc. Why sell if you don’t need money and can use it?
The subject will take some time: I just found seemingly relevant material and have to look into it. But don’t forget the sea route. As I understand, Vladivostok was handling something like 10 million poods annually. Maybe more.
Going modern #1
349. Going modern #1
Wings of the empire.
Officially, the Age of Aviation, if one disregards the lighter than air thingies, started in 1903. Or perhaps in 1895 when Zeppelin was patented in Germany. Of course, the Russians preferred to think that it started in 1880 when Mozhaisky patented his “air-flying device” powered by steam engine but there were no records about its successful testing
“The first flight of the airplane on the military field in Krasnoe Selo gave unimportant results: the device separated from the ground, but, being unstable, tilted to one side and broke the wing. There were no further experiments for lack of funds. Mozhaysky's apparatus is interesting as the first practical attempt to build a large airplane.”
After this the idea of heavier than air flying lost its popularity. However, in 1885 special Air Unit had been created to use the air balloons for the reconnaissance purposes. Starting from 1886 the unit started doing aerial photography and in 1890 the Training Aeronautical Park was created with the first Russian dirigibles being added to its equipment.
As everywhere else, the first airplanes appeared in Russia but at the beginning they were imported from France and Italy and mostly considered as the extravagant toys or a way to make money: in Odessa, the popular pilot, Utochkin, was hired to run the flying show with an explicit order to fly low within a fenced perimeter so that those who did not buy tickets would get a free show. The government first remained indifferent but then felt obliged to go with a tide:
"...In pursuance of this, the GIU ordered airplanes in France. Wright and Voisin... and at the same time purchased 7 gasoline engines to put them on airplanes and to test the suitability of various types of motors for such vehicles. The construction of five airplanes in the Training Aeronautical Park is coming to an end, and these airplanes will be tested by flying on the Gatchina Military Field..."
In 1904, an aerodynamic institute was established in Kuchino, headed by the Russian scientist Nikolai Zhukovsky, the creator of aerodynamics (and hydrodynamics). The Institute carried out work aimed at improving aviation equipment. At the same time, Russian designer Dmitry Grigorovich began his work on the creation of the world's first seaplanes.
In 1908, the All-Russian Aero Club was opened in St. Petersburg.
However, the whole thing was lacking a necessary element, a high-ranking and enthusiastic “protector” capable of getting the funds and organize things on a big scale. Fortunately, by the 1807 [1] there was something of a “governmental crisis”. The ministers had been pissed off with the situation when one of them, and actually somewhat inferior in a rank, A director of the General Directorate of the Commercial Fleet and the Ports, the Great Duke Alexander Mikhailovich was, as a member of Imperial Family, more than a little bit more equal than them. It would probably be tolerable if he was just an “empty suit” but, unfortunately, he was quite energetic, competent and, by the functionality of his Directorate, on a regular basis getting at odds with the Finance Minister Witte and Minister of Interior Stolypin (the ports and commercial navigation meant customs and border guards, among many other points of contention).
On a comparative scale of the importance he was less important than these two figures and had to be gently removed, which was done by incorporating his Directorate into newly-created Ministry of Industry and Trade (which would remove him from a cabinet position), after which he resigned.
But now there was an obvious question what to do about him? Of course, being a rear-admiral, he could be sent back to the Black Sea Fleet but this would be undeserved reprimand unless the pill is sweetened. Besides, he was very useful, among other things as one of the main promoters of new naval program. So why not keeping him useful? Especially in a view of his well-known fascination with these new flying thingies? There were reports about them already being adopted by various armies and so far Russia was lagging behind. The Grand Duke was promoted into vice-admiral and made Inspector-General of the Imperial Aviation…
Intermission. OTL. From the memoirs of Alexander Mihailovich "...Minister of War, General. Sukhomlinov shook with laughter when I spoke to him about airplanes. - I understood you correctly, Your Highness, - he asked me between two bouts of laughter: - Are you going to use these Blerio toys in our army? ... - Don't worry, Your Excellency. I only ask you to give me a few officers who will go with me to Paris, where to teach them how to fly with Blériot and Voisin. As for the future, the one who laughs last laughs well. The sovereign gave me permission to travel to Paris of the officers I elected..."
He started with creation of the Officers School of Aviation in Sevastopol and, as soon as more planes had been purchased abroad, created on more in Training Aeronautical Park and continued creation of the new schools in various parts of the empire. The military establishment first switched from laughing to smirking and then did not smirk anymore: the whole thing became too serious, both because reports coming from the abroad could not be ignored and because “Sandro”, being quite friendly with “Nicky” and well-regarded by the Emperor as the most serious young member of the Family, could and did tell the right things to those who really mattered.
While flying was considered too risky for the heir to the throne, Tsesarevich personally visited the first graduation ceremony of the Sevastopol School of aviation, which was a great honor and unequivocal sign of the interest on a highest level. As Alexander Mikhailovich predicted, the one who laughs last laughs well, and he definitely had the last laugh.
In 1912 the aviation issues were withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Main Engineering Directorate and transferred to a specially created body - the Aeronautical Unit of the General Staff and the first 18 aviation units, 6 planes in each. Now, Russia needed more planes and the people capable of building and flying them.
The private aviation schools had been opening in a number of the big cities, one of the most popular was a school owned by a popular aviator, V.Lebedev. Among other students of his school was the first Russian female aviator, Princess Shakhovskaya, who was accepted in the Russian military aviation (on the photo below - sitting in Farman plane behind Lebedev)
Initially, the technical side had been handled by the tool-shops doing repairs of the imported foreign planes but starting from 1909 the plant of the "First All-Russian Aeronautics Association" began production of the biplane "Russia-A" of its own design. In the same year this plant produced its first hydroplane designed by D.P.Grigorovich.
At the same time company “Dux” in Moscow and St-Petersburg switched from bicycles and motorcycles to the planes production and opened the first in Russia full-scale airport.
In 1910 V. Lebedev decided to go commercial and, together with his brother, professor of the Mining Institute and an active member of the “First All-Russian Aeronautics Association" (specialist in aviation engines), with a financial help from St. Petersburg’s businessman Lomach and founded plane-building company “Lomach & Co”. C. A. Lebedev built Voisin-class aircraft in L, LA, LAS versions. His plant in Petrograd developed quite quickly, and employed 867 workers. Already in the first year of its existence, 47 different aircraft were built at the plant, in 1911 - 187, and in 1912 - 227 aircraft were handed over to customers. Later he opened new plants in Penza, Yaroslavl and Taganrog. In 1911 Lebedev signed a seemingly fantastic contract on making 225 planes “Lebed-XII” on his most modern plant in Taganrog.
The plane had a crew of two, speed 135 km/hr, maximum ceiling 3,500 meters. [2]
Obviously, the main interest of Grand Duke Alexander was in the military usage of the aviation, both by the army and the navy so, development of both the “usual” and hydroplanes had been getting his backing. However, a military usage assumed certain specific requirements regarding construction’s robustness and, while initially the intended functionality of these planes was exclusively reconnaissance (and the only weapons were the pistols of their pilots), the logical flow of the events led to the upgraded requirements. The planes would need the machine guns and there were experiments with the pilots throwing small bombs from them. So he was looking for the manufacturers ready and capable of designing and making these types of the planes. And an important pre-requisite was that all their components had to be produced, and preferably designed, in Russia. Which meant that the major producers must have their own technical design teams.
I. Sikorsky. After his “failed but important” experiments with the helicopters he switched to the planes design on “Russo-Balt”.
In 1912 he created his first 4 engine plane “Russian Vityaz” shortly followed by more robust “Ilya Muromets” intended to serve both as a passenger/cargo plane and as the world’s first heavy bomber.
This plane was accompanied by an escort-fighter S-16, one of the first aircraft to possed synchronisation gear [3] for its 7.7 mm machine gun.
The most promising figure in his bureau was a young engineer N. Polikarpov, who actively participated in Muromets and S-16 projects. It was clearly just a matter of a short time for him to grow into an independent figure.
_____________
[1] This date is 2 years behind OTL hut everything else is going to be ahead of the schedule.
[2] In OTL it was built in 1916-17 and plagued with the engine problems but ITTL I’m going to shrug off this issue (after all, in a peace time there is a lesser pressure and the engine issues could be fixed). The important thing is that Russia has reasonably mass production of warplanes. Strange as it may sound in 1914 RE did have the biggest air force in the world, 263 planes. But it had been plagued by a limited ability to produce its own engines and other parts and was relying upon the licenses, mostly of the outdated constructions.
[3] Enabling a single-engine configuration aircraft to fire its forward-firing armament through the arc of its spinning propeller without bullets striking the blades. This allowed the aircraft, rather than the gun, to be aimed at the target.
“The airplane stays up because it doesn't have the time to fall.”
Orville Wright
“The sky is about to become another battlefield no less important than the battlefields on land and sea....”
Giulio Douhet (Italian staff officer), 1909
“Only idiots applaud in two public places. In the cinema and on the plane when it lands."
Frederick Begbeder
“The Russian air fleet should be stronger than the air fleets of our neighbors. This should be remembered by everyone who cares about the military power of our Motherland.”
Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, "To the Russian People", magazine "Heavier than Air", 1912, No. 6.
Orville Wright
“The sky is about to become another battlefield no less important than the battlefields on land and sea....”
Giulio Douhet (Italian staff officer), 1909
“Only idiots applaud in two public places. In the cinema and on the plane when it lands."
Frederick Begbeder
“The Russian air fleet should be stronger than the air fleets of our neighbors. This should be remembered by everyone who cares about the military power of our Motherland.”
Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, "To the Russian People", magazine "Heavier than Air", 1912, No. 6.
Wings of the empire.
Officially, the Age of Aviation, if one disregards the lighter than air thingies, started in 1903. Or perhaps in 1895 when Zeppelin was patented in Germany. Of course, the Russians preferred to think that it started in 1880 when Mozhaisky patented his “air-flying device” powered by steam engine but there were no records about its successful testing
“The first flight of the airplane on the military field in Krasnoe Selo gave unimportant results: the device separated from the ground, but, being unstable, tilted to one side and broke the wing. There were no further experiments for lack of funds. Mozhaysky's apparatus is interesting as the first practical attempt to build a large airplane.”
After this the idea of heavier than air flying lost its popularity. However, in 1885 special Air Unit had been created to use the air balloons for the reconnaissance purposes. Starting from 1886 the unit started doing aerial photography and in 1890 the Training Aeronautical Park was created with the first Russian dirigibles being added to its equipment.
As everywhere else, the first airplanes appeared in Russia but at the beginning they were imported from France and Italy and mostly considered as the extravagant toys or a way to make money: in Odessa, the popular pilot, Utochkin, was hired to run the flying show with an explicit order to fly low within a fenced perimeter so that those who did not buy tickets would get a free show. The government first remained indifferent but then felt obliged to go with a tide:
"...In pursuance of this, the GIU ordered airplanes in France. Wright and Voisin... and at the same time purchased 7 gasoline engines to put them on airplanes and to test the suitability of various types of motors for such vehicles. The construction of five airplanes in the Training Aeronautical Park is coming to an end, and these airplanes will be tested by flying on the Gatchina Military Field..."
In 1904, an aerodynamic institute was established in Kuchino, headed by the Russian scientist Nikolai Zhukovsky, the creator of aerodynamics (and hydrodynamics). The Institute carried out work aimed at improving aviation equipment. At the same time, Russian designer Dmitry Grigorovich began his work on the creation of the world's first seaplanes.
In 1908, the All-Russian Aero Club was opened in St. Petersburg.
However, the whole thing was lacking a necessary element, a high-ranking and enthusiastic “protector” capable of getting the funds and organize things on a big scale. Fortunately, by the 1807 [1] there was something of a “governmental crisis”. The ministers had been pissed off with the situation when one of them, and actually somewhat inferior in a rank, A director of the General Directorate of the Commercial Fleet and the Ports, the Great Duke Alexander Mikhailovich was, as a member of Imperial Family, more than a little bit more equal than them. It would probably be tolerable if he was just an “empty suit” but, unfortunately, he was quite energetic, competent and, by the functionality of his Directorate, on a regular basis getting at odds with the Finance Minister Witte and Minister of Interior Stolypin (the ports and commercial navigation meant customs and border guards, among many other points of contention).
On a comparative scale of the importance he was less important than these two figures and had to be gently removed, which was done by incorporating his Directorate into newly-created Ministry of Industry and Trade (which would remove him from a cabinet position), after which he resigned.
But now there was an obvious question what to do about him? Of course, being a rear-admiral, he could be sent back to the Black Sea Fleet but this would be undeserved reprimand unless the pill is sweetened. Besides, he was very useful, among other things as one of the main promoters of new naval program. So why not keeping him useful? Especially in a view of his well-known fascination with these new flying thingies? There were reports about them already being adopted by various armies and so far Russia was lagging behind. The Grand Duke was promoted into vice-admiral and made Inspector-General of the Imperial Aviation…
Intermission. OTL. From the memoirs of Alexander Mihailovich "...Minister of War, General. Sukhomlinov shook with laughter when I spoke to him about airplanes. - I understood you correctly, Your Highness, - he asked me between two bouts of laughter: - Are you going to use these Blerio toys in our army? ... - Don't worry, Your Excellency. I only ask you to give me a few officers who will go with me to Paris, where to teach them how to fly with Blériot and Voisin. As for the future, the one who laughs last laughs well. The sovereign gave me permission to travel to Paris of the officers I elected..."
He started with creation of the Officers School of Aviation in Sevastopol and, as soon as more planes had been purchased abroad, created on more in Training Aeronautical Park and continued creation of the new schools in various parts of the empire. The military establishment first switched from laughing to smirking and then did not smirk anymore: the whole thing became too serious, both because reports coming from the abroad could not be ignored and because “Sandro”, being quite friendly with “Nicky” and well-regarded by the Emperor as the most serious young member of the Family, could and did tell the right things to those who really mattered.
While flying was considered too risky for the heir to the throne, Tsesarevich personally visited the first graduation ceremony of the Sevastopol School of aviation, which was a great honor and unequivocal sign of the interest on a highest level. As Alexander Mikhailovich predicted, the one who laughs last laughs well, and he definitely had the last laugh.
In 1912 the aviation issues were withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Main Engineering Directorate and transferred to a specially created body - the Aeronautical Unit of the General Staff and the first 18 aviation units, 6 planes in each. Now, Russia needed more planes and the people capable of building and flying them.
The private aviation schools had been opening in a number of the big cities, one of the most popular was a school owned by a popular aviator, V.Lebedev. Among other students of his school was the first Russian female aviator, Princess Shakhovskaya, who was accepted in the Russian military aviation (on the photo below - sitting in Farman plane behind Lebedev)
Initially, the technical side had been handled by the tool-shops doing repairs of the imported foreign planes but starting from 1909 the plant of the "First All-Russian Aeronautics Association" began production of the biplane "Russia-A" of its own design. In the same year this plant produced its first hydroplane designed by D.P.Grigorovich.
At the same time company “Dux” in Moscow and St-Petersburg switched from bicycles and motorcycles to the planes production and opened the first in Russia full-scale airport.
In 1910 V. Lebedev decided to go commercial and, together with his brother, professor of the Mining Institute and an active member of the “First All-Russian Aeronautics Association" (specialist in aviation engines), with a financial help from St. Petersburg’s businessman Lomach and founded plane-building company “Lomach & Co”. C. A. Lebedev built Voisin-class aircraft in L, LA, LAS versions. His plant in Petrograd developed quite quickly, and employed 867 workers. Already in the first year of its existence, 47 different aircraft were built at the plant, in 1911 - 187, and in 1912 - 227 aircraft were handed over to customers. Later he opened new plants in Penza, Yaroslavl and Taganrog. In 1911 Lebedev signed a seemingly fantastic contract on making 225 planes “Lebed-XII” on his most modern plant in Taganrog.
The plane had a crew of two, speed 135 km/hr, maximum ceiling 3,500 meters. [2]
Obviously, the main interest of Grand Duke Alexander was in the military usage of the aviation, both by the army and the navy so, development of both the “usual” and hydroplanes had been getting his backing. However, a military usage assumed certain specific requirements regarding construction’s robustness and, while initially the intended functionality of these planes was exclusively reconnaissance (and the only weapons were the pistols of their pilots), the logical flow of the events led to the upgraded requirements. The planes would need the machine guns and there were experiments with the pilots throwing small bombs from them. So he was looking for the manufacturers ready and capable of designing and making these types of the planes. And an important pre-requisite was that all their components had to be produced, and preferably designed, in Russia. Which meant that the major producers must have their own technical design teams.
I. Sikorsky. After his “failed but important” experiments with the helicopters he switched to the planes design on “Russo-Balt”.
In 1912 he created his first 4 engine plane “Russian Vityaz” shortly followed by more robust “Ilya Muromets” intended to serve both as a passenger/cargo plane and as the world’s first heavy bomber.
This plane was accompanied by an escort-fighter S-16, one of the first aircraft to possed synchronisation gear [3] for its 7.7 mm machine gun.
The most promising figure in his bureau was a young engineer N. Polikarpov, who actively participated in Muromets and S-16 projects. It was clearly just a matter of a short time for him to grow into an independent figure.
_____________
[1] This date is 2 years behind OTL hut everything else is going to be ahead of the schedule.
[2] In OTL it was built in 1916-17 and plagued with the engine problems but ITTL I’m going to shrug off this issue (after all, in a peace time there is a lesser pressure and the engine issues could be fixed). The important thing is that Russia has reasonably mass production of warplanes. Strange as it may sound in 1914 RE did have the biggest air force in the world, 263 planes. But it had been plagued by a limited ability to produce its own engines and other parts and was relying upon the licenses, mostly of the outdated constructions.
[3] Enabling a single-engine configuration aircraft to fire its forward-firing armament through the arc of its spinning propeller without bullets striking the blades. This allowed the aircraft, rather than the gun, to be aimed at the target.
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Author did you have any plan about isot story for no GNW if this timeline is finished, if you did no GNW Russia should isot into otl world after Russia invasion of Ukraine is begins for at least 2 months in order to have a interesting interaction with the world.
I feel like the invasion of Ukraine would be too modern politics and frankly cliche, its not like there's much of our history that would change with it considering how recent it was anyway
My vote for a ISOT would be during OTL WWI, like GNW Russia just crushes everyone involved in the Great War before being utterly confused and needing to get updated with centuries of our world's history
Then if you keep Germany in a butterfly net Hitler just shows up all revengy trying to show Russia who's the boss and just gets crushed again for our collective schadenfreude
My vote for a ISOT would be during OTL WWI, like GNW Russia just crushes everyone involved in the Great War before being utterly confused and needing to get updated with centuries of our world's history
Then if you keep Germany in a butterfly net Hitler just shows up all revengy trying to show Russia who's the boss and just gets crushed again for our collective schadenfreude
The reason i like Russia empire is isot during Ukraine invasion is Russia empire is having diplomatic struggle in world stage because they became alone in the world, nato and usa will not like re-emerge Russia,
trukey also block Russia from entering Mediterranean sea thus losing trade in south and China is also hate Russia for taking away their territory. Neutral nation also will not trust even Sweden in this world hate and distrust Russia no matter how Russia said it they are aillies in no GNW world.
trukey also block Russia from entering Mediterranean sea thus losing trade in south and China is also hate Russia for taking away their territory. Neutral nation also will not trust even Sweden in this world hate and distrust Russia no matter how Russia said it they are aillies in no GNW world.
How would Russia deal with the alt baltics from our world as well as Finland and the Caucasus that are part of otl russia but not TTL russia? They just can't give them back to Sweden in otl
I'd happily give all of Russia to Sweden IOTL but I guess the russians wouldnt be happy about that and its not like the swedish can do anything about it