298. Italy, Ethiopia, etc. #2
“Enemies have come who would ruin our country and change our religion. They have passed beyond the sea which God gave us as our frontier….These enemies have advanced, burrowing into the country like moles. With God’s help I will get rid of them.”
Menelik II
“…barbarians whose material progress and spiritual salvation cried out for the high ministry of Roman civilization”
Italian PM Crispi about the Ethiopians
“Die erste Kolonne marschiert... die zweite Kolonne marschiert... die dritte Kolonne marschiert.."
General Weyrother, battle plan for Austerlitz [1]
“Italy has a large appetite but poor teeth.”
Bismarck
“The Abyssinians are as good shots as any men in Africa, the Transvaal Boers not excepted.”
Augustus Wylde
“Emperor Menelik enters a desperate struggle with Italy for the existence of his state, its freedom and independence, wins a number of brilliant victories over his enemy and thereby proves in an irrefutable way that there is a black race in Africa that can stand up for itself and has all the data on an independent existence…Christian Abyssinia plays an excellent role in world progress as a transfer authority of European civilization to wild Central African peoples…. The high civilizational mission of Abyssinia, its centuries-old, almost continuous struggle for faith and freedom with the Muslims around us, the proximity of its people by confession - all this has long attracted Russian people to it.”
A. Bulatovich, “With the armies of Menelik II…” [2]
Ethiopia, 1895-1896
The Italian governor of Eritrea, General Oreste Baratieri, was not an idiot and by 1896 had reputation of the best Italian general [3] with a considerable fighting experience, first, under Garibaldi and then in Italian regular army. Based upon the length of his active service one would assume that he learned certain basic functions associated with the position of commander in chief. He also had bigger and better groomed mustaches than any of his subordinated generals. Probably, some faults could be written off on these mustaches: a considerable part of his daily activities would have to be dedicated to maintain their walrus-like appearance leaving limited time to other functions. [4] Anyway, he was seemingly more intelligent than his PM: while Crispi wanted to introduce “
Roman civilization” [5] in Ethiopia
with the minimal expenditures, Baratieri was planning just to keep Eritrea. Needless to say that his subordinate commanders had been on an aggressive side and the news of the coming dismissal due to not being aggressive enough also had been a factor in Barateri’s final decision.
But for now he was quite optimistic. Outside of Eritrea the Italians occupied a big part of Tigray and the news about, mostly Askari, force being whipped out could be considered as just a minor offset that did not noticeably diminish the earlier successes. For a while Baratieri was intended to maintain a defensive position holding the heights and waiting for the Ethiopians (those who still will be with Menelik) to come to him suffering from the food shortages and exposing themselves to the Italian fire. What could get wrong?
Actually, quite a few things were “wrong” from the very beginning.
Due to Menelik’s skillful diplomacy, not only all provincial rulers, including son of the late emperor, joined him with their armies but they were staying with him throughout the campaign. Last but not list, either on his own or by listening to Lebedev’s advice (credit was assigned based upon the sympathies of the authors of a narrative), Menelik opted for not attacking the Italians but instead forcing them either to retreat or to advance inland having all types of problems and allowing Menelik to chose time and place of a battle. Menelik organized his supply service so well that until the very end his soldiers did not have to eat the rations which they had been carrying with them. Only when campaign dragged for much longer than anticipated Ethiopian army started having the food shortages.
Italians had inadequate maps (if the primitive and inaccurate sketched could pass for the maps) , old-model guns, poor communication equipment and inferior footgear for the rocky ground. The newer
Carcano Model 91 rifles were not issued because Baratieri, under constraints to be economical, wanted to use up the old cartridges and his troops were armed with the old M1870/87 Italian Vetterli-Vitali 4-shots (pr even M1870 single shot rifles). Morale was low as the veterans were homesick and the newcomers were too inexperienced to have any esprit de corps. However, Baratieri got some high quality reinforcements: five Bersaglieri sharpshooter battalions and one Alpini mountain battalion. The units were armed with the latest in small-arms equipment, the 1891 Carcano bolt-action 6.5mm rifle, and in addition to the infantry, two field batteries, two machine guns, and a mortar battery. There were also up to 7,000 native Askari soldiers armed with single-shot Remington rifles.
There was a shortage of mules and saddles and, while he was waiting for Menelik coming to him, he was running out of food.
The Ethiopian Army started to move towards Adowa and the fort of Makallè was the only position held by the Italian Army on the road between Amba Alagi and Adowa. The fort was defended by Major Galliano with 21 officers, 54 Italians, 1150 Ascaris, 102 workers and 4 mountain guns. On the other side, the Ethiopian Army could deploy 12 guns with a greater range and two Italian mountain guns taken at Amba Alagi. These guns were placed in batteries in five different positions.
Personal comments.
I’m completely confused. Various descriptions keep mentioning Hotchkiss fast-fire 37 mm guns as having superior range to the Italian mountain artillery. As far as the ranges are inbolved, Hotchkiss fast-fire 37 mm gun had accuracy range of 2,000 yards (1,800 m). The Italians presumably had type 94B 75mm brass mountain guns which had range of 4,200 yards but the Osprey book says that at Adowa they “were silenced by Ethiopian ‘pom-poms’, which had greater accurate range”. Does this mean that these Italian guns had accuracy less than 2,000 yards? Can it be that the author is just a little bit “too knowledgeable” and misses a simple alternative? In the midst of a battle artillery on both sides was brought within a short distance to a real fighting and in that scenario the important thing would be not a range but a rate of fire in which Hotchkiss would greatly outperform the Italian counterpart, which, thanks to a primitive recoil system, had to be moved back to a firing position after each shot.
The siege started with an ill-advised frontal attack by Ras Makonnen’s warriors, which cost Ethiopians loss of 1,500 vs. only 4 Askari. Because of these losses, the Ethiopians did not attack anymore and decided to take the fort by thirst. Finally, on January 20th, when the final reserve of water has been already used, the surrender was negotiated: the troops of Major Galliano, according to the agreement reached, had to be escorted by Menelik and could join the Italian forces. On January 21st there was the formal surrender of the fort with military honors - Menelik was still hoping to resolve the conflict peacefully.
These events infuriated Crispi, who taunted his commanders for their incapacity and cowardice. He called the Ethiopians “rebels” who somehow owed allegiance to Italy. In Parliament Crispi was able to garner additional military appropriations by claiming that the troop movements were purely defensive and that the war in Ethiopia would be a profitable investment. Major Galliano was promoted Colonel, despite he would never be fully satisfied of this promotion, gained with a defeat.
The Ethiopian troops from Makallè were released after the advance of the Ethiopian Army towards Adowa at the end of January.
By late February 1896, the Italian army was entrenched around Mount Enticho in Tigray. Led by General Baratieri, who was just back from Rome (where he had been awarded the “Order of the Red Eagle”), 17,000 - 20,000 Italians and Italian-officered native auxiliaries [6] had waited for the Ethiopians to attack their fortified positions as they had done in previous battles. When such an attack did not occur, Baratieri ordered what he hoped would be a surprise attack on the Ethiopians assembled near Adwa. The defeat was unthinkable for a modern European army of such size with its disciplined and well-equipped formations. A decisive victory over the upstart natives would win a vast new empire for Italy. Unfortunately for Baratieri, he was maneuvering over unfamiliar terrain without accurate maps, relying upon ineffective intelligence, and leading troops “
garbed in uniforms designed for European winter” [7], a disastrous combination of ingredients. Taking into an account that his troops were staying in the area for months with no enemy nearby, not preparing the descent maps hardly could be blamed on anybody but himself and whoever was passing for his chief of staff, if he had one (if he did, such a person never appeared in the campaign’s descriptions). So why these people considered themselves “
a modern European army” is anybody’s guess.
On February 21st in the main camp of Saurià General Baratieri, held a council of war in order to decide the next steps. Three possible strategies were examined: an offensive in the hearth of Ethiopia; a passive defence, which wasn’t possible to realize because of the enemy mobility and the extension of the operational front and finally a manoeuvred defence. The Brigade commanders, Generals Arimondi, Dabormida, Albertone and Ellena, underestimating the enemy, supported the idea of an advance; there were false news of troubles in the Ethiopian army and disarray among their ranks. General Baratieri, under pressure from the Italian government in Rome, suggested a temporary retreat to increase the size of the army with the just arrived reinforcements, but he was not able to impose his decision to the other generals [8]. The operative orders were issued on 29th February; the troops, amounting a four Brigades, were divided into 4 columns and ordered to march toward the enemy.
On March 1st, the Italian army with less than four days’ worth of rations and even less water was getting close to the Ethiopian positions near Adwa Mountains. Oreste Baratieri, hoped to save his men from starvation by making an daring surprise assault on the much larger enemy force arrayed against them. At the dawn they were spotted by the Tirgrayan warriors of Ras Alula serving as frontline sentries while King Menelik and two-thirds of the Ethiopian army attended an Orthodox Christian mass at the nearby Church of Zion. Baratieri plan to attack while the Ethiopians are celebrating Saint George’s Day on March 1 failed.
Menelik’s army included his imperial bodyguard accounted for 30,000 soldiers, all armed with modern rifles, mail coats, light javelins, and curved swords known as
shotels. Empress Taitu augmented the bodyguard with an additional 3,000 infantry and 6,000 horsemen of her own.
Ras Makonnen came with 15,000 of his Oromo warriors, Ras Mikael - with 10,000 Wello cavalry and even Menelik’s sworn Tigrayan enemies, Ras Mengesh Yohannes and Ras Alula, pledged their 21,000-man army to the cause. With all other contingents Menelik had approximately 100-110,000 soldiers out of which 80,000 had the most modern rifles.
Italian battle plan “
called for three columns to march in parallel formation to the crests of three mountains – Dabormida commanding on the right, Albertone on the left, and Arimondi in the center – with a reserve under Ellena following behind Arimondi. The supporting crossfire each column could give the others made the 'soldiers as deadly as razored shears'. Albertone's brigade was to set the pace for the others. He was to position himself on the summit known as Kidane Mehret, which would give the Italians the high ground from which to meet the Ethiopians.”
Albertone had four
indigeni (Askari) battalions and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batteries, totaling 4,076 soldiers and 12 cannons. With his soldiers being much better adjusted to the local conditions (and being physically stronger) than the Italian troops his “setting the pace” resulting in his column being well ahead of others and, him having a rough sketch instead of a map, it also marched in a wrong direction leaving a gap of over 4 miles between him and other columns. In a happy ignorance of the situation he bumped into the Ethiopian vanguard of Ras Alula and was met with a terrible gunfire. A wild bayonet charge led by Colonel Domenico Turitto and the 1st Indigeni Battalion drove Alula from the hill, but Albertone’s men were still miles away from their true objective. Alula dispatched messengers to other Ethiopian commanders and first to join were Ras Mikael with his Wello cavalry and Ras Makonnen. Together, they employed an old Ethiopian technique of mountain warfare called
afena which involved encircling an enemy while artillery pounded him into submission. Under covering fire, the warriors advanced toward the center with the goal of engaging their foes in hand-to-hand combat
. Italiian artillerymen was firing effectively until Dejazmach Balcha Abba Nefo brought up the artillery [9] and decimated Albertone’s guns: all the men died on their places.
At 6:30am Baratieri scaled the heights of Mt. Raio and scanned the hills with his telescope. He did not like what he saw—Albertone’s brigades were missing. Baratieri dispatched messengers to locate the left column, but they never returned. Hmmm.. probably something was getting wrong.
At 6:45, Baratieri drafted a vague order for Dabormida’s right column to “join hands” with Albertone. Based on the cryptic message, Dabormida moved his entire force to the southeast, but Baratieri intended for him to send only a few units to locate Albertone. This disastrous miscommunication was the undoing of the entire Italian army. Dabormida packed up his column and wandered into a labyrinth of ravines, leaving the right flank completely exposed. Within an hour the major general was hopelessly lost. [10]
By 7:30 am, Albertone drafted an imperative message to Baratieri, telling him that his forces could not maintain their positions past 8:15. [11] Baratieri, however, did not receive this notice for another 45 minutes. By then, the message was not needed. A stream of fugitives running away from Menelik’s personal 30,000-man Showan bodyguard announced the destruction of the Italian left flank.
The center column’s 8th Battery opened fire on Albertone’s retreating forces in order to check the advances of Menelik’s bodyguard hitting both friend and foe. The Ethiopians seized the Spur of Belah, cutting off all communication with Dabormida’s lost right flank (up to that point it was just
lost but now it was
completely lost, see the difference?). Two companies of Bersaglieri sharpshooters under Colonel Lorenzo Compaino stormed the hill. With bayonets and rifle butts, the Bersaglieri collided with 10,000 Showans. The colonel was hit on a leg and for some time was performing some heroics with his sword staying one knee until he was struck by a spear. Only 40 Bersaglieri got back from the hill alive.
A reserve battalion was dispatched to relieve the Bersaglieri. Baratieri then ordered Ellena to bring up two quick-firing guns from the rear to support the center.
The good news were that Albertone’s left flank finally joined the center. The bad news were that this left flank was crumbling. Galliano with 1,200 Askari tried to hold position but his unit was cut to pieces Makonnen’s Oromo swordsmen. Albertone’s ordered retreat and remained behind with a handful of soldiers to protect his fleeing men. He was taken prisoner and most of his people were killed.
The Tigrayan armies of Alula and Mengesh Yohannes joined Menelik’s bodyguard and slammed into Arimondi’s center column. For a while their attack was held by the Italian artillery until it run out of shells. The Ethiopians charged with their swords. Baratieri sent his last reserves but this did not help. The center broke and Arimondi was fatally wounded. At 11am, as if this really matter, Baratieri officially ordered a retreat.
Danormida was left along, surrounded and most of his force had been trampled down by the Ethiopian cavalry.
The Italians had been retreating with an amazing speed: they reached Massawa in just two days. Over 70 percent of the Italian army was destroyed by Menelik’s monumental confederation. Casualties included 7,500 dead Italians, 7,100 slain Eritreans, 1,428 wounded, and 1,865 prisoners. the Ethiopians captured four million cartridges and fifty-six cannon. Ethiopian casualties were also appallingly high—some 7,000 dead and 10,000 wounded.
After the victory Menelik did not advance all the way to Massawa: with the newly-arrived reinforcements there were over 18,000 troops there in a strongly fortified position with an open supply line by the sea and his own army was exhausted and logistics of a long siege could be very difficult. He stopped at the Eritrean Highlands while Tigray and Wello troops occupied southern part of Eritrea.
In August 1896 the Italians agreed to the unconditional abrogation of the Treaty of Wuchale, and recognition of the sovereign independence of Ethiopia. Once the Italians had conceded on this point, negotiations proceeded quickly. The Italian prisoners-of-war, who had enjoyed "reasonably benign captivity" , would be repatriated, and Italy pay an indemnity of 10,000,000
Italian liras for their upkeep. The Italians retained provinces Massawa and Sahil and Dahlak Archipelago. What Menelik explicitly refused to put into a treaty was an obligation not to place himself under anybody else’s “protection”.
As a token of a continued mutual friendship, Russia got a permission to establish a refueling station in the port of Asab.
Egged on by Italy’s defeat, European nations rushed to conclude treaties with Menelik’s government. Indeed, 1896 became the “year of the ferenj” in Ethiopia. Expatriate traders flocked in and spearheaded the acceleration of economic activities. In record numbers, European governments set up consulates throughout the country and aided foreign merchants and investors in seeking concessions and royalties. Ethiopians basked in national pride and a sense of independence and its admission into the Red Cross Society was another sign of acceptance into the family of nations.
Italy.
What Menelik had demonstrated was that he had the power to defy any European imperialists. The defeat at Adwa brought Italy its greatest humiliation since unification and genuinely demoralized the Italian public. Their string of relatively easy colonial victories, the first their army had attained, came to an abrupt and shocking end. Political leaders had not prepared the populace for defeat in Africa, let alone a total disaster. “All is saved except honor” proclaimed the Tribuna. Stunned crowds outside of Parliament shouted, cheered, cursed, hissed, howled, and groaned. Some were heard to cry, “Long live Menelik!” All available Italian transport steamers were ordered to assemble at Naples “to take troops to Massawa.” It was rumored that Baratieri planned a military coup to rehabilitate his reputation before Baldissera superseded him. Church fathers were described as being delighted at the failure of the “Satanic” Italian armies that had paid the wages of a divine vendetta at Adwa.
Crispi’s political career was shattered as was the nation’s colonial ambition that he had come to personify. Hailed as the greatest parliamentary statesman of Italy, the seventy-seven-year-old Prime Minister was recognized as one of the chief political figures of Europe. Crispi was acclaimed as the most important Italian and was the only Premier who really captured the nation’s imagination. His impulsiveness marred his career, and his actions all too often were “neither informed by knowledge nor controlled by sound judgment.” His ideas were grandiose beyond the resources of the country. As the New York Times editorialized, “his greatest mistake [was] in supposing the attention of the Italian people could be successfully diverted from domestic scandals by foreign embroilments.”
Outside Italy the whole thing had been causing a considerable gloating with a good deal of the usual moralization. The New York Times ran front-page stories with consecutive day headlines heralding “Italy’s Terrible Defeat,” “Italy is Awe-Struck,” “Italy Like Pandemonium,” and “Italy’s Wrathful Mobs.” An editorial on March 5, 1896, opined, “
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia…was a mere piece of piracy…an enterprise unrighteous. In truth, the Italian ‘colonial expansion’…is not founded on fact or reason, and has nothing to say for itself in the form of morals and of civilization. It is no more businesslike than it is moral…It is not on business but for the glory that they go to war.”
____________
[1] Or Italian plan for battle of Adwa translated to German… 😉
[2] Bulatovich was drawing parallels with the Russian “civilizing mission” in the CA and also was making a point that the direct contacts of various “natives” with more advanced westerners were, typically, disastrous for the natives. So,
in his view, by conquering his neighbors (after defeat of the Italians) Menelik was providing a more gradual approach to “spreading civilization” in Africa. It seems that his book and theories found a warm reception in Russian Empire.
[3] I wonder if being “best of the worst” can be considered a compliment.
[4] Crispi also had huge mustaches but they looked less groomed. Well, to be fair, in the mustaches area Kitchener would be at least an equal competitor but he tended to operate slowly and methodically having considerable resources and leaving little to a chance and thus having plenty of time for all important daily functions. Of course, this is just an empiric theory not backed by any scientific research. 😜
[5] I wonder what exactly Crispi & Co had to do with “Roman civilization”? AFAIK, none of them had been wearing toga, they did not talk in Latin, ethnic link to the ancient Romans was quite tenuous at best, the army was a laughingstock of Europe, the roads were bad, the government institutions were noticeably different and so was the food, the literature unimpressive and the list is going on. Why can’t the people be proud enough of simply being themselves?
[6] According to M.Campai, «The italian áscaris. From Agordat to Adowa», “551 officers, 7823 national infantrymen (mostly the worst privates sent by the national regiments to clean up the rosters and not fully acclimatized to the country), 1520 artillerymen, 6790 Ascaris and band warriors, including 400 Artillery Ascaris.”
[7] Neither depictions nor photos of that campaign (at least those I could find on the web) show Italians in the overcoats except for a photo showing the wounded transported to a hospital in
Naples (below
) . It is possible to assume that they got the overcoats on a departure.
[8] An army commander can’t “impose” his decision upon the subordinates … There were definitely the most interesting notions of a discipline in the Italian army of that time and it looks like they were spreading from top to bottom.
[9] According to wiki, “
Russian advisor Leonid Artamonov wrote that it comprised forty-two Russian mountain guns supported by a team of fifteen advisers.” Wiki’s reference is to Artamonov’s biography which does not contain that claim but wiki also points out that “
British writers suggest that the Ethiopian guns were Hotchkiss and Maxim pieces captured from the Egyptians or purchased from French and other European suppliers”. Actually, it points to a single British author (book in Osprey series) who wrote “
It is unclear what types of cannon were used, but sources agree that they were a mix of older guns bought or captured from various sources. They included Krupps, and mountain guns captured from the Egyptians when they tried to take Ethiopian territory in 1875 and 1876, or left behind when the Egyptian garrison evacuated Harar in 1885.” Regarding Adowa he wrote “
More effective [in a battle] were the several automatic cannon that Menelik brought to Adowa. A detailed listing is unavailable, but Maxim weapons are mentioned, and perhaps six were 37mm Hotchkiss pieces.” Which has nothing to do with a range or existence of bigger guns. Now, as far as the Russian artillery is involved, at that time Russian army widely used Krupp guns so there is no contradiction. Typical wiki’s sloppy work.
[10] So am I: how the right column would be able to do <whatever> with the left column with the center and reserve being on its way? I’m completely lost in the tactics involved. 😪
[11] What if he would get an order to hold until 8:17?
en.m.wikipedia.org
