No German involvement in North Africa - Effect on Eastern Front?

No German involvement in North Africa - Effect on Eastern Front?

  • Germany can plausibly defeat the USSR

    Votes: 6 10.9%
  • Germany performs better but still loses

    Votes: 40 72.7%
  • Involvement in Africa was a good decision

    Votes: 9 16.4%

  • Total voters
    55

Wendigo

Banned
What if in 1941 Germany never got involved in North Africa to bail out the Italians and so could have used the resources spent there instead for Operation Barbarossa and future campaigns in the East?

Would this be enough to turn the tide against the Soviets and knock them out of the war?

What about no involvement in North Africa plus no invasion of the Balkans?
 

Minty_Fresh

Banned
The troops used and lost in Africa were a fraction of those lost in 1941 alone for the Germans. Having Rommel in the East would help, as would having the troops sent to Africa, but it wasn't anywhere near being decisive if put in the East.
 
The troops used and lost in Africa were a fraction of those lost in 1941 alone for the Germans. Having Rommel in the East would help, as would having the troops sent to Africa, but it wasn't anywhere near being decisive if put in the East.
also this opens up the underbelly of Europe, and at the same time provides less distraction for western allies
 
The Italians would have lost control of the Med by end 41- mid 42 the latest

This frees up mega tonnage of effective shipping as ships are no longer obliged to go around the Horn

Italy effectively defeated in the Med would likely have a knock on effect for the Attitudes of Portugal, Spain, possibly Turkey but certainly Vichy French Colonies

Also the Japanese would face more than a half dozen or so poor brigades in Malaya plus with Italy knocked out a much greater RN fleet can be sent East

I wonder how a Ha-Go 95 and 97 likes a Matilda II or Valentine ;)

Britain no longer having to support a major campaign in the desert + the logistical dividend probably means far more LL for Russia earlier than OTL

As for Germany gaining the talents of Rommel in the east - he's a very good Divisional Commander an ok Corps Commander I think he would make a poor Army commander

They had better hope someone else is handling his logistics if he became one!
 

Deleted member 1487

What if in 1941 Germany never got involved in North Africa to bail out the Italians and so could have used the resources spent there instead for Operation Barbarossa and future campaigns in the East?

Would this be enough to turn the tide against the Soviets and knock them out of the war?

What about no involvement in North Africa plus no invasion of the Balkans?
What happens in North Africa without the Germans there? The Balkans would need some German involvement, at least in Yugoslavia, because the Brits cultivated the dissent to the joining of the Axis, which meant no matter what Yugoslavia was revolting and required an Axis invasion. Perhaps the Italians don't attack Greece in this scenario, seize Malta, and can maintain their position on the border of Libya-Egypt, which prevents the German involvement in North Africa.

So if we assume then no Greece/Crete and no North Africa then Barbarossa is a lot more powerful. 2nd and 5th Panzer division wouldn't be stuck in Greece and lose their equipment in a transport sinking preventing them from participating in Barbarossa. The German occupation divisions/wrecked divisions in Greece wouldn't happen (5th Mountain, 7th Flieger). Ju52 transports wouldn't be decimated. VIII Fliegerkorps wouldn't be worn down. There is a lot less wear and tear on German forces due to no Greece. Rommel's corps is available. So Germany is actually quite a bit more powerful in the East without Greece and North Africa. If Rommel and the German paras are applied to AG-North then Leningrad probably falls in July 1941, which could be a game changer in terms of Moscow falling. It certainly changes a ton down the road for the Eastern Front. Murmansk likely falls thereafter, AG-North can draw supply via Leningrad except in winter, the northern front shuts down. LL via the Arctic route is now impossible. 4th Panzer Group is freed up early to fight around Moscow. There is no August-September diversion to attack Leningrad, which means the Soviet attacks in front of Smolensk in August-September are a LOT more costly to the Soviets, so Taifun is easier.

Even taking Moscow in 1941 wouldn't finish the Soviets off without killing Stalin, so the war will continue, but the Soviets will be in a much worse place than IOTL and the Germans in a better one. What that means in a longer war in terms of the Soviet ability to survive or win it tough to say, but if Moscow falls in 1941 it will be more a matter of survival than victory for the Soviets going forward.
 
What happens in North Africa without the Germans there? The Balkans would need some German involvement, at least in Yugoslavia, because the Brits cultivated the dissent to the joining of the Axis, which meant no matter what Yugoslavia was revolting and required an Axis invasion. Perhaps the Italians don't attack Greece in this scenario, seize Malta, and can maintain their position on the border of Libya-Egypt, which prevents the German involvement in North Africa.

So if we assume then no Greece/Crete and no North Africa then Barbarossa is a lot more powerful. 2nd and 5th Panzer division wouldn't be stuck in Greece and lose their equipment in a transport sinking preventing them from participating in Barbarossa. The German occupation divisions/wrecked divisions in Greece wouldn't happen (5th Mountain, 7th Flieger). Ju52 transports wouldn't be decimated. VIII Fliegerkorps wouldn't be worn down. There is a lot less wear and tear on German forces due to no Greece. Rommel's corps is available. So Germany is actually quite a bit more powerful in the East without Greece and North Africa. If Rommel and the German paras are applied to AG-North then Leningrad probably falls in July 1941, which could be a game changer in terms of Moscow falling. It certainly changes a ton down the road for the Eastern Front. Murmansk likely falls thereafter, AG-North can draw supply via Leningrad except in winter, the northern front shuts down. LL via the Arctic route is now impossible. 4th Panzer Group is freed up early to fight around Moscow. There is no August-September diversion to attack Leningrad, which means the Soviet attacks in front of Smolensk in August-September are a LOT more costly to the Soviets, so Taifun is easier.

Even taking Moscow in 1941 wouldn't finish the Soviets off without killing Stalin, so the war will continue, but the Soviets will be in a much worse place than IOTL and the Germans in a better one. What that means in a longer war in terms of the Soviet ability to survive or win it tough to say, but if Moscow falls in 1941 it will be more a matter of survival than victory for the Soviets going forward.

Why does any change in the situation in the Med / North Africa theatre somehow always result in Malta being seized!

In this scenario the Axis are far weaker particularly in air power - yet are now able to somehow 'Seize Malta'

And how does the same force that was comprehensively routed from the Egypt / Libyan boarder now somehow maintain its position?

As for actual troops - during the initial assault into Russia - Rommel had 5th light (later 21st Panzer) and 15th Panzer in Africa + support troops - the majority of his troops were Italian.

As for your revised timetable of subsequent events - I think its 'optimistic' and why would Rommel - who would be 'just another Corps Commander' in the East have such an impact relative to his peers?
 

Deleted member 1487

Why does any change in the situation in the Med / North Africa theatre somehow always result in Malta being seized!
In this scenario the Axis are far weaker particularly in air power - yet are now able to somehow 'Seize Malta'
Apparently there is a misunderstanding, so let me clarify: I'm not saying that Malta falls as a result of changes, it is a part of the changes that need to happen to have the Germans not need to show up in the Medditeranean. Though if there is no Greek campaign and the Italians put those resources into an early effort to take Malta then Malta falls due to that change, as it was not ready for invasion in June 1940.

And how does the same force that was comprehensively routed from the Egypt / Libyan boarder now somehow maintain its position?
No Greek invasion and an Italian effort in June to take Malta. Freeing up resources from all of their historical diversions to put into Libya to make that work. It wouldn't have been that hard to stop the Brits, Operation Compass had only something like 30k men committed and it came after the Greek diversion.

As for actual troops - during the initial assault into Russia - Rommel had 5th light (later 21st Panzer) and 15th Panzer in Africa + support troops - the majority of his troops were Italian.
One additional Panzer corps attached to AG-North would be a major tipping point when backed up by the Fallschirmjager and their transports not lost in Crete. A para drop on Riga on day one would decapitate the Soviet Northwestern Front and effectively render them headless for a critical week. Having Rommel able to rush then to Riga and up through Estonia would put him at the decisive point on the Luga line when he moves beyond Narwa. Plus the Estonian move opens the Baltic ports months early. With the hundreds of Ju52s not lost at Crete there is enormous airlift capacity to allow Rommel and Rheinhardt's corps to cut loose of ground supply and reach Leningrad before defenses can be set up.

As for your revised timetable of subsequent events - I think its 'optimistic' and why would Rommel - who would be 'just another Corps Commander' in the East have such an impact relative to his peers?
Because in specific areas 1 additional corps would make all the difference to the campaign. With AG-North it would allow a rapid move up Estonia rather than letting the foot bound 18th army take two months to clear it out. A hard charger like Rommel could take advantage of the Soviet disorder early in the campaign to move up it before Soviet lines gelled with the aid of the German paras and their Ju52s for air supply. Then opening the Estonian ports to Baltic shipping would seriously help with logistics. Plus Rommel IOTL in 1941 had 10% of Germany's trucks for his theater transport due to the lack of rail transport from the ports to the front. So logistically having the Afrika Korps in the East means a major enhancement to the strategic truck lift capacity of the German army and AG-North's ability to move more rapidly thanks to not having to wait for supplies as much due to greater truck supply capacity.
 
One additional Panzer corps attached to AG-North would be a major tipping point when backed up by the Fallschirmjager and their transports not lost in Crete.

While this possibility is intriguing, I still believe the best German move would be to boost the strength of AG South by placing the additional troops in Romania.
Principally because the likelihood of inflicting much larger casualties on the Red Army in the first two weeks was greater there.
And the ripple effects of that could be felt to a great extent in both AG Center and AG North in the second half of July.
 

Deleted member 1487

While this possibility is intriguing, I still believe the best German move would be to boost the strength of AG South by placing the additional troops in Romania.
Principally because the likelihood of inflicting much larger casualties on the Red Army in the first two weeks was greater there.
And the ripple effects of that could be felt to a great extent in both AG Center and AG North in the second half of July.
The ability to get strategic results though is seriously lacking. Sure you could inflict more casualties, but what does that get you when most of those guys were wiped out anyway? Rostov wasn't taken due to logistics and more Panzers aren't going to take Odessa or Sevastpol any sooner. In the North you could get strategic effects, in the south just tactical ones.
 
Apparently there is a misunderstanding, so let me clarify: I'm not saying that Malta falls as a result of changes, it is a part of the changes that need to happen to have the Germans not need to show up in the Medditeranean. Though if there is no Greek campaign and the Italians put those resources into an early effort to take Malta then Malta falls due to that change, as it was not ready for invasion in June 1940


No Greek invasion and an Italian effort in June to take Malta. Freeing up resources from all of their historical diversions to put into Libya to make that work. It wouldn't have been that hard to stop the Brits, Operation Compass had only something like 30k men committed and it came after the Greek diversion.

The Italians always had their eye on the Balkans - that was their prize - their sphere of influence

They had been bullying Greece for years why suddenly stop now that the world is pre-occupied and unable / unlikely to do anything about it?

Also not having units meshed in a Greek adventure does not 'auto seize Malta' as the number of specialised troops capable of such an assault and amount of necessary specialist equipment does not change if the Italians have abandoned their designs on the Balkans

The only way in which Italy is invading Malta in 1940 / 41 is via a administrative landing i.e. unopposed which is highly unlikely to occur

Can Italy - without massively upgrading the coastal rail line and port facilities in Cyrenaica - maintain more forces than it did historically?

I don't think that it can.

And anyway why would they - the British only had 36,000 men in theatre (that in Egypt Aug 40) - the Italians have 150,000 (in Cyrenaica) and out number the British 2:1 in the air, 2+:1 in tanks and 15:1 in artillery.

I know the British are good - but come on ;)


One additional Panzer corps attached to AG-North would be a major tipping point when backed up by the Fallschirmjager and their transports not lost in Crete. A para drop on Riga on day one would decapitate the Soviet Northwestern Front and effectively render them headless for a critical week. Having Rommel able to rush then to Riga and up through Estonia would put him at the decisive point on the Luga line when he moves beyond Narwa. Plus the Estonian move opens the Baltic ports months early. With the hundreds of Ju52s not lost at Crete there is enormous airlift capacity to allow Rommel and Rheinhardt's corps to cut loose of ground supply and reach Leningrad before defenses can be set up.


Because in specific areas 1 additional corps would make all the difference to the campaign. With AG-North it would allow a rapid move up Estonia rather than letting the foot bound 18th army take two months to clear it out. A hard charger like Rommel could take advantage of the Soviet disorder early in the campaign to move up it before Soviet lines gelled with the aid of the German paras and their Ju52s for air supply. Then opening the Estonian ports to Baltic shipping would seriously help with logistics. Plus Rommel IOTL in 1941 had 10% of Germany's trucks for his theater transport due to the lack of rail transport from the ports to the front. So logistically having the Afrika Korps in the East means a major enhancement to the strategic truck lift capacity of the German army and AG-North's ability to move more rapidly thanks to not having to wait for supplies as much due to greater truck supply capacity.

All this requires a high quality working crystal ball and assumes that nothing goes wrong with what would be an early mass parachute drop - which even late war had a tendency to go badly wrong.

And Rommel going off half cocked - nicking other units supplies is going to get boring very quickly and his superiors are not going to stand for it - he would get reigned in PDQ on the Eastern Front.

He is just another Corps Commander in 1941 and certainly not their best

Also the defences of Leningrad were started a Week after the invasion of Russia - I say they still get stopped 100 KMs short come end of July as OTL
 
Sorry for the double post, but I need one post to point out that the question in the original post was "what if the Germans didn't commit resources to North Africa." It wasn't "what if they didn't intervene in the Balkans etc." My other post will try to answer the original question.

I just realized that there is an AH tradition that any change in the situation in the Med in World War II results in the Axis taking Malta, sort of like Barack Obama always becoming President.
 
The Germans committed something like two panzer divisions to North Africa, plus lots of Luftwaffe support, both for combat support and to protect the long supply line. Also some of the gas they required could have been used in Russia, and then you have Rommel.

First, take the situation in Russia. To take things in reverse, Rommel could have been a panzer corps commander at the start of Barbarossa. Rommel was very good, but so were the IOTL panzer corps commanders they had. Someone will have to point out which of the IOTL panzer corps commanders would have resulted in a clear upgrade from Rommel. And I'm not sure how much the massive logistics effort to support the Afrika Korps was transferable. Obviously the shipping wasn't, but the oil itself and maybe the trucks could have been used elsewhere. The two divisions aren't much, maybe their best use is as a source of spare parts and replacements, but some of the Russian campaigns were close enough that every little bit helped.

The big deal is the LUftwaffe commitment. That could have been the game changer in Russia. Imagine the additional trains, trucks, and oil used in Case Blue. Its tempting to just switch Rommel with Paulus, but again that is not as much as an upgrade as it appears, and even though Paulus was considered for North Africa there are really too many butterflies to consider with using Rommel in Russia. He might have been sacked along with the others in December 1941. He might have gotten himself killed. He might have been assigned to Army Groups Center or North. He could have been an army group chief of staff, or wound up at OHL.

With North Africa, yes as happened elsewhere Hitler thought he had to bail Mussolini out. But the British always had problems taking Tripoli for the exact same reason the DAK could never get past El Alamein, logistices. The British at least had a railway from Egypt that eventually went to Tobruk, but there is still a long distance to cover by truck supply, with the usual difficulties for doing that. They had perfectly good reasons for not going for Tripoli after Compass, and why they took almost three months to get there in 1942-3. I think the Italians could have held out on their own for months if they concentrated on defending the place, and sent a competent commander there, though this may be too much to ask for the Italians.

If the additional resources committed in Russia make the difference with Case Blue, then the British are shutting down whatever they have going on in Libya and sending everything to make sure Baku holds out.

An interesting variant is that the Italian 8th Army isn't sent to Russia and is used to defend Tripoli instead. This would have made more sense than what happened IOTL (and what actually happened wasn't exactly planned that way, it was one thing feeding into another). Ambrosio was one of their few competent generals. Now the Germans are behind in manpower in Russia in 1942 compared with IOTL, but I think the additional air support more than makes up for that.
 
The ability to get strategic results though is seriously lacking. Sure you could inflict more casualties, but what does that get you when most of those guys were wiped out anyway? Rostov wasn't taken due to logistics and more Panzers aren't going to take Odessa or Sevastpol any sooner. In the North you could get strategic effects, in the south just tactical ones.

That's were the ripple effects come into play. One such scenario might be something akin to the following:

Lets assume as a starter that they strengthen the forces in Romania with a small panzergroup, some additional infantry as well as a greater Luftwaffe presence.
And launch an attack into Besserabia on the 22nd.

(1) The direct consequence of such a move might resemble AG North's advance into Lithuania.
The Axis gains operational freedom while inflicting close to 100k soviet casualties up until 7.July as opposed to the OTL ~15k. With the additional Soviet loss of the 3 Mech corps in the area (2,16,18).

(2) Furthermore, by early July, you would then have two panzer groups with operational freedom, and a lot of Soviet troops in between. At some point, these two pincers will close and encircle a number of Soviet troops. How many is very difficult to quantify, since it depends on a lot of factors. But it's probably going to be a 6-digit number.

(3) In early July, the 16th and 19th Armies (about 150k troops and 1000 tanks) were ordered to leave the Ukraine and head for the Western Front. In ATL, I believe (1)+(2) will result in these units staying in the south to prevent the front line from collapsing.

(4) Now, lets move a bit north and look at the battle of Smolensk.
In OTL, this battle didn't go as smoothly as the Germans had hoped. It dragged out all the way to 5.Aug (German definition) and failed to produce any great encirclements. In the second half of the battle, the German mobile troops also had to fend off attacks from the soviet third strategic echelon, which caused a lot pain.

But it did come close to producing a major victory.

Glantz puts the number of troops in the Western Front at 579k on 10.July.
Remove 16A+19A from that, and the Soviet chance of keeping the Germans at bay drops dramatically (especially considering that not all of the Western Front troops were in the path of the German attack, but most of 16A+19A were). This stays true even if we allow for some other Soviet reinforcement getting there instead (41st RC for instance).
In fact, the likely outcome would be for the pincers to close around Smolensk on about 15.July. In addition to a more successful operation in the Nevel direction. And with major combat operations ending at the end of July.

(5) In order to deal with these losses, the Soviets probably keep the 34th Army in the Western Front (were it started it's career) instead of sending it north in early August.

(6) In OTL, the Soviets took advantage of AG Norths weak eastern flank on two occasions (Soltsy and Staraia Russa).
Without the 41st RC and 34 Army, the success of these operations can be put in question.
I seem to remember Glantz estimated that both of these counterstrokes delayed the German advance on Leningrad by roughly 10 days each.


Thus, by 10. August, the situation might look something like this.
In AG North, the Germans have reached the city (6).
In AG South, with the force correlation moving in Axis direction by mid July due to (1),(2),(3), they have performed somewhat better in the following month. And are thus in a great position moving forward.
In AG Center, due to (4),(5), the Germans have enjoyed a ~10-day rest/refit period, and are getting ready to strike again. Only, this time, the great strategic debate about where to strike doesn't happen. With the situation in the south and north under control, the Germans are headed due east.


In summary, I'm going by the assumption that the Soviets were mobilizing troops as fast as possible during July/August (although they probably had the capability to raise some additional very low quality militia units...).
Given this, if they lose say 250k additional troops in the opening stage of the invasion, they will have to fight with 250k fewer troops in July/August.
I'm also going by the assumption that this troop reduction would be felt all across the front line, and not only in the southern sector. Among them, on the eastern flank of AG North and around Smolensk.

Which provides for the strategic implications.
 
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