The ability to get strategic results though is seriously lacking. Sure you could inflict more casualties, but what does that get you when most of those guys were wiped out anyway? Rostov wasn't taken due to logistics and more Panzers aren't going to take Odessa or Sevastpol any sooner. In the North you could get strategic effects, in the south just tactical ones.
That's were the ripple effects come into play. One such scenario might be something akin to the following:
Lets assume as a starter that they strengthen the forces in Romania with a small panzergroup, some additional infantry as well as a greater Luftwaffe presence.
And launch an attack into Besserabia on the 22nd.
(1) The direct consequence of such a move might resemble AG North's advance into Lithuania.
The Axis gains operational freedom while inflicting close to 100k soviet casualties up until 7.July as opposed to the OTL ~15k. With the additional Soviet loss of the 3 Mech corps in the area (2,16,18).
(2) Furthermore, by early July, you would then have two panzer groups with operational freedom, and a lot of Soviet troops in between. At some point, these two pincers will close and encircle a number of Soviet troops. How many is very difficult to quantify, since it depends on a lot of factors. But it's probably going to be a 6-digit number.
(3) In early July, the 16th and 19th Armies (about 150k troops and 1000 tanks) were ordered to leave the Ukraine and head for the Western Front. In ATL, I believe (1)+(2) will result in these units staying in the south to prevent the front line from collapsing.
(4) Now, lets move a bit north and look at the battle of Smolensk.
In OTL, this battle didn't go as smoothly as the Germans had hoped. It dragged out all the way to 5.Aug (German definition) and failed to produce any great encirclements. In the second half of the battle, the German mobile troops also had to fend off attacks from the soviet third strategic echelon, which caused a lot pain.
But it did come close to producing a major victory.
Glantz puts the number of troops in the Western Front at 579k on 10.July.
Remove 16A+19A from that, and the Soviet chance of keeping the Germans at bay drops dramatically (especially considering that not all of the Western Front troops were in the path of the German attack, but most of 16A+19A were). This stays true even if we allow for some other Soviet reinforcement getting there instead (41st RC for instance).
In fact, the likely outcome would be for the pincers to close around Smolensk on about 15.July. In addition to a more successful operation in the Nevel direction. And with major combat operations ending at the end of July.
(5) In order to deal with these losses, the Soviets probably keep the 34th Army in the Western Front (were it started it's career) instead of sending it north in early August.
(6) In OTL, the Soviets took advantage of AG Norths weak eastern flank on two occasions (Soltsy and Staraia Russa).
Without the 41st RC and 34 Army, the success of these operations can be put in question.
I seem to remember Glantz estimated that both of these counterstrokes delayed the German advance on Leningrad by roughly 10 days each.
Thus, by 10. August, the situation might look something like this.
In AG North, the Germans have reached the city (6).
In AG South, with the force correlation moving in Axis direction by mid July due to (1),(2),(3), they have performed somewhat better in the following month. And are thus in a great position moving forward.
In AG Center, due to (4),(5), the Germans have enjoyed a ~10-day rest/refit period, and are getting ready to strike again. Only, this time, the great strategic debate about where to strike doesn't happen. With the situation in the south and north under control, the Germans are headed due east.
In summary, I'm going by the assumption that the Soviets were mobilizing troops as fast as possible during July/August (although they probably had the capability to raise some additional very low quality militia units...).
Given this, if they lose say 250k additional troops in the opening stage of the invasion, they will have to fight with 250k fewer troops in July/August.
I'm also going by the assumption that this troop reduction would be felt all across the front line, and not only in the southern sector. Among them, on the eastern flank of AG North and around Smolensk.
Which provides for the strategic implications.