I've always doubted the plausibility of this equation. Even if the Germans didn't invade Belgium, wouldn't the British have joined later, given the fact that this war was not just on a continental European scale, but a colonial one as well?
No. Without an invasion of Belgium and a general defensive stance of Germany in the west (=no DoW and attack on France) it is far more likely that Britain would have stayed neutral.
Here are the reasons why:
That the UK would have gone to war regardless of the violation of Belgian neutrality is a myth I have debunked several times. Here is why:
Even in OTL with not the best relations between Germany and the UK, the majority of the cabinet and a significant portion of MPs were against an entry into the war without an acceptable casus belli. Actually there was only one member of the cabinet who supported intervention under any circumstances, and that was Churchill. Asquith and Grey both leaned towards intervention, but saw the difficulties in selling this to the public and the parliament, the latter being a very important factor since the UK was a democracy and without parliamentary consent an entry into the war was impossible. Maybe Crewe could be counted towards the pro-intervention faction, too, but his stance on the subject is much more spiffy.
Although Bonar Law, the leader of the Unionists, supported immediate intervention and in the end Asquith, Grey and Churchill (and maybe Crewe) did that, too, they did it not all with the same fervour. Asquith's priority was the unity of his government, of the cabinet and the party. As Asquith argued to Samuel and Pease:
"The National situation is far from ordinary and I cannot persuade myself that the other party is led by men, or contains men, capable of dealing with it."
And furthermore :
“I suppose a good number of our own party in the House of Commons are for absolute non-interference. It will be a shocking thing if at such a moment we break up.“
Grey had already mentioned that he might be willing under certain circumstances to let Britain stay aside. That is if British interests were not touched. Grey thought that the British public would not have been willing to go to war for Russia and he always emphasised that if France get into the war because of Russia it was their own fault. If Germany had taken a neutral stance in the west, that is neither invading Belgium nor attacking over the French border, Grey might very well had lived with that.
Grey threatened resignation only for the case that the cabinet would support unconditional neutrality, which the cabinet had not. Only Churchill was quiet adamant on intervention regardless of the situation.
If Asquith had really decided to go with the Conservatives, I am not sure he would have had a majority in parliament. Most likely only Churchill and Grey would have followed him. Lloyd George then would have led the vast majority of the cabinet, including a large portion of the Liberal party which could have also relied on Labour's support (which would have even gone further). Lloyd George was a quiet influential figure in the Liberal party and would have been a formidable opponent. Either way such an entry would have been difficult to sell to the public, would have sparked lots of heated debates and a government of national unity would have been difficult to promote under these circumstances. Not to say what would have happened, if those in the know had revealed Grey's secret dealings with the French up to and including to send a BEF to the continent.
Besides that according to
Thirteenth Days by Clive Ponting, although the possibility of a coalition of Liberal Imperialists and Conservatives was known it had not become an issue in the discussion and thus might not have been considered seriously at all:
2nd August: “The majority view around the cabinet table was expressed by Samuel: 'We were not entitled to carry England to the war for the sake of our goodwill for France, or for the sake of maintaining the strength of France and Russia against that of Germany and Austria. This opinion is shared by the majority of the cabinet with various degrees of emphasis on the several parts of it.'”
“Although the letter [by Bonar Law supporting immediate intervention] opened the possibility of a pro-war coalition being formed from the small minority in the cabinet who supported war alongside France in any circumstances and the opposition, in practice the letter had little impact on the discussion.”
As long as Germany would have taken a defensive stance in the west I doubt a British intervention. Russia was not looked favourably upon, but was seen as the far worse enemy than Germany. Russia was the rival in Asia, especially threatening India and Persia. The British public also disliked the autocratic regime of the Tsar far more than the German Emperor. Most people like to think of the UK being played by one person Paradox Game style. But the UK was a democracy and that meant that the public opinion mattered and that the opinion of the Parliament that is the party members mattered. According to some sources 9/10th of the governing liberal party were strongly against an intervention, Asquith estimated in a letter to Venetia Stanley, that at least 3/4th of the party would not have followed him.
Britain might have intervened in the end, if France as a Great Power was really in danger. That might mean a late entry into the war, only a blockade going or just threatening British involvement to ensure early peace talks favourably to France.
A defensive stance might also bring great difficulties for France. Although France was obliged to enter the war on Russia's side they did want Germany to be in the wrong. The decision makers found it paramount that Germany has to attack first. If Germany just was sitting in their forts and did nothing there is the question how long was France willing to wait for a German attack? And if its not coming forth, would they really risk to attack, although that might have turned public opinion against them? What if butterflies had Jaurès still living? And all the while the French would still have no positive decision by the British government that they would intervene on their side. That would really be a dilemma which would grow more seriously every day the French would wait while their Russian ally would have to take on Germany and A-H.
Here are some other quotations of Thirteen Days, by Clive Ponting, Chatto & Windus, London 2002 [highlighting by me]:
31st July:
“Grey continually emphasised that Britain 'was bound by no treaties' and that if Berlin and Vienna showed flexibility and Russia put itself in the wrong, 'he could sponsor the idea of not immediately taking the part of France'.
[…]
Harcourt also wrote, clearly reflecting Grey's line, 'if Russ[ia] unreasonable we wash our hands'. Pease himself described the general view in his diary: 'British opinion would not now enable us to support France – a violation of Belgium might alter public opinion, but we could say nothing to commit ourselves.'
[…]
“In the light of the financial crisis, the cabinet felt 'British neutrality might be the only way of averting the complete collapse of European credit'.”
1st August:
Asquith, Grey and Haldane meet: “There seems to have been a general feeling, reflecting the mood of the cabinet on the previous day, that France was too closely tied to Russia and that it was Russia that was provoking a European war by mobilising. Britain had stood by France in the Moroccan disputes of 1906 and 1911 because Morocco formed part off the Anglo-French colonial agreements. Was this the case now? Did Britain have to support France just because its ally had intervened in the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia – a dispute in which Britain had no direct interest? Grey had, at the previous day's cabinet meeting, hinted that Britain would wash its hands of the consequences.”
In a later cabinet meeting: “The rest of the cabinet, apart from Grey and Asquith [and Churchill], did not believe that Britain ought to intervene simply to support France and that public opinion would not support such action. […] Asquith described Lloyd George as being 'all for peace' but added he was for 'keeping the position still open'.”
Grey later answered to Cambon: “Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany. If France could not take advantage of this position, it was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties … This did not mean that under no circumstances would we assist France, but it did mean that France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a position to promise.”
“If Germany offered France neutrality and they did not accept because of their treaty with Russia, then Britain might argue it was absolved from any obligation it might have to France. Such a position would probably have been endorsed by a majority of the cabinet. In their view any British intervention in an European war should not be determined by France but by any violation of Belgium neutrality if Germany did attack France. (Such a position was also far more acceptable to Parliament and the country.) There was always an important distinction between support for France and for Belgian neutrality. The majority of the cabinet did not want to go to war just to support France (and Russia) against Germany (and Austria-Hungary). Grey claimed that he also told Cambon 'as to the question of our obligation to help France, I pointed out that we had no obligation'."
To summarise: There was no unified opinion in the leadership of the UK on this matter. Parliament and cabinet were deeply divided with only small minorities backing an intervention
regardless of the situation leading to the war. Belgium's neutrality was indeed the decisive matter on this issue. Without it the field of speculations is wide open. There were economic, military, domestic and diplomatic reasons for staying neutral, but favouring France. The probability of the UK entering the conflict without a violation of Belgian neutrality and without Germany declaring war on France is very, very slim. And that was something which was known to quite some German diplomats.
Depending on the PoD you can even get an almost 0 % probability of Britain entering the war.
The second Moroccan Crisis was a turning point in British-German relations: in OTL bad diplomatic moves by then German secretary of the Foreign Office Kiderlen-Wächter mismanaged the situation which was a once in a lifetime-opportunity to gain ground again. Germany was clearly in the right with its protest towards France and a different handling of the affair with open cards towards Britain might have ended quite favourably for Germany. Grey was initially very unhappy with France and only the Panther at Agadir, the silence of the German diplomats and exaggerated demands later let to a change in attitudes - not only of Grey, but also and more importantly of Lloyd George and Churchill, up until then quite Germanophile and pro-peace.
Better talks on naval armament controls are another factor which might help establish a better relationship between Germany and the UK.
But even with a very late PoD, (say abandoning the Schlieffenplan during the mobilisation phase) - as long as Germany is not declaring war first and then at least at the beginning is just holding the line in the west against the French, the probability of the UK staying out of the war is much higher than its entrance. This includes, of course, that the German navy stays put and does not move against France, too. Without a PoD before June 1911 the UK will have an informal naval agreement with France that they will protect their channel coast against naval attacks. If German armies are becoming a serious threat to French channel and Atlantic ports, a British intervention becomes increasingly more likely.
Kind regards, G.
