No German DOW. US concentrates on Pacific

Flubber

Banned
I know what I meant to say...


We can't read your mind. We can only read what you write.

If you cannot or will not take care to make what you write comprehensible, what does that say about the care you take with your ideas?
 
We can't read your mind. We can only read what you write.

If you cannot or will not take care to make what you write comprehensible, what does that say about the care you take with your ideas?

Noted. Will use spellcheck.:eek:

Now then back to the discussion. The US has been heavily committed from 6 to 9 months to an exclusively Pacific struggle. Now Europe is calling and will officially be receiving top priority. The campaigns and timetable for victory will now have to be revised somewhat. Let's assume they have begun either begun active operations or are in the advance stages preparing for all the ones I mentioned in the original post. Which gets scaled back; maybe abandoned.

I think a good part of the answer will depend on how successful the US has been to that point. If any were a debacle then they will probably be dropped. But then you should also consider the effect on allies (i.e. US could have got a bloody nose in Burma, but the Brits need to be shored up; local Chinese contractors are overbilling on everything, but Chiang won't go on the attack without the extra hardware he was promised)

And then if the US was having spectacular success in certain operations and more looked like it was in the offering, why would they want to stop.

I guess the point is that simply cutting off operations and begin shipping all to Europe is not that easy. So what is sacrificed in the PTO and what compromises are made in the ETO.
 

Flubber

Banned
The US has been heavily committed from 6 to 9 months to an exclusively Pacific struggle.


No. As has already been explained to you, the US does not yet have the tools necessary to undertake what you're assuming.

The fruits of the Two Ocean Navy Bill will not start arriving until late '42 and early '43, the UK controls much of the passenger shipping the US will require, and, leaving your ill-founded ideas about an air offensive stage from the Aleutians aside, the US does not yet have the numbers of planes required.

As I wrote at the beginning of this thread, this idea has been examined many many times here. Nothing you've proposed is new. Nothing you've proposed hasn't already been examined and refuted dozens of time over.

This idea is a non-starter. Once the US is allied with the UK in a Pacific war, Germany simply cannot allow the US to supply the UK unmolested. Because Germany cannot allow the UK to be supplied, it is in Germany's best interests to hit the US at a time and place which can theoretically do the most damage. That means Germany's best chance is to DOW the US before the US can get ready.

Hitler didn't DOW the US on December 10th because he was a fucking lunatic. He did it because it was Germany's best chance to put the boot in while the US was weak.
 
Another idea involving the Aleutians as a major air base during WWII? Not even remotely plausible. It took mammoth efforts on the part of the US to establish and maintain one such airfield as of mid-1942.
 
And let’s not forget the Aleutians. Geographically the closest territory the US has to the Japanese home islands and therefore a place to consider for an air build-up to support a strategic bomber campaign.

Somebody's been reading too much Alexander P. de Seversky.

http://books.google.com/books?id=2B...a=X&ei=IM2dULS6F-KBywGe0IGYDQ&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA

In Victory Through Air Power, he includes a dramatic picture of an octopus centered on Japan, with bombers flying towards its body, ignoring the tentacles. Some of those bombers are flying from the Aleutians.

As other commentators have observed, this displays an astonishing ignorance of flying conditions in Alaska, the infrastructure that would be required for supply and support, and the capabilities of existing bombers. Unless he wanted to put the entire war on hold until the B-36 was available.

That wasn't the silliest How-To-Win-The-War book I encountered. It may be a toss-up between the one that advocated putting General de Gaulle in command of the entire Allied armies and navies for an invasion of Italy, and the one that advised sending the Allied "mass of maneuver" -- the entire U.S. Army -- to the "central position", the Soviet Pacific provinces, where it could strike against either the Japanese in China or the Germans in Ukraine and Byelorussia [Belarus].
 
Ok let's see if I can answer a few of these points.

To the Aleutians, which seem to more and more be the favorite, it must have had some merit (however ill founded) in that the US did devote considerable resources there forming its 11th Air Force to co-ordinate combat operations. Also the Japanese took the idea serious enough to launch a significant strike against the area and occupied a few of the islands. And after the Japanese were driven out attempts were made to attack bases and shipping in the Kuriles and Hokkaido (without much success for the effort that was expended).

Another point. This is only one possible avenue of operations. Never said it was the only or even a major theatre of action. Just, for planning purposes it would be under consideration.

Now as to the British controlling liner shipping, why wouldn't the British help the US in that respect? They are allies after all in the war against Japan, and the US has made a major commitment to defend one of the key Commonwealth member states, Australia so any help they can give there is most certainly going to be forthcoming (or is Churchill telling Menzies, sorry in which case expect Australian troops to leave North Africa).

Also if a major land commitment develops in Burma, well India is the heart of the British imperial system, the loss of which would be a crippling, even fatal, blow to the British war effort. Assisting in deploying US troops is therefore in their best interest.

Agreed that the lack of naval resources until the end of 42 is going to be a serious constraint on offensive options but I cannot believe that the US will simply decide not to do anything or only what they did IOTL. The focus and the expectations of the American public is to fight back against Japanese aggression and a mass mobilization is in progress so something more is going to be needed that a single thrust against a single island. Victories are needed before questions of competency begin to be asked.

One item that hasn't been much talked about here is how do the Japanese respond. They are going to see a build-up in Australia and New Guinea, in Burma and China. How will that influence the next wave of Japanese strikes. Do they send an enlarged force to blast Australia to delay the buildup there. Is there an enlarged incursion into the Indian Ocean to disrupt allied operations there. Do they launch a new offensive in China to smash as many Chinese forces as they can before they gain in competency. Please discuss.
 

Flubber

Banned
Ok let's see if I can answer a few of these points.


Believe me, you have no answers.

Also the Japanese took the idea serious enough to launch a significant strike...

That strike was a deliberate attempt to divert US attention and assets away from the planned sucker punch at Midway. It was a diversion, a ruse, and not a serious attempt to open an Aleutians front.

And after the Japanese were driven out attempts were made to attack bases and shipping in the Kuriles and Hokkaido (without much success for the effort that was expended).

Without much success due to the distances involved and the continually lousy weather, none of which will change no matter how many resources the US throws into the region.

I find it decidedly odd that you already knew the Aleutians were a poor location for the air offensive you proposed and yet you still proposed it.

Now as to the British controlling liner shipping, why wouldn't the British help the US in that respect?


Because, just as occurred in the OTL, the British need them for their own troop movements. Once again and because the concept is seemingly beyond your comprehension, the US does yet not have the assets to undertake the operations you're proposing. And the US cannot borrow those assets either.

The US in the OTL wasn't just waiting for all the carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers in the Two Ocean Navy Bill pipeline. The US was also waiting for all the freighters, attack transports, tankers, and other logistical assets in the pipeline too. Not fighting Germany does nothing to speed up the production of those assets. In fact, prior to Torch in November of '42 most of the US war effort went to the Pacific.

Agreed that the lack of naval resources until the end of 42 is going to be a serious constraint on offensive options but I cannot believe that the US will simply decide not to do anything or only what they did IOTL.


Without the tools, how can the US do more than it did in the OTL? Not fighting Germany doesn't speed up production one iota.

The focus and the expectations of the American public is to fight back against Japanese aggression and a mass mobilization is in progress so something more is going to be needed that a single thrust against a single island. Victories are needed before questions of competency begin to be asked.

Do you even know what US plans for fighting a Pacific war were prior to Pearl? (And don't say Plan Orange as your reputation will sink even lower.) The US planned on assuming a defensive poster, patrolling a line between the Marshalls and Wake while aggressively counter-punching, and waiting for the assets necessary for the offensive to be produced.

The US knew in '41 it didn't yet have the means to launch offensives of the kind you're suggesting and would have to wait for those assets to be produced. Not fighting Germany does nothing to change that situation.

Please discuss.

Please stop. You've no grasp of the situation,no comprehension of what was needed, and no understanding of what was involved. Just stop.
 
Ironically the diversionary strike on the Aleutians didn't even get the attention of the US commander who found it suspect that any IJN officer who was remotely competent would want such islands in the first place.
 

Flubber

Banned
Ironically the diversionary strike on the Aleutians didn't even get the attention of the US commander who found it suspect that any IJN officer who was remotely competent would want such islands in the first place.


Exactly.

Yet ITTL the US is somehow going to ignore their own opinion of the Aleutians and cram hundreds of B-17s on the islands in order to bomb the nearly-as-useless Kuriles just because they have to be seen as doing something.

And pixies make the flowers grow too.
 
The fundamental problem with threads like this is that they all seem to assume that the German DOW was some sort of capricious act on the part of Hitler; just one more display of lunacy from the Fuhrer.

The truth is otherwise. By the latter part of 1941 the Germans were convinced, with some justifcation, that it was the Lend-Lease supplies that were keeping Britain and the USSR in the war. These lines of supply had to be cut but the U-Boats simply weren't able to sink enough tonnage in the convoys to stop the flow. This was compounded by a series of US actions that took over a large part of the responsibility for overseeing and protecting the convoys in the Atlantic. Neutrality hadn't stopped at least one US warship getting into a fight with a U-Boat either.

There was simply no way to stop the supply line unless it was attacked at source; this was the opinion of the commander of the U-Boat force. Thus in the wake of an attack that Hitler hoped had critically weakened the US navy he declared war and authorized Operation Drumbeat, U-Boat attacks off the East Coast. For a time this seemed like it might work but it was a temporary solution and the US belated adoption of convoy tactics essentially negated it.

Added to this Hitler was still hoping that Japan would join the war against the USSR and the DOW was an inducement in the hope that they would reciprocate.

So the DOW was probably inevitable and post Pearl harbour was probably the best moment to do it from a German perspective. So any thread that assumes they don't needs a really good reason why, which has so far been lacking.
 
I always knew it was inevitably going to come down to a question of whether conflict with Germany was avoidable and the answer would be the resounding NO I hear (an I happen to be in that camp).

That was not the intention of this thread however. It was to discuss which military strategy a Pacific focussed US could have undertaken and the consequences of those actions.

Now I could go on and give other PODs ranging from the BEF captured at Dunkirk with a Halifax government taking over in the aftermath and asking for an armistice, through to a poison plot incapacitating the Nazi leadership and bringing moderates to the forefront who decide to seek accommodation with the Anglo-Saxon powers, through to a more isolationist (with respect to Europe) alternate to FDR as POTUS to simply asking our favorite extra-terrestrial mammal for some Jedi mind control tricks. That is all for another threat, however.

So what about it. Which of the campaign possibilities outlined above would the US most likely undertake (and please feel free to add your own). How will the allies behave. And above all what do the Japanese do
 

Flubber

Banned
That was not the intention of this thread however. It was to discuss which military strategy a Pacific focussed US could have undertaken and the consequences of those actions.


There are two things which need to be taken into consideration when attempting to answer those questions.

First and as you hopefully understand now, the US does not have the assets to undertake large or even multiple offensives in the Pacific and will not have those assets for more than a year. The initially Pacific-focused US ITTL is going to behave pretty much like the OTL US did.

Second, how long is it going to be before the US and Germany officially go to war with one another?
 
Flubber said:
First and as you hopefully understand now, the US does not have the assets to undertake large or even multiple offensives in the Pacific and will not have those assets for more than a year. The initially Pacific-focused US ITTL is going to behave pretty much like the OTL US did.
That's mainly true. However, as I'm understanding the OP now, the need to account for attacks by Germany is much lower.

If that's true, USN does have somewhat more flexibility. Putting all 7 carriers at Nimitz's disposal changes the outcome at Coral Sea. It may change the outcome at Midway, to the detriment of the U.S.:eek: It's also likely to accelerate the Central Pacific offensive (if Nimitz doesn't have his head handed to him at Midway:eek:) by about a year.
Flubber said:
Second, how long is it going to be before the US and Germany officially go to war with one another?
Given the way Congress, & public opinion, was trending, & given a German desire to have Japan syphon effort from ETO, it could be a year or more after Pearl Harbor.
 

Flubber

Banned
That's mainly true. However, as I'm understanding the OP now, the need to account for attacks by Germany is much lower. If that's true, USN does have somewhat more flexibility.


It isn't true because you're forgetting once again that the US is going to be sending convoys across the Atlantic to it's new ally, the UK, and the USN is going to escorting those convoys.

So, unless Germany orders all it's U-boats home, there's still a lot of work for the USN to do in the Atlantic.

Putting all 7 carriers at Nimitz's disposal changes the outcome at Coral Sea.

The only carriers not immediately available for the Pacific were Ranger and Wasp. Hornet was still working up. Wasp could go to the Pacific, but Ranger will never be put in the way of any actual harm.

Given the way Congress, & public opinion, was trending, & given a German desire to have Japan syphon effort from ETO, it could be a year or more after Pearl Harbor.

If you think Germany is going to allow the US to supply the UK unmolested for a year, I'm afraid I won't be able to use enough :eek::eek::eek::eek::eek:s to register my disbelief.
 
I would like to mention Miracle at Midway by Gordon W Prange which lists US forces in the Aleutians during this period. The listing makes all too clear why the local American commander responded with contempt to the idea of Japan invading the islands.
 
That's mainly true. However, as I'm understanding the OP now, the need to account for attacks by Germany is much lower.

Thank You!!!! This is the discussion I wanted.:D

If that's true, USN does have somewhat more flexibility. Putting all 7 carriers at Nimitz's disposal changes the outcome at Coral Sea. It may change the outcome at Midway, to the detriment of the U.S.:eek: It's also likely to accelerate the Central Pacific offensive (if Nimitz doesn't have his head handed to him at Midway:eek:) by about a year.

Given the way Congress, & public opinion, was trending, & given a German desire to have Japan syphon effort from ETO, it could be a year or more after Pearl Harbor.

A thought here. The extra forces now present are going to attract more notice from the Japanese. They will want to take those out and disrupt as much as possible the build-up of forces in progress in Australia. I think therefore it is likely they will commit more than the 2 fleet and 1 light carrier they did IOTL. Say another two carriers. Could not the showdown that happens replace Midway as THE decisive battle that crippled Japanese naval air power and gave the initiative to the US?

Another thought. If the US decided to move to Burma in the big way I suggested, US naval forces are going to be needed there also (say the Wasp and maybe the Ranger are present). When Nagumo comes roaring into the India Ocean at the end of March 1942 could there be an attempt made to counter attack or will they all just run (given the size of the Japanese force this is probably the wisest course). If the allies do fight and enough damage is done (say similar losses to OTL Coral Sea), that will most likely impact number of forces they could send to the Coral Sea.

Or perhaps the Indian Ocean Raid is cancelled and the force sent down to take out the US forces in the Coral sea first?
 
Flubber said:
It isn't true because you're forgetting once again that the US is going to be sending convoys across the Atlantic to it's new ally, the UK, and the USN is going to escorting those convoys.

So, unless Germany orders all it's U-boats home, there's still a lot of work for the USN to do in the Atlantic.
I'm not. I am, however, accepting for sake of discussion the demand is down.
Flubber said:
The only carriers not immediately available for the Pacific were Ranger and Wasp. Hornet was still working up. Wasp could go to the Pacific, but Ranger will never be put in the way of any actual harm.
As of 7 Dec 41? (Also, Ranger has uses on ferry duty, for which the fleet carriers would otherwise be needed.)
Flubber said:
If you think Germany is going to allow the US to supply the UK unmolested for a year, I'm afraid I won't be able to use enough :eek::eek::eek::eek::eek:s to register my disbelief.
I don't. My question is, how many incidents does it take before public opinion, & Congress, move off of "do something, but no war"? There was, even in about August '41, around 70% of the public polling for both options.
georgy176 said:
A thought here. The extra forces now present are going to attract more notice from the Japanese. They will want to take those out and disrupt as much as possible the build-up of forces in progress in Australia. I think therefore it is likely they will commit more than the 2 fleet and 1 light carrier they did IOTL. Say another two carriers. Could not the showdown that happens replace Midway as THE decisive battle that crippled Japanese naval air power and gave the initiative to the US?
I do think TTL's Coral Sea could be equal OTL's Midway. I'm less sure Japan would send more CVs, even knowing the U.S. had more. The question is, does Japan see MO as important enough?
georgy176 said:
If the US decided to move to Burma in the big way I suggested, US naval forces are going to be needed there also
That I'm not seeing. Burma ops would be handled by AAF, not USN.
 
Top