All it proves is he can't proofread. Neither can I. I know what I meant to say...It's spelled ROOSEVELT.
When you can't even get get the name of the US president correct, what does that say about the rest of your "ideas"?
All it proves is he can't proofread. Neither can I. I know what I meant to say...It's spelled ROOSEVELT.
When you can't even get get the name of the US president correct, what does that say about the rest of your "ideas"?
I know what I meant to say...
We can't read your mind. We can only read what you write.
If you cannot or will not take care to make what you write comprehensible, what does that say about the care you take with your ideas?
The US has been heavily committed from 6 to 9 months to an exclusively Pacific struggle.
And let’s not forget the Aleutians. Geographically the closest territory the US has to the Japanese home islands and therefore a place to consider for an air build-up to support a strategic bomber campaign.
Somebody's been reading too much Alexander P. de Seversky.
Ok let's see if I can answer a few of these points.
Also the Japanese took the idea serious enough to launch a significant strike...
And after the Japanese were driven out attempts were made to attack bases and shipping in the Kuriles and Hokkaido (without much success for the effort that was expended).
Now as to the British controlling liner shipping, why wouldn't the British help the US in that respect?
Agreed that the lack of naval resources until the end of 42 is going to be a serious constraint on offensive options but I cannot believe that the US will simply decide not to do anything or only what they did IOTL.
The focus and the expectations of the American public is to fight back against Japanese aggression and a mass mobilization is in progress so something more is going to be needed that a single thrust against a single island. Victories are needed before questions of competency begin to be asked.
Please discuss.
Ironically the diversionary strike on the Aleutians didn't even get the attention of the US commander who found it suspect that any IJN officer who was remotely competent would want such islands in the first place.
That was not the intention of this thread however. It was to discuss which military strategy a Pacific focussed US could have undertaken and the consequences of those actions.
That's mainly true. However, as I'm understanding the OP now, the need to account for attacks by Germany is much lower.Flubber said:First and as you hopefully understand now, the US does not have the assets to undertake large or even multiple offensives in the Pacific and will not have those assets for more than a year. The initially Pacific-focused US ITTL is going to behave pretty much like the OTL US did.
Given the way Congress, & public opinion, was trending, & given a German desire to have Japan syphon effort from ETO, it could be a year or more after Pearl Harbor.Flubber said:Second, how long is it going to be before the US and Germany officially go to war with one another?
That's mainly true. However, as I'm understanding the OP now, the need to account for attacks by Germany is much lower. If that's true, USN does have somewhat more flexibility.
Putting all 7 carriers at Nimitz's disposal changes the outcome at Coral Sea.
Given the way Congress, & public opinion, was trending, & given a German desire to have Japan syphon effort from ETO, it could be a year or more after Pearl Harbor.
That's mainly true. However, as I'm understanding the OP now, the need to account for attacks by Germany is much lower.
Thank You!!!! This is the discussion I wanted.![]()
If that's true, USN does have somewhat more flexibility. Putting all 7 carriers at Nimitz's disposal changes the outcome at Coral Sea. It may change the outcome at Midway, to the detriment of the U.S.It's also likely to accelerate the Central Pacific offensive (if Nimitz doesn't have his head handed to him at Midway
) by about a year.
Given the way Congress, & public opinion, was trending, & given a German desire to have Japan syphon effort from ETO, it could be a year or more after Pearl Harbor.
I'm not. I am, however, accepting for sake of discussion the demand is down.Flubber said:It isn't true because you're forgetting once again that the US is going to be sending convoys across the Atlantic to it's new ally, the UK, and the USN is going to escorting those convoys.
So, unless Germany orders all it's U-boats home, there's still a lot of work for the USN to do in the Atlantic.
As of 7 Dec 41? (Also, Ranger has uses on ferry duty, for which the fleet carriers would otherwise be needed.)Flubber said:The only carriers not immediately available for the Pacific were Ranger and Wasp. Hornet was still working up. Wasp could go to the Pacific, but Ranger will never be put in the way of any actual harm.
I don't. My question is, how many incidents does it take before public opinion, & Congress, move off of "do something, but no war"? There was, even in about August '41, around 70% of the public polling for both options.Flubber said:If you think Germany is going to allow the US to supply the UK unmolested for a year, I'm afraid I won't be able to use enoughs to register my disbelief.
I do think TTL's Coral Sea could be equal OTL's Midway. I'm less sure Japan would send more CVs, even knowing the U.S. had more. The question is, does Japan see MO as important enough?georgy176 said:A thought here. The extra forces now present are going to attract more notice from the Japanese. They will want to take those out and disrupt as much as possible the build-up of forces in progress in Australia. I think therefore it is likely they will commit more than the 2 fleet and 1 light carrier they did IOTL. Say another two carriers. Could not the showdown that happens replace Midway as THE decisive battle that crippled Japanese naval air power and gave the initiative to the US?
That I'm not seeing. Burma ops would be handled by AAF, not USN.georgy176 said:If the US decided to move to Burma in the big way I suggested, US naval forces are going to be needed there also