No flooding of the Belgian polders, autumn 1914

I just finished reading The Making of the First World War by Ian Beckett: it's a series of vignettes, many of which cover less-well-known aspects of this conflict. It's a fascinating read, which I recommend highly. But I digress.

The first vignette addresses the strategic and intentional flooding of much of Belgium in October 1914 to prevent the Imperial German Army from reaching key channel ports, such as Dunkirk. In no small part, the strategem hinged on utmost secrecy: had the Germans gotten wind of the plan, quite likely it could have been blunted/thwarted entirely.

So let's consider this: suppose the Germans had learned of the plan before it could be executed, and thus had been able to get to the key Channel ports in October 1914? Now the BEF is unable to evacuate should it need to, among other things. How does this capture of the coast affect the development of the Western front and the war in general?
 

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I do not think this will change the earlier part of the war. The BEF was planning on head back to the Channel to regroup prior to the Battle of the Marne. The loss of the ports would only effect their supply situation.

One big loser will be Belgium itself. Without flooding the Flanders the Kingdom would have lost all of Belgium and all reason to stay in the war.
 
So this means Dunkirk is German controlled (but pretty close to the front, I assume the German would be stopped at the River Aa canal regardless, So Calais is still Allied controlled)

Dunkirk could be under artillery fire to make it much use for the Germans other than a temporary refuge for submarines and toperdo boats, but the Germans could use the canal from Newport for small submarines to transit there and Ostend would be further away from the front so more useful as a forward base.

The Dover barrage would be a bit weaker and easier for the Germans to raid. So a few less submarines would be lost (it was often ineffective anyway). Gotha raids on London could start a little closer in 1918.

I suppose the big butterfly is that if the German submarine offensive is a bit more succesfull operating under the prize rules, perhaps the Germans don't feel the need to goto unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 (or go unrestricted in just certain areas like the eastern mediterranean / english channel / north sea where they are more likely to get a pass from the United states.
 
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