No E-M Theory effects on fighter development.

Even in Falklands the air combat was dramatically different from, say, Vietnam, due to simple fact that all-aspect Sidewinders were available.

That said though, all aspect was more of an intimidation tool in the Falklands since it was never actually tested/required in the combats that arose.
 
Well I think the AWACS point should be disregarded. If we're counting AWACS, then the best fighter becomes a B1B ripple-firing Sparrows or AMRAMS.


Besides, we build the things to fight peer opponents, in which case we can reasonably expect to lose quite a few AWACS. Especially if we're talking 70's and 80's, when the relevant designs were being drawn up.

We go to war against the USSR in 83, you bet your sweet ass AWACS coverage is going to be spotty.

Much or most of WW3 in Europe would have been fought on the defensive using the IADS there, backed by all manner of civilian and mobiles radar and other sensors to help fill holes as they appeared.
 
Much or most of WW3 in Europe would have been fought on the defensive using the IADS there, backed by all manner of civilian and mobiles radar and other sensors to help fill holes as they appeared.

On the other hand, the conventional phase (5 minutes? 5 hours? 5 days?) would have been fought in very heavy EW environment, so visual detection might have been very important too.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
Much or most of WW3 in Europe would have been fought on the defensive using the IADS there, backed by all manner of civilian and mobiles radar and other sensors to help fill holes as they appeared.

Not the point.

Nobody predicated their fighter design based on AWACS support, and the actual kill rates of any hypothetical fighter isn't really the focus of the thread.


If you want to actually put something forward regarding aircraft design, or how it would affect aspects of it such as missiles, or stealth, or sensor packs, by all means.

But if your point boils down to "doesn't matter, AWACS", well, we're all aware of this, but it's rather outside the point.
 
Much or most of WW3 in Europe would have been fought on the defensive using the IADS there, backed by all manner of civilian and mobiles radar and other sensors to help fill holes as they appeared.
Yep... And my understanding is that the North Vietnamese interceptors also relied heavily upon GCI when combatting the USAF and USN over North Vietnam.
 
Not the point.

Nobody predicated their fighter design based on AWACS support, and the actual kill rates of any hypothetical fighter isn't really the focus of the thread.


If you want to actually put something forward regarding aircraft design, or how it would affect aspects of it such as missiles, or stealth, or sensor packs, by all means.

But if your point boils down to "doesn't matter, AWACS", well, we're all aware of this, but it's rather outside the point.
I'm actually not certain that likely availability of some form of GCI or AWACS support didn't factor into the design of at least some fighters / interceptors.

I suspect that if it was widely believed this wasn't going to be available we would have seen lots more aircraft with their own powerful long range radars.
 
Science doesn't work like that. There are hundreds of examples in history of simultaneous discovery, from calculus to radar. Other people were working on the same problems, with the same tools available to them -- another individual or group would have come up with the same solutions.
 
I'm actually not certain that likely availability of some form of GCI or AWACS support didn't factor into the design of at least some fighters / interceptors.

It did. See the F-106 and SAGE for example. See also datalink facilities in western fighters at least from the late 80's on.
 
It did. See the F-106 and SAGE for example. See also datalink facilities in western fighters at least from the late 80's on.
Yep.. Although I would suggest the F106 was more of an interceptor :)

Still I expect there was an assumption that some form of external "cueing" would often have been avalaible to most fighter pilots during many (but probably not all) missions.
 
On the other hand, the conventional phase (5 minutes? 5 hours? 5 days?) would have been fought in very heavy EW environment, so visual detection might have been very important too.
I have my doubts as to how effective visual detection (without at least some form of early warning from Radar or other similar sensors) would have been for air defence air craft for example in a WW3 setting.

IMHO the fighter / interceptor air craft at times could have managed without radar so long as something else was initially detecting the enemy air craft besides the pilots own eyes.
 
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I have my doubts as to how effective visual detection (without at least some form of early warning from Radar or other similar sensors) would have been for air defence air craft for example in a WW3 setting.

Ask the Lightning F.2A pilots from 19 and 92 Sqns RAFG in the 70's. They were to an extent specialist at low level interceptions, and visual detection as aircraft were skylined going over ridges was one of their tricks of the trade.
 
Ask the Lightning F.2A pilots from 19 and 92 Sqns RAFG in the 70's. They were to an extent specialist at low level interceptions, and visual detection as aircraft were skylined going over ridges was one of their tricks of the trade.
Yep.. But presumably they were given some indication of where and when to intercept or at least look for their targets ?
 
Not the point.

Nobody predicated their fighter design based on AWACS support, and the actual kill rates of any hypothetical fighter isn't really the focus of the thread.


If you want to actually put something forward regarding aircraft design, or how it would affect aspects of it such as missiles, or stealth, or sensor packs, by all means.

But if your point boils down to "doesn't matter, AWACS", well, we're all aware of this, but it's rather outside the point.

E-M gained traction as a result of the Vietnam War experience, but that was due to the RoE that demanded visual ID of the enemy before engaging him placing a premium on close-in maneuvreing while virtually discarding the US strength in radars and longer range weapons. Without such restrictive RoE the USN/USAF would likely have fired Sparrows at maximum range, with the USN getting 1 kill per 20 fired and the USAF 1 per 10 fired, and breaking up enemy formations as they evaded the barrage.

Such restrictive RoE have not appeared since, IIRC, so all of that work put into making the F15 and F16 E-M fighters has never really been put to the test. I think it's likely that if the F15 had been the 60,000lb swing wing proposal that was mooted in about 1969 the lack of restrictions of RoE and advances in on-board sensors, missile technology and the proliferation and combat integration of off-board sensors it would have achieved a similar 102-0 kill ratio.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
E-M gained traction as a result of the Vietnam War experience, but that was due to the RoE that demanded visual ID of the enemy before engaging him placing a premium on close-in maneuvreing while virtually discarding the US strength in radars and longer range weapons. Without such restrictive RoE the USN/USAF would likely have fired Sparrows at maximum range, with the USN getting 1 kill per 20 fired and the USAF 1 per 10 fired, and breaking up enemy formations as they evaded the barrage.

Such restrictive RoE have not appeared since, IIRC, so all of that work put into making the F15 and F16 E-M fighters has never really been put to the test. I think it's likely that if the F15 had been the 60,000lb swing wing proposal that was mooted in about 1969 the lack of restrictions of RoE and advances in on-board sensors, missile technology and the proliferation and combat integration of off-board sensors it would have achieved a similar 102-0 kill ratio.


I'm aware, but again, that's rather outside the point.

Sure EM influence hasn't been tested, and I'm rather uninterested in how it affects practical real world performance in modern operating environments.

I'm interested in, and started this thread to discuss, how it's absence would have affected 4th, 4+, and 5th generation fighter design.
 
I'm interested in, and started this thread to discuss, how it's absence would have affected 4th, 4+, and 5th generation fighter design.

OK, I'm onto it now.

I think the most profitable example is the F111B/VFAX/VFX vortex in the 60s, the last fighter type before E-M and the almost contemporary of the first E-M fighter the F15.

When it became apparent in the early 60s that the F111B would go ahead the Navy started the VFAX competition to replace the F4 in the escort/air superiority fighter and ground attack roles, working alongside the F111B in CVWs. The 1966 VFAX spec demanded it be able to beat the Mig 17 and Mig 19 in close combat, and the 1967 spec demanded later Soviet fighters, as well as undertaking the attack missions of the A7.

In parallel Grumman was working on the F 111B, trying to reduce weight, and was contracted by the Navy to undertake studies of advanced fighters. In the event the VFAX proved to be a dud, not better than the F4 as a fighter or the A7 as an attack aircraft. In the process Grumman came up with design 303 and in 1967 reworked this design to include the AWG9-Phoenix system.

As a result, bearing in mind the problems with F111B which was pushing it towards inexorable cancellation, the Navy was presented with the answer to both of its problems, a replacement for the failing F111B and a replacement for the F4 in the escort/air superiority role. The F111B was cancelled and a month later the Navy issued the VFX requirement written around Grumman design 303. 6 manufacturers submitted proposals but Grumman's 6th refinement of 303 won the competition.

So basically the F14 is an escort/air superiority fighter with interceptor equipment squeezed in. I'd suggest that this was about as early as this could be done; the Tomcat used new turbofan engines, extensive titanium, newly developed swing wings and innovative aerodynamics. Coincidentally the USN decided to use the USAF upgraded A7 themselves, covering the loss of the 'A' portion of the VFAX.

Basically in my opinion even without E-M maneuverable fighters would be built because they could be.
 
I'm interested in, and started this thread to discuss, how it's absence would have affected 4th, 4+, and 5th generation fighter design.

Since size and weight are cost limiting factors there would be still need for a single engine light weight fighter a la F-16. It might look more like Viggen or Mirage F1, though. I would guess fighters would have less emphasis on manouverability and more on speed. STOL was in fashion during the Cold War so that might be the case in ATL as well.
 
So we’re talking a USAF heavy fighter, designed late 60s/early 70s designed for big air to air payload and power over manoeuvrability. My immediate thought is Grumman put a full on F111 derivative forward - similar to the naval variant but with less worry about weight. Probably not the Phoenix/AWG9 fit either.
Would be interesting to see what other manufacturers would respond with. Grumman’s design may not be the best, but much of the development work was already done.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
OK, I'm onto it now.

I think the most profitable example is the F111B/VFAX/VFX vortex in the 60s, the last fighter type before E-M and the almost contemporary of the first E-M fighter the F15.

When it became apparent in the early 60s that the F111B would go ahead the Navy started the VFAX competition to replace the F4 in the escort/air superiority fighter and ground attack roles, working alongside the F111B in CVWs. The 1966 VFAX spec demanded it be able to beat the Mig 17 and Mig 19 in close combat, and the 1967 spec demanded later Soviet fighters, as well as undertaking the attack missions of the A7.

In parallel Grumman was working on the F 111B, trying to reduce weight, and was contracted by the Navy to undertake studies of advanced fighters. In the event the VFAX proved to be a dud, not better than the F4 as a fighter or the A7 as an attack aircraft. In the process Grumman came up with design 303 and in 1967 reworked this design to include the AWG9-Phoenix system.

As a result, bearing in mind the problems with F111B which was pushing it towards inexorable cancellation, the Navy was presented with the answer to both of its problems, a replacement for the failing F111B and a replacement for the F4 in the escort/air superiority role. The F111B was cancelled and a month later the Navy issued the VFX requirement written around Grumman design 303. 6 manufacturers submitted proposals but Grumman's 6th refinement of 303 won the competition.

So basically the F14 is an escort/air superiority fighter with interceptor equipment squeezed in. I'd suggest that this was about as early as this could be done; the Tomcat used new turbofan engines, extensive titanium, newly developed swing wings and innovative aerodynamics. Coincidentally the USN decided to use the USAF upgraded A7 themselves, covering the loss of the 'A' portion of the VFAX.

Basically in my opinion even without E-M maneuverable fighters would be built because they could be.


So the US goes whole hog on the F-14.

I could see that happening if the Air Force were to accept it as well (and frankly it meets most of the requirements, though I'm given to understand the USAF and USN brass just fucking hated working together outside of an immediate operation).


Perhaps the Super Tomcat is rolled out as the next heavy mover in lieu of F-15E.


Though if the F-15 stalls out, I still think there's a chance we get an F-4X type derivative of the Phantom. It's a fairly inexpensive step forward, the Phantoms performed admirably in Vietnam, and it fits the "faster, higher, better" mentality the USAF old guard had been following since WWII.
 
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