No diversion of Bomber Command in early 44

Ok


Early 1944 the RAF and the AAC , practically ceased bombing industrial targets in Germany and switched to attacking transportation targets in France and Belgium in preperation for Overlord.

My question is what would the effect of not using strategic bombers for essetially theatre targets? Would the continued strikes at german industry have had shortend the wars, or would it have made little diffrence? and at the other end of the scale, would D-day have been a whole lot bloodier due to more german forces being available, or could the medium and light bomber forces available to the tactical airforces have taken up the slack and covered the marshalling yards ect?


Your thoughts are appreciated as at present I cant decide on where thet bombers could have been best used.

Regards
 
In my opinion they should have only attacked theatre targets for most of the war. BC lacked the strength to much else for many years, yet mounted pinprick attacks against Germany when there were many good theatre targets being left alone.
 
More dead allied troops in Normandy, slower breakout, possibly leading to a Inner German Border further to the West. The main beneficiaries of the Allied Bombing campaign were the Soviets. As the majority of the German Army was fighting in the East by reducing German military production (by continued bombing) you are in fact aiding the Russians more than anyone else.
 
My opinion is that there can only be opinions based on wild conjecture. To separate and evaluate operations performed by strategic bombers in a tactical role would be difficult. To evaluate the effectiveness of stategic missions never undertaken is impossible. There was no slack in the medium and light bomber force to cover additional missions. It was a busy time, what with no-ball and radar missions, but B-26's were noted to have attacked such as marshalling yards. Additional bombers operating in the Med could be called up, but to what purpose? They had targets there too.
 
Having conducted a detailed study of the allied bomber offensive , my conclusion would be that the effect on Germany's industrial output or war effort would be...zip. You have to remember that throughout the war neither the RAF nor the USAAF had the ability to precision-bomb anything smaller than the average industrial conurbation. From 1942 to 1944 , the main period of the offensive , German output actually increased dramaticly as they moved to a total war economy. Even when certain key industries were badly hit (such as the ball-bearing works at Shweinfurt , flattened at tremendous cost to the USAAF) the Germans simply became more efficient at disseminating factories into smaller suburban units and re-cycling material to reduce demand.

Though Harris would later decry the diversion of bomber commands resources to Coastal command and theatre operations (indeed , he was later to claim he could have averted the need to invade france had he got his way) , I personally think that this says far more about Harris's misplaced confidence in the Douhet strategy than it does in his actuall ability to force Germany to the brink.

Had bomber command been allowed to maintain its assault on German cities , the consequences would have been the following

1. Reduced air-cover over normandy , resulting in a better German response
2. Lack of avaliable aircraft for airbourne operations ,perhaps curtailing Operation Market Garden
3.Stalin would have pulped Eastern Europe marginally quicker
 
I've spent some time fiddling with this too. I think attacking theater targets was a better use of the aircraft, though building fewer heavy bombers, more medium bombers and fighters, and a LOT more trucks would have been better still.
 
Having conducted a detailed study of the allied bomber offensive , my conclusion would be that the effect on Germany's industrial output or war effort would be...zip. You have to remember that throughout the war neither the RAF nor the USAAF had the ability to precision-bomb anything smaller than the average industrial conurbation. From 1942 to 1944 , the main period of the offensive , German output actually increased dramaticly as they moved to a total war economy. Even when certain key industries were badly hit (such as the ball-bearing works at Shweinfurt , flattened at tremendous cost to the USAAF) the Germans simply became more efficient at disseminating factories into smaller suburban units and re-cycling material to reduce demand.

Though Harris would later decry the diversion of bomber commands resources to Coastal command and theatre operations (indeed , he was later to claim he could have averted the need to invade france had he got his way) , I personally think that this says far more about Harris's misplaced confidence in the Douhet strategy than it does in his actuall ability to force Germany to the brink.

Had bomber command been allowed to maintain its assault on German cities , the consequences would have been the following

1. Reduced air-cover over normandy , resulting in a better German response
2. Lack of avaliable aircraft for airbourne operations ,perhaps curtailing Operation Market Garden
3.Stalin would have pulped Eastern Europe marginally quicker

Here we go again, the myth that germany cared so little about the war they bumbled along until Speer took over and showed them how to run the system...:confused:

The mistake the RAF made was not to keep hammering away at a vital target(s), but instead to hit one once or twice then move onto something else. This was quite clearly seem by the Germans, who were thankful they made the mistake (ironically, the LW made exactly the same mistake in the BoB..!!)

The Battle of the Ruhr was in fact very successful; Bomber command could handle the losses, and output from the Ruhr stagnated for 6 months (yes, they didnt really reduce it. But the plans showed the Germans expecting a significantly higher output than was achieved under the bombing)
The Ruhr was vital to German industry, and the heavy basic industries couldnt be moved. Far more useful than frittering away planes on a mainly political target like Berlin
 

CalBear

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More dead German and French civilians.

More dead Americans, Australians, English, Canadian, South African, etc. troops not just in the Landings but all the way across France.

Possibly a more advantageous position for the USSR at the end of the War (hard to be sure on this one).

The diversion of Bomber Command, despite Sir Arthur's bitching, saved 10 times the lives that it cost Bomber Command. The USAAF had been doing its best to kill the Luftwaffe for close to a year, but the destruction of the transport network by both bomber forces was a critical element in making the Invasion possible and in reducing the ability of the Heer to move troops to meet the threat (once Hitler accepted that it WAS a threat).
 

CalBear

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I've spent some time fiddling with this too. I think attacking theater targets was a better use of the aircraft, though building fewer heavy bombers, more medium bombers and fighters, and a LOT more trucks would have been better still.

Agree on the Fighter Bombers.

Not quite sure about the mediums. The heavies did more good, especially in the day (and when Harris could be pried away from killing civilians for a day or two, at night as well) than is generally accepted these days.

Trucks use different materials so one doesn't detract from the other.
 
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