No British Leyland

So the incompetent management who still thought it was the 1850s didnt have anything to do with it.

The entire motor industry killed itself in the UK back then. My Dad was at Vauxhalls in Ellesmere Port in the mid 70s and he remembers lads turning up for nights with their sleeping bags!
 

kernals12

Banned
The entire motor industry killed itself in the UK back then. My Dad was at Vauxhalls in Ellesmere Port in the mid 70s and he remembers lads turning up for nights with their sleeping bags!
As a matter of fact, Britain's car output has now surpassed the record set in 1972. The manufacturers are all foreign owned, but who cares?
 
Ah so it was the rise of capital costs thanks to automation.
Furthermore Her Majesty's Government's demand management policies often meant that the firms weren't producing at full capacity.

For example hire purchase restrictions introduced in 1960 coincided with Standard-Triumphs programme to increase its production from 50,000 in its 1956-57 financial year to 185,000 in its 1960-61 financial year. This did for Standard-Triumph and led directly to its purchase by Leyland Motors in December 1960.

Standard-Triumph Production 1957-72.png
 

kernals12

Banned
Furthermore Her Majesty's Government's demand management policies often meant that the firms weren't producing at full capacity.

For example hire purchase restrictions introduced in 1960 coincided with Standard-Triumphs programme to increase its production from 50,000 in its 1956-57 financial year to 185,000 in its 1960-61 financial year. This did for Standard-Triumph and led directly to its purchase by Leyland Motors in December 1960.

View attachment 393842
Why did they impose hire purchase restrictions. Is this another one of those rube goldbergian schemes that the Treasury used to stop balance of payments crises?
 
Why did they impose hire purchase restrictions. Is this another one of those rube goldbergian schemes that the Treasury used to stop balance of payments crises?
AFAIK it was part of the STOP-GO demand management policy. I should know more about it than I do.

This was also during the "You've never had it so good era."
 
The first table is from the book. The table below is an attempt to calculate the number of cars actually built. As I don't have the number of cars built in 1978 I've had to use the 1977 figures.

Table 2.2 Share of Production.png
 

kernals12

Banned
The first table is from the book. The table below is an attempt to calculate the number of cars actually built. As I don't have the number of cars built in 1978 I've had to use the 1977 figures.

View attachment 393844
Whoa, I didn't expect that their market share rose during the 70s. I'm guessing that their problems were caused by increased imports.
 
Whoa, I didn't expect that their market share rose during the 70s. I'm guessing that their problems were caused by increased imports.
The combined market share of British Leyland's predecessors was as follows:

1947 - 57.6%
1954 - 52.2%
1960 - 47.8%

So British Leyland had about the same market share in the middle 1970s as the combined production of Austin, Morris, Jaguar, Rover and Standard-Triumph in the 1940s and 1950s.

Also imports don't come into it because the table is for UK production not UK sales. Some of the production was exported.
 

kernals12

Banned
The combined market share of British Leyland's predecessors was as follows:

1947 - 57.6%
1954 - 52.2%
1960 - 47.8%

So British Leyland had about the same market share in the middle 1970s as the combined production of Austin, Morris, Jaguar, Rover and Standard-Triumph in the 1940s and 1950s.

Also imports don't come into it because the table is for UK production not UK sales. Some of the production was exported.
That's what I meant, that BL may have had a growing share of UK production, but a shrinking share of UK sales.
 
It would require amongst other things:

- A government not bent on nationalizing and forming huge combines out of every industry.

- Morris investing in modernization and new tooling soon after WW2 (like Austin under Leonard Lord did) meaning Miles Thomas would have to take over and largely sideline the parsimonious William Morris in the immediate post-war period (leaving the latter in a influential figurehead role), prior to William Morris later covertly orchestrating the merger of BMC as in OTL (likely precipitating Miles Thomas leaving given his allegedly frosty relationship with Leonard Lord) yet with BMC now being a merger of equals instead of Morris being the weaker partner. This would additionally result in Morris producing RWD cars with fully-independent suspension and butterfly anything resembling a Morris Marina, while saving BMC money having to modernize Morris and give it new tooling.

- BMC quickly rationalizes its marque portfolio down to Austin, Morris, MG and Vanden Plas, while discontinuing Riley and Wolseley by the late-1950s. Pushing MG into a more Junior Jaguar like role with Vanden Plas donning a more Radford and Wood & Pickett like role for well-heeled customers. Meanwhile Austin and Morris would be differentiated from each other exterior and configuration wise compared to OTL, with Austin from the 1960s producing FWD hatchbacks, while Morris produces more conventional RWD cars yet both marques managing to use largely related mechanicals and componentry.

- BMC pushes towards a more linear evolutionary path instead of opting for clean-sheet designs (meaning no Allegro), as mentioned above it would also not fully commit to FWD (which would feature hatchbacks from the outset to capitalize on the FWD layout) but also continue to produce RWD cars (under Morris and even MG) to capture any potential lost sales that otherwise would have gone to more conventional rivals like Ford, Rootes (minus Imp) and Vauxhall, etc.

- Leyland Motors acquires Jaguar instead of Rover since Land Rover aside, Rover clashed with Triumph. Which would require Henry Spurrier of Leyland Motors living a bit longer to persuade William Lyons to opt for Leyland instead of BMC (Lyon's biography suggests it was an option). BMC meanwhile benefits from acquiring Rover in place of Jaguar without having the latter pull its weight around seeking to undermine any internal competition, since Jaguar under Leyland would only have Triumph to deal with (as opposed to numerous marques at BMC) and the latter actually compliments Jaguar at the lower-end of the range*.

- Joe Edwards taking over from Leonard Lord at BMC instead of George Harriman whose incompetence contributed towards BMC being merged with Leyland, with Stanley Markland take over from Henry Spurrier instead of salesman Donald Stokes.

*- A potential partnership between William Lyons and Edward Turner to form a motorcycle business could have been formed as soon as WW2 ended, which could have led to Jack Sangster selling Triumph motorcycles to Jaguar instead of BSA. So Leyland could have had both the Triumph car and motorcycle divisions under one roof alongside Jaguar and its commercial vehicles division.
 

kernals12

Banned
- BMC quickly rationalizes its marque portfolio down to Austin, Morris, MG and Vanden Plas, while discontinuing Riley and Wolseley by the late-1950s. Pushing MG into a more Junior Jaguar like role with Vanden Plas donning a more Radford and Wood & Pickett like role for well-heeled customers. Meanwhile Austin and Morris would be differentiated from each other exterior and configuration wise compared to OTL, with Austin from the 1960s producing FWD hatchbacks, while Morris produces more conventional RWD cars yet both marques managing to use largely related mechanicals and componentry.
Wasn't that BL's exact strategy in the 70s? I don't see how that could work, rear wheel drive virtually disappeared in small cars in the 1980s.

- BMC pushes towards a more linear evolutionary path instead of opting for clean-sheet designs (meaning no Allegro), as mentioned above it would also not fully commit to FWD (which would feature hatchbacks from the outset to capitalize on the FWD layout) but also continue to produce RWD cars (under Morris and even MG) to capture any potential lost sales that otherwise would have gone to more conventional rivals like Ford, Rootes (minus Imp) and Vauxhall, etc.
BMC (and BL's) problem was the exact opposite. They were chronically short of cash to develop new models and their most important cars were left to whither on the vine.
Mini: 1959-2000
Metro: 1980-1996
Morris Minor: 1948-1975
Jaguar XJ6: 1968-1986
Jaguar XJS: 1975-1995
MGB: 1962-1980
Range Rover: 1970-1996
 
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kernals12

Banned
I recommend this website for everything you possibly want to know about the British Auto Industry.
When the Austin Motor Company was under administration in the early 1920s, the then Sir Herbert Austin made tentative attempts to sell his troubled company to General Motors – which went on to buy Vauxhall instead – and to Ford. Even the idea of joining Austin, Morris and Wolseley together was mooted as early as 1924 by Dudley Docker of Vickers, who then owned Wolseley. Austin and Wolseley were keen, but Morris said that such a conglomerate would be difficult to control ‘and might tend to strangle itself.’ A perceptive chap, Bill Morris, though he out-bid Austin to buy Wolseley in 1927. However, by 1952 the Austin + Morris concept was even more fraught with hazards.
A tie up with Ford probably would've been for the best. Austin was already selling the "British Model T", the Seven, so this would be a natural move. It would've also avoided some confusion since IOTL Ford of Britain and Ford of Germany, despite sharing the name, were really two seperate companies that competed in countries outside the home market.
 
Wasn't that BL's exact strategy in the 70s? I don't see how that could work, rear wheel drive virtually disappeared in small cars in the 1980s.


BMC (and BL's) problem was the exact opposite. They were chronically short of cash to develop new models and their most important cars were left to whither on the vine.

Not really. The RWD Marina used aging Morris Minor mechanicals that entailing buying new tooling for old components at great cost, while the Allegro was basically a clean-sheet design that despite sharing a number of components had little relation to the 1100/1300 it replaced. What am proposing is that Morris earlier on (as in the early post-war period) embraces RWD with fully-independent suspension that is eventually replaced by a new generation of RWD models beginning in the 1960s likely featuring Hydrolastic / Hydragas suspension (or simply retaining its existing ATL fully-independent suspension layout), the Landcrab for example was originally designed with RWD and largely derived from Alex Issigonis's work at Alvis on the shelved RWD V8-powered TA350 prototype with fully-independent suspension (a precursor to Hydrolastic).

It would mean that Morris at the lower-end of the range would (apart from the Minor - a story in itself) not feature the Mini and 1100/1300 from the early-1960s, but instead feature a trio of conventional RWD 3-box saloons from Vauxhall Viva / Opel Kadett and Ford Cortina to range-topping Ford Corsair equivalents derived from their ATL mechanicals with the Corsair rival replaced by a RWD Morris version of the Austin Tasman (challenging the Rover P6 and Triumph 2000/2500). The Cortina rival would probably feature a downscaled version of the platform akin to a RWD Maxi saloon, with the same being said for the Viva / Kadett rival (possibly derived from the 1100/1300 in Austin Apache / Victoria form and converted to RWD in a similar manner to the Triumph 1300/1500/Toledo/Dolomite).

From the 70s onwards Morris would probably begin to adopt FWD at the lower end of the range though by that time will have managed to successfully differentiate itself from Austin in this ATL as well as prevent losing traditional RWD customers switching to more conventional rivals.
 
Best thing BL could do was work out how to stop their cars rusting. I remember all the hours I wasted on removing rust, filling, sanding and painting with rattle cans.
 
I do agree that the OTL strategy of FWD Austin’s and RWD Morris’ was the right plan. The problem was the terrible execution with things like the Maxi’s awful gearchange, something which should have been sorted out in development.

And while it’s clear that BL should have gone for hatchbacks I think I read something on AROnline.co.uk that British car buyers of the time didn’t like them, which is supposedly a reason why the Mini remained a big seller for so long. The suggestion was BL was so dependent on the UK market that it based product planning decisions largely on it, while companies with a more European focus went for hatchbacks and this paid off as British buyers cane round to them during the 70’s.
 
It always comes as a bit of a shock to see Jeremy Clarkson actually doing some research and being a half-decent journalist. I spent a large chunk of my childhood years helping to jump-start whatever dreadfully unreliable Rover my Dad had bought. Fortunately we lived on a hill at the time.
 

kernals12

Banned
Best thing BL could do was work out how to stop their cars rusting. I remember all the hours I wasted on removing rust, filling, sanding and painting with rattle cans.
Rustproofing is expensive. Although for Jaguar you could use fiberglass since those were low volume cars.
 

kernals12

Banned
The sensible thing would've been to put the Rover V8 in all of their expensive cars, even Jaguars (which they wanted to do with the XJ40 but engineers sabotaged this plan by making the engine bay too narrow). The Rover V8 was an extremely reliable engine and very well suited to the US market since buyers and mechanics were most familiar with V8 engines. And by sticking to one engine, it would've reduced tooling costs.
 

kernals12

Banned
I do agree that the OTL strategy of FWD Austin’s and RWD Morris’ was the right plan. The problem was the terrible execution with things like the Maxi’s awful gearchange, something which should have been sorted out in development.

And while it’s clear that BL should have gone for hatchbacks I think I read something on AROnline.co.uk that British car buyers of the time didn’t like them, which is supposedly a reason why the Mini remained a big seller for so long.
The suggestion was BL was so dependent on the UK market that it based product planning decisions largely on it, while companies with a more European focus went for hatchbacks and this paid off as British buyers cane round to them during the 70’s.
The problem with that explanation is that they made the Allegro and Princess look like hatchbacks but with none of the practical advantages that come with it. I read it was because the Maxi was to be the company's hatchback and no other car was allowed that selling point.
 
I do agree that the OTL strategy of FWD Austin’s and RWD Morris’ was the right plan. The problem was the terrible execution with things like the Maxi’s awful gearchange, something which should have been sorted out in development.

Which is why after the ATL FWD hatchbacks have been launched, all subsequent FWD models (including the Maxi and possibly even the Princess) should have replaced the in-sump gearbox arrangement with an end-on arrangement. Interestingly another BMC precursor to the FWD cars was an early 1950s FWD Morris Minor prototype that featured a transverse engine as well as end-on gearbox layout, which was developed prior to Alec Issigonis moving to Alvis though for some reason decided against the end-on gearbox arrangement.

A no BL scenario would have still meant Issigonis being sidelined to some degree at BMC despite carrying over his ideas for the 9X and E-Series engines that would have been properly developed and emulated the later Volkswagen EA111 and Volkswagen EA827 respectively (given their apparent similarities).

The 9X/10X projects however potentially had a similar weakness with regards to gear-change despite featuring a new gearbox layout as well as an all-new engine and overall clean-sheet design, with the gear-change being unfavorably compared to the original Mini and Clubman as well as the Autobianchi A112 Abarth in what was otherwise a favorable comparison test for the 9X prototype.

The sensible thing would've been to put the Rover V8 in all of their expensive cars, even Jaguars (which they wanted to do with the XJ40 but engineers sabotaged this plan by making the engine bay too narrow). The Rover V8 was an extremely reliable engine and very well suited to the US market since buyers and mechanics were most familiar with V8 engines. And by sticking to one engine, it would've reduced tooling costs.

The Rover V8 could have only been useful had Rover been allowed to develop it further to feature Quad-Cams, 32-valves and fuel-injection on top of larger capacities as was planned for the Rover P8 project. Otherwise even though it was partly their fault the P8 was cancelled, Jaguar could have been justified to reject the Rover V8 as it was in OTL where it could be dismissed as technically inferior and negatively impacting on Jaguar's prestige (being the engine equivalent of the Cadillac Cimarron with a similar potential to kill Jaguar). Though the notion of a Rover engined Jaguar did not appear to get far beyond a Daimlerized version of the Rover SD1.

However if Jaguar were part of Leyland instead of BMC, Jaguar would have had the option of using the Daimler V8 between the XK6 and V12 that was capable of being enlarged to 5-litres (with the power of the 4.5-litre being understated being more than 220+ hp), a rough 60-degree V8 derived from the V12 and the Triumph V8. The latter which had it been developed properly could have been quite an asset to Jaguar as it was capable of displacing 2.5-4.0-litres and with Saab's developments of the Slant-4 potentially allowing for displacements of 4.2/4.3-5.0-litres. Buying Jaguar time to develop their 1980s modular engine family much earlier that in OTL under Ford ownership end up forming the basis of the Jaguar AJ-V8 yet was capable of producing anything from a 4-cylinder to a V12.

And while it’s clear that BL should have gone for hatchbacks I think I read something on AROnline.co.uk that British car buyers of the time didn’t like them, which is supposedly a reason why the Mini remained a big seller for so long. The suggestion was BL was so dependent on the UK market that it based product planning decisions largely on it, while companies with a more European focus went for hatchbacks and this paid off as British buyers cane round to them during the 70’s.
The problem with that explanation is that they made the Allegro and Princess look like hatchbacks but with none of the practical advantages that come with it. I read it was because the Maxi was to be the company's hatchback and no other car was allowed that selling point.

Another factor was the OTL Maxi's weaknesses with the styling and having to carry over the centre section of the Landcrab, which made the Maxi a bigger and heavier car then it should have been with slow sales partly being the cause in preventing BL from rolling out hatchbacks on other models. The Maxi was originally suppose to feature a similar wheelbase to the later Austin Maestro and like the latter feature a 1300cc engine at the lower end of the range.

The Maxi needed amongst other things new styling akin to the Pininfarina 1800 and Aquila to go with the hatchback bodystyle, an end-on gearbox layout and a wheel-base of 100-inches or a shade below with a length of around 155-inches (making for a lighter car). Combined with properly developed E-Series engines capable of growing to 2-litres in 4-cylinder (think 2-litre EA827) as well as a 1300cc entry-level model (either E-Series or more likely A-Series) and you basically have an earlier Austin Maestro with Hydragas and contemporary styling featuring EA827-like engines that precede the Volkswagen engines by 3 years (or potentially even earlier).
 
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