No Bernadotte for Sweden - effects on Napoleon’s invasion of Russia?

I’ve been reading Dag Ahlander’s Sverige vid avgrunden 1808-1814 (Sweden at the abyss 1808-1814) detailing Sweden’s political and diplomatic situation during the critical years of the Napoleonic wars. A big surprise while reading it was the large roll Ahlander attributes to Charles XIV John Bernadotte during Napoleon’s Russian invasion. Essentially he argues:


  1. Sweden opposing France rather than Russia allowed Russia to redeploy 60,000 man from Finland to Russia, as well as forcing France to redirect the same amount of men to guard the Baltic coast.
  2. Bernadotte could with his French military experience provide invaluable advice to Emperor Alexander, including encouraging him to support the scourged earth strategy of Kutuzov.
  3. Bernadotte’s support had a considerable psychological effect on Emperor Alexander who no longer felt that Russia was fighting all of Europe at once, and strengthened his resolve to not negotiate with Napoleon.
  4. Later on, Bernadotte played a key role in working out the 6th coalition’s strategy leading up to the battle of Leipzig.

Ahlander also points out that Napoleon himself lamented not securing Swedish support on his western flank as one of his greatest mistakes leading up to the Russian war, while in exile on St Helena.

This of course prompts the question: how would the French invasion of Russia have been affected with a Bernadotte-less Sweden? Say that crown prince Charles August survives or that Charles XIII biological son Charles Adolf loves to adulthood, removing Bernadotte’s adoption.

As Ahlander points out, most of the Swedish leadership was more interested in a French alliance and eventual reconquest of Finland before their new crown prince switched focus to the west and Norway. Without him in power, Sweden continues a anti-Russian agenda, though it is unlikely that any serious military action can be attempted against Russia with Sweden as weak as it is. More likely Sweden passively supports France.

How is the invasion affected by a less exposed northwestern flank for Napoleon, as well as a less well-advised and less confident emperor Alexander?
 
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I’ve been reading Dag Ahlander’s Sverige vid avgrunden 1808-1814 (Sweden at the abyss 1808-1814) detailing Sweden’s political and diplomatic situation during the critical years of the Napoleonic wars. A big surprise while reading it was the large roll Ahlander attributes to Charles XIV John Bernadotte during Napoleon’s Russian invasion. Essentially he argues:


  1. Sweden opposing France rather than Russia allowed Russia to redeploy 60,000 man from Finland to Russia, as well as forcing France to redirect the same amount of men to guard the Baltic coast.
  2. Bernadotte could with his French military experience provide invaluable advice to Emperor Alexander, including encouraging him to support the scourged earth strategy of Kutuzov.
  3. Bernadotte’s support had a considerable psychological effect on Emperor Alexander who no longer felt that Russia was fighting all of Europe at once, and strengthened his resolve to not negotiate with Napoleon.
  4. Later on, Bernadotte played a key role in working out the 6th coalition’s strategy leading up to the battle of Leipzig.
Where is the surprise? It is all (presumably) well-known facts. 😉

Well, with the exception of few details :
1. Russia had in Finland 30K+, not 60K.
2. While Bernadotte did give #2 advice, it was, IIRC, mostly about retreating. Kutuzov is rather irrelevant because he arrived to the army short before the Battle of Borodino and explicit scorched earth policy never was really implemented, anyway.
Edit: Add #5. By curbing excessive Prussian enthusiasm in 1813 he avoided the trap set by Napoleon and saved Berlin (Battle of Großbeeren and Dannewitz).

Ahlander also points out that Napoleon himself lamented not securing Swedish support on his western flank as one of his greatest mistakes leading up to the Russian war, while in exile on St Helena.

Well, occupying Swedish Pomerania was a rather peculiar way to guarantee the Swedish support. 😂
This of course prompts the question: how would the French invasion of Russia have been affected with a Bernadotte-less Sweden? Say that crown prince Charles August survives or that Charles XIII biological son Charles Adolf loves to adulthood, removing Bernadotte’s adoption.
As was demonstrated by the previous war, Swedish army was rather weak. In OTL Britain provided considerable subsides and Bernadotte had a record of being a very good military organizer. So the critical question is how good the army would be in your scenario? Anyway, probably 30,000 Russian troops in Finland could have it tied for quite a while. What is often overlooked is that by the time of invasion Russia had huge reserves already mobilized and in training. In OTL they were used only in 1813 but this could be expedited.



As Ahlander points out, most of the Swedish leadership was more interested in a French alliance and eventual reconquest of Finland before their new crown prince switched focus to the west and Norway. Without him in power, Sweden continues a anti-Russian agenda, though it is unlikely that any serious military action can be attempted against Russia with Sweden as weak as it is. More likely Sweden passively supports France.

But there was also an objective factor: the CS was ruinous for the Swedish economy.
How is the invasion affected by a less exposed northwestern flank for Napoleon, as well as a less well-advised and less confident emperor Alexander?
While Bernadotte did give an advice, don’t overestimate its value. At the time of invasion AI was ready to stick to the Phul’s disastrous plan and the rest was not as much a well-thought of plan but a pure practicality pushed by Barclay against opposition of most of the Russian generals and with a very tepid support from Alexander.
 
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As was demonstrated by the previous war, Swedish army was rather weak. In OTL Britain provided considerable subsides and Bernadotte had a record of being a very good military organizer. So the critical question is how good the army would be in your scenario? Anyway, probably 30,000 Russian troops in Finland could have it tied for quite a while. What is often overlooked is that by the time of invasion Russia had huge reserves already mobilized and in training. In OTL they were used only in 1813 but this could be expedited.
As written I do doubt Sweden’s ability to conduct any large-scale military operation against Russia.

But there was also an objective factor: the CS was ruinous for the Swedish economy.
Yeah, continual support for Napoleon will likely be ruinous for Sweden, especially if he loses the same as otl.

While Bernadotte did give an advice, don’t overestimate its value. At the time of invasion AI was ready to stick to the Phul’s disastrous plan and the rest was not as much a well-thought of plan but a pure practicality pushed by Barclay against opposition of most of the Russian generals and with a very tepid support from Alexander.
So what would you recon the likely consequences of a neutral, if not French-friendly/anti-Russian Sweden would be for the 1812 invasion? If it still happens the same as otl.
 
As written I do doubt Sweden’s ability to conduct any large-scale military operation against Russia.


Yeah, continual support for Napoleon will likely be ruinous for Sweden, especially if he loses the same as otl.


So what would you recon the likely consequences of a neutral, if not French-friendly/anti-Russian Sweden would be for the 1812 invasion? If it still happens the same as otl.
In the worst case scenario Russia may may lost Riga: I simply don’t remember where the troops from Finland had been moved in OTL.
 
In the worst case scenario Russia may may lost Riga: I simply don’t remember where the troops from Finland had been moved in OTL.
Wikipedia seems to agree that the army of Finland was partially in Riga. That’s interesting then, would a capture of Riga lead Napoleon or some part of the grand army further into the Baltic provinces, perhaps theyd try more to get to Petersburg rather than Moscow?
 
Wikipedia seems to agree that the army of Finland was partially in Riga. That’s interesting then, would a capture of Riga lead Napoleon or some part of the grand army further into the Baltic provinces, perhaps theyd try more to get to Petersburg rather than Moscow?
I doubt it. The Grand Army was rushing ahead in an attempt to catch the Russian 1st & 2nd armies placed near the border and by the time capture of Riga could realistically happen (it was a reasonably well fortified city with a strong garrison and flotilla of the gun boats capable of operating up the Dvina river and Riga being on the wrong side of it) the Grand Army would be too far away for a major reallocation of its troops especially taking into consideration that a main goal, defeating the Russian field armies, was not accomplished. Then, it is not like Riga was just within spitting distance from St. Petersburg: Revel was still on the way.
 
If Sweden somehow becomes friendly to France before Napoleon moved into Pommerania then Napoleon do not give Russia carte blanche in Finland to Russia. Many butterflies. With no war Sweden still border Russia close to St Petersburg. If Sweden join forces with Napoleon then Britain suffer as they get most of their timber from Sweden. If Napoleon embarks on his Russian adventure he will go for Moscow as OTL, but his ally Sweden will tie up Russian forces as they move toward St Petersburg.

Unfortunally for Sweden the army is still the same useless army as OTL 1808/09 and not the army of Charles XII up to Poltava.
 
I doubt it. The Grand Army was rushing ahead in an attempt to catch the Russian 1st & 2nd armies placed near the border and by the time capture of Riga could realistically happen (it was a reasonably well fortified city with a strong garrison and flotilla of the gun boats capable of operating up the Dvina river and Riga being on the wrong side of it) the Grand Army would be too far away for a major reallocation of its troops especially taking into consideration that a main goal, defeating the Russian field armies, was not accomplished. Then, it is not like Riga was just within spitting distance from St. Petersburg: Revel was still on the way.
What then would be the consequences of Riga falling in French hands?

If Sweden somehow becomes friendly to France before Napoleon moved into Pommerania then Napoleon do not give Russia carte blanche in Finland to Russia.
According to the book, Swedish leadership was largely deluded when it came to Napoleon, retaining hopes of an alliance even after he occupied Pomerania and orchestrated Russia's invasion of Finalnd. Even choosing Bernadotte was, from Swedish side, believed to be a pro-Napoleon move; Bernadotte candidated on being "Napoleon's man". Neither the Swedish leadership of public knew (or cared) about his rivalry with the Emperor.

Either way this PoD is after the Finnish war.
 
Wikipedia seems to agree that the army of Finland was partially in Riga. That’s interesting then, would a capture of Riga lead Napoleon or some part of the grand army further into the Baltic provinces, perhaps theyd try more to get to Petersburg rather than Moscow?
Wasnt the failure to take Riga in big part of the result of the prussians reluctance to take a too active role in the war?
 
Wasnt the failure to take Riga in big part of the result of the prussians reluctance to take a too active role in the war?
I don't know, maybe it was. Though I suspect there was a stronger general unwillingness to help Napoleon. Success can be a useful greaser for the wheels of war though.
 
What then would be the consequences of Riga falling in French hands?


According to the book, Swedish leadership was largely deluded when it came to Napoleon, retaining hopes of an alliance even after he occupied Pomerania and orchestrated Russia's invasion of Finalnd. Even choosing Bernadotte was, from Swedish side, believed to be a pro-Napoleon move; Bernadotte candidated on being "Napoleon's man". Neither the Swedish leadership of public knew (or cared) about his rivalry with the Emperor.

Either way this PoD is after the Finnish war.
I know. I have the same book. Facepalm de luxe
 
What then would be the consequences of Riga falling in French hands?

Can’t tell for sure but the forces on French left flank had been limited so I would not expect any miracle. Garrison of Riga was 18,000 and MicDonald’s corps had 17,000, later increased up to 22,000.

Time frame: By the time McDonald was ready to move his siege artillery to Riga Napoleon was already in Moscow and 10,000 troops from Finland (out of 30,000?) arrived only in September 1812.

The main Russian problem were not French & Prussians but a complete ineptitude of their own commander, von Essen. Anyway, Wittgenstein’s successful operations against Oudinot and Saint-Cyr made a possible French success at Riga rather irrelevant strategically.


According to the book, Swedish leadership was largely deluded when it came to Napoleon, retaining hopes of an alliance even after he occupied Pomerania and orchestrated Russia's invasion of Finalnd. Even choosing Bernadotte was, from Swedish side, believed to be a pro-Napoleon move; Bernadotte candidated on being "Napoleon's man". Neither the Swedish leadership of public knew (or cared) about his rivalry with the Emperor.
That’s true and it was rather difficult for them to know because by the time of choice Bernadotte patched (again) his relations with Napoleon (it is rather funny how easily Nappy was manipulated by a rather primitive flattery) and it look like he managed to absolutely charm the Swedish representatives in Paris to a degree that they’d simply refuse to listen to anything unfavorable to him.
Don’t remember which of them, after Savary (then Minister of Police) told him something nasty about Bernadotte, wrote to the Swedish court that, of course, a person of such quality as Prince Ponte Corvo must be hated by the likes of the Duke of Rovigo. 😂

So by the time he arrived to Sweden he was pretty much “his own man”.
Either way this PoD is after the Finnish war.
 
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