No battle of Verdun

[abc123]

I dont know did someone allready asked this, but, let's say that Germans do not launch Battle of Verdun? Let's say that Germans ( Falkenhayn ) decide that it would be foolish to vaste precious amount of soldiers on their disposal there so they decide that no major operation on West will happen.
Since Germany had about 350 000 soldiers killed there ( and many more wounded and even more soldiers and resources engaged there ), what would be the consequences if battle never happened? And if Germans used that soldiers and resources somewhere else?

 

[Shaby]

Way I see it, they had to try something. If not Verdun then what? Besides, saving troops goes both ways. Without the Verdun French are also spared the losses they incurred in the defense. What would be interesting is the long term butterfly effect it would have on interwar French Army. Falkenhayn would probably be forced to resign for not having any plan to attack...

 

[rast]

The number of Germans killed and missing was about 80,000. - 350,000 is roughly the sum of overall German casualties (dead and missing, wounded, ill). There had to be an offensive action at the Western Front in early 1916, the coming Anglo-French offensive (Somme) had to be pre-empted by weakening the French Army. So, either Verdun, Belfort, or Champagne-Argonne - can't see any of these attacks being less costly, keeping in mind Falkenhayn's peculiar way of not assigning sufficient forces from the start but feeding them into the grinder piecemal and too late.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I dont know did someone allready asked this, but, let's say that Germans do not launch Battle of Verdun? Let's say that Germans ( Falkenhayn ) decide that it would be foolish to vaste precious amount of soldiers on their disposal there so they decide that no major operation on West will happen.
Since Germany had about 350 000 soldiers killed there ( and many more wounded and even more soldiers and resources engaged there ), what would be the consequences if battle never happened? And if Germans used that soldiers and resources somewhere else?

Germany did not have 350,000 killed at Verdun, they had 350k casualties.
http://www.wereldoorlog1418.nl/battleverdun/slachtoffers.htm
They had about 100k dead and the rest were wounded. They also had double the number of wounded return to combat later compared to the French.

The numbers on Wikipedia are way off.

Part of the problem with the premise is that Falkenhayn was a 'westerner' who saw that the West would be the decisive theater, so he launched Verdun as a means to seize the initiative in a year when the Allies would be bringing their enormous manpower to bear, thanks to the British finally fielding an army and the Russians finally mobilizing their vast manpower. So Germany went after the weakest Entente power in the one area where Germany had an advantage on the front.
Verdun in conception wasn't a bad idea at all, but it was very poorly executed by the Crown Prince's 5th army.

The idea was to confine the fighting to the East Bank of the Meuse where the German 5th army ringed the French on three sides; the Germans would advance very slowly and force the French to bleed to death by holding the East Bank where German artillery would vastly outnumber them.

The problem in execution was when the French collapsed during the initial bombardment and ran away the 5th army followed quickly and left their artillery trailing behind, which let the French artillery rake them as they moved up. Under the original plan the Germans wouldn't have advanced and let the French recover, reoccupying some of their positions, while the Germans slowly moved forward like how von Mudra conducted the Argonne offensive in October 1914. Unfortunately the Crown Prince and his staff did not get that idea so ran forward, trying to capture ground and as a result sacrificed their infantry to capture ground. Then the Germans found themselves in the ugly situation where they couldn't bring their artillery that far forward that quickly, so their infantry had to fight without it to capture defensible ground while under French artillery fire. Then the campaign became about capturing ground so that they could declare the offensive over and hold to conserve manpower; the problem then was that the only defensible ground was the high ground in very difficult terrain, which the French held very strongly. So the Germans attacked and attacked, because the 5th army's leadership was so wedded to holding ground that they had taken, so they wouldn't retreat to defensible ground to the rear and instead focused on moving forward to get the necessary ground. In the meantime the French had full observation of German positions so could hit them whenever they formed up to attack or just for yucks. Still, Germany managed a favorable kill and casualty ratio, but not by nearly enough margin to justify the cost.


Germany couldn't sit on the defensive in the West, because Falkenhayn would have had to have a totally different personality for that to work, changing everything up to this point. Also if the Germans stayed on the defensive in the West then they would get hit very hard come August when the Somme offensive was originally planned for. The British would be much better prepared and the French would have an extra 300k+ men to contribute to that battle. Being on the receiving end of so much artillery and Entente manpower simultaneously would have broken the German army, especially if the Brusilov offensive still goes through.
Verdun was better than the alternative and it did really break the French army in many ways, creating the conditions for the French mutinies in April 1917. I'd argue staying on the defensive in the West in 1916 would be worse for Germany.
Overall the best situation is the 5th army to stick to the freakin' plan and bleed the French out at Verdun without sticking their infantry into the meat grinder.

The number of Germans killed and missing was about 80,000. - 350,000 is roughly the sum of overall German casualties (dead and missing, wounded, ill). There had to be an offensive action at the Western Front in early 1916, the coming Anglo-French offensive (Somme) had to be pre-empted by weakening the French Army. So, either Verdun, Belfort, or Champagne-Argonne - can't see any of these attacks being less costly, keeping in mind Falkenhayn's peculiar way of not assigning sufficient forces from the start but feeding them into the grinder piecemal and too late.

There was a reason Falkenhayn fed in men slowly, because that played to the original plan; he wanted not to advance quickly, but force the French to hold ground and his infantry to always stay within range of their artillery, thus not exposing their infantry to French guns unsupported. He was going for a rerun of the von Mudra offensive in the Argonne in October 1914, but apparently the 5th army's leadership never understood that and went back to the obsession with capturing ground, to the great cost of their infantry. The Crown Prince screwed up royally and threw away Falkenhayn's plan within the first couple days.

 

[abc123]

Intresting. Thanks.

 

[freivolk]

There were be two non-westfront-alternatives discussed at this time. A new offensive in the East to weaken Russia further or a joint attack with Austria against Italy.

 

[abc123]

There were be two non-westfront-alternatives discussed at this time. A new offensive in the East to weaken Russia further or a joint attack with Austria against Italy.

OK, so, what do you think, wich one of them would be more beneficial to Germany?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

There were be two non-westfront-alternatives discussed at this time. A new offensive in the East to weaken Russia further or a joint attack with Austria against Italy.

The problem is that there were totally against the strategic view of OHL and Falkenhayn. Something had to be done in the west because of the looming Franco-British offensive, in fact Falkenhayn hoped that the pressure exerted on Verdun would force the British into a hasty attack at the Somme which would be slaughtered because it was unprepared; he was half right in that the British attacked early, but not early enough, so were slaughtered on the first day, but not thereafter.

Falkenhayn also thought that the Italians could be held indefinitely on the Alps, which was right; he also thought that after the 1915 offensive against Russia left her crippled and therefore unable to seriously attack in 1916; on that he was wrong. So Falkenhayn and his staff did not see Italy or Russia as a threat in 1916, so were irrelevant to Germany's strategy of decision in the west (the fear with the Russians was that they could withdraw indefinitely into their vast Steppe, which 1915 demonstrated; they took a massive beating, refused to negotiate, and had increased German supply lines tremendously, which were hurting her ability to supply her armies AND economy. Any further advance into Russia was seen as unsustainable, which actually was right come 1917-8 when Germany occupied Ukraine).
Falkenhayn only saw the West as a threat, but also as the only vulnerable Entente center of gravity that could be shoved off balance, thus forcing the Entente to either negotiate or lose one member of the alliance. France was judged, rightly, the weakest power in 1916, so something had to be done to attack France; Verdun was the one place that was most favorable for Germany to attack, because everywhere else was well supplied, had ample reserves, and was likely to end up a German version of the Somme. At least at OTL Verdun, Germany came out ahead in losses and crippled the French army into 1917.

 

[abc123]

Also if the Germans stayed on the defensive in the West then they would get hit very hard come August when the Somme offensive was originally planned for. The British would be much better prepared and the French would have an extra 300k+ men to contribute to that battle. Being on the receiving end of so much artillery and Entente manpower simultaneously would have broken the German army, especially if the Brusilov offensive still goes through.
Verdun was better than the alternative and it did really break the French army in many ways, creating the conditions for the French mutinies in April 1917. I'd argue staying on the defensive in the West in 1916 would be worse for Germany.
Overall the best situation is the 5th army to stick to the freakin' plan and bleed the French out at Verdun without sticking their infantry into the meat grinder.



.

OK, but Germany would have a lot more soldiers, artillery, shells etc. for Somme too...

 

[Deleted member 1487]

OK, but Germany would have a lot more soldiers, artillery, shells etc. for Somme too...

But the French and British would have much more and they would be attacking when they were ready, so wouldn't have made the same mistakes as they did on July 1st (they were supposed to attack 6-7 weeks later but IOTL attacked early because of the French begging them).
It would be vastly more costly to hold the Somme then, which was not very good defensive terrain. The French and British could concentrate their artillery to a degree not seen except perhaps in 1918. Germany didn't have the firepower to match the combined Franco-British number of guns or supply of shells. Perhaps they could have held at the Somme, inflicting the same number of losses as IOTL at less cost, but that was not known in 1915-6. All Falkenhayn remembered was that in 1915 the French very nearly broke through during their Autumn offensive while he was attacking in Russia, which very badly scared him; he was therefore unable to sit idly by and let the Entente fight on their terms, he needed to take the fight to the enemy is a way that was on HIS terms. Remember that Verdun was only a bad idea in hindsight; at the time it made the most sense given that OHL though the Russians were unable to attack prior to Autumn and the Italians were no threat to anyone.
He also thought he could force the British to attack before they were prepared by exerting enough pressure on the French, which was true to a degree. All this would in his mind help blunt the threat of the Somme offensive when it came; he was right because the British attacked before they were ready and suffered 60k casualties in one day as a result and the French were only able to contribute a fraction of the forces they were supposed to.

Germany got a favorable kill ratio out fo the West in 1916:
Somme: 623,000 Entente casualties to 462,000 German ones
Verdun: 337,231 French (with 162,308 dead) to 337,000 German (with 100k dead and twice as many wounded returning to duty as the French).

It wasn't a great ratio, in fact Germany couldn't afford it when you add in the 350k casualties from the Brusilov offensive. But it was still a favorable one, which Germany thought it would not get at the Somme in August 1916 if the French and British were allowed to prepare; I think Falkenhayn was right that waiting for the Allies to attack on four fronts that the same time would have been a disaster for the Central Powers. Instead they got half of a disaster in 1916 by launching the Verdun offensive.

Had the Verdun offensive stuck to the plan, I think Germany would have come out of 1916 ahead. Based on the options on the table and the conceptions of the war in late 1915-early 1916 it was the only logical choice; we have the benefit of hindsight, which influences our views of things, but even with the other options on the table, which there really were none of, Germany made the 'right' choice by attacking at Verdun. It turned out worse than anticipated, but better than sitting still IMHO.

 

[Hörnla]

I guess the idea will be picked to pieces, because if it made sense, it would have been proposed a lot of times since 1916, but I was always a bit puzzled why the main action ("Gericht") occured right north of Verdun.

If the idea was to "bleed the French", I would have figured to attack South-East of the fortress, with the objective of reaching the river South of the city with the intention of turning not only the city itself, but also the roads leading to it into a target practice area for the German artillery, while as much as possible evading the forts.

I am not talking about actual encirclement, but creating a situation where the French might fear the possibility.

Did Falkenhayn fear any similarity to Cannae after the Schlieffen-concept had not worked miracles?

 

[BlondieBC]

Also, a lot has to do with Conrad. If he does not attack Italy and works with the strategic plan, then Brusilov offensive gives the Russians modest gains in land for massive loss of men. Change this event, Romania does not enter the war. Germany wins, and we talk about Verdun like some historians talk about the BEF's heavy losses in 1914 or the Somme. Something that had to be done to win the war. Add in the executed plan at Verdun and the French refuse to give up ground, then Falkenhayn has a reputation better than Napoleon.

We have to remember what risks Falkenhayn took based on what he could have reasonably know. He could not anticipate Conrad's great failure. The Russians did not. A-H did not. He could reasonably expect his officers to follow orders fairly close. The real risk he took was the French would withdraw from the Verdun pocket and await to launch the main offensive (Somme plus others) at same time. So lets look at a reasonable worst case scenario. Italy stalemated. A-H loses ground in east, but is not broken. Russian losses would mean this would be the last effective offensive by the Russia. Romania does not join the war, so the food issues of 1917 and 1918 are greatly lessened. The Ottomans could have setbacks, but this could not be avoid and would not lose the war. Germany would likely hold in the west, but at heavy losses. CP likely get a draw here, even if we assume ASW is the same as OTL, which is unlikely. Sure the USA will show its weight in 1918, but Russia will have a lot harder time lasting as long so we get a much better late 1917 and early 1918 for Germany. Still, it could go both ways. Life and war is not risk free.

OK, to a mid case where some things go bad. Italy, Romania and A-H the same as worst case. France will try to hold the pocket but be economical with resources. France will not be an effective fighting force on the offensive again. Similar to worse case in 1917 and 1918, but the French literally will never launch a major attack after 1916. Symbolic attacks at best.

And go to a good case. France army is not an effective fighting force going forward. Somme is British only attack with maybe symbolic French forces. Come 1917, France and Russia can't launch effective attacks. British holding back German attacks for a year and a half will be very difficult. Good chance the UK's army is largely a spent force by the time the USA arrives so the USA has to carry the load alone. Our troops were not very good by 1918 standards, so the USA has to fight into 1919 and 1920. All this assuming the Entente holds on so long.

And the key is it likely butterflies away USW, which means simply all case are a German win. When you have to bet in war, you take the best odds.

Note: Some other poster suggest an attack in Flanders. This would not be possible due to very heavy rains. All the rivers took up the full flood plain in the area. It was Verdun, Belfort, no attack, attack Russia. These are the only realistic options.

 

[freivolk]

Falkenhayn only saw the West as a threat, but also as the only vulnerable Entente center of gravity that could be shoved off balance, thus forcing the Entente to either negotiate or lose one member of the alliance. France was judged, rightly, the weakest power in 1916, so something had to be done to attack France; Verdun was the one place that was most favorable for Germany to attack, because everywhere else was well supplied, had ample reserves, and was likely to end up a German version of the Somme. At least at OTL Verdun, Germany came out ahead in losses and crippled the French army into 1917.

Only that the crippled French army was still able to start the Nivelle-Offensive in spring 1917.
Don´t get me wrong, I think your analysis of Falkenhayns decision is right, still this don´t make Verdun a good idea, even in hindsigh´t. It didn´t forced France to make peace, it maybe weakend but not prevent the offensive at the Somme, together with the Battle at the Somme it bleeded the german reseves dry, so that the Germans nearly came to late to prevent the collapse of Austria and Romania joined the War. In the end, 1916 leaded nearly to an earlier defeat of the Central Powers. Austrias army never recovered and even the german army started to decline as a fighting force after Verdun/Somme.

 

[John Farson]

Germany got a favorable kill ratio out fo the West in 1916:
Somme: 623,000 Entente casualties to 462,000 German ones
Verdun: 337,231 French (with 162,308 dead) to 337,000 German (with 100k dead and twice as many wounded returning to duty as the French).

Perhaps a dumb question, but how did the Germans get a favorable kill ratio in Verdun and also in the Somme, for that matter? Were the Entente and French simply more on the attack, thus more instances of British and French troops charging towards German machine guns and artillery than vice versa?

I've always known that the Germans suffered less losses at Verdun than the French, but have never been able to find a real explanation for it.

 

[abc123]

All the rivers took up the full flood plain in the area. It was Verdun, Belfort, no attack, attack Russia. These are the only realistic options.

Italy?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Only that the crippled French army was still able to start the Nivelle-Offensive in spring 1917.
Don´t get me wrong, I think your analysis of Falkenhayns decision is right, still this don´t make Verdun a good idea, even in hindsigh´t. It didn´t forced France to make peace, it maybe weakend but not prevent the offensive at the Somme, together with the Battle at the Somme it bleeded the german reseves dry, so that the Germans nearly came to late to prevent the collapse of Austria and Romania joined the War. In the end, 1916 leaded nearly to an earlier defeat of the Central Powers. Austrias army never recovered and even the german army started to decline as a fighting force after Verdun/Somme.

The reason Verdun didn't work out was the leadership of the 5th army, not the idea itself.

Also considering how badly the Nivelle offensive failed despite the massive disparity of forces and how the French army reacted to the failure, I'd say it was hobbling along until it fell on its face; the French army needed the better part of a year to pick itself up again after that. Nothing about the losses during that offensive justified the negative reaction that it got from the French soldiers, which indicates the wounds from the Verdun battles opening up even more.

My question is what was the alternative? The only better option was for Conrad not to attack in Italy AND Verdun not to be mishandled.

Perhaps a dumb question, but how did the Germans get a favorable kill ratio in Verdun and also in the Somme, for that matter? Were the Entente and French simply more on the attack, thus more instances of British and French troops charging towards German machine guns and artillery than vice versa?

I've always known that the Germans suffered less losses at Verdun than the French, but have never been able to find a real explanation for it.

The godawful mishandling of infantry. The french had very good artillery in WW1, but their infantry were very badly handled, which led to them being slaughtered. I'm not exactly clear what they did so badly, but I do know that their infantry arm was very badly handled relative to every other part of the French army. That meant that they didn't get a chance to build up experience like the other armies, so perhaps had to suffer from constantly regaining experience when the current crop was wiped out in the latest offensive.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

You might want to look at the comparative attrition rates in the later stages of the Somme which are more likely to be the case with the later start

Wartime casualties are difficult as different armies report in different ways e.g. german reports do not include lightly wounded allied do (german equivalent report is a separate document) and noone distinguishes between individuals wounded multiple times. Generally Anglo french records are better than German and Russian non existent.

Probably the best proxy is something like the German Irreplaceable loss number - dead pow, badly wounded which gives 1.4 million for Jan - October 1916 or which 330k are during the Verdun Phase and maybe 500k during the Somme phase the rest are elsewhere/elsewhen

Or dead. which is not so subject to interpretation. Allied dead 146k german dead 164k on the Somme.

Any German planning overall has to consider that the alllies will attack in the west in 1916. On balance Falkenhayn was right in concept though you can argue about execution and in the end

Quoi qu'on fasse, on perd beaucoup de monde

 

[BlondieBC]

Italy?

Sure you can do it, but it is largely pointless and dumb. You are leaving hugely defensive terrain for open terrain and in the process not harming the Entente that much. Just let Italy keep charging up mountain sides every few weeks is a better option.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

You might want to look at the comparative attrition rates in the later stages of the Somme which are more likely to be the case with the later start

Wartime casualties are difficult as different armies report in different ways e.g. german reports do not include lightly wounded allied do (german equivalent report is a separate document) and noone distinguishes between individuals wounded multiple times. Generally Anglo french records are better than German and Russian non existent.

That is frankly bullshit. Its been debunked repeatedly. Germany kept track of light wounds and the author of that lie was the author of the British official history of the campaigns in France, who happened to be one of the staff officers that planned the Somme; the author, James Edmonds, was trying to cover his own butt by lying about German losses, claiming they were close to 700k to cover up for his own failures during the campaign by claiming the Germans didn't keep track of their lightly wounded. Looking at the official German history of casualties in WW1, the Sanitätsbericht, shows that they did keep track and included that in their official total for losses at the Somme and everywhere else.

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=129974

Probably the best proxy is something like the German Irreplaceable loss number - dead pow, badly wounded which gives 1.4 million for Jan - October 1916 or which 330k are during the Verdun Phase and maybe 500k during the Somme phase the rest are elsewhere/elsewhen

Or dead. which is not so subject to interpretation. Allied dead 146k german dead 164k on the Somme.


Any German planning overall has to consider that the alllies will attack in the west in 1916. On balance Falkenhayn was right in concept though you can argue about execution and in the end

Quoi qu'on fasse, on perd beaucoup de monde

Germany did not lose 164 kia on the Somme, as that number included POWs as well, which turned out to be some 31k.

Edit:
Looking through the official numbers from late June through November, here were German losses:
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=129974

Forgive me if I post another Sanits tabulation - it's hard to digest these statistics - but here is its compilation for the Somme from June 21st to November 26th 1916:
Killed 57,987
Missing 85,683
Wounded 273,132

So if there were 31,000 POWs during the Somme, then that means German dead totalled: 112,670
If not and all the missing were dead then the total is: 143,670.
I'm not sure where the death toll of 164,000 is coming from.

I guess the idea will be picked to pieces, because if it made sense, it would have been proposed a lot of times since 1916, but I was always a bit puzzled why the main action ("Gericht") occured right north of Verdun.

If the idea was to "bleed the French", I would have figured to attack South-East of the fortress, with the objective of reaching the river South of the city with the intention of turning not only the city itself, but also the roads leading to it into a target practice area for the German artillery, while as much as possible evading the forts.

I am not talking about actual encirclement, but creating a situation where the French might fear the possibility.

Did Falkenhayn fear any similarity to Cannae after the Schlieffen-concept had not worked miracles?

The north of Verdun allowed for greater artillery concentration, there was greater access to rail road supply, and from the south it was harder to conceal troop movements and massing of artillery.

 

[unprincipled peter]

a question: I seem to have a hazy recollection that the crown prince also got aggressive in the opening phases of the war, when he was supposed to hold on the defensive in the center (per the Schlieffen plan) and instead decided to counterattack the french.

Am I recollecting right?