No Battle of Crete

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Deleted member 1487

What if due to getting better intelligence about British defenses on Crete Hitler opts not to risk the invasion of the island due to expected losses?

I couldn't find any thread on this topic, this was the closest I could find:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=372748&highlight=crete

The Germans would save some 300 aircraft, about half of them Ju52s, plus several thousand casualties and a lot of wear and tear on other units, plus the garrisoning troops on Crete itself, which at its peak included some 75k mean, including top tier divisions. Obviously they would also have their paratroopers for Barbarossa, plus their transports, but then also 8th Fliegerkorps (Richthofen's CAS specialists) would save a lot of losses and wear and tear. Same with 5th Mountain division.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=360451&highlight=crete

The British would save some 10k Greek soldiers and over17k men not captured and over 4k killed. Plus the following naval losses:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Crete
4 cruisers and 6 destroyers sunk.
1 aircraft carrier, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine damaged.

They would also retain Crete for operations, but as was the case in 1941 it wasn't a great airbase (as the Germans found out) and close to Axis positions in Greece, especially their better airbases (90 miles from Greek mainland). What's worse is that the best ports are on the north side of the island and vulnerable to attack from that directly and not supportable by land based Allied aircraft.

On balance was it a boon to the British to really hold? It would lock down tens of thousands of men and probably a lot of aircraft and ships to hold and supply, while close to Axis bases to attack with Decima MAS, submarines, aircraft, other special forces, etc. It took over 75k Axis troops to defend it IOTL and required a lot of upgrades to be used for naval strikes on Allied shipping, probably a lot more to be useful for strategic bombers. Might it end up being a Salonika of sorts, even if useful as a staging base to support guerillas in the Balkans and commando raids there too? Perhaps could the British then use the fact they have it as leverage in the argument about launching Churchill's desired Greek campaign? Might we end up seeing a disastrous invasion of Greece in 1942-44? Or could it be used to leverage the Turks to join the Allies sooner?

Who gains or loses more from Crete staying in British hands in 1941? Does the early end to the Greek campaign and greater forces available for Barbarossa make enough of a difference or are the British eventually able to leverage the island to make it of use to the war effort?
 
Always a good question.

Wouldn't Hitler need to garrison Greece proper at a higher level than OTL, just in case? Also, Crete being a viable base, if not any sort of awesome staging point for massed air-raids or the like still could interdict/make even more marginal the Axis bases on the islands further west.

It also puts the Greek government in a stronger position, controlling some territory and being able to act as a government. This will likely help post War, if the Allies still come out roughly as per OTL.

Also, I guess the NZ Infantry Division will be in slightly better shape, which is nice for us.
 

Deleted member 1487

Always a good question.

Wouldn't Hitler need to garrison Greece proper at a higher level than OTL, just in case? Also, Crete being a viable base, if not any sort of awesome staging point for massed air-raids or the like still could interdict/make even more marginal the Axis bases on the islands further west.

It also puts the Greek government in a stronger position, controlling some territory and being able to act as a government. This will likely help post War, if the Allies still come out roughly as per OTL.

Also, I guess the NZ Infantry Division will be in slightly better shape, which is nice for us.
German garrisoning of Greece was relatively small IOTL, but then some units like the 5th mountain had to be withdrawn due to losses in Crete. Likely the additional requirements are probably less that what was used to hold Crete IOTL. So at worst its a wash in terms of manpower and the Italians would probably up their investment of men too.

The island bases to the East were pretty useless to the Axis anyway in terms of strikes, so even as Crete would make them strategically limited in their abilities, they'd still actually be able to hit shipping to Crete as they did during the battle IOTL. Plus the best airfield at Malme was also the closest to Axis bases in Greece. Unfortunately for the Brits Crete is highly under developed and all the ports of capacity are close to Axis bases in Greece and the islands. So shipping to and from Crete is vulnerable to air, naval, and special forces attacks (and mines). Likely all the effort the Decima MAS put into attacking all over the Mediterranean ends up concentrated against Crete.
greece.jpg


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decim...of_Allied_ships_sunk_or_damaged_by_Decima_MAS

Yes the Greeks would be in a much better place, especially the Cretans, who would then avoid the bloody occupation. Of course they'll probably suffering quite a bit more bombing.
 
Crete may be hard to develop into an offensive base, but it is useful as a fighter base for air support for convoys to Malta.
 
Crete was less than ideal as an Allied base because for one thing the best anchorages are on the north side of the island (thus more vulnerable to air attack), and close enough to Greece that it could be hammered at will by the Axis. It wasn't as vulnerable as Malta of course, but the fears that Hitler had that the RAF would use it to bomb Ploesti were overblown.

An unnecessary battle for both sides really and the Axis war effort would have suffered little harm by letting the British stay.

Avoiding the battle keeps the XI Fliegerkorps from being wrecked which could have interesting consequences in the East, and it frees up a pretty sizable fleet of RN ships. Ships that would be useful if they hadn't been sunk or heavily damaged in the Indian Ocean and Far East in less than a year.

British ground losses were significant but not nearly as significant as their warship losses
 

Deleted member 1487

So let's say no Crete and no Malta, 8th air corps is preserved for Barbarossa, as are the paras. 5th mountain is left to hold Greece with the Italians and whatever the historical German occupation was. So what do the German paras do in Russia (I personally think they'd do a drop on Riga with all sorts of consequences for the Soviets)? What do the Brits do with Crete? How is Rommel affected in Africa?
 
Crete may be hard to develop into an offensive base, but it is useful as a fighter base for air support for convoys to Malta.

..............................................................

Only convoys sailing from Suez to Malta.
OP with reduced threat of Axis invasion of Egypt, Commonwealth troops could thrash Rommel earlier.
German garrison troops would have been less expensive to feed if they stayed on the Greek mainland. .... Also easier to fob off Greek occupation on the Italian Army.
With more transport airplanes and paratroopers, the Luftwaffe might have turned the tide at Stalingrad.
 
The allies have an extra division's worth of troops available (they suffered over 4k killed and over 17k captured).
 
Possessing Crete gives some strategic defense to Egypt and the Middle East for the Allies. This would allow some additional troops to be deployed elsewhere, but likely not decisively so.

It also provides some better protection for convoys in the eastern Mediterranean.

It also provides the Greek government-in-exile with actual land held for them which provides them some prestige and operational gains later on. Important in terms of its impact on the Greek resistance.

Strategic benefits limited in 1941-1942. The only real benefit I see is that it might allow some additional units to be sent to the Far East after Japan invades. Whether that means a better result in Burma is very uncertain though.

Starting in 1943, Allied held Crete offers some additional opportunities.

First, it makes it more likely for a successful Dodecanese Campaign once Italy surrenders because Crete is not a threat and a much nearer base of operations. They can intercept potential German reinforcements better, and better support British (and Greek) troops.

Second, a successful Dodecanese Campaign likely leads to additional British efforts in Greece, most likely additional Aegean islands like the North Aegean Islands and possibly the Cyclades as well as improved efforts to support the resistance.

Third, this would allow the Greek government-in-exile to exercise more control in the resistance movement since help is being provided. EAM is likely to be less influential, and a pro-government resistance will have more success and support. EAM is unlikely to try to form their own separate government in March 1944 if the Greek government has control of most of the Aegean Islands and is backing their own resistance movement on the mainland. There won't be Greek Armed Forces sitting on the sidelines in Africa. They'll be in the Aegean on Greek soil. They won't mutiny in support of a proposed new government.

In 1944 when German forces begin withdrawing, the British and Greeks can likely occupy the southern mainland before the resistance groups can take control. Even if EAM is able to seize northern Greece, the government is going to be in much better condition. We'll see either a less intense civil war, or perhaps avoid the civil war entirely since EAM's position will not be as strong.

Fourth, slightly greater chance that Bulgaria agrees to terms with the Western Allies before the Soviets invade in august 1944. IOTL, Bulgaria had never declared war on the Soviets and was trying to secure peace with the Western Allies before the Red Army reached their border. Bulgaria didn't agree to declare war on Germany in time to prevent Moscow from declaring war and occupying the country. With Allied troops in the Aegean, negotiations might have gone differently. The British might be more willing to land troops sooner if they had control of the Aegean, and the difference in forces might have compelled Bulgaria to agree to Allied terms earlier. This is much less certain, but if it happens it means Bulgaria won't be part of the Soviet camp as it would have avoided Red Army occupation.

Fifth, it might have some additional benefits in the Oil Bombing Campaign against Ploesti.

Overall, I see some improvement in the postwar era. Greece would benefit. Much less chance of Bulgaria escaping Soviet occupation, but it is a real possibility.
 

Deleted member 1487

The allies have an extra division's worth of troops available (they suffered over 4k killed and over 17k captured).
Wouldn't they at a minimum be required to garrison Crete? The Axis needed 75k men at the peak of occupation, perhaps the Allies need half of that due to the Cretans not being against them.

As to using it as a bombing base against Romania, Ploesti is too far away to use bombing aids for night bombing and by the time they have enough bomber based ground viewing radar they'd already have Italian bases which were better. By day its suicide to run unescorted raids to Romania (too far for fighters). Mosquitos could do the distance in a straight line (probably somewhat more with reduced payload), but they again have to go by day and go right over Bulgaria in a straight line and through the big defenses in Romania:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Tidal_Wave#Preparations
Thanks to US raids in 1942 (before Mosquito bombers were available outside Britain, which mostly came after 1943) there was a strong defense set up in Ploesti/Romania, so it wouldn't really do any better to use Mosquitos or any British/US medium bombers in 1943 than IOTL. In fact the attempts to use the faster and lighter P-38s didn't do much either.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_chronology_of_World_War_II#1943
After Tidal Wave there weren't attacks until bases in Italy were secured in 1944 and then they expended a lot of effort for minimal returns. Later mining of the Danube proved far more effective, but that required the much closer bases in Italy, which had far better infrastructure.

So the fear of Crete being a major bomber base is probably unfounded and would suck up a lot more British resources for minimal additional returns over OTL if any.

Likely the biggest benefit would be to post-war Greece and the biggest additional threat to the Axis is Crete as a base for SOE operations in the Balkans/Greece.
 
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Wouldn't they at a minimum be required to garrison Crete? The Axis needed 75k men at the peak of occupation, perhaps the Allies need half of that due to the Cretans not being against them.
Why would the British need that many to garrison Crete? If they know the Germans aren't going to invade (at least, in 1941), there's not much point in keeping tens of thousands of men there when they could be better used elsewhere. Oh maybe a few thousand to help plan and construct field defences against any possible future invasion, but beyond that it's really up to the Greeks to keep the place going.
 

Deleted member 1487

Why would the British need that many to garrison Crete? If they know the Germans aren't going to invade (at least, in 1941), there's not much point in keeping tens of thousands of men there when they could be better used elsewhere.
Fear of a later invasion, protecting any naval/aircraft units based there. Knowing the Greeks were not in a position to defend it. Plus its not like the British made great decisions in 1941-42 ;)
Also given Churchill's obsession with Greece he'd probably want to build it up as a staging area for a Greek campaign at some point (probably 1942-43).
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2013/January%202013/0113churchill.aspx
However, if Churchill and the British had their way, D-Day might not have happened. They did everything they could to head off the American plan to attack across the English Channel. They pressed instead for a strategy focused on the Mediterranean, pushing through the "soft underbelly" of southern Europe, over the Alps and through the Balkans.

US and British objectives were not the same. The British wanted to restore and protect the prewar empire, including the routes through Gibraltar and Suez to their colonies and possessions in Africa and Asia. The Americans regarded the Mediterranean and Middle East as a distraction from the main task of taking on the Germans. They were not interested in preservation of the British Empire​

British doctrine—unlike that of the Americans, Germans, and Russians—did not emphasize direct concentration of force. From the Victorian era onward, the British had favored limited engagements on the periphery of the empire, conflicts that were frequently protracted but which minimized risks and losses.​
The situation was further complicated by Churchill’s personality. He was unsurpassed as the leader of a nation at war but the popular impression that he was also a gifted military strategist was mistaken. To the distress of his generals and admirals, he followed his instincts and impulses rather than reasoned advice and deliberation. Brooke noted in his diary that Churchill "talks absurdities."

Brooke arrived one morning to discover the first item on the War Cabinet agenda was the Prime Minister’s new proposal to land in Portugal, cut through northern Spain, and advance across the Pyrenees. Brooke managed to scuttle that particular brainstorm, but Churchill’s strategic notions came so often that Brooke had to be selective in which ones he challenged.

Ironically, the Mediterranean strategy seems to have originated with Brooke rather than Churchill, but nobody pursued it longer or harder than the Prime Minister himself.

In a speech to the House of Commons in November 1942, Churchill described a "wide encircling movement in the Mediterranean, having for its primary object the recovery of that vital sea," but also to expose the underbelly of the Axis, especially Italy, to heavy attack. That seemed "from the beginning of this year to be the correct strategy," he said.​
Whether Churchill ever called it the "soft underbelly" is open to question, but others—including Brooke—certainly phrased it that way and it has become firmly entrenched in history.

The Trident Conference in May reached a compromise—continuation of the southern offensive into Italy, coupled with a target date of May 1, 1944, for the invasion of France. Operation Roundup was redesignated Overlord. By summer, Churchill was expressing doubts about the feasibility of Overlord and suggesting new initiatives in Greece and Yugoslavia.

he British accepted Overlord in principle, but refused to declare it an "overriding priority." Instead, it was termed the "main object." The British also agreed with some reluctance to the possibility of Operation Anvil (later Dragoon), a landing in the Marseille-Toulon area of southern France to support Overlord.

Meanwhile, Churchill had become enamored of seizing some Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, just off the coast of Turkey. If the German occupiers could be ousted, it might draw Turkey into the war on the Allied side. Brooke regarded the scheme as "sheer madness," but he did not challenge Churchill on it.

"Postwar politics rather than the expeditious defeat of Hitler seemed the Prime Minister’s motive," said historian Warren F. Kimball. "The Aegean was a backwater, Turkey’s entry into the war was too little and too late, and any diversion of resources threatened Overlord." British commandos captured several of the smaller islands in the archipelago but could not hold them unless they also captured the large island of Rhodes. This action became the inspiration for The Guns of Navarone, but unlike the book and film, was a disaster for the British, who were repulsed with substantial casualties.

Unwilling to give up, Churchill made a zealous pitch at the Cairo Conference in November 1943 for the Americans to join in an assault on Rhodes. To the horror of British onlookers, the exasperated Marshall responded, "Not one American soldier is going to die on that goddamned beach."

The cross-channel attack was pushed forward for another month to avoid weakening the effort to take Rome. When two British divisions were pulled out of the Mediterranean to prepare for D-Day, Churchill complained operations in the south were being short-changed in "the shadow of Overlord."​
In May 1944, Churchill told a conference of dominion Prime Ministers he would have "preferred to roll up Europe from the southeast, joining hands with the Russians" but that "it had proved impossible to persuade the United States to this view."

British Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan, appointed chief planner of Overlord, said, "Apart from a mere dislike of the project, the British authorities proceeded to make every possible step impede progress in northwest Europe by diverting their forces, as unobtrusively as possible, to other theaters of war."

Pogue noted, "So long as Churchill, with the aid of American forces, was winning a peripheral victory in North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, or the Middle East, he was gaining victories for the British Empire." Churchill was not necessarily hastening the final victory in Europe and he "was definitely delaying the comeback fight in the Pacific for which the American public was clamoring."

Even more so than before, Churchill was drawn to actions in which Britain could have a leading role and a claim to the credit. He focused on the Mediterranean theater, where the top commanders were British. He listened with great interest to Alexander, who assured him he could break through the Ljubljana Gap between Italy and northern Yugoslavia and advance from there to Vienna, and that "neither the Apennines nor even the Alps should prove a serious obstacle."

The British resented the transfer of resources from the Mediterranean to Overlord and the reallocation of forces to the supplementary Anvil/Dragoon landing in southern France (the Meditterranean operation was postponed and finally conducted on a reduced scale 10 weeks after D-Day).

Churchill’s persistence on the southern flank did not end with D-Day. In a note to his military chiefs in July 1944, Churchill said with some petulance, "Let them take their seven divisions—three American and four French. Let them monopolize all the landing craft they can reach. But at least let us have a chance to launch a decisive strategic stroke with what is entirely British and under British command. I am not going to give way about this for anybody. Alexander is to have his campaign."


In his memoirs, Churchill put a less parochial face on the position he had taken during the war, saying, "The mounting of Overlord was the greatest event and duty in the world. But must we sabotage everything we could have in Italy, where the great strength of our country was involved? ... As I saw the problem, the campaign in Italy, in which a million or more of our British, British-controlled, and Allied armies were engaged, was the faithful and indispensable comrade and counterpart to the cross-channel operation."

One of the few Americans to agree with Churchill and Alexander was Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, commander of US Fifth Army in Italy, who said in his 1951 autobiography that "the weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war."

The Italian campaign did have military value. It knocked Italy out of the war and it tied down more than 20 German divisions, denying their use elsewhere. However, the prevailing opinion is that Churchill pushed the southern strategy too hard for too long, and sometimes for the wrong reasons. An argument can also be made that an invasion of the continent in 1943 would have been premature and that British reluctance saved the Allies from making a mistake.

Unfortunately, Churchill and the British stuck to their reluctance long after the situation changed.

As British historian Andrew Roberts points out, "It is next to impossible for any reader of Closing the Ring to spot the slightest Churchillian doubt about the success of Overlord six weeks before it was launched."​
Hastings noted, "It was American resolution alone that ensured the operational timetable for D-Day was maintained, while the Prime Minister expended political capital in a struggle with Washington that he was not only bound to lose, but which he deserved to lose." Planning for Overlord went on despite him, Hastings said.

"Churchill’s single-minded pursuit of the Mediterranean option, and his obsession with Turkey and the Balkans—again a hangover from the First World War—might well have inflicted serious damage on Western strategy if he had won his way," said British military historian Richard J. Overy. "Hemmed in by the Alps and the Balkan ranges, at the end of long supply lines, the Western Allies would have inflicted much less damage on Hitler than they did in France, while the Soviet advance in the east would have been slowed up."

Looking back, Maj. Gen. John Noble Kennedy, director of military operations at the War Office and assistant chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1943 to 1945, acknowledged that "had we had our way, I think there can be little doubt that the invasion of France would not have been done in 1944."​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodecanese_Campaign
 
I think Crete would be a valuable asset to the Commonwealth mainly because of the gradual increase in air strength that occurred from mid 1940 through to 1943. While not much would happen in mid 1941 as the months progress squadrons could be moved in and out of Crete as the situation demands, strangling the supply line to North Africa and putting pressure on the Luftwaffe to defend Greece itself.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think Crete would be a valuable asset to the Commonwealth mainly because of the gradual increase in air strength that occurred from mid 1940 through to 1943. While not much would happen in mid 1941 as the months progress squadrons could be moved in and out of Crete as the situation demands, strangling the supply line to North Africa and putting pressure on the Luftwaffe to defend Greece itself.
I mean Fliegerkorps X was already defending the area, mostly based in Crete. ITTL they'd just be based in Greece proper instead. Likely they'd be in active combat operations against Crete forcing the British to expend resources to defend that island and its build up there.
 
I mean Fliegerkorps X was already defending the area, mostly based in Crete. ITTL they'd just be based in Greece proper instead. Likely they'd be in active combat operations against Crete forcing the British to expend resources to defend that island and its build up there.

Britain had built an advanced naval base in Souda Bay from October 1940 so was already committed to defensive duties in Crete long before the Greek campaign. The first RAF squadrons could be those evacuated from Greece, these would be tasked with defending Souda Bay, with the rest of Crete just having to endure bombing like Malta did.

The RAF could move squadrons in and out according to the conditions of the day, if the Luftwaffe got too frisky they could withdraw to Egypt and let AAA and civil defence cope with the bombing. Or conversely if the situation in Egypt allowed it fighters could be moved in to do battle with the LW, again much like Malta.
 

Deleted member 1487

Britain had built an advanced naval base in Souda Bay from October 1940 so was already committed to defensive duties in Crete long before the Greek campaign. The first RAF squadrons could be those evacuated from Greece, these would be tasked with defending Souda Bay, with the rest of Crete just having to endure bombing like Malta did.

The RAF could move squadrons in and out according to the conditions of the day, if the Luftwaffe got too frisky they could withdraw to Egypt and let AAA and civil defence cope with the bombing. Or conversely if the situation in Egypt allowed it fighters could be moved in to do battle with the LW, again much like Malta.
So pretty much accepting that it won't be a bomber base? It sounds like you're advocating it being an outpost useful for some support missions, otherwise going little more than soaking up bombs

Of course Souda Bay was one of the closet parts of Crete to the mainland, so it, besides being the best port on the island and only major naval anchorage, is also the most vulnerable to bombers from Greece and mining, not to mention frogmen.
http://www.distancesfrom.com/flight...-Souda-Bay-Greece/FlightHistory/28030900.aspx
238km from Sparta to Souda Bay.

156km from the island of Oia:
http://www.distancesfrom.com/flight...30900.aspx?IsHistory=1&GMapHistoryID=28030900

map-greece.jpg


Landkarte-Souda-7933.jpg
 
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How long does Crete stay relevant?

How long would Crete stay relevant if the rest of the North African campaign goes as OTL? Once the Axis forces surrender in Tunisia and Sicily is invaded the pressure is off Malta. I could see Crete being used as a bomber base but Foggia offers you the opportunity to really expand. Crete is not flat like Tinian in the Pacific. I don't think you can cram the whole 15th Air Force in there.

So I see Crete becoming a backwater by the winter of 1943. The German air attacks would dwindle down to bed check Charlie night attacks. The RAF and USAAF will keep up the pressure with twin engine bombers on the Greek islands like how Rabual was kept under siege later in the war but the main effort will shift to Foggia.
 

Deleted member 1487

How long would Crete stay relevant if the rest of the North African campaign goes as OTL? Once the Axis forces surrender in Tunisia and Sicily is invaded the pressure is off Malta. I could see Crete being used as a bomber base but Foggia offers you the opportunity to really expand. Crete is not flat like Tinian in the Pacific. I don't think you can cram the whole 15th Air Force in there.

So I see Crete becoming a backwater by the winter of 1943. The German air attacks would dwindle down to bed check Charlie night attacks. The RAF and USAAF will keep up the pressure with twin engine bombers on the Greek islands like how Rabual was kept under siege later in the war but the main effort will shift to Foggia.

The problem with Churchill, as I posted before, was that he wanted the Greek campaign in late 1943, so likely he uses Crete to try and invade Greece and gets either a bloody nose like the OTL Aegean campaign or a quagmire in the Peloponnese Peninsula that sucks off strength from the Italian and Normandy campaigns. Operation Dragoon might not happen then, which could mean some 150k men are freed up to fall back on Germany
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Dragoon

That's assuming other things don't change first in the East due to the VIII and XI Fliegerkorps being full strength and present on day 1 of Barbarossa. Something like 60% of the ground support for VIII Air Corps and 40% of its aircraft weren't available on June 22nd due to Crete, as they were in transit and that's not counting the ~150 aircraft that had been lost and the fact that they had been in combat constantly since April 1941 leading up to Barbarossa (i.e. no rest to get ready for the campaign). Serviceability was abysmal going into the invasion.
 
A mini island hopping campaign?

Could you have a mini island hopping campaign start in the Greek islands if Churchill got his way? The British start seizing some of the smaller islands to use as bases. The Royal Navy brings some of its carriers into the Aegean to provide air support except this time the British manage to stay. Late 1943 turns into a battle of attrition in the Greek islands.
 
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