No battle of Britain, Mediterranean instead?

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The "problem" with the view that a larger German force can not be supported in Libya is that it fails to take in consideration that the British managed to do so in late 1942 and early 1943 when the 8th Army was there. Using the same ports with the same "insufficient" capacity. :cool:


So much for van Creveld. :D

Just because he writes a lot of books doesn't necessarily mean he knows what he's talking about. As one of my professors used to say "theory is nice but there will always be some emphirical proof screwing up a good theory".

The comparison is inappropriate.

Tripoli could handle 5 cargos and 4 troop ships at a time – when undamaged. By mid-1941, this theoretical capacity was already reduced to 50% (Giorgio Giorgerini, La guerra italiana sul mare). That is because of continuous Allied attacks, which never ceased being a threat to Tripoli, not to mention to other ports. Once the British came in control of Tripoli (and of other ports in late 1942), the Axis was no longer able to significantly damage the ports' handling capacity. After the initial repairs, the Allies were able to re-establish the full capacity.

During the war in the desert, the Axis always employed coastal traffic to supplement the logistical movements from Tripoli to the front. This traffic was never exempt from the danger of Allied attacks, especially from the air and from submarines. By the end of the North African campaign, conversely, the danger from air attacks on Allied shipping, be it coastal or not, was non-existent and the danger from subs negligible.

The British, during their advance into Libya, extended West their railway line from El Alamein. While it did not get all the way to Tripoli, the mere fact that they did that – while the Axis always had to rely on expensive, fuel-burning fleets of trucks – shows the different tack on the issue of logistics, and goes to show how much the situation was different.

Even after taking into consideration all of the above differences, still Montgomery had a very serious logistical problem after the fall of Tripoli, on January 23rd, 1943. He had to temporarily remove all of the motor vehicles from a whole Corps (the X) just in order to keep his force supplied. In other words, at that point, that Corps had the same problems as Graziani's marching infantry in 1940. It took the British a month (until mid-February) to send _one division_ across the Tunisian border.

I think these facts are the empirical proof that the theory opposite to that of Van Creveld is wrong.
 
The Central Med wasn't that useful for the British at this point. Virtually all British supplies went around the Cape anyway so the loss of Malta doesn't affect British logistics substantially. With Crete held submarines can operate from there with only small reductions in efficiency. Even if the interdiction of Axis supply lines is less successful, it doesn't really matter, as those supplies will just sit uselessly at the dock, as the Axis logistics on land were incapable of transporting it all to a front on the Egyptian border.

Crete is also vastly easier to resupply than Malta, so tv large number of very valuable fast freighters lost on the Malta run can be used in more valuable trips.

The advantage of holding Crete is three fold.

It puts Ploesti in range of bombers, including the likes of low level Mosquitos before the Germans have really got their act together on air defenses. This becomes more relevant when America enters the war, the island would be paved with runways.

It will pin an entire large German army uselessly in Greece, like Norway. Even better, this army will be dependent on a couple of railways very vulnerable to partisans.

A much more relevant Greek government can be maintained, and the Wallies will get a massive headstart in The Balkans when German collapse begins.
 
Avoiding the BoB could only be beneficial for the germans, even if the Med strategy has no other gains. It would double the planes for Barbarrosa, which might speed up the advance or help stop soviet counterattack in winter.
On the other hand, I think the main reason the british resisted was that they knew american help was coming. Remove that strong hope and they would make a deal, but they won't even if they lose the Med or the Middle East, even if the soviets fall. Germany's best chance for a settled peace is to remove FDR from the equation, the sooner the better.
 

General Zod

Banned
On the other hand, I think the main reason the british resisted was that they knew american help was coming. Remove that strong hope and they would make a deal, but they won't even if they lose the Med or the Middle East, even if the soviets fall. Germany's best chance for a settled peace is to remove FDR from the equation, the sooner the better.

This may be paramount in the mind of Churchill, he gambled everything on Roosevelt. However, the rest of the British ruling elite, Parliament, and public may not be so willing to see the British Empire go to Hell when the Med and the Middle East are lost for the sake of fulfilling Churchill's anti-fascist crusade. Roosevelt may be as eager's to get Hitler's scalp as a junkie for a fix, but he CANNOT enter the war in Europe without a casus belli that looks damned compelling to the isolationist Congress and public, such as a German DoW, or a repetition of the Zimmerman telegram. Any such opportunity coming before Pearl Harbor is terribly unlikely. The American people are NOT interested in saving the British Middle Eastern Empire (the British Isles themselves may be another matter) or the USSR from invasion.

@ Altaran: all this talk about Crete as a British base is dependent on the Italian attack on Greece, which is far, far from certain in this scenario. If Musso thinks he can reap easy booty in the Med and the Middle East with German help, he won't even think of attacking Greece (at most draft a secret deal with Germany acknowledging Italian protectorate on Greece and Yugoslavia in the peace settlement). True, Churchill might think of violating Greek neutrality (if they are not attacked, Mextaxas won't ally with the British) and conquering Crete. It remains to be seen if they have the opportunity, when they are swiftly losing Egypt and Iraq. As soon as they lose Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria, they shall have to pull the fleet from the Med.
 
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