No battle of Britain, Mediterranean instead?

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The problem with the theory of disagreeing with Van Creveld is that he mentions that the British had a railway in Egypt that ran from Port Siad, through Alexandria to Mersah Matruh before the war, and they extended it to the Egypt/Libya border during the war. So the British didn't have the rear area transport problems of the Axis. In addition the British were much more willing to push ships into forward ports, being a naval nation and all, so their forward area transport problems weren't as acute as the Axis. The upshot is that the British could do what the Axis couldn't in Africa.
 

Deleted member 1487

The effect that I am looking for with this POD is that without the BoB and the losses that entailed, the Germans are able to take Malta and hold the Brits in Libya/Egypt. So, instead of the mess in Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as a stronger LW, the Germans are able to out manuever the Brits in the Mediterranean and thus manage and greater success in Russia. This would also have the knock on effect of perhaps allowing the Afrika Korps (maybe not under Rommel) to hold N. Africa with the Italians for longer against Monty. Now whatever effects this has on the overall all war effort are up in the air. I think Malta can be taken relatively easily if the Axis moves quick after the fall of France. Malta really only became the fortress it was OTL later in '41, after Crete fell. I would agree that Cyprus would become a fortress, but as it is on the other side of the Mediterranean, it would be relatively irrelivant to N. Africa.

So we are looking at a N. Africa that is less of a logistical nightmare that it was OTL with far less losses and an increasing ability to challenge British dominance in the region for less resources than it cost OTL. Perhaps this pushes back the invasion and flip of allegance of Italy. Also, with the increased strength of the LW without the BoB, perhaps the Brits get more smashed up in Africa and any bomber attacks on the mainland. This could lead to a great contest of the air over Europe when and if the Americans get involved. Perhaps even this causes enough casualites to the Brits to finally have them throw in the towel, but I doubt it unless the Afrika Korps takes the Suez an the Russians are not in the game yet. Once Russia becomes and active belligerent, Britain is in for the long haul. That is unless Stalin quits, but that would take a hell of a lot a pain to cause.

Does this sound reasonable? Does the strong LW cause enough change to alter the course of the war?
 
By 1939 the British on the spot in Egypt were openly developing a capacity to maintain a force of 300,000 men which explains British logistical success. It is doubtful that a retreating British Army would have spared much of that capacity.

My, such hatred for FDR due to a single plan which certainly never went in to effect or have we all imagined West Germany's industrial capacity from 1949 to 1989.:rolleyes:

Germany was 'gutted' by WWII yet somehow we've all also managed to miss the utter destruction of Europe's welfare and prosperity since that time.:rolleyes:


Whatever Stalin's crimes, and they were massive, he was also vastly more cautious than Hitler, which makes him marginally preferable in terms of choosing between brutal tyranny or genocide.

I won't go on about this assumption that the destruction of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia were things Germany was 'entitled' to.

I will, however, note that these hopes based on a hypothetical coup ignore that such a coup never took place, that there was no reason for any such participants to assume a coup could make matters worse for Germany and might improve terms while surely cutting short an ever-worsening bloodbath sooner for Germany, that this also ignores the moral bankruptcy of most of the figures in the coup who were willing to follow a Hitler before they had one and who were plotting against him for the sole reason that he was losing the war.

This also ignores the obvious questions as to what happens if the coup fails and the Nazis look to the ruthless but pragmatic Stalin when finally ready for a deal, what happens if Germany plunges into civil war while Stalin has far more troops in Europe(outside Italy NO British or Americans until D-Day), and the prospects for German democracy in a nation where twice in a generation the military rushed eagerly to war, then stabbed the German government in the back to save themselves.

I can see what Germany gets out of these proposals, most of it undeserved, but it remains unclear just what the US and UK get out of rewarding Germany for aggression and genocide by leaving her most of her conquests in return for changing a few faces at the top. The most likely result would be a third war against Germany, possibly a war against Stalin, all in return for a lower death toll.
 
The problem is that, as observed above, the logistics mean that you actually could get the opposite effect.

If Malta falls in the way you describe, Crete won't, which is a net loss to the Axis.

Even disregarding that, the Axis infrastructure/logistical situation in North Africa is such that they can't actually usefully employ many more resources their than they did in OTL, and the carrying cost of deploying more troops mean that its actually a negative sum game, and they will actually become less capable of offensive action. This is compounded if the lines end up closer to Egypt, as the vast amounts of motor transport required will compromise the advance of the Eastern front even more. Worse, the greater logistic burden means busier shipping lanes, with more ships stacked up outside overloaded ports, which will mean that the Italian merchant navy will be exhausted sooner and more losses in transit. The Axis will also have to feed the Italian civilian population of North Africa.

All in all, the logistics prevent the Germans taking Egypt.

So, in the Mediterranean theatre alone, a greater German deployment might well mean that the Axis does less well there than in OTL, for a substantially higher cost in men and material. Meanwhile, on the Eastern front the gutting of the German armies motor pools for the North African campaign means that the opening stages of Barbarossa are slightly less of a crushing victory, and so the tide turns on the Eastern front six months earlier than OTL.

The lack of the bombing of British industry means that it is ~10-15% more productive than OTL. This is improved another ~10% as resources can be diverted to ASW meaning the Battle of the Atlantic is won earlier. This, together with planes being avaliable and without the panic causing excessive resources to be kept at home, means that the Japanese are defeated in Thailand. They are incapable of offensive operations by the end of 1943.

The German forces in North Africa are a wasting asset by that point, their supply lines unreliable. The Allies ignore them, and with the Eastern front collapsing, Overlord happens in 1943, and the war is over by May '44.
 
The "problem" with the view that a larger German force can not be supported in Libya is that it fails to take in consideration that the British managed to do so in late 1942 and early 1943 when the 8th Army was there. Using the same ports with the same "insufficient" capacity. :cool:

The British had established supply lines from Alexandria, it started having problems itself when it pushed beyond them.

The Germans wanted to build their own railway lines but Rommel didn't have the patience to wait for them even if Italy had mobilised the resources to build them.
 
Crete might not be an issue if Greece stays out the conflict, and I think that Germany would have an advantage over OTL--the large forces lost in Tunisia OTL would essentially have grabbed the Suez Canal instead, and Germany has reduced its border and has no need to occupy Italy, which is instead a friendly country instead of an occupied country.

I would call this a net gain for the Axis, actually, but I don't see them advancing beyond Syria-Iraq. The Middle East becomes a hellhole theater with pro-Axis partisan activity and massive atrocities against Jews. And I'm not sure that Bomber Harris would launch a large strategic bombing campaign ITTL, which probably boosts the allies slightly.

The Soviets might be slightly disadvantaged--because they might wind up sending men into the Middle East, or at least having to keep some forces on their Southern border against a German attack.

The Second Front in Africa takes a lot longer, but come 1945, bottled sunrise will hit the Axis powers--probably against cities once the holocaust is revealed to be real in the remnants of Israel. This could not continue past 1947, where the USA would start ramping up production of these weapons.
 

General Zod

Banned
My, such hatred for FDR due to a single plan which certainly never went in to effect or have we all imagined West Germany's industrial capacity from 1949 to 1989.:rolleyes:

Thankfully for Europe and the world, nature removed FDR and his cronies from the helm in time and let a new President and Administration take over with a rational German policy. They realized that a livable Germany was necessary to Europe's welfare and economy and to contain the Soviets. So the plan was scrapped.

Germany was 'gutted' by WWII yet somehow we've all also managed to miss the utter destruction of Europe's welfare and prosperity since that time.:rolleyes:

There are degrees of being gutted, of course. Truman's Administration was sane and wise enough to realize that rebuilding Germany as a functional and prosperous state was going to support the stability and welfare of democratic Europe much much more than FDR's mad genocidal revenge schemes. However, one must wonder how much additional welfare and stability could have been reaped for Europe (and indirectly, the world) during the last 50 years had WWII American political leadership pursued the same approach and sought to keep Germany united in her ethnic borders and Eastern Europe free of Communism.

Whatever Stalin's crimes, and they were massive, he was also vastly more cautious than Hitler, which makes him marginally preferable in terms of choosing between brutal tyranny or genocide.

This is a false dichotomy. A policy could be pursued during WWII by the Western Democracies that sought to topple or contain both Hitler and Stalin as much as possible equally.

I won't go on about this assumption that the destruction of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia were things Germany was 'entitled' to.

According to national self-determination, yes. The people of Austria and the Sudetenland had clearly expressed their wish to be reunited with Germany after the fall of the Habsburg Empire, but they had been forcibly prevented by the Entente powers and had been forced to become a separate state, or a subject minority of the Czech, by the Versailles-St.Germain settlement. Germany's actions in 1938 had provided the means by which such national self-determination will could be exercised. It involved the threat of military force, sure, but then again pretty much any national unification in history has required the use of force to some degree, either by revolution or war or threat of force.

Anyway, if the Western Allies had any doubt about the democratic legitimacy of the Anschluss and the Munich settlement, there is an infallible means to ascertain such matters, namely a referendum. They could have asked post-Nazi Germany as a peace treaty clausle to run referendums in Austria and the Sudetenland, under their supervision, with the choice of union with Germany, separate nation, or union with Czechoslovakia, respectively. Just like it was done for Saar. I have no doubt about the result.


I will, however, note that these hopes based on a hypothetical coup ignore that such a coup never took place, that there was no reason for any such participants to assume a coup could make matters worse for Germany and might improve terms while surely cutting short an ever-worsening bloodbath sooner for Germany,

I utterly fail to understand the point here. Offering the chance for a decent peace deal to the Axis powers, is a win-win option for all parties involved. Either the people of the Axis powers topple their dictators and sue for peace, which cuts the bloodbath for all, or they do not, in such a case the Allies simply go on with the war till final victory. The Allies lose nothing by scrapping Unconditional Surrender, since their goal is not to annex Germany, Italy, or Japan (the reason why US made sense in the ACW but does not in WWII).

that this also ignores the moral bankruptcy of most of the figures in the coup who were willing to follow a Hitler before they had one and who were plotting against him for the sole reason that he was losing the war.

This ignores that many of the partecipants in the coup had been plotting to topple Hitler for years, but only the worsening military situation during the late phase of the war created the circumstances that gave the coup a fair chance to succeed. Some of the others may have been sincere patriots that only were awakened to anti-Nazism gradually by the grim realities of the war; so what ? Hitler deceived millions about his true intentions, both inside and outside Germany. And if some others are cynical pragmatists that are simply trying to bring their nation out of the terrible mess the previous leadership had brought it into, again, so what ? Toppling the murderous tyrant and ending the war and the genocide are still the right thing to do, even if you do it with selfish motivations. Besides, to my knowledge NOBODY of the military resistance had been directly and actively involved in the Nazi crimes against humanity to any significant degree.

This also ignores the obvious questions as to what happens if the coup fails and the Nazis look to the ruthless but pragmatic Stalin when finally ready for a deal,

I fail to see the point here. If the coup fails, there won't be any deal. Hitler was not going to seek a compromise peace.

what happens if Germany plunges into civil war while Stalin has far more troops in Europe(outside Italy NO British or Americans until D-Day),

It is very questionable that had the coup succeeded, patchwork resistance by local nests of Nazi diehards would have been in the position to launch any kind of prolonged civil war. Rather some days or weeks of mop-up work at most. In 1943, this scarcely gives Stalin any huge advantage.

and the prospects for German democracy in a nation where twice in a generation the military rushed eagerly to war, then stabbed the German government in the back to save themselves.

The revelation of the crimes of the Nazi regime would retroactively remove any legitimacy for it in the eyes of the vast majority of the German people. Moreover, national unity in the 1937 plus Austria/Sudetenland ethnic-linguistic borders and economic livelihood is a deal that again the vast majority of the German people can deem satisfying, given the circumstances. Most would readily acknowledge that the Walkurie plotters had moved to save the Fatherland from near-certain destruction and restore her honor. In all likelihood, post-war Germany will quickly tread the path back to a functional democracy just like it did OTL, only with less of a guilt complex since it would have removed the butcher and his cronies with her own hands.

I can see what Germany gets out of these proposals, most of it undeserved, but it remains unclear just what the US and UK get out of rewarding Germany for aggression and genocide by leaving her most of her conquests in return for changing a few faces at the top. The most likely result would be a third war against Germany, possibly a war against Stalin, all in return for a lower death toll.

Your bias shows. Pick a map, look at the extent of the territory Nazi Germany had occupied by 1942-43, then look at Austria and the Sudetenland and explain to me how you can honestly call the latter "most of her conquests". Besides, they were a special case: there were an overwhelming German majority in those territories, which did not exist in any other of Hitler's conquests (well, except Danzig). If you remember, the occupation of Bohemia-Moravia turned the Western Democracies' opinion against Hitler decisively just because it was the first case where he did not have a rather good point based on national self-determination, it was just naked imperialistic conquest.

Anyway, the US and UK win in this scenario since they end the war much sooner, limiting the bloodshed and hardship for themselves and the civilian populations of Europe greately, they cut the Holocaust short greately (it would have had only a year to run), they remove the regime responsible for the war in Europe, return Germany to be a functional democratic and peaceful member of Europe, and prevent Stalin from expanding his tyranny outside the pre-war borders of the SU.

As for Stalin, hopefully he will acknowledge that he must content himself with restoring the integrity of the pre-war Soviet Union, and by looking at all the stuff he was able to conquer in 1939-41, the deal is rather positive. If he insists about waging a war of conquest in Europe even after the Nazi regime is toppled and the integrity of the SU is restored, this just proves he is an aggressor and a threat to Europe no less dangerous than Hitler and he must regretfully be dealt with by similar means. It's really no different a scenario from the one where Stalin chooses to wage WWIII in response to the Berlin airlift or the Korean War. If anything, the US and UK would be in a rather better situation to fight that war if they can have a united post-Nazi Germany at their side instead of just West Germany.
 
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Grimm, Zod, if I could just ask you guys to stay on topic--this isn't really supposed to be a political thread.

I'm wondering how much of a gain/loss this variation of the war would be:
 
This has become a rather diffuse thread, discussing everything from FDR to Operation Valkyrie. However, it does not seem to have tried to answer the question of what would result from the quickest possible commitment of German forces to the Mediterranean in summer 1940. My view is that if it had been diplomatically possible in late June to early July to send strong Luftwaffe units to Sicily, Rhodes and Libya together with even a single panzer division to Libya, the combined Italian and German forces would have quickly taken Malta and Egypt.

The key weakness of the British position was its lack of modern aircraft. OTL the single available Hurricane (there were no Spitfires) was moved between air fields to give the Italians a misleading impression of British strength. The corresponding German strengths include the performance of the Bf 110 and the effectiveness of the Ju 87 and Ju 88 against ships. Against Gladiators and Sea Gladiators, long ranged Bf 110 squadrons could escort German and Italian bombers from Sidi Barrani to Alexandria or equally from Rhodes to Cyprus (they did escort bombers from Stavanger to Newcastle). Bf 110s could also have defended Italian warships from daylight air attacks. Luftwaffe units from Sicily could also have seriously damaged any large warships attempting to pass through the Mediterranean and bombers from near Sidi Barrani or from Rhodes could have attacked any ships sailing from Egypt westwards.

The Luftwaffe would probably not have prevented the Italian Navy from suffering heavy losses in night actions (is it ASB for Germany to offer Seetakt sets to Italy, if necessary taken from damaged warships such as Lutzow?). However, it is unlikely that a Taranto style attack would have been possible and the British fleet would probably not be able to remain at Alexandria. Thus it would have been possible to move supplies by sea at least as far as Tobruk.

The arguments that the Axis could not have supplied an advance into Egypt seems to fail as they did supply (poorly) an army at El Alamein in 1942 and the Axis strength from August to October 1942 would have defeated 7th armoured division and 4th Indian Division in December 1940. In addition, Italy had more ships in 1940, and the ports were probably in better condition. Note that El Alamein is quite close to Alexandria, and once Alexandria falls, supply becomes simpler as there is greatly reduced surface naval opposition.

One important caveat is that Italy must be persuaded to make the effort to take Egypt. OTL more forces were send against Greece. Perhaps the best (ASB!) method would be for the Germans to place their units under Italian command to carry out an agreed plan. Italian East Africa was only taken in April 1941 using 4th Indian Division which was redeployed from Egypt. If Egypt falls, this is unlikely to occur. In fact, all British units will probably be drawn towards Egypt and probably defeated, leaving Iraq free to rebel and leaving India, Aden and Kenya as the British bases (and even Aden might fall if Luftwaffe units get to Eritrea).

This assumes only the use of troops send to Africa before June 1941 and, as aircraft can be moved quickly over long distances, Barbarossa would not be weaker. It actually would be stronger if the Luftwaffe had suffered fewer loses. However, it does assume that the British do not rush modern aircraft to Egypt. Thus a weaker air attack on Britain may be necessary as a deception. This could be focused on British naval bases to sink destroyers and thus help with the Battle of the Atlantic.
 
There's a fundamental problem underlying the easy presumption of U.S. aid or alliance, namely it didn't happen OTL. Congress was showing slim sign of willingness to declare war on Germany, & absent Hitler's lunatic DoW, I see no reason Congress would move. U.S. public opinion was strongly isolationist, & Congress, & FDR, knew it. And don't go saying "Lusitania"; that's a fiction to cover the Zimmermann Telegram.

On FDR, Zod, I have to say I think you give him too much of the blame for unconditional surrender. Winston went along with it; if he hadn't agreed, & despite the popular notion I think he did, I feel it's pretty certain he'd have said something against it, or tried to persuade FDR to modify it. Also, don't forget, the surrender wasn't unconditional in the event. Did the Allies bungle it? Absolutely. Both FDR & Winston failed to make explicitly clear the war was against Nazis, not Germans, which might have move the Army to overthrow Hitler much sooner & made any demand for unconditional surrender unnecessary. Also, IIRC, the Morgenthau Plan was actually written by Harry Dexter White, who we now know was a Communist spy, not by FDR...

The lack of the bombing of British industry means that it is ~10-15% more productive than OTL. This is improved another ~10% as resources can be diverted to ASW meaning the Battle of the Atlantic is won earlier.

You're dreaming. Harris would release more to Coastal Command like he'd give up his left nut.
 
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You're dreaming. Harris would release more to Coastal Command like he'd give up his left nut.

Without a Battle of Britain and the following city bombing campaign, the politics of the Air Ministry will bevery different. Without the political imperative to retaliate Harris will be less powerful.

More importantly, my scenario is slightly exadgerated, but I hope it makes the point that the much toured Med' Strategy isn't any kind of magic bullet for the Axis, and that by wasting resources there for little gain is actually a net loss. There is a reason why the OKW didn't want to intervene in North Africa.
 
A major Axis campaign in the Med in 1940/1941 would probably be successfull in getting Egypt, Malta and bringing the front to the Middle East.

Two interesting butterflies from this would be:

1. What do the Arabs do?

2. Does Turkey join Axis?
 
It depends on location, if the battle is in the sea of Egypt, Cyprus or Turkey area, the Allies would win easily. If the battle is in the sea of Libya or Italy, the battle would be in tie.
 

General Zod

Banned
More importantly, my scenario is slightly exadgerated, but I hope it makes the point that the much toured Med' Strategy isn't any kind of magic bullet for the Axis, and that by wasting resources there for little gain is actually a net loss. There is a reason why the OKW didn't want to intervene in North Africa.

IMHO you are undervaluing how much Egypt was valuable to Britain, strategically and politically. For once, it is not ASB to see Churchill fall, if he loses Egypt after losing France and Britain stands alone. if he loses Iraq as well, his fall is certain.

A major Axis campaign in the Med in 1940/1941 would probably be successfull in getting Egypt, Malta and bringing the front to the Middle East.

Two interesting butterflies from this would be:

1. What do the Arabs do?

2. Does Turkey join Axis?

Re. 1) The fall of Egypt most likely causes the pro-Axis coup in Iraq to go into motion. From there, the essential point is whether the Axis is swift enough to bully Vichy France into opening its Syrian ports and airports to them (the fall of Egypt paints the British as weak, so in all likelihood they will) and to send airborne troops (how much the Axis has left after taking Malta ?) to shore up the Iraqi before the British can crush them.

Re. 2) the fall of either Egypt or Stalinged to the Axis makes it likely, but not sure. The fall of Syria/Iraq or Moscow makes it all but certain.
 
As long as Bomber Harris stays on you won't be seeing a diversion of long range bombers to ASW duties.

When it finally happened OTL the US had to provide the bulk of the forces and the response by Harris to less than @15 percent of Bomber Command's reserve planes not being used instead going on ASW duties can be charitably described as hysterical.
 
More importantly, my scenario is slightly exagerated, but I hope it makes the point that the much toured Med' Strategy isn't any kind of magic bullet for the Axis, and that by wasting resources there for little gain is actually a net loss. There is a reason why the OKW didn't want to intervene in North Africa.

I don't believe that a Mediterranean strategy can cause an immediate British collapse or solve all Germany's problems. However, if Italy allows Germany to move similar forces south in mid 1940 as it sent in 1941 OTL and Italy and Germany agree a common strategy, the Axis gains significant advantages over OTL:

1. They take Egypt, Malta and Cyprus with some effect on Turkish views (for example, Turkey will supply all its production of chromium ore to the Axis. Useful for armour and jet engines).
2. There is no Balkan campaign, which should save at least two weeks and extensive wear on tracks for Barbarossa.
3. They can probably get forces to Iraq in time to support its revolt and thus take the known Middle Eastern oil, which they probably cannot exploit but still hurts the British Empire. Holding Iraq later stops Lend-Lease going to Russia via Iran.
4. I think that they can hold Eritrea. The two regular Italian divisions in East Africa were defeated at Keren in Feb. 1941 by 4th and 5th Indian OTL. 5th Indian alone had been forced to retreat and 4th Indian was sent south after helping to defeat the Italian attack on Egypt in Dec. 1940. OTL Massawa fell in April and the last Italian force at Gondar surrendered in November. Italian submarines could sail from Italy to Massawa and if they can be based and supplied there, the British need many escorts for the Indian Ocean. Could Aden be taken?
5. Very uncertain but they may even be able to take Gibraltar. See http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=66870&highlight=felix+gibraltar . You wouldn't want to bet on it but your losses wont be huge if it fails. From September 1940, you could probably have persuaded Vichy to allow you to base aircraft at Oran to defend it. These can at least force the British fleet to move elsewhere.

There are more "global" effects
6. A limited Battle of Britain will mean that the Luftwaffe is stronger during Barbarossa. Focusing on RN bases might actually sink more warships.
7. The capture of British territories will raise Italian morale and not having to keep forces in the Balkans will allow them to send more to Russia.
8. American opinion will be less impressed by British power.
9. Not preparing for Sealion means that about 2,000 barges are used by the German economy during the second half of 1940!
10. Not modifying the barges means that Tirpitz is commissioned sooner (dim memory but I seem to recall that labour was moved).

Not a magic bullet but all worth doing and with no more cost than OTL except that Hitler has to offer the Italians command of German forces and promise at least Egypt and Sudan (and secretly Greece and Yugoslavia after peace with Britain).

In addition, Germany needs to succeed with Barbarossa and to avoid giving FDR a good excuse for war. Thus they need to produce more tanks (ideally learning the lessons of France that they need powerful guns), trucks and aircraft. They also need to find policies and slogans to weaken Russian resistance. By 1942, if the USSR has fallen, Britain is still trying to take Eritrea and the USA has not declared war, Churchill may fall. If not speed up development of the V1.

ps. apologies if this is mostly in other threads or fora https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=110306
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=146796
 

General Zod

Banned
Mostlyharmless, your other points have much merit, but IMO you are seriously underestimating the political impact of repeated British defeats by Spring 1941. ITTL, in leass than a year Churchill has lost France, Malta, Egypt, Gibraltar (IMO if the Axis takes Egypt Franco shall be persuaded to open its borders to Axis forces and from land, Gibraltar shall be taken), Cyprus, Sudan, and Iraq. Two of the most precious possessions of the British Empire, Suez and the Middle Eastern oil, are gone. Spain, Turkey, Iran, and Vichy France are at least actively cooperating with the Axis if not gone to full alliance (very likely if Egypt and Iraq are gone Axis), Britain still fights alone, and Churchill has no real victory to boast of (since ITTL the Battle of Britain shall be a deception skirmish). With such a record, Churchill's fall is quite likely.
 
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Alratan, how does the fall of Malta while holding Crete equate to a better British position? The loss of Malta, an old and strongly held British colony far more strategic than Crete would be a disaster for the British, making it impossible for them to use the central Med while giving the Axis a much more secure use of same. It's also a larger military defeat for the British as Malta would almost certainly have withstood the Axis forces which took Crete.
 
A capture of Malta in 1940 is of course impossible.

The burden of the operation would unavoidably fall on Italy. Germany had other fish to fry until late June, a thorough reorganization in July, and even cancelling any air attack against Britain, it would take quite some time to redirect the German effort South. Apart from that, in 1940 Mussolini was still convinced he was waging a parallel war and would not accept any German help whatsoever.

The Italians had no plans in 1940 to storm Malta.

They had no landing craft, which means they should have not only captured a port, but they should have captured it intact.

They had no experience in landing operations, and had neither army nor navy infantry units trained for those.

The Regia Marina began the war in the Med with 2 battleships, 0 carriers, 7 heavy cruisers, 17 light cruisers, 53 destroyers and 55 subs. Four more battleships were almost ready and some more 50 subs were currently not operational (in training or under maintenance), and they could join in later – just like the British kept reinforcing their assets in the Med, which at the date of the Italian DoW was 5 battleships, 2 carriers, 0 heavy cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 35 destroyers and 12 subs. Note that trying to make up the inferiority in battleships by lining up Italian heavy cruisers against British battleships would invariably turn out to be a bad idea. In short, the Italian navy assets did not have the superiority needed to make a landing operation secure.

Finally, as to the paratroopers, the Italians had a suicidal Libyan battalion and a national battalion, newly formed, and still untrained. They also had a parachute that famously killed its users; the reason why I called the Libyan battalion "suicidal" is that the soldiers volunteered in order to leave a pension to their families after their death (which probably implies their health and psychological condition weren't exactly the best). Indeed, in June 1940 it was one battalion – sized down from two. Those two initial battalions had not been ever used in combat, the losses they suffered were _entirely caused by training accidents_. Indeed, between July 26, 1940, and December 1, 1940, the newly established pareatroop training center of Tarquinia saw _all of the paradrop drills stopped_ because of the losses incurred in training. In other words, for the first months of the Italian war, the Italians had _no_ operational paratroop force.
 
The problem with the theory of disagreeing with Van Creveld is that he mentions that the British had a railway in Egypt that ran from Port Siad, through Alexandria to Mersah Matruh before the war, and they extended it to the Egypt/Libya border during the war.

And farther West, right into Libya.

So the British didn't have the rear area transport problems of the Axis. In addition the British were much more willing to push ships into forward ports, being a naval nation and all, so their forward area transport problems weren't as acute as the Axis. The upshot is that the British could do what the Axis couldn't in Africa.

Yes.
 
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