No August 1941 Leningrad offensive

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Deleted member 1487

What if rather than diverting forces north, Hitler leaves his armies on the Luga Line in August 1941 and uses the 4th and 3rd Panzer Groups to launch limited attacks to secure the joints between AG-North and Center and wear down Soviet forces East of Smolensk to create breathing room to refit the two groups for a major mid-September offensive while Guderian secures Kiev and then moves up to support them when ready? VIII Air Corps remains with AG-Center too. What can they accomplish in the meantime, does the Staraya Russa offensive happen or do Soviet forces get diverted? What do Soviet forces around Leningrad do in the meantime? How does Finland react? Would this increase chances to reach Moscow prior to the onset of mud? Will it help prevent the wearing down of German forces in August-September East of Smolensk, do the Soviets sit on the defensive, and what happens with Yelnya if Zhukov isn't diverted AND AG-Center retains armored forces?
 
Ill throw out some questions/comments to keep this current:

I assume 18th army is going to clean up Estonia sort of like OTL?

Since Baltic supply logistics is better (a better road net, sea supply possibilities) perhaps a Leningrad operation doesn't hurt overall delivery of supplies to the central part front and is just an easily doable August/September thing? I guess what I am getting out is that it would seem better for the Germans to always spread out the front of their attacks to remove road and rail bottlenecks, live off the land easier, don't let the Soviets focus their defenses any particular place. (Kind of like OTL where divergence to Kalinin and Kursk during Typhoon are often called mistakes but maybe is what the Germans had to do because they just couldn't supply concentrated forces).

Leningrad just seems to big of a threat to leave just laying around. OTL the productivity of a huge city was neutralized, a fleet was immobilized, several armies encircled with minimal supplies. Perhaps a Yelnya scale counter attack occurs here. Really it seems OTL once the initial stage of Typhoon spent itself, and mud, supply and distance became factors, it would have made sense to switch back to the Volkov and Crimea in November to finish the job.
 

Deleted member 1487

I assume 18th army is going to clean up Estonia sort of like OTL?
Yes.

Since Baltic supply logistics is better (a better road net, sea supply possibilities) perhaps a Leningrad operation doesn't hurt overall delivery of supplies to the central part front and is just an easily doable August/September thing? I guess what I am getting out is that it would seem better for the Germans to always spread out the front of their attacks to remove road and rail bottlenecks, live off the land easier, don't let the Soviets focus their defenses any particular place. (Kind of like OTL where divergence to Kalinin and Kursk during Typhoon are often called mistakes but maybe is what the Germans had to do because they just couldn't supply concentrated forces).
The Kalinin diversion had nothing to do with lack of roads, there was an unoccupied highway road to Moscow that was left unutilized in the attempt to strike north at Kalinin Front and encircle them.

Leningrad just seems to big of a threat to leave just laying around. OTL the productivity of a huge city was neutralized, a fleet was immobilized, several armies encircled with minimal supplies. Perhaps a Yelnya scale counter attack occurs here. Really it seems OTL once the initial stage of Typhoon spent itself, and mud, supply and distance became factors, it would have made sense to switch back to the Volkov and Crimea in November to finish the job.
In the long run, sure, the question is what power projection ability does it have in 4th quarter 1941? The Germans have finite resources and Moscow is a much bigger prize and one that if taken severely limits rail supply to Leningrad.
 
What if rather than diverting forces north, Hitler leaves his armies on the Luga Line in August 1941 and uses the 4th and 3rd Panzer Groups to launch limited attacks to secure the joints between AG-North and Center and wear down Soviet forces East of Smolensk to create breathing room to refit the two groups for a major mid-September offensive while Guderian secures Kiev and then moves up to support them when ready? VIII Air Corps remains with AG-Center too. What can they accomplish in the meantime, does the Staraya Russa offensive happen or do Soviet forces get diverted? What do Soviet forces around Leningrad do in the meantime? How does Finland react? Would this increase chances to reach Moscow prior to the onset of mud? Will it help prevent the wearing down of German forces in August-September East of Smolensk, do the Soviets sit on the defensive, and what happens with Yelnya if Zhukov isn't diverted AND AG-Center retains armored forces?

I don't see a good reason why the Staraya Russa Offensive would not go ahead (my understanding is that the Russians were planning it before the start of the German offensive). If LVI Panzer Corps is not available to come to its aid then X Army Corps is in serious trouble.
 

Deleted member 1487

I don't see a good reason why the Staraya Russa Offensive would not go ahead (my understanding is that the Russians were planning it before the start of the German offensive). If LVI Panzer Corps is not available to come to its aid then X Army Corps is in serious trouble.
ITTL the entire 4th Panzer Group would be available.
 
ITTL the entire 4th Panzer Group would be available.

Your original musings were vague. Seaton strongly suggested (though never explicitly came out and said it) that Fourth Panzer Group should've been moved to AGC (the sooner the better) Seaton repeatedly emphasizes how ill suited the Baltics were to armored warfare. I thought maybe you were thinking along the same lines. Seaton fails to mention the Staraya Russa Offensive. Now if all of Fourth PzG is hanging around and readily available then the Staraya Russa Offensive gets in trouble in a hurry but while Seaton overstates a little IMO he does have a point about the terrain around Lake Ilmen being bad so I don't see Fourth PzG encircling all of 34th Army much less the other two armies. So the Germans do better there (and I would note they will have less Luftwaffe support) in short order but not YU-ugely better. Now the Valdai Hills held a strange fascination for Hitler so I could see him demanding that AGN try to follow up this greater success by advancing to Vyshny Volochyok
 

Deleted member 1487

Your original musings were vague. Seaton strongly suggested (though never explicitly came out and said it) that Fourth Panzer Group should've been moved to AGC (the sooner the better) Seaton repeatedly emphasizes how ill suited the Baltics were to armored warfare. I thought maybe you were thinking along the same lines. Seaton fails to mention the Staraya Russa Offensive. Now if all of Fourth PzG is hanging around and readily available then the Staraya Russa Offensive gets in trouble in a hurry but while Seaton overstates a little IMO he does have a point about the terrain around Lake Ilmen being bad so I don't see Fourth PzG encircling all of 34th Army much less the other two armies. So the Germans do better there (and I would note they will have less Luftwaffe support) in short order but not YU-ugely better. Now the Valdai Hills held a strange fascination for Hitler so I could see him demanding that AGN try to follow up this greater success by advancing to Vyshny Volochyok
To clarify what I mean, the 4th Panzer Group would be diverted to secure the seam between the two army groups and go after the Soviet forces in that area. Effectively it would be the area south of Lake Ilmen against the Soviet 27th army on the map and the Soviet 22nd army south of it off map near Velyiki Luki. 3rd Panzer Group can focus on lopping off elements of the Soviet forces attacking AG-Center in August.

AGN-1-31Aug-1024x680.jpg


Smolensk_SAVO007_July10_Aug_41.jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

Alright, found a better map of the situation as of August 1st:
AGN-1-31July-624x533.jpg


The 4th Panzer Group in August would then be used to attack the Soviet 27th and 22nd armies to eliminate them and drive the front back to the Valdai Hills (seemed like a defensible terrain feature) as it secures the flank between AG-North and Center. As the Staraya Russa offensive by the Soviets happens at the same time 4th Panzer Group would help hit them as per OTL and drive the Northwest front back, while unhinging the flank of the West Front. Perhaps with 3rd Panzer Group not having to be sent to Leningrad and fight 22nd Army ITTL (their OTL use in August-early September) they can support the flank by attacking the Soviet 29th army in support and destroying that too.

The question then is what do the Soviets do? We are assuming the Luga Group and Northwest Front attack the German 16th army as per OTL and lose just as badly. What about the Kingisepp Group without 41st Panzer corps attacking it along with 18th army? The Germans have a defensive position along the Luga river, do the Soviet start really hammering that? I'm seeing the German 50th, 1st, 28th, and 38th corps holding the Luga Line. 26th corps would be tied up in the Baltic states into September trying to clear out the last of the Soviet 8th army and dealing with the Baltic islands. Looks like after 4th Panzer Group gets done with the Soviet Northwest Front and 22nd army the 10th and 2nd German infantry corps would be holding a like from Lake Ilmen to the Valdai Hills, while 4th Panzer Group is south of the Valdai Hills threatening the flank of the Soviet West Front (depending on the fate of the Soviet 29th army). Perhaps then the Soviet August-September offensives are directed north to deal with the threat from 3rd and 4th Panzer Group to the West Front?
 
I am considering in order to actually take Moscow the Soviet reserve forces must decisively be destroyed during the August September period or at least reduced down enough to curtail the possibility of a counteroffensive for Typhoon. (Like something like the Third Battle of Kharkov) The reason Smolensk was such a failure was because of the fast advance by the German forces, Soviet forces were not yet deployed or prepared and the forces that were there devolved into a single blob with absolutely no ability to be able to do a counteroffensive and avoid being encircled.
 

Deleted member 1487

I am considering in order to actually take Moscow the Soviet reserve forces must decisively be destroyed during the August September period or at least reduced down enough to curtail the possibility of a counteroffensive for Typhoon. (Like something like the Third Battle of Kharkov) The reason Smolensk was such a failure was because of the fast advance by the German forces, Soviet forces were not yet deployed or prepared and the forces that were there devolved into a single blob with absolutely no ability to be able to do a counteroffensive and avoid being encircled.
You mean the July Smolensk battle? That wasn't really a successful German pocket battle because Guderian diverted forces to take and hold Yelnya, so closing the pocket was much more costly and took a lot longer.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...gehead-during-battle-of-smolensk-1941.402773/
 
You mean the July Smolensk battle? That wasn't really a successful German pocket battle because Guderian diverted forces to take and hold Yelnya, so closing the pocket was much more costly and took a lot longer.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...gehead-during-battle-of-smolensk-1941.402773/
I did not realize. There were a few armies that escaped though they probably should not have because of the delay in the retreat order, but that would help explain it. Even if (which is a big if) the German Army is able to destroy Soviet forces at Moscow (Typhoon) the Red Army would still not be completely or perhaps even decisively/effectively destroyed. In 1942 they appear to be 8.6 million strong so even the loss of the forces at Moscow is not necessarily the end. I am interested though if you disagree.
 

Deleted member 1487

I did not realize. There were a few armies that escaped though they probably should not have because of the delay in the retreat order, but that would help explain it. Even if (which is a big if) the German Army is able to destroy Soviet forces at Moscow (Typhoon) the Red Army would still not be completely or perhaps even decisively/effectively destroyed. In 1942 they appear to be 8.6 million strong so even the loss of the forces at Moscow is not necessarily the end. I am interested though if you disagree.
It's a major matter of conjecture of what would happen if Moscow fell. Soviet morale can take only so much and the plans to exterminate the Russia people weren't known to the Soviets. Of course some forces would continue to fight to the bitter end, especially communist party affiliated units like the NKVD that only had a bullet waiting for them, but it is an open question of how many forces would continue to fight if Moscow fell, as successful defense of the capital was a major part in affirming the power of the Soviet state and Stalin specifically, as well as the ability of the Soviet military to actually stop the invaders. I've heard that Stalin nearly evacuated city but stayed because he realized that leaving would mean the capital would fall and with it his regime would be undermined, as well as the will of the military to follow him. As the heart of the nation in many ways, losing the capital would really screw up morale and Soviet ability to fight (about 10% of the pre-war industry of the nation was in and directly around the capital, even with evacuations that was still a sizeable chunk of industry, plus it was a hugely important rail junction and major land line telephone hub). Losing Moscow could well unravel Soviet ability to fight...or not, it's impossible to say for sure. Fighting would go on for sure after the capital fell, the question is whether that would be the beginning of the end of Soviet resistance or the end of the beginning.
 
Question: some years ago I saw a documentary on history channel about superweapons in the ww2 in particular about V1 and v2 anyways it claimed that moskow was (as we know) the core of the rail network west the urals but also the biggest node of the electricity distribution grid of the whole USSR, so strategic attack(with v1 LOL) or conquest of it would have crippled also the industry in the urals and all the production east the volga:is this statement true? I tryed to look in internet but i found nothing.
 

Deleted member 1487

Question: some years ago I saw a documentary on history channel about superweapons in the ww2 in particular about V1 and v2 anyways it claimed that moskow was (as we know) the core of the rail network west the urals but also the biggest node of the electricity distribution grid of the whole USSR, so strategic attack(with v1 LOL) or conquest of it would have crippled also the industry in the urals and all the production east the volga:is this statement true? I tryed to look in internet but i found nothing.
As far as I can tell based on German planning documents to bomb it, the Moscow-Upper Volga industrial complex would be crippled by the loss of Moscow due to the electrical shortages. I forgot about that, thanks for bringing it up. AFAIK though they couldn't transmit electricity to the Urals, it was just too far, so there was local electrical production, including a hydroelectrical facility in the Urals. Based on a previous discussion we had on this forum about Operation Eisenhammer and a working He177 potentially targeting it in 1942, until 1943 there was actually electrical shortages, so any further losses of electrical production would cause severe electrical problems in the self contained Moscow-Upper Volga industrial complex, which included Gorki and Yaroslavl to the East. Those two cities had their electrical facilities, but again AFAIK not enough to power all the industry/city. Beyond that evacuating them to the Urals en masse would just mean electrical shortages in the Ural industrial complex, which was severely burdened by the OTL evacuation to the point that they weren't heated and often even lacked roofs in winter, which did the workers no favors for survival.

This book has some info about the plan to bomb Soviet electrical infrastructure around Moscow:
https://www.amazon.com/German-Air-War-Russia/dp/1877853135
https://www.amazon.com/German-Air-War-Russia/dp/1877853135

And this:

https://books.google.com/books?id=T...EIXTAO#v=onepage&q=moscow upper volga&f=false
 
As far as I can tell based on German planning documents to bomb it, the Moscow-Upper Volga industrial complex would be crippled by the loss of Moscow due to the electrical shortages. I forgot about that, thanks for bringing it up. AFAIK though they couldn't transmit electricity to the Urals, it was just too far, so there was local electrical production, including a hydroelectrical facility in the Urals. Based on a previous discussion we had on this forum about Operation Eisenhammer and a working He177 potentially targeting it in 1942, until 1943 there was actually electrical shortages, so any further losses of electrical production would cause severe electrical problems in the self contained Moscow-Upper Volga industrial complex, which included Gorki and Yaroslavl to the East. Those two cities had their electrical facilities, but again AFAIK not enough to power all the industry/city. Beyond that evacuating them to the Urals en masse would just mean electrical shortages in the Ural industrial complex, which was severely burdened by the OTL evacuation to the point that they weren't heated and often even lacked roofs in winter, which did the workers no favors for survival.

This book has some info about the plan to bomb Soviet electrical infrastructure around Moscow:
https://www.amazon.com/German-Air-War-Russia/dp/1877853135

And this:

https://books.google.com/books?id=TIHKkzcf_bcC&pg=PA394&lpg=PA394&dq=moscow+upper+volga&source=bl&ots=oGo-Oz4DSi&sig=gwfrkD3o7MbVPkt04uXj17X1GpM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiDv8WBqaHSAhWM34MKHWu0A20Q6AEIXTAO#v=onepage&q=moscow upper volga&f=false

Is it confirmed that the rest of the upper Volga was reliant on electricity from Moscow? If so, how much would the region's loss damage the Soviet war economy?
 

Deleted member 1487

Is it confirmed that the rest of the upper Volga was reliant on electricity from Moscow? If so, how much would the region's loss damage the Soviet war economy?
AFAIK based on our last discussion of the topic the area was an integrated industrial zone, so yes the loss of Moscow production with the capture of the city, which would also entail the loss of the hydroelectric station at the Rybinsk Reservoir, would create shortages East of Moscow in the Upper Volga area; that wouldn't mean complete lack of electricity, rather not enough for all needs even after eliminating civilian consumption. I forget the specific numbers off hand, but Gorki was a major automotive area, the Detroit of the USSR, and based on estimates something like in general 30% of Soviet weapons production would have been lost, while in specific categories it would have been much higher; most T-60 production was in Gorki for instance.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eisenhammer
 
AFAIK based on our last discussion of the topic the area was an integrated industrial zone, so yes the loss of Moscow production with the capture of the city, which would also entail the loss of the hydroelectric station at the Rybinsk Reservoir, would create shortages East of Moscow in the Upper Volga area; that wouldn't mean complete lack of electricity, rather not enough for all needs even after eliminating civilian consumption. I forget the specific numbers off hand, but Gorki was a major automotive area, the Detroit of the USSR, and based on estimates something like in general 30% of Soviet weapons production would have been lost, while in specific categories it would have been much higher; most T-60 production was in Gorki for instance.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eisenhammer

Is the 30% for a hypothetical successful implementation of the bombing plan or does it take into account the combination of the loss of Moscow with the shortages elsewhere?
 

Deleted member 1487

Is the 30% for a hypothetical successful implementation of the bombing plan or does it take into account the combination of the loss of Moscow with the shortages elsewhere?
It's the loss of Moscow and resulting loss of power to nearby industrial cities like Gorki and Yaroslavl. Though both had bombing targets within to really shut them off; IIRC only 50% of Moscow targets were to be bombed, so the entire loss of the city and Rybinsk would be a greater loss of electricity even leaving the electrical facilities in both those cities intact.
 
It's the loss of Moscow and resulting loss of power to nearby industrial cities like Gorki and Yaroslavl. Though both had bombing targets within to really shut them off; IIRC only 50% of Moscow targets were to be bombed, so the entire loss of the city and Rybinsk would be a greater loss of electricity even leaving the electrical facilities in both those cities intact.

What happens if the fall of Leningrad is added sometime in 1942 due to the rail supply reduction?
 
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