No arctic convoys

I was wondering what if Winston Churchill with his wild anti communism and America under pressure from Republicans, anti communist and people against the Soviets own aggression decided not to give the Soviet Union any form of aid?
 

archaeogeek

Banned
I suspect either a) FDR tells Churchill and the republicans to knock it off and stop being suicidal idiots or b) it turns into a much harder slog, meaning the funds for Manhattan Project may not be available in time, plus who knows if in these circumstances the soviets will enter the war in asia and whether without that declaration of war the japanese leadership will be so keen to surrender immediately (although if the war goes on, the possibility of a revolution in Japan increases exponentially, the government was terrified of the possibility that the people of Japan would rise up through most of 1944-1945, and there was apparently a lot of angry noise going through the major cities); there will be heavier fighting and the western allies will have to be willing to deal with significantly more dead. The resistance groups become more soviet aligned after the war because of the perceived betrayal.

The war ends a year or two later than OTL.
 
Routes that Lend Lease took.

http://www.o5m6.de/Routes.html

Given Rosevelts long term plans to knock the European powers back, I don't see him not authorising Lend Lease to the SU.


From ‘Warlords, the heart of conflict 1939 – 1945’ by Simon Berthon and Joanna Potts.

Page 131

But as the war ground on, Churchill began to see a new threat to Europe – the man who had become the third ally in the fight against Hitler, Joseph Stalin. In late 1942 he told Anthony Eden: ‘It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarianism overlaid the ancient state of Europe.’

Roosevelt thought otherwise. As far as he was concerned, the cause of war in the first place was the in fighting between Europe’s ancient, imperialist nations and he began to see in Stalin someone who would help him in his great cause of freeing the world of that Imperialism. Also in 1942, in a conversation with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York, he remarked: ‘The European people will simply have to endure Russian domination in the hope that – in ten or 20 years – the European influence will bring the Russians to become less barbarous.’


This is taken from ‘The Roosevelt Letters: Being the Personnel Correspondence of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Vol.3: 1928 – 1945.
 
From ‘Warlords, the heart of conflict 1939 – 1945’ by Simon Berthon and Joanna Potts.

Page 20

In his diary, declassified in 2002, Guy Liddell, the wartime head of MI5’s B Division, admitted ‘There is no doubt that the Russians are better in the matter of espionage than any other country in the world.’ Evidence to support this came from the defection in January 1940 of Walter Krivitsky, the former head of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe, who became the most significant defector yet from the elite of the Soviet intelligence services. Krivitsky gave tantalising clues pointing to a network of agents embedded deep in both the British government and the intelligence services. Though he did not know their identities, he was talking about the Cambridge Five, headed by the notorious trio of Burgess, Maclean and Philby.


Page 38

Stalin’s agents were also busy elsewhere. From its London headquarters the British security service, MI5, was collecting substantial evidence that the Communist Party of Great Britain was being ordered by Moscow to adopt a policy that was nothing short of treachery. ‘Moscow’s instructions’, noted Guy Liddell, the head of MI5’s counter-subversion unit, ‘are that the imperialist war must be gradually converted into a civil war, that no steps should be taken to oppose a German landing in this country since a short period under a Nazi regime would be the quickest way of bringing about a Communist revolution.’ Churchill was serious about intelligence and knew that Stalin was approving subversion in Britain, but he was not willing to jeopardise even the slightest prospect of an alliance with the Soviet leader by bearing down too heavily on Soviet espionage. He and his Cabinet continued to ‘abstain from any action which might suggest impatience, suspicion or irritation’.
 
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