Italy was valued for her naval power which before Adowa was considerable. Not on par with the French but added to another powers very important. The English greatest fear in the Mediterranean Sea was a French-Italian-Spanish alliance. With Crispi, that would have been impossible but under different leadership perhaps.
After him, the Italians let their navy rot. Their army also deteriorates rapidly but in 1896 her relative power was far higher than it was in 1914
Italy's greatest asset was that her alliance was less natural- she could go to war with either Austria or France and could ally with either side
Agreed, but my point was broader. Italy played the Great Powers play (although maybe abusively, but still). Different Italian actions in the previous decades mean a very different 1914. Some sort of general war is still likely, but it may differ wildly from the one we know.
Italian colonial policy was a significant factor in the big picture of politics of those years, critically because IOTL, Italian invasion of Libya triggered the Balkan wars and all the ensuing jazz, including the Sarajevo assassination.
With Crispi invading (successfully?) Libya in 1896, and thus staying in power, all the dynamic is changed beyond recognition.
For instance, Crispi was heavily anti-French and pro-Alliance. If the Italian conquest of Libya is seen as a product of the Italian pro-German alignment, you may have a situation where Germany sees Italy as a more reliable partner than the Ottomans, Italy has no reason to approach France, and Britain still sees Russia as the biggest threat. There may be no Triple Entente at all, although Germany and Britain would still be rivals.
Also, what happens in the Horn is pretty signifcant. It impacts the *Fashoda Crisis analog, if there's one (though, butterflies may be even earlier effects since here the POD must be in the 1880s at least). The whole Anglo-French conflict for the Nile is different ITTL.
Ethiopia as a British partner (or colony) would have important consequences in this era.