no 1922 treaty of Washigton
- Thread starter hans
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simonbp said:... and in the 1920's, the RN would be right; it wasn't until the late 30's that carrier aircraft armament (bombs and torpedoes) was able to sink a battleship. Land-based bombers and flying boats are another matter, though (and what Michell actually used in his demonstration)...
Simon
Mitchell sank a battleship that was stationary with its watertight doors open and no damage control crew aboard. Oddly enough you aren't going to find one of those in action !
The RN was confident that it could build battleships that could withstand land-based bombers in this period. Don't forget we're talking mainly about new construction anyway, and not whether the older battleships would stand up to attack.
Grey Wolf
Redbeard
Banned
I entirely agree that Mitchell’s ”tests” proved very little and the facts turned out to be that levelbombing was surprisingly ineffective – not at least against moving seatargets. I have the book you mention, and where Brown contributes, but I don’t think there was provided any proof of unsinkable ships, but it is remarkaable that the FAA focused so much on torpedobombers and ignored divebombers. I haven’t got any sources at hand but they appear to have drawn the right conclusion early –that if you want to sink ships you have to let in water and not air.
Aerial torpedoes in the 1920’s were insignificantly different from those used in early WWII, and when thinking of the non-existent or very crude torpedo defence systems and the simple AAA I actually think naval airpower had a zenith in the interwar years – there just wasn’t a chance to show it. By late WWII the defence against naval airattack probably had the upper hand, but that never showed bacause only one side had all the advantages.
If BB’s had kept growing in size and cost I’m sure the motivation to invest in researching alternative ways to sink BB’s would be greatly increased. Airborne torpedoes and mines would be obvious, but fleet subs would probably also attract great interest. We know that the steam powered fast sub proved a failure, but I guess it would be possible before WWII to build a schnorkeled and diesel-electric powered fast fleet sub (an early Type XXI). Alternative propulsion like the Sterling engine etc. would also attract interest and investment. I wonder if it would be possible to armour a fast DD size vessel against the 6” secondaries of BB’s. With an all forward torpedoarmament such a vessel (at night?) would be interesting to deploy aganst large ships.
But the effect of not rebuilding Kaga/Amagi and the Lex’es to big CV’s might be significant, at least early on, but I guees the big strike was so obvious to Pacific conditions that the IJN/USN CV would anyway have developed that way – just later.
Regarding Japan I think we must not mix Japan of the 1920’s with Japan of the late 1930’s. The first was in chaos and broke and the later a very harsh dictatorship capable of squezing anything and everybody. The two Tosas and at least some of the Akagis (the two laid down in 1920) might have been completed (not counting in the earthquake which destroyed Tosa on the slip), but that is also far from the plans pre WT. It wouldn’t be the first time that plans aren’t realised, even Denmark had plans in the interwar years to build (small) BB’s, but they were never realistic.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
Aerial torpedoes in the 1920’s were insignificantly different from those used in early WWII, and when thinking of the non-existent or very crude torpedo defence systems and the simple AAA I actually think naval airpower had a zenith in the interwar years – there just wasn’t a chance to show it. By late WWII the defence against naval airattack probably had the upper hand, but that never showed bacause only one side had all the advantages.
If BB’s had kept growing in size and cost I’m sure the motivation to invest in researching alternative ways to sink BB’s would be greatly increased. Airborne torpedoes and mines would be obvious, but fleet subs would probably also attract great interest. We know that the steam powered fast sub proved a failure, but I guess it would be possible before WWII to build a schnorkeled and diesel-electric powered fast fleet sub (an early Type XXI). Alternative propulsion like the Sterling engine etc. would also attract interest and investment. I wonder if it would be possible to armour a fast DD size vessel against the 6” secondaries of BB’s. With an all forward torpedoarmament such a vessel (at night?) would be interesting to deploy aganst large ships.
But the effect of not rebuilding Kaga/Amagi and the Lex’es to big CV’s might be significant, at least early on, but I guees the big strike was so obvious to Pacific conditions that the IJN/USN CV would anyway have developed that way – just later.
Regarding Japan I think we must not mix Japan of the 1920’s with Japan of the late 1930’s. The first was in chaos and broke and the later a very harsh dictatorship capable of squezing anything and everybody. The two Tosas and at least some of the Akagis (the two laid down in 1920) might have been completed (not counting in the earthquake which destroyed Tosa on the slip), but that is also far from the plans pre WT. It wouldn’t be the first time that plans aren’t realised, even Denmark had plans in the interwar years to build (small) BB’s, but they were never realistic.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
RN's AA priorities
This ia an extract from my book 'Rapid Fire: the Development of Automatic Cannon, Heavy Machine Guns and their Ammunition for Armies, Navies and Air Forces':
"Even at the beginning of the 1930s there was some concern about the adequacy of the British weapons. The problem was considered by the Naval Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Committee, which produced a report in April 1932.
The Committee went into great technical detail in calculating the effectiveness of different guns. They took into consideration such matters as the nature of the threats, the time during which aircraft could be brought under effective fire by different weapons, the range and rate of fire of the guns, the effectiveness of shells and fuzes, and appropriate methods of fire control. Their conclusions make interesting reading.
Three types of attack were considered; precision (i.e. level) bombing, torpedo bombing, and close-range attack with bombs or machine guns. With remarkable prescience, the Committee also identified a further potential risk:
"The possibility of explosive aircraft being manoeuvred by human pilots to hit ship targets cannot however be ruled out. It is reported that, sooner than accept defeat, ramming other aircraft is a recognised principle among Japanese pilots.
Note:- The Air Ministry regard this idea as exceptionally secret and would prefer that it be not generally promulgated"
It was clear that the Committee considered such attacks to be potentially extremely difficult to deal with, a concern fully justified by the experience of a dozen years later.
In considering short-range defence, the Committee was most concerned about torpedo bombers, calculating that any weapon system able to cope with them would be able to deal with other forms of short-range attack easily enough. Exercises between 1928 and 1931 had shown that the probability of a torpedo bomber hitting a ship was only 10% at 1,250 yards (1,140m) but rose to 30% at 1,000 yards (910m), 50% at 750 yards (690m) then increased very sharply to 85% at 600 yards (550m).
This led to a demand for a range of 2,500 yards (2,300m) from automatic AA guns, in order to achieve the aim of certain destruction of an aircraft with 10 seconds of firing at a mean range of 2,000 yards (1,820m). It was estimated that an aircraft dropping a torpedo from 1,200 yards (1,100m) would already have been under fire from such weapons for 17 seconds, which was assumed to be more than enough time to shoot it down."
The book goes on to evaluate the weapons available and what the RN thought of them.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion
forum
This ia an extract from my book 'Rapid Fire: the Development of Automatic Cannon, Heavy Machine Guns and their Ammunition for Armies, Navies and Air Forces':
"Even at the beginning of the 1930s there was some concern about the adequacy of the British weapons. The problem was considered by the Naval Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Committee, which produced a report in April 1932.
The Committee went into great technical detail in calculating the effectiveness of different guns. They took into consideration such matters as the nature of the threats, the time during which aircraft could be brought under effective fire by different weapons, the range and rate of fire of the guns, the effectiveness of shells and fuzes, and appropriate methods of fire control. Their conclusions make interesting reading.
Three types of attack were considered; precision (i.e. level) bombing, torpedo bombing, and close-range attack with bombs or machine guns. With remarkable prescience, the Committee also identified a further potential risk:
"The possibility of explosive aircraft being manoeuvred by human pilots to hit ship targets cannot however be ruled out. It is reported that, sooner than accept defeat, ramming other aircraft is a recognised principle among Japanese pilots.
Note:- The Air Ministry regard this idea as exceptionally secret and would prefer that it be not generally promulgated"
It was clear that the Committee considered such attacks to be potentially extremely difficult to deal with, a concern fully justified by the experience of a dozen years later.
In considering short-range defence, the Committee was most concerned about torpedo bombers, calculating that any weapon system able to cope with them would be able to deal with other forms of short-range attack easily enough. Exercises between 1928 and 1931 had shown that the probability of a torpedo bomber hitting a ship was only 10% at 1,250 yards (1,140m) but rose to 30% at 1,000 yards (910m), 50% at 750 yards (690m) then increased very sharply to 85% at 600 yards (550m).
This led to a demand for a range of 2,500 yards (2,300m) from automatic AA guns, in order to achieve the aim of certain destruction of an aircraft with 10 seconds of firing at a mean range of 2,000 yards (1,820m). It was estimated that an aircraft dropping a torpedo from 1,200 yards (1,100m) would already have been under fire from such weapons for 17 seconds, which was assumed to be more than enough time to shoot it down."
The book goes on to evaluate the weapons available and what the RN thought of them.
Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion
forum
So far every one has focus on the BB's. The WT also set limits on the size & armament of other classes of ships. For example - The heavy cruiser was limited to 8" and 10,000 tons. Many of the 20's & 30's era cruisers were designed under these limitations - when they could have been improved had there not be a tonnage/armament cap.
We might have seen a gradual implementation of new ideas had naval construction continued at the higher level unhampered by treaty design limitations. Maybe only a handfull of ships would have been built, but they might have been better combat vessels.
We might have seen a gradual implementation of new ideas had naval construction continued at the higher level unhampered by treaty design limitations. Maybe only a handfull of ships would have been built, but they might have been better combat vessels.
Remember one of the definitions of a cruiser is the largest ship that can be built in significant numbers (yes I know that doesn't work in all cases) if size goes up then so does expense.
The clauses regarding cruisers will affect some countries more than others. The British have worldwide commitments and need a larger numbers of ships rather than larger ships. In reality the British pretty consistently built well under the 10,000 ton limit. Without Washington the British will likely go for more rather than bigger ships.
The Americans I think will go in the same direction for different reasons. At the end of WW1 the Americans have a powerful but unbalanced fleet. They have the battleships but their are light in cruisers. As has already been commented the US navy's big problem is trying to get funds out of congress. The Americans are probably going to have to make a relatively small amount go as far as possible, thus smaller ships.
Japan I think is the only one of the three that is likely to go for larger cruisers. Japan obviously can not match America in building capacity so will likely seek to build ships that are superior one on one. But the question of expense will put a break on how large these cruisers can get. They probably won't go beyond the displacement of the Pre Dreadnought armoured cruisers.
On the whole I think no Washington Treaty will result in more rather than significantly larger cruisers.
The clauses regarding cruisers will affect some countries more than others. The British have worldwide commitments and need a larger numbers of ships rather than larger ships. In reality the British pretty consistently built well under the 10,000 ton limit. Without Washington the British will likely go for more rather than bigger ships.
The Americans I think will go in the same direction for different reasons. At the end of WW1 the Americans have a powerful but unbalanced fleet. They have the battleships but their are light in cruisers. As has already been commented the US navy's big problem is trying to get funds out of congress. The Americans are probably going to have to make a relatively small amount go as far as possible, thus smaller ships.
Japan I think is the only one of the three that is likely to go for larger cruisers. Japan obviously can not match America in building capacity so will likely seek to build ships that are superior one on one. But the question of expense will put a break on how large these cruisers can get. They probably won't go beyond the displacement of the Pre Dreadnought armoured cruisers.
On the whole I think no Washington Treaty will result in more rather than significantly larger cruisers.
Actually I'm not sure - the 8" limit was wholly artificial. Look at the ACs pre-WW1 and you see 9.1" and in the Rurik 10" for ACs.
These limits also affect submarine cruisers - hence Surcouf is the maximum that is allowed post-Washington treaty, whereas before it the M class submarines had a single 12"
Grey Wolf
These limits also affect submarine cruisers - hence Surcouf is the maximum that is allowed post-Washington treaty, whereas before it the M class submarines had a single 12"
Grey Wolf