As Pétain continued preparations to defend against a massive German
attack, a severe shortage of personnel continued to shape his actions. An
assessment in early October 1917 anticipated that the army would receive
110,000 new recruits every month until September 1918 but still be short
100,000 soldiers at the end of that period. Such a shortage would require
the French to suppress twenty-four battalions, the equivalent of six divisions.
As shortages began hampering operations, Pétain dissolved three
divisions in November 1917. That same month, another study anticipated
a shortage of 200,000 men by November 1918 and the suppression of
nine divisions. Mid-December 1917 brought a more extreme assessment
of France’s personnel situation. The study assumed the French would
lose 920,000 soldiers between October 1, 1917, and October 1, 1918; this
ªgure matched the losses suffered from July 1, 1916, to July 1, 1917. The
study also said that the army required an additional 158,000 men if it was
to increase its artillery, engineers, aviation, and antiaircraft units. The
combination of projected losses and anticipated additions meant that the
army required 1,078,000 recruits. Since the army expected to receive
only 750,000 new recruits during this period, the study projected a
deªcit of 328,000 men. This deªcit equaled twenty-ªve divisions (including
three already dissolved), the ªgure cited by Pétain at the SupremeWar
Council meeting on January 30, 1918.With six divisions in Italy
and eight in Macedonia, Pétain expected to have only seventy-seven
divisions in France in October 1918.23 Though one could quarrel with
the assumptions and conclusions of this bleak assessment, the specter of
a crisis in personnel continued to inºuence Pétain’s preference for limited
offensives within a defensive strategy. Similarly, many of his criticisms
of Foch’s ideas came from his fears that the French would run out
of men.
