Nimitz

I have heard the view that Nimitz had a better strategic grasp than McArthur.

Is it possible that the Pacific War would be shorter if a different approach was used.

If so then there would be no NEED for the nuke.
 
I suppose you could argue that the invasion of the Phillipines was not strictly necessary, but I'm not really qualified to argue that point. The Bomb, however, was necessary. The only other option was to put troops on the ground in Japan and that would been a blood bath that would have made Iwo Jima and Okinawa look like picnics.
 
The very fact that Japan surrendered OTL shows that they could surrender in an ATL. Once it became clear that a massive invasion is underway and going to happen, I think the situations that led to Japan's surrender OTL could happen in an ATL.
 
Invading the Phillipines might not have been absolutely necessary, but they are American soil, and that's what the US's priority is going to be, it's own territory.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
No Nuke = No Surrender. This has been hashed out many times in the past.

Any attempt to surrender without the prod of Hiroshima & Nagasaki WOULD have failed. Even with the nukes being used there was an almost successful coup attempt made to prevent the Emperor's speech from being broadcast.

The IJA was ready to toss the entire country into the fire rather than surrender. Since the IJA effectively WAS the Japanese Government, the only way for a surrender to happen was at the Emperor's command. Hirohito wasn't willing to risk assassination until the shock of the Bombings rattled some of the senior IJA officers sufficiently to back him.

The record is clear. All that caused the Japanese to accept that they had lost was the Atomic Bomb.

Regarding the original Question:

From a strategic perspective it may have been better to cut the Philippines off and let them wither, but the fate of the POW's, and more importantly, the Philippine Civilian population after such a strategy is too horrible to consider.

It is also worth remembering that the Battle of Leyte Gulf (which is actually four different engagements, all of which were as large, or larger, than Jutland), which was a direct result of the Philippines invasion was where the IJN died. Before Leyte the Japanese Navy was still a strategic threat, after the battle(s) it was a memory. That success was only possible since the Japanese HAD to react with everything they had when the U.S. attacked the Islands. The tactical victories generated at Leyte allowed the strategic island hopping campaign to continue without effective opposition.

The BIG mistake was the attack on Peleliu. It had been planned well before the Philippine invasion, as it was believed that the Paula's would be needed as a support site for the main invasion. As the Philippine Invasion drew near it became clear to Admiral Halsey, among others, that the Paula Chain assaults were no longer needed. The invasion of Pelelui was allowed to proceed because the planning was so far advanced. OPPS! Marine invaders found themselves in what may have been the worst battleground they came across in WW II (with the POSSIBLE exception of Iwo Jima).

The Officer who stated that the Pelelui assault was too far advanced to cancel? Admiral Nimitz.

It is worth mentioning that McArthur (an officer for whom I have little respect & less love), Nimitz AND Halsey all believed that the Philippines were a crucial location that needed to be taken before the invasion of the Home Islands could be attempted. Dugout Doug may have wanted to go back so he could show "he had returned", but ALL the senior Pacific Commanders, from all Services, agreed that the Philippines had to be taken.

Nimitz WAS a better strategist than McArthur, if not as astute of a politician. That being said, it is questionable if the war would have been won faster without McArthur. Winning the war required the Bomb & it was not going to be ready any sooner than occurred IOTL.
 
No Nuke = No Surrender. This has been hashed out many times in the past.

Any attempt to surrender without the prod of Hiroshima & Nagasaki WOULD have failed. Even with the nukes being used there was an almost successful coup attempt made to prevent the Emperor's speech from being broadcast.

The IJA was ready to toss the entire country into the fire rather than surrender. Since the IJA effectively WAS the Japanese Government, the only way for a surrender to happen was at the Emperor's command. Hirohito wasn't willing to risk assassination until the shock of the Bombings rattled some of the senior IJA officers sufficiently to back him.

The record is clear. All that caused the Japanese to accept that they had lost was the Atomic Bomb.

Regarding the original Question:

From a strategic perspective it may have been better to cut the Philippines off and let them wither, but the fate of the POW's, and more importantly, the Philippine Civilian population after such a strategy is too horrible to consider.

It is also worth remembering that the Battle of Leyte Gulf (which is actually four different engagements, all of which were as large, or larger, than Jutland), which was a direct result of the Philippines invasion was where the IJN died. Before Leyte the Japanese Navy was still a strategic threat, after the battle(s) it was a memory. That success was only possible since the Japanese HAD to react with everything they had when the U.S. attacked the Islands. The tactical victories generated at Leyte allowed the strategic island hopping campaign to continue without effective opposition.

The BIG mistake was the attack on Peleliu. It had been planned well before the Philippine invasion, as it was believed that the Paula's would be needed as a support site for the main invasion. As the Philippine Invasion drew near it became clear to Admiral Halsey, among others, that the Paula Chain assaults were no longer needed. The invasion of Pelelui was allowed to proceed because the planning was so far advanced. OPPS! Marine invaders found themselves in what may have been the worst battleground they came across in WW II (with the POSSIBLE exception of Iwo Jima).

The Officer who stated that the Pelelui assault was too far advanced to cancel? Admiral Nimitz.

It is worth mentioning that McArthur (an officer for whom I have little respect & less love), Nimitz AND Halsey all believed that the Philippines were a crucial location that needed to be taken before the invasion of the Home Islands could be attempted. Dugout Doug may have wanted to go back so he could show "he had returned", but ALL the senior Pacific Commanders, from all Services, agreed that the Philippines had to be taken.

Nimitz WAS a better strategist than McArthur, if not as astute of a politician. That being said, it is questionable if the war would have been won faster without McArthur. Winning the war required the Bomb & it was not going to be ready any sooner than occurred IOTL.

I agree that the Phillipines were a political and military neccessity, but I would like to point out that the nuclear raids (for lack of a better term), weren't the most destructive, casualty causing, operations of the war. Fire bombing killed far more Japanese than the nuclear weapon ever did. I seem to recall a number on the order of 275,000 killed in Tokyo in one fire bombing raid. I'm not second guessing Truman, but its not like we hadn't gotten thier attention.

I do agree though, that a forced occupation of the home Islands would have easily cost not just the United States, because the Allies as a whole would have sent in token units in order to say they had contributed, something on the order of at least 200,000 men by the time it was done.
 
The Phillipines wasnt necessary to invade to finish off Japan. Didnt Nimitz want to go after Formossa instead of the Phillipines. Invade formossa and the Phillipines are useless and no shipping can go to Japan. IJN would have to come out and fight or be totally cut of from Japan.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
I agree that the Phillipines were a political and military neccessity, but I would like to point out that the nuclear raids (for lack of a better term), weren't the most destructive, casualty causing, operations of the war. Fire bombing killed far more Japanese than the nuclear weapon ever did. I seem to recall a number on the order of 275,000 killed in Tokyo in one fire bombing raid. I'm not second guessing Truman, but its not like we hadn't gotten thier attention.

I do agree though, that a forced occupation of the home Islands would have easily cost not just the United States, because the Allies as a whole would have sent in token units in order to say they had contributed, something on the order of at least 200,000 men by the time it was done.

Actually the Japanese reactions to the mass firebombing illustrates the need for the Bomb. More people were killed in Toyko than in either A-Bomb attack, it was the obvious power of the weapon that made some of the IJA senior leadership waver just enough to give Hirohito and the Peace faction an opening. Conventional weapons just didn't have that effect, no matter how damaging the attack.
 
The US navy was doing a good job of cutting off the Japanese home islands from the rest of the world, which as a result helped to deprive the home islands of the large amount of food which they needed to import. Its possible that the US could have bypassed the philippeans and instead concentrated on other sites and simply have tightened the embargo, by sinking every jap ship they could find (not that they weren't doing that already, but with more resorces from not invading) In addition, turning the bombing everything they could find on the home islands.The trouble is that you still have the Japanese mentality. They would have continued to hold out, despite stavation and shortages. The result could have been what the Jap leaders feared most. Not a US invasion, but a civil uprising, and the overthrow of the military leaders that ran the country.
 
No Nuke = No Surrender. This has been hashed out many times in the past.

Any attempt to surrender without the prod of Hiroshima & Nagasaki WOULD have failed. Even with the nukes being used there was an almost successful coup attempt made to prevent the Emperor's speech from being broadcast.
Well, no. Hiroshima predates surrender. So does Nagasaki. Absent the Sov declaration of war, I'd expect more of the same, since there was no qualitative difference between nukes & firebombing, from Japan's POV.
From a strategic perspective it may have been better to cut the Philippines off and let them wither, but the fate of the POW's, and more importantly, the Philippine Civilian population after such a strategy is too horrible to consider.
Compared to what actually happened? Really not.
The tactical victories generated at Leyte allowed the strategic island hopping campaign to continue without effective opposition.
The BIG mistake was the attack on Peleliu.
Yeah, a completely unnecessary slaughter. P.I. was needless 5mo delay, tho, & about as many casualties. Plus, P.I. campaign made Iwo/Oki harder: troops bound there were intercepted by Sub Force, & ended up at Iwo/Oki, instead.:eek:

BTW, to suggest how Leyte could've been different: make Spruance commander. He'd destroy Kurita & Ozawa, scoring the greatest victory in the history of naval warfare, & likely to remain so, & we wouldn't still be arguing how big a nitwit Halsey'd been.
The Officer who stated that the Pelelui assault was too far advanced to cancel? Admiral Nimitz.
He also wouldn't support extensive sub minelaying, & insisted on close surveillance of ports by subs. So he's not perfect. He's still a damn sight better than MacArthur, IMO.
It is worth mentioning that McArthur (an officer for whom I have little respect & less love), Nimitz AND Halsey all believed that the Philippines were a crucial location that needed to be taken before the invasion of the Home Islands could be attempted. Dugout Doug may have wanted to go back so he could show "he had returned", but ALL the senior Pacific Commanders, from all Services, agreed that the Philippines had to be taken.
It is. I do wonder, however, how much of that was just to keep MacArthur from going out of his way to f*ck things up. I also wonder how much of the need was a product of previous bad decisions, like not concentrating subs at Pearl, or not giving tankers top priority immediately, or patrolling out of the Aleutians (a total waste of effort, enough to shorten the war about 3mo), or not using minelaying...
it is questionable if the war would have been won faster without McArthur.
It really isn't. Just for a start, there were numerous sub missions into P.I. to deliver a trickle of supplies to his vaunted guerrillas, diverting subs from their primary mission, sinking Japanese merchantmen. There was also the divided command, with subs in Oz, which put the most lucrative patrol area, the Luzon & Formosa Straits, off limits, for fear of fratricide, not to mention Oz-based subs were only about 75% as effective as HI-based boats (as an OTTOMH guess, based on Blair; maybe as low as 50%). Would Wainwright have gotten 7h Fleet, including about 2 dozen fleet boats, for the duration? I doubt it; he wasn't going to be running for President any time soon, & FDR knew it. MacArthur was liable to, if he was Stateside; FDR knew that, too.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Well, no. Hiroshima predates surrender. So does Nagasaki. Absent the Sov declaration of war, I'd expect more of the same, since there was no qualitative difference between nukes & firebombing, from Japan's POV.

I would disagree, if for no other reason (not that there not many) than the minutes of the meeting when Hirohito decided that the war MUST end.

Compared to what actually happened? Really not.

When I was a LOT younger, I worked with several men who had survived the Bataan Death March (talk about a tough bunch of old birds). All of them were well below 100 pounds when liberated. I would certainly have never known those men, met their kids and grandkids, and heard their 1st person stories if the PI had been bypassed. So yea, really.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
CalBear: I've got to agree with you on the Nukes. When you compare the choice of those or Operation Olympic, the choice wasn't "them or us," it was "them or everybody."

And, as much as I dislike MacArthur on a personal level, he was the kind of crazy that worked well in World War II. I put Patton in that realm, also. The Second World War gave those types of people the perfect opportunity to flex the mental muscles and give to their country, but after the war their personalities were not able to fit back into the society that their victories had made.
MacArthur was deeply flawed man with a knack for fighting. I just don't know if he always put himself in the best positions, vis a vis his entourage and such.
 

jose1357

Donor
CalBear: I've got to agree with you on the Nukes. When you compare the choice of those or Operation Olympic, the choice wasn't "them or us," it was "them or everybody."

And, as much as I dislike MacArthur on a personal level, he was the kind of crazy that worked well in World War II. I put Patton in that realm, also. The Second World War gave those types of people the perfect opportunity to flex the mental muscles and give to their country, but after the war their personalities were not able to fit back into the society that their victories had made.
MacArthur was deeply flawed man with a knack for fighting. I just don't know if he always put himself in the best positions, vis a vis his entourage and such.
A fault could be found with nearly every major leader in the campaign at one point or another, that they got the job done is a testament of how they all overcame those shortcomings
 
Nimitz WAS a better strategist than McArthur, if not as astute of a politician. That being said, it is questionable if the war would have been won faster without McArthur. Winning the war required the Bomb & it was not going to be ready any sooner than occurred IOTL.

While I agree about Philippines, how about cutting the New Guinea and Solomons campaign in Summer of 1943 and use these resources to speed up the drive in Central Pacific?
 

burmafrd

Banned
The Japanese admitted after the war that the two prong attack really had them puzzled and forced them to divide their resources and that was Mostly because of Nimtiz. Pelilu was a mistake but everyone is entitled to one. The Phillipines were a political moral and cultural imperative for us. Remember we were a much simpler country back then.

The nukes were a whole other realm from firebombings- the Japanese figured that out real quick. While a couple of the hardliners correctly figured that we did not have many of them, the shear power and ability to do to a city with one bomb once what it took hundreds of B-29's several strikes has to have had a HUGE impact. I have always questioned that the Russian attack made all that much difference: Manchuria was a long ways away and its not like the IJA had not pretty much thought it was going to happen anyway. They had decent intelligence on the build up of Russian forces and they knew Stalin did not go to those lengths for nothing- especially how resource strapped the Russians were by mid 1945.
 
While I agree about Philippines, how about cutting the New Guinea and Solomons campaign in Summer of 1943 and use these resources to speed up the drive in Central Pacific?
MacArthur would never have agreed to it, & FDR wanted Mac out of DC & not running for President.

Cal, I don't disagree things in P.I. were dire, but I take the attitude ending the war a year sooner (5-6mo P.I., 6mo between Peleliu, Oki, & Iwo), which "no P.I. campaign" could do IMO, is a balance against the atrocities against civilians of fighting there. And if the war does end even 9mo sooner, without fighting in P.I., those guys might just survive anyhow. Plus, I'd take off 3-4mo of uncertainty while Truman & Byrnes waited to see if the Bomb was really ready, to threaten SU (which Byrnes seemed to want), which IMO FDR wouldn't wait for if alive (& TTL, he'd still be); recall, Japan was looking for a negotiated peace that'd let them keep the Emperor as early as 4/45. TTL, those overtures could be as early as 6/44, which IIRC is around when Saipan fell, taking Tojo's government with it. Opportunity for FDR to demand surrender, while agreeing to let Japan keep the Emperor (if not that one...)? I'd say yes.
 
Top