Newbie here with a WWII Question

Always been fascinated with the German Side of the conflict since the war seemed to revolve around them. I get this is kind of a question with a lot nuances, so I'm just wondering what are some holes in this scenario.

What if Hitler didn't lauch a summer offensive in 1943 (elastic defense - Manstein's Idea) and built up for a winter offensive with more of those heavier tanks. They could have learned from what went sorta wrong in winter 41', and caused a crushing blow if they allowed a bulge into their lines from the Russians in summer 43' (measured retreat). This could have provided the respite on the East Front to allow the Germans to crush an Allied landing in normandy (would have probably postponed imo). This seems to allow a way for the Germans to decisively defeat the Soviets. Then it would have been a race to the bomb between the US and Fortress Europe (although I believe they lacked the uranium). I understand this is a loaded question with logistics, etc. Just curious for any input.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Always been fascinated with the German Side of the conflict since the war seemed to revolve around them. I get this is kind of a question with a lot nuances, so I'm just wondering what are some holes in this scenario.

What if Hitler didn't lauch a summer offensive in 1943 (elastic defense - Manstein's Idea) and built up for a winter offensive with more of those heavier tanks. They could have learned from what went sorta wrong in winter 41', and caused a crushing blow if they allowed a bulge into their lines from the Russians in summer 43' (measured retreat). This could have provided the respite on the East Front to allow the Germans to crush an Allied landing in normandy (would have probably postponed imo). This seems to allow a way for the Germans to decisively defeat the Soviets. Then it would have been a race to the bomb between the US and Fortress Europe (although I believe they lacked the uranium). I understand this is a loaded question with logistics, etc. Just curious for any input.

Welcome to the board.

We have had lot of threads on such topics. In 1943, it is too late for the Nazi to win. But they can make the war longer and bloodier. There are lots of ideas, but you seem to want an optimal German strategy. The Russians were going to launch a major attack in 1943, but decided it was better to wait and defend at Kursk. So probably the best move is to continue OTL Kursk delay, and just keep it going. The Germans keep building up, but never quite get around to launching the offensive. We can probably delay a Russian attack to about 2, maybe 3 months after OTL offensive was launched. So the soviets will launch the attack sometime in September. We can debate where.

After this, the Germans can stay on the defensive and try to inflict as many casualties as possible. Maybe with luck, the mud or Soviet indecision can delay the attack until the snows fall. D-Day will still happen on time. And D-Day will work because we broke the Luftwaffe in Feb/Mar 44.
 
Then it would have been a race to the bomb between the US and Fortress Europe (although I believe they lacked the uranium).

If that had been the problem Germany might have been better off. The Nazis dismissed nuclear physics as "Jewish science" from the beginning, meaning they didn't really believe in the idea in the first place. Furthermore, Heisenberg had screwed the math up for a bomb, thinking it would take more uranium than existed to create a bomb. Even worse, he had been completely wrong about the nature of a reaction, thinking it would be self-limiting. In case something went wrong they would throw in some graphite to stop things.

This would not have worked. If the German program had ever gotten to an actual reaction it would have killed everyone present.
 
What if Hitler didn't lauch a summer offensive in 1943 (elastic defense - Manstein's Idea) and built up for a winter offensive with more of those heavier tanks. They could have learned from what went sorta wrong in winter 41', and caused a crushing blow if they allowed a bulge into their lines from the Russians in summer 43' (measured retreat).

To start with, the concept of mobile defense was still in its infancy at Kursk and had not yet gained much credence with the military leadership. Manstein didn't propose it seriously until after Kursk. So to suggest that Hitler alone was responsible for one not being followed in early 1943 is inaccurate. The professional debate among German military leadership in the spring-summer of 1943 was not on what type of defense to adopt, but what type of attack. No one in the German senior military leadership expected their forces to be thrown back in the tactical defenses, as actually happened, because up until that time such an event had been unprecedented.

Secondly, what the Germans had learned in the winter of '41-'42 was not that elastic defense worked. If anything, they learned the opposite as Hitler's insistence on the army holding its ground that time had succeeded. And while the Germans did not know this at the time, their dogged defense of the Rzhev salient in November-December 1942 unhinged Soviet plans for an offensive all along the front in the winter of '42-'43. Had Rzehv been abandoned early in line with the tenets of mobile defense, then it is entire possible that things might have gone worse for the Germans.

Finally, there is the fact that by 1943, German post-war claims for a mobile defensive war working out better relies on the assumption that they continued to maintain a degree of operational superiority that evidence indicates did not actually exist any more. Throughout 1943 the Germans did an atrocious job of predicting where Soviet offensives would fall and were always scrambling on the back foot once the Red Army seized the initiative. German offensive plans also delayed and weakened Soviet offensive forces and channeled their attacks into areas of German strength. The defensive preparations the Soviets committed to Kursk for example precluded them launching major offensive operations elsewhere from March until July. Given that the Russians actually had significant superiority in forces around Kursk in March, its entirely possible that if there had been no threat of a German offensive they would have attacked much earlier, and with success, starting a successful major push west months before it happened historically. Thus it has to be considered that things might go worse for the Germans once they let the Russians have free reign on where and when they strike. Possibly much worse.
 
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