New Timeline. WI HSF Fought GF on 28/10/1918?

How about this then:

On March 21st 1918 the Germans broke through on the Somme. Knowing that the Allies would need to ship reinforcements from England, the German Navy sorties to attack the light forces in the Channel and pick off some allied merchant ships?

Historically speaking, the British only fielded light forces in the English Channel. No BB/BCs. Only Destroyers and light cruisers backed up by obsolite armoured cruisers.

Surprising really that the German Navy never attacked the channel when it was only defenced by light forces.

Light forces go into the channel to do as much damage as they can... Sink shipping, bombard harbours on both sides etc.

The main battlefleet (Should be repaired and fully functional) covers the East end of the channel should the Grand Fleet appear. Seaplanes and Zeppelins patrol North and newly laid minefields are set along the most likely path that the Grand Fleet will take. Submarines are also present for scouting outside British ports and to try and pick off a few ships.

That is feasable isn't it? The fleet sails in support of land actions and to disrupt the flow of supplies to France. American presence with the Grand Fleet is the following ships USS New York, USS Delaware, USS Florida, USS Wyoming and USS Texas. I believe however that they were all escorting a convoy to Norway at that time. Not 100 on that. 21st march may have been just before the convoy left the UK.

Eternity

The problem with an attack on the Channel is that its probably a death trap for the Germans. To get near its eastern end they have to get a fair way from their bases and be at great risk of the British fleet getting behind them. Which in those narrow waters could be very difficult to escape. The Germans can possibly try disrupting sailings to the BEF for a short while but their got to be willing to risk most of their fleet in the process. Might be deemed worthwhile if thought vital to achieve a breakthrough on the western front. [Although whether the German Navy would view it this way;)]. Also by March 1918 a lot of the moral and material problems that crippled the fleet would have been building up. You might have got them to sail given that it looked like it might be key to breaking the allies's resistance but stioll going to have problems in materials.

The British, as well as light units and various minefields, the latter pretty extensive by this time, kept a force of pre-dreads as the core of the Channel fleet. [With the original Dreadnought as its flagship;)]. Very vulnerable to the HSF if it arrived in strength but easily enough to trash any non-capital units they encounter.

Steve
 

LittleSpeer

Monthly Donor
Eternity

GO FOR IT. THIS IS WHAT MAKES THIS ALTERNATIVE HISTORY!!!! WRITE LIKE IAN WAS GONNA BAN U TOMORROW!!!!
 
That is feasable isn't it?


Eternity,

Please do some research first and then ask questions.

Britain had quite a capable force guarding the Channel's eastern end in order to prevent the exact type of raid you're suggesting. HMS Dreadnought herself was part of it and rammed a U-boat will serving there, the only vessel she sank in her career. There are also extensive minefields along with substantial air assets.

In the case of latter alone, you're suggesting sending less maneuverable seaplanes and lumbering zeps on daylight recon missions into an area that has many fighter bases defending Britain proper from raids by Gotha bombers.

You're also completely ignoring Room 40. Britain will learn the HSF's plans almost as quickly as the HSF's own squadron commanders do. Thanks to Room 40, during the run-up to Jutland the Grand Fleet left Scapa before the High Seas Fleet left the Jade.


Bill
 
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What if the High Seas fleet does something similar to eternity's latest scenario, but more as a Jutland style operation?

The surviving battlecruisers of the High Seas Fleet, possibly with battleships in support, advance towards the channel, demonstrating against the british forces there, and attempt to disrupt the british shipping. Time it to coincide with a german offensive (if successful, the war in france is that much easier; if not, the british are temporarily in disarray). As the forces in the channel are outmatched by the interlopers, elements of the grand fleet are dispatched south to intercept. the germans then retire, with the british in pursuit, drawing them towards the main elements of the High Seas Fleet...

Does this sound any better?
 
Does this sound any better?


Atreus,

Because you obviously missed it, let me repeat the fourth paragraph of my last post:

You're also completely ignoring Room 40. Britain will learn the HSF's plans almost as quickly as the HSF's own squadron commanders do. Thanks to Room 40, during the run-up to Jutland the Grand Fleet left Scapa before the High Seas Fleet left the Jade.

The Grand Fleet is reading the High Seas Fleet's mail. Do you seriously think the HSF won't be intercepted before it reaches the Channel? Intercepted in a narrow seaway and pinned against the neutral Dutch coast and watching the vastly numerically superior Grand Fleet complete with redesigned AP shells, better powder handling methods, and the attached USN battle squadron thundering down from the north.

Want to ask your question again? :rolleyes:


Bill
 
ok ok.

How about this. The fleet sorties in conjunction with the March 1918 land attack. The fleet is planned to hit the channel at same time as the assault is launched on the land.

The land attack proceeds as it historically did. German victory. The Naval operation is fast BB/BCs (25+ knots??) with light escorts and goes into the channel to attack the defending forces and attempt to disrupt shipping at the Eastern end. Even with HMS Dreadnought, the fleet would be out classed as by 1918. HMS Dreadnought (Best ship in fleet??) is obsolite. Minefields will take out some lighter forces on the German side. Some heavy forces will be damaged by the naval engagement.

The bulk of the fleet wait off the Dutch coast in support. The Grand Fleet will sorte in response and fresh German minefields and submarines are positioned to attack what ships they can along the most probably line of approach.

@ Bill Cameron. The British were not aware of the German land offensive of March 21st 1918 were they? I mean, it achieved complete surprise and a 60km advance.....

Now, the last thing anybody on the German side would want would be to warn the Allies of an impending attack, especially one as large as this was so extra care would be taken. Is it not therefore possible for the Naval High Command to give all orders as written, sealed orders and not use the radio for anything other than "normal" traffic, so as to give the impression that nothing was up? Once at sea, lamp and flag signals could be used instead of radio. Radio could be used after the land offensive occurs.

In support of this, in WW2 the Japanese used that tactic and ALSO left their radio operators in harbour when the fleet left for the Pearl Harbour attack and as such, the Americans thought that the Japanese were still in harbour until it was too late. Could the Germans not use this tactic?

Now, as for an outcome. The British pre-dreadnoughts and HMS Dreadnought would get wiped. No question of that. A modern fleet vs an obsolite fleet? It would be the Battle of Coronel all over again for the British, except closer to home. No doubt the British would give it all they have, but out classed and out gunned means a British defeat. Once the British GF sortied however, the HSF would have a limited time to retire or attack them. They could destroy the Channel Fleet, bombard the harbours and attack shipping in the Eastern end of the Channel. Generally annoy England. Aircraft were not exactly a worry for ships at the time in terms of being damaged by them, as demonstrated by General Mitchell in 1921. The sinking of stationary, uncrewed ships with no damage control was just about manageable in the end. Had the ships been crewed, manouvering and with damage control..... That was hard enough in WW2 without aerial torpedos. If submarines and Zeppelins scouted the North Sea then the HSF could have some warning of the GF approach. If the HSF were to choose to engage the GF in a Jutland re-match as it were, then yes, I do agree, that the HSF would be severly damaged - if not wiped out - as an effective fighting force.

What proportion of the GF they could take with them (After the Channel Fleet) is debatable.
 
Just doing some reading and HMS Dreadnought was no longer with the Channel Fleet as of April 1918. She had transferred back to the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow.

"She returned to the Grand Fleet in March 1918" was the only reference to date that I could find, so if anybody has an exact date? With her departure, the Channel Fleet (3rd Battle Squadron) was "finally dissolved in March 1918" as the only other capital ship in it was HMS Dominion (King Edward VII Pre-Dreadnought). Even she was transferred to be a parent ship for the Zeebrugge Raid and the First Ostend Raid.

Given that, was there even a Channel Fleet left on 21st March 1918? If so, what ships were in it anybody? If the fleet had just been dissolved, then with no large ships in the Channel, I think that it would be an ideal time to attack as there would be no serious opposition.

Oh and @ Bill Cameron again..... "At the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, HMS Dreadnought was flagship of the Fourth Battle Squadron in the North Sea, based at Scapa Flow. Ironically for a vessel designed to engage enemy battleships, her only significant action was the ramming and sinking of German submarine U-29 skippered by K/Lt Otto Weddigen (of U-9 fame) on 18 March 1915 – Dreadnought thus became the only battleship ever to sink a submarine directly." While based at Scapa and not in the English Channel! :p lol
 
@ Bill Cameron. The British were not aware of the German land offensive of March 21st 1918 were they? I mean, it achieved complete surprise and a 60km advance.....


Are you trolling us or something? Are you?

Room 40 was part of the Admiralty and it primarily read German naval codes. It read German naval codes and analyzed message traffic so well that the Grand Fleet was informed of the Scarborough Raid in advance, left Scapa before the HSF left the Jade during the run-up to Jutland, and knew German naval moves well in advance.

You idea still ignores the presence of Room 40. Whether Britain in the OTL knew about the land offensive or not is moot, once the naval preparations you propose to support that offensive begin, Room 40 will inform the Admiralty. In fact, those preparations mean that the Germans will most likely lose the OTL strategic surprise you write about because of the huge leak in their naval communication system.

Furthermore, the High Seas Fleet will never reach the Channel to engage the British defenses there. The Grand Fleet will fall on the Germans like a bolt from the blue somewhere between Harwich and Zeebrugge because there is no way in hell the British will allow the Channel to be raided in force.

And don't bother suggesting that the HSF's faster assets will still get through either. The analysis and decryption of German message traffic allowed more than enough time for the RN to position itself to intercept HSF battle cruisers during the Yarmouth and Scarborough raids.

All this asinine idea does is tip the Entente off to the size and scope of Germany's spring offensives because, if the Kaiser is going to risk his precious ships in support of the attacks, the attacks must be incredibly important.

I wish you'd do some actual research on this instead of pissing away your time determining just where HMS Dreadnought rammed that submarine. You claim to have read Massie's book, but I cannot understand how you could have done so without coming away with an appreciation of the role of Room 40. Massie devotes entire chapters to code breaking, the intelligence derived, and the use/misuse of that intelligence. It's literally impossible to miss if you actually read the book.


Bill
 
Anybody, What be "Trolling"?

I am just trying to get a reasonable starting point for a scenario. If that takes debate then so be it.

Bill: I am aware that Room 40 was just a naval code breaking establishmant. MI1 was the army equivilant. I never said that Room 40 would have broken the German army assault codes. I mearly asked if the British were aware of the assault as, as far as I can tell, it achieved complete surprise.

You idea still ignores the presence of Room 40. Whether Britain in the OTL knew about the land offensive or not is moot, once the naval preparations you propose to support that offensive begin, Room 40 will inform the Admiralty. In fact, those preparations mean that the Germans will most likely lose the OTL strategic surprise you write about because of the huge leak in their naval communication system.

I make the point that if all orders in relation to the sortie are written orders then there is no radio traffic for Room 40 to intercept, decode and take intelligence from. Can you please explain how Room 40 will intercept, decode and take intelligence from non-existant radio traffic?

And don't bother suggesting that the HSF's faster assets will still get through either. The analysis and decryption of German message traffic allowed more than enough time for the RN to position itself to intercept HSF battle cruisers during the Yarmouth and Scarborough raids.

Again if there is no radio traffic since I am proposing that all German Naval orders in relation to the raid are written, how can the GF be given warning of the impending sortie by the HSF? If they are unaware of the raid, then they have no idea that they should position themselves to intercept.

Furthermore, the High Seas Fleet will never reach the Channel to engage the British defenses there. The Grand Fleet will fall on the Germans like a bolt from the blue somewhere between Harwich and Zeebrugge because there is no way in hell the British will allow the Channel to be raided in force.

Only if they know about it. If they are aware, then I do agree with you here. If they are not aware however then how will the GF know to intercept?

All this asinine idea does is tip the Entente off to the size and scope of Germany's spring offensives because, if the Kaiser is going to risk his precious ships in support of the attacks, the attacks must be incredibly important.

The attack was the beginning of the end for Germany. They must have known that. The entire attack was designed to break the British and French BEFORE the Americans got seriously involved as they knew that once the Americans arrived in mass, the war was lost for them. I would therefore say that yes, this attack IS incredibly important for the Germans.

I wish you'd do some actual research on this instead of pissing away your time determining just where HMS Dreadnought rammed that submarine. You claim to have read Massie's book, but I cannot understand how you could have done so without coming away with an appreciation of the role of Room 40. Massie devotes entire chapters to code breaking, the intelligence derived, and the use/misuse of that intelligence. It's literally impossible to miss if you actually read the book.

I make the point again that I read the book several years ago, and I do apolagise again if I have forgotten some of the detail. As for "pissing away my time determining just where HMS Dreadnought rammed that submarine." I came across that by accident. You accuse me of doing flawed research, I was just pointing out that your counter-research is also potentially flawed as well.

That aside however, I would still like to get a firm date on HMS Dreadnough's departure from the Channel Fleet as it appears that the Channel Fleet was dissolved at this time, leaving only light forces in defence of the channel.


In summary my questions:

1) Does anybody know the exact date that HMS Dreadnought departed the Channel Fleet and returned to Scapa Flow? This marks the end of the Channel Fleet
2) Were the British/Allies aware of the German land offensive in way, shape or form? It does not appear that they were, but I could be wrong.
3) How can Room 40 intercept, decode and take intelligence from non-existant radio traffic? Written orders means no radio traffic.
 
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How can Room 40 intercept, decode and take intelligence from non-existant radio traffic? Written orders means no radio traffic.


Eternity,

How? Ever hear of signals intelligence? It's when you study the location, frequency, and responses within radio networks to gain intelligence without having to know the actual content of the messages involved. SIGINT is just as important as decryption and SIGINT gave Room 40 many breakthroughs during the war.

Then there's all the other messages this asinine sortie requires beyond those direct orders to the warships involved. Hundreds of messages need to be sent out to colliers, stores ships, minesweepers, and various shore organizations before the HSF leaves the Jade. Each and every one of those messages is a potential leak and the Germans will not - cannot - rely on written orders for every one of them.

Case in point: The HSF fleet sent a radio message back home after Jutland containing their ETA for crossing Horn's Reef and requesting zeps to scout the area for RN forces. Room 40 didn't crack the ETA message, but they did pick up the messages sent to zeppelin bases and the responses sent in turn which meant Scheer's uber-secret ETA information was blown by messages sent by other organizations.

SIGINT is also why naval orders pertaining to this useless lunge at the Channel will tip off the Entente to Germany's planned land offensives.

So, your latest wrinkle won't work either. It will only make things worse.

Keeping that in mind, lLet me ask you a question for a change: Just what the hell do you think this asinine death ride will accomplish? Beyond more Entente and German deaths that is. The stillborn OTL plan was nonsense and did nothing but spark the mutinies that doomed Germany, you plan is nonsense too and will result in even more unrest - assuming the sailors actually allow the HSF to leave port. What result are you looking for? Are you looking for a more angry Entente? For a tougher Versailles? What is the point behind all of this?


Bill
 
Let me deal with the question you asked about the objectives of it first.
Let me ask you a question for a change: Just what the hell do you think this asinine death ride will accomplish?
:confused: I have answered that in my previous posts, but let me say it again:

The attack (German 1918 Spring Offensive) was the beginning of the end for Germany. They must have known that. The entire attack was designed to break the British and French BEFORE the Americans got seriously involved as they knew that once the Americans arrived in mass, the war was lost for them.

Now, one of the historic objectives was the capture of Dunkirk, Calais & Boulogne (Lys Offensive). These were the main Channel supply ports. Had they been captured, it would have brought the Germans breathing space at worst. At best, their capture would have pushed the British out of the war. The removal of Britain from the war was the German aim.

The flow of supplies from England historically broke the German army and they never captured the ports. Should supply sailings be interrupted and/or delayed, the German army may have been able to take these ports and potentially achieve their strategic objectives due to less reinforcements & supplies arriving from them to aid the allies.

From historic evidence in wars, even the threat of a minefield is enough to stop all merchant sailings in an area (Especially Troopships!!) until it has been swept and cleared.

As shown by the loss of the Novorossiysk (Ex-Giulio Cesare) in Russia in 1955 to a WWII German mine, sweeping isn't a guarantee of safety either. One missed mine detonating a week later and the whole process has to be repeated, this results in even more delays. After the Novorossiysk was sunk, Russian divers found 19 German mines on the bottom of Sevastopol Bay.

This would be the objective of the HSF Sortie. Sail into the channel, take out the defence ships, shell harbours and ports used in supply runs (Sunken ships in ports is a pain and slows down port operations, as does damage or destruction of port facilities as WWII demonstrated) and then lay a few minefields on their way out. Some German Light Cruisers could carry upwards of 160 mines. Sure, Aircraft could watch where they were laid, but the WHOLE area would have to be swept to be sure it was safe for merchants. That would take time and delay supplies from England, and as above, any missed mines = more delays.

Each and every one of those messages is a potential leak and the Germans will not - cannot - rely on written orders for every one of them.
Flag signals, lamp signals..... I did say that the Germans would use these until the start of the naval attack..... Taking a page from the Japanese here. In 1941 they sailed a fleet and controlled it totally using flag and lamp signals. That fleet then launched a surprise attack on the American Fleet at Pearl Harbour.

Ever hear of signals intelligence? It's when you study the location, frequency, and responses within radio networks to gain intelligence without having to know the actual content of the messages involved. SIGINT is just as important as decryption and SIGINT gave Room 40 many breakthroughs during the war.
:confused::confused: Ok..... I will say it again, just for you - for the THIRD time - since you appear to have missed it each time: "Is it not therefore possible for the Naval High Command to give all orders as written, sealed orders and not use the radio for anything other than "normal" traffic, so as to give the impression that nothing was up?"

If there is only "normal" radio traffic, then there is no signals intelligence in relation to the sortie as the impression is given that nothing strange is going on.
Point in case: The Japanese did this before WWII, going to the extent of leaving their principal radio operators in harbour when they sailed, and the American Intelligence Service thought that the Japanese Pearl Harbour attack fleet was in still in harbour up to the time of attack!

Complete failure of Signals Intelligence.

The only reason they knew something was up (But not what) was because they were reading diplomatic codes. America knew that diplomatic ties were to be severed, but not that an attack was coming.

What I propose has worked historically, and I have supplied examples. Where is the problem of these things working in WWI? In essence, all I am doing is pulling part of a Japanese plan from 1941 forward to 1918 and applying it to the HSF. It is wrong of you to assume that the Germans could not think of doing this and implement it in 1918.

SIGINT is also why naval orders pertaining to this useless lunge at the Channel will tip off the Entente to Germany's planned land offensives
As I have explained, this would not be a useless lunge by the fleet. It would be in support of the Lys Offensive whose aim is to take the three main channel supply ports. The objective of the sortie would be to disrupt the supply lines to assist the German Army

The stillborn OTL plan was nonsense and did nothing but spark the mutinies that doomed Germany, you plan is nonsense too and will result in even more unrest - assuming the sailors actually allow the HSF to leave port.
I agree that Plan 17 was a Death Ride, but since the GF is unaware in this proposal, as explained above then my plan is NOT nonsense and WILL NOT result in what you fall back on - What happened 7 months later..... Revolution.....

You could do this if there was a revolution in March 1918, but there was not so your argument there is a mute point. If the Germans made sure (Through the explained proposals) that the GF was unaware of the sortie, then it IS NOT a Death Ride. They will be back in port BEFORE the Grand Fleet can intercept. The Sailors WILL NOT mutiny as it IS NOT seen as a Death Ride.
 
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How much damage would an interruption of supplies via the channel cause. I would imagine there would have been stockpiles of ammunition and supplies that would last weeks if not months after all the weather in the English Channel can get very nasty even today with the giant ferries sailings get interrupted.

Anoher thing even blocking the narrow part of the channel between Southeastern ports and Northwest France leaves the western approaches ports open. Plymouth Falmouth and the Bristol Channel ports would have beeen open and traffic could have been sent to Cherbourg, St Nazaire and Brest for example whilst the narrows were cleared. The only problem I can see with this is that the coal traffic from SouthWales would have been disrupted to make space for food and ammunition.

There would have been delays obviously but with stockpiled materials and what could have come through the western ports surely the Allies would have survived even if it meant Bully Beef for all so that the ammunition kept flowing.
 
Hi fastmongrel,

True, the Allies would have supply stockpiles, maybe a few weeks worth (How many supplies would several million men need??) If the Eastern Channel Ports were closed, then true, the allies would naturally use the Western Channel Ports.

The catch here is that there is going to be an additional delay in the supplies arriving at the front line, as they would need to travel further across country in France. For example 150 miles instead of 50. This would obviously mean a delay. Also, if the supplies came in from a Western port, then the war has not meant that civilians have moved from this area. There will be civilian traffic which will cause additional delays (Military traffic will take priority, but some civilian traffic is important to the war effort. ie Raw materials to factories and food for workers!)

Do the French and Belgums like Bully Beef? lol The main issue with closing the Eastern Channel Ports (As far as I can see) is the troop reinforcements. If the HSF can delay these, even by a few days, then they can gain an advantage. Whether or not it is a decisive advantage however.....

If they can gain an advantage then perhaps they can capture supply dumps and cause further hiccups for the Allies that way. I do admit that the German plan of capturing all three ports would be a doubtfull occurance. However, if they concentrated and captured ONE port (Say Dunkirk), then theoretically they could use it as a submarine re-supply base for submarine raids against the other two and still render all three ports useless that way. Just a little blue-sky thinking there.

With regards to submarines in the Channel: While during WWII was a suicide run, it was not so in 1918. The British first tested their ASDIC in 1920 and started production in 1922, although with submarines running rampant in the Channel I would expect that to be pulled forward!!!
 
The attack (German 1918 Spring Offensive) was the beginning of the end for Germany. They must have known that.


Eternity,

They knew it was the beginning of the end? Huh? They knew they were going to lose and yet launched the Kaiserschlatt anyway?

They launched the attacks to win the war before the Americans could weigh in and they launched those attacks without roping in the High Seas Fleet because they knew the HSF couldn't help. If they thought there was a chance of disrupting shipping in the Channel don't you think they would have tried it? They weren't stupid, so they must have realized what you seemingly cannot: The High Seas Fleet cannot realistically disrupt shipping in the Channel.

:confused::confused: Ok..... I will say it again, just for you - for the THIRD time - since you appear to have missed it each time: "Is it not therefore possible for the Naval High Command to give all orders as written, sealed orders and not use the radio for anything other than "normal" traffic, so as to give the impression that nothing was up?"

And I'll explain to you for the umpteenth time that you have no fucking idea what you're talking about.

You're suggesting that the Germans impose radio silence. Why? Well, because the British are reading and DF-ingGerman naval signals in real time of course. We in 2009 know that, so your suggestion seems to make perfect sense. The Germans in 1918, however, had no idea about British decryption and DF capabilities and thus never saw any reason to limit their radio communication. That's why your idea makes absolutely no sense in the timeline's historical context because you're granting future knowledge to historical personages in order to create seemingly plausible, but actually historical implausible, actions.

Point in case: The Japanese did this before WWII, going to the extent of leaving their principal radio operators in harbour when they sailed, and the American Intelligence Service thought that the Japanese Pearl Harbour attack fleet was in still in harbour up to the time of attack!

Actually that's another example of you having no fucking idea what you're talking about.

Do you know why the Kido Butai sailed under a communications blackout? Do you know why signals, complete with fake "fists", were broadcast from the Inland Sea in order to fool US DF stations?

Because the Japanese knew how the British used SIGINT to defeat the German Navy in WW1.

They applied the post-WW1 admission of Room 40's importance to their 1941 plans. Germany in WW1 cannot do the same.

Complete failure of Signals Intelligence.

No. Rather, a complete failure of understanding on your part.

In essence, all I am doing is pulling part of a Japanese plan from 1941 forward to 1918 and applying it to the HSF. It is wrong of you to assume that the Germans could not think of doing this and implement it in 1918.

Wrong of me? I'm not the one applying post-WW1 knowledge to a proposed WW1 naval operation. The Germans never thought of implementing this, they never had any inkling regarding it's importance, so why are they suddenly going to figure it all out? What plausible spur could occur?

There was a recent thread here about Germany immediately launching large scale unrestricted submarine warfare the moment WW1 began. The OP of that thread made the same gross conceptual error you've continually made here. Because USW was so successful late in WW1 and throughout WW2, historical illiterates automatically assume that the ideas behind USW are "no brainers". They believe it was blindingly obvious that subs were perfect merchant ship killers and that everyone involved knew that fact from the very beginning.

Of course, that belief regarding earlier USWs wholly laughable, just as your belief that the HSF would suddenly impose a communications blackout because in hindsight it is a very good idea.

Your proposal is wholly implausible and your supporting ideas for it are nothing more than misapplied historical hindsight.

If you want this asinine idea to have any chance of working, you need to find a way in which Germany learns of and greatly appreciates the dangers posed by the activities of Room 40. Absent that, you doing nothing but wasting your time.


Bill
 
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They launched the attacks to win the war before the Americans could weigh in
Isn't that what I said? If they lost the Spring Offensive, they lost the war due to American reinforcements

I never said that they knew they were going to loose. I said that it was the beginning of the end, and they knew that. They knew that it was the last act of the war. They have to win or they will loose due to American reinforcements.

"Point in case: The Japanese did this before WWII, going to the extent of leaving their principal radio operators in harbour when they sailed, and the American Intelligence Service thought that the Japanese Pearl Harbour attack fleet was in still in harbour up to the time of attack!"

Actually that's another example of you having no fucking idea what you're talking about.
So, according to you, the IJN did not sail without their radio operators, did not transmit false signals from harbour and did not sail under radio silence, and that everybody knew where they were, and the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl harbour was not in fact a surprise attack?

Is that actually what you mean? That is what it sounds like when you tell me I have no idea what I am on about. If that is what you mean, then you are the one who does not know what they are on about. Oh By the way, watch your language please.

"Complete failure of Signals Intelligence"

Complete failure of Signals Intelligence. No. Rather, a complete failure of understanding on your part.
No... I am pretty sure that nobody in the US knew where the IJN was and it was a signals intelligence failure. However, if you would like to provide undeniable proof that the USN knew where the IJN Pearl attack fleet was, I will reconsider my position on this.

Also, regarding Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (How did that get here?) Germany introduced it in 1915 then dropped it again after the RMS Lusatinia was sunk with the loss of 128 American lives. They must therefore have been aware as to the submarines nature regarding ideal merchant ship killers in 1915. In fact, the German navy was aware that the submarine was an ideal commerce raider before 1914. That was one of the reasons as to why they were already building a submarine fleet.

oh and the Germans knew something was up after Jutland, just not what. After all, the ENTIRE Grand Fleet just happening to perfectly run into the HSF? The Germans never believed that it was a coincidence and changed their Naval codes as a result. They would also have considered other alternatives as to why they were intercepted.
 
What this enthusiastic newcomer who's receiving such a warm welcome at this site is proposing is a last pitched battle between the HSF and GF - not an HSF victory over the GF.
POD: The HSF sails in support of the Spring Offensive. So British intelligence realizes the HSF is up to something. The GF sails to intercept, the pitched battle occurs and the HSF becomes an ornament of the North Sea seabed or, with a stroke of luck, the Channel. The CP still losses WWI, but no Kiel mutinies, as there is the would be mutineers became fish food months ago.

Welcome to the board Eternity :)
 
Eternity, I think your initial plot is good. - But it requires an earlier POD. In October 1918, the HSF was depleted, the best officers and men having gone to the U-Boats and the small craft.
The big ships were not neglected, in April 1918 there was a fleet sortie to Norway, and they were always kept in high readiness.

Say, in early 1918 Scheer and Hipper decide to concentrate on a core ability, mothballing all outdated ships and those with insufficient fire power. They then might arrive at a smaller but far more capable fleet, which also has an improved morale because the best personnel available has been picked.

Nevertheless, it would be requisite that the sailors do not know they're sent on a death voyage without return. So, a positive objective of the operation must be propagated.
 
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BTW, the Germans knew that the enemy was tracking and reading their radio messages (just like they were tracking and reading British radio emissions). For the April 1918 sortie, for example, radio silence was kept - until SMS Moltke ran into trouble off Stavanger and had to cry for help.
 
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