Neutral Ottomans in WWI?

If there is a USSR but no German advance inland, the Turks are the aggressors and facing a substantially superior navy (which historically was sunk because the Germans captured the moorings). Crimea? Come on!

Seriously, the amount of Otto-overestimation on these boards. :rolleyes:
Too much depends on how the hypothetical alt-Russian Civil War goes. Crimea is a major stretch, but theoretically possible if Russia is weakened enough by infighting. It's entirely possible that a surviving Russian fleet either ends up split in loyalties and mostly sinking itself or is scuttled at some point to prevent the other side from capturing it.
 
Too much depends on how the hypothetical alt-Russian Civil War goes. Crimea is a major stretch, but theoretically possible if Russia is weakened enough by infighting. It's entirely possible that a surviving Russian fleet either ends up split in loyalties and mostly sinking itself or is scuttled at some point to prevent the other side from capturing it.

Well, more than that, it depends on how WW1 goes. There could be no navy if the Germans reach the ports.

As for the Navy - it'd not be an even split. The major reason for desertion of several units were precisely the orders to scuttle them. It was a very difficult decision. Without it, the sailors' councils will probably stay even more loyal.

Basically, the Reds will still have enough stuff afloat to deny the Turks Crimea even after it's all over with the whites.

But say there is no navy; whoever wins the civil war in Russia, Turkey still will have hell to pay afterwards. Kars is one thing, Crimea is something else entirely.

They're smarter than that, I imagine, and wouldn't't do it.
 
But say there is no navy; whoever wins the civil war in Russia, Turkey still will have hell to pay afterwards. Kars is one thing, Crimea is something else entirely.

They're smarter than that, I imagine, and wouldn't't do it.
True; the Ottomans taking Crimea is a major stretch, but is possible if everything goes right for them and wrong for the Russians. Holding the area against whatever Russian state emerges from the civil war is another matter entirely. However, I could see Crimea being used as leverage for negotiation; the Ottomans might offer to hand Crimea back in exchange for Russia accepting other Ottoman gains. While Russia could take Crimea back by force without any concessions, any way to get the land back without more fighting would be tempting to any country that just went through World War I, followed by a long, bloody civil war.
 
Years of work right there.

Political work, sure, but with a Russian collapse, Armenia and Azerbaijan will almost certainly assert their independence as they did OTL. Azerbaijan will probably be pretty keen on a close relationship with Turkey, which puts Armenia in no position to object to the whole of the Ottoman army, fresh and equipped. Militarily, the operation would be pretty easy. It actually happened, in fact, with a battered and drained Ottoman army, elsewhere engaged, and having to start by retaking large chunks of its own territory.

In the same sense that Megali Idea was a thoroughly reasonable proposition.

Much as I was using it is a far-out example of what could happen theoretically, thus my phrasing, I take objection to that comparison. There are major differences. The Crimean Tartar population, while not a majority by 1918, was large and politically and culturally active, and able to secure dominance in a short-lived anti-communist republic. The Ottomans have real support on the ground, unlike the Greeks, who only had the small Greek minorities everywhere.

If there is a USSR but no German advance inland, the Turks are the aggressors

Are they, though? The whites made their last stand in the Crimea, after all. I never said "annexation", I said "intervention". With Bolshevism triumphant in Dniepr Ukraine, the Ottomans could try to establish a protected state of Tatars and white emigres. Or as suggested, the whole intervention could be just a bargaining chip. Or it could fail.

and facing a substantially superior navy (which historically was sunk because the Germans captured the moorings). Crimea? Come on!

Do we actually have figures for the naval strengths of Russia and the Ottomans? An Osprey of mine claims that during the worst of the Brusilov Offensive, the Austrians threw around the idea of invading the Ukraine asthough the naval element was already taken care of. Breslau and Goeben changed things a lot, of course, but lest we forget, the Ottomans getting a pair of shiny new battleships is a potential starting point for the whole scenario.

Seriously, the amount of Otto-overestimation on these boards. :rolleyes:

I merely suggested, based on my own rather inadequate knowledge of the naval balance and the historical attempt to build a Russo-Tartar republic, that there was a possibility, small but there, of Ottoman troops mucking around in the Crimea. I never even said that they would succeed. The whole affair could be a costly failure, rather like the White Sea show, in fact. The suggestion was intended to illustrate that surviving Ottomans have major butterflies for the USSR starting with its birth.

That's hardly drastic.
 
Do we actually have figures for the naval strengths of Russia and the Ottomans? An Osprey of mine claims that during the worst of the Brusilov Offensive, the Austrians threw around the idea of invading the Ukraine asthough the naval element was already taken care of. Breslau and Goeben changed things a lot, of course, but lest we forget, the Ottomans getting a pair of shiny new battleships is a potential starting point for the whole scenario.

Yes, except the Russians will have three shiny new Empresses at the same time all ready and prepared, plus all of their five old PDNs, plus a significantly superior amount of supporting units. Without neutralization of Russian ports, no chance.

And as for Austrians and their war-making and war-planning skills...without the Germans, Ukraine was as far for them as the moon. With a less hostile Ottoman Empire and the supply lines still active, the Russians may not even do as badly as they did OTL.

It's hard to say, but without the ports being compromised, Crimea is out of reach.
 
Yes, except the Russians will have three shiny new Empresses at the same time all ready and prepared, plus all of their five old PDNs, plus a significantly superior amount of supporting units. Without neutralization of Russian ports, no chance.

What about the chance that the Whites retain control of enough to tip the balance and, having lost in Ukraine, invite the Ottomans in?

And you still haven't actually produces a source for your OOBs, whereas, as I said, a booklet of military history from a well-regarded publisher indicated that the Central Powers were in control of the Black Sea.

And as for Austrians and their war-making and war-planning skills...without the Germans, Ukraine was as far for them as the moon.

1) They have Ze Germans.

2) What I was referring to was the idea of the Ottomans invading Ukraine from the Black Sea to relieve Austria. Of course the idea was unworkable... because the Ottomans needed every man of military age, but that the Austrians thought to bring it up suggests that the Ottomans had a Black Sea fleet able to square up to Russia's. As, indeed, does Russia's failure to undertake any raiding on the Ottoman coast that I've been made aware of, which if I'm not mistaken would, by cutting the main lifeline between Istanbul and the coalfield around Zonguldak, enormously disrupt the Ottoman's ability to wage war.

I'm no expert on the balance in the Black Sea, but I don't think you are, either.

With a less hostile Ottoman Empire and the supply lines still active, the Russians may not even do as badly as they did OTL.

That's rather a given. I've elaborated on such a scenario elsewhere. It involves no Ottoman intervention anywhere, because the Entente win in '16.

It's hard to say, but without the ports being compromised, Crimea is out of reach.

A) I'm still not convinced,

B) Who said they weren't? I actually think that with neutral Ottomans a Russian collapse is rather unlikely, but if it occurs, why ar ethe ports sacrosanct all of a sudden?
 
What about the chance that the Whites retain control of enough to tip the balance and, having lost in Ukraine, invite the Ottomans in?

Depending on the butterflies, what are the Whites doing in Crimea to start with?

The navy was mostly gone before the whites holed up behind Perekop, anyway. It was gone because German advance directly threatened the ports. If there's no Germans, the fleet may still be there. If the fleet is still there, there's no guarantees the whites will even have a stonghold in Crimea. It could also either lead the British to directly confront the Reds by sending a sizeable task force there (here's a good chance the Turks might join in, but then their getting Crimea is 100% contingent on the whims of the British). Or the British could simply avoid the risk altogether.

And you still haven't actually produces a source for your OOBs, whereas, as I said, a booklet of military history from a well-regarded publisher indicated that the Central Powers were in control of the Black Sea.
It depends on the time period. Russia was more or less in control in 1916 and mined a good chunk of the Turkish coast. By 1918, they can be counted as in control because the soviets ordered the fleet scuttled. However, the CPs weren't in control enough to stop the British from landing intervention troops in the South and interning the White Fleet.

Basically, the arrival of just one Empress restricted Goeben's activities somewhat. Three of them would do a lot more. Of the three, one was historically given to the whites (after being siezed first by the Germans and then by the British), one was scuttles, and one suffered extensive damage in an accidental explosion and was never repaired due to the civil war; the fourth of the Empresses was almost complete and if Russia did better in the war, would be in 1918 or thereabouts. Depending on how the butterflies have it, sole intervention by the Ottomans could face four new DNs and several PDNs. That is probably too much to handle.

So CP control of the black sea in 1916 seems like boasting to me. They most certainly didn't have it.

I'm still not convinced
I hope I've gone some way to convince you, then. There's several contingiencies. Do the Germans ever threaten the ports? Are there allied intervention landings (i.e. is the revolution before the war's end or after?). Are the Ottos part of the intervention? Where are the white generals when this revolution starts (and can they retreat to Crimea at all?). How did the Fleet split in the Red-White sense? Where is the Red portion of it (sunk by the Allies, scuttled?).

Without all of these going in a particular direction (yes, yes, maybe, Ukraine, whites got more than OTL, sunk), Crimea is out of reach.
 
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Depending on the butterflies, what are the Whites doing in Crimea to start with?

Escaping.

Depending on butterflies, why is there a Russian Civil War? Carry on like this and we shall have to understand life, the universe, and everything before proceeding. Let's stick to those scenarios which are relevent to the question.

The navy was mostly gone before the whites holed up behind Perekop, anyway. It was gone because German advance directly threatened the ports. If there's no Germans, the fleet may still be there.

There are Germans. That's sort of the point.

If the fleet is still there, there's no guarantees the whites will even have a stonghold in Crimea. It could also either lead the British to directly confront the Reds by sending a sizeable task force there (here's a good chance the Turks might join in, but then their getting Crimea is 100% contingent on the whims of the British). Or the British could simply avoid the risk altogether.

You'll have to run that by me again. What?

It depends on the time period. Russia was more or less in control in 1916 and mined a good chunk of the Turkish coast. By 1918, they can be counted as in control because the soviets ordered the fleet scuttled. However, the CPs weren't in control enough to stop the British from landing intervention troops in the South and interning the White Fleet.

I'll have to check, but I believe Batum was after the armistice. Nevertheless, having done some check-ups, the naval forces were more in Russia's favour than I had thought. This doesn't really change my argument one bit.

Basically, the arrival of just one Empress restricted Goeben's activities somewhat. Three of them would do a lot more. Of the three, one was historically given to the whites (after being siezed first by the Germans and then by the British), one was scuttles, and one suffered extensive damage in an accidental explosion and was never repaired due to the civil war; the fourth of the Empresses was almost complete and if Russia did better in the war, would be in 1918 or thereabouts. Depending on how the butterflies have it, sole intervention by the Ottomans could face four new DNs and several PDNs. That is probably too much to handle.

As I said, there are circumstances in which is it possible. The navy has been scuttled for fear of Ze Germans. The navy has been torn by civil war. The British have signed on. And certain circumstances were all I said there were.

So CP control of the black sea in 1916 seems like boasting to me. They most certainly didn't have it.

The Austrians were certainly capable of getting their facts wrong.

I hope I've gone some way to convince you, then. There's several contingiencies. Do the Germans ever threaten the ports? Are there allied intervention landings (i.e. is the revolution before the war's end or after?). Are the Ottos part of the intervention? Where are the white generals when this revolution starts (and can they retreat to Crimea at all?). How did the Fleet split in the Red-White sense? Where is the Red portion of it (sunk by the Allies, scuttled?).

Without all of these going in a particular direction (yes, yes, maybe, Ukraine, whites got more than OTL, sunk), Crimea is out of reach.

If we acknowledge that there are non-ASB scenarios in which this can take place, I've won. See, let's retrace this.

I said that it was "possible" for the Ottomans to intervene in (not take, I didn't even say take) the Crimea. My intent was to illustrate the drastic butterflies on Soviet Russia in a dramatic way, not to say that it was a likely outcome.

Denied my statement. Since my statement was "The Crimea? It's possible", by refuting it, you assert that intervention in the Crimea was impossible.

You just contradicted your own argument.
 
Denied my statement. Since my statement was "The Crimea? It's possible", by refuting it, you assert that intervention in the Crimea was impossible.

You just contradicted your own argument.

I assumed actual control of Crimea and compared it to the Megali idea. About equal likelihood, and you've said nothing to convince me otherwise.

A brief intervention lead by the British under which the Ottomans are junior partners is, however possible.

If that is victory, you can have it.
 
Do you know much about the history of the Caucasus front? Because the Ottomans DID take Batum and Kars, DID take Azerbaijan (Russian AND Persian) and Armenia, were forestalled from occupying Georgia by a German declaration of protectorate, and were in the process of marching on Astrakhan when the war ended. And that's after 12 years of war while fighting on several other fronts.

If the Ottomans had been neutral throughout the course of the war, in case of Russian collapse, there is virtually zero doubt the Ottomans would very quickly overrun the Caucasus, and the Crimea is a real possibility. In OTL they did all I described above with the equivalent of a division. With their entire army available, it would be like a knife through butter.

I think it was pretty clear from I Blame Communism's post that he was talking about a scenario with a Russian collapse. If there isn't, then there is of course no question of Ottoman advances into these regions.

Regarding the question of the Straits, I'm not sure what would happen - it would depend on how the war progressed. If the Germans started sinking ships off the Straits, the Ottomans might very well close them, in which case Russia will have problems.

The diversion of forces to fight the Ottomans was in the case of Russia not massive - I'm not sure it would make too much difference, as much of this would be required to garrison the frontier. It would still result in more being available elsewhere.

It would, however, free up a hundreds of thousands, even millions, of British Empire troops for use elsewhere. This could potentially make a large difference - I would presume they would be used in a Balkan front.

So it seems to me that a Russian collapse is a lot less likely, but not impossible.

In any case, neutrality for the Ottomans would be huge for them. The fear in OTL was that the victors would dismember the empire; that was a valid concern, but only if the war was brief. Once it was clear it would not be, then neutrality would have seemed "safer", in that the combatants would be to exhausted to take on such a project.

OK.



Years of work right there.



In the same sense that Megali Idea was a thoroughly reasonable proposition.

If there is a USSR but no German advance inland, the Turks are the aggressors and facing a substantially superior navy (which historically was sunk because the Germans captured the moorings). Crimea? Come on!

Seriously, the amount of Otto-overestimation on these boards. :rolleyes:
 
Well, more than that, it depends on how WW1 goes. There could be no navy if the Germans reach the ports.

As for the Navy - it'd not be an even split. The major reason for desertion of several units were precisely the orders to scuttle them. It was a very difficult decision. Without it, the sailors' councils will probably stay even more loyal.

Basically, the Reds will still have enough stuff afloat to deny the Turks Crimea even after it's all over with the whites.

But say there is no navy; whoever wins the civil war in Russia, Turkey still will have hell to pay afterwards. Kars is one thing, Crimea is something else entirely.

They're smarter than that, I imagine, and wouldn't't do it.

That depends. If the Ukraine could be supported against the Reds with a quid pro quo of acceptance of Ottoman occupation of the Crimea, then its conceivable, if not extremely likely.

The Ottomans would be able to field a qualitatively much superior force to the Red Army, and not that much inferior quantitatively, either, for a while at least, albeit not in the Crimea. If the Ottomans were supported by France and Britain in this, it could happen - but I'm not sure if the threat of Communism was felt strongly enough for this at this time to justify retaining a German division of Russia which an independent Ukraine represents.
 
Do you know much about the history of the Caucasus front? Because the Ottomans DID take Batum and Kars, DID take Azerbaijan (Russian AND Persian) and Armenia, were forestalled from occupying Georgia by a German declaration of protectorate, and were in the process of marching on Astrakhan when the war ended. And that's after 12 years of war while fighting on several other fronts.

If the Ottomans had been neutral throughout the course of the war, in case of Russian collapse, there is virtually zero doubt the Ottomans would very quickly overrun the Caucasus, and the Crimea is a real possibility. In OTL they did all I described above with the equivalent of a division. With their entire army available, it would be like a knife through butter.

I think it was pretty clear from I Blame Communism's post that he was talking about a scenario with a Russian collapse. If there isn't, then there is of course no question of Ottoman advances into these regions.

Regarding the question of the Straits, I'm not sure what would happen - it would depend on how the war progressed. If the Germans started sinking ships off the Straits, the Ottomans might very well close them, in which case Russia will have problems.

The diversion of forces to fight the Ottomans was in the case of Russia not massive - I'm not sure it would make too much difference, as much of this would be required to garrison the frontier. It would still result in more being available elsewhere.

It would, however, free up a hundreds of thousands, even millions, of British Empire troops for use elsewhere. This could potentially make a large difference - I would presume they would be used in a Balkan front.

So it seems to me that a Russian collapse is a lot less likely, but not impossible.

In any case, neutrality for the Ottomans would be huge for them. The fear in OTL was that the victors would dismember the empire; that was a valid concern, but only if the war was brief. Once it was clear it would not be, then neutrality would have seemed "safer", in that the combatants would be to exhausted to take on such a project.

Thanks. You put it a lot better than I could have.
 
Do you know much about the history of the Caucasus front? Because the Ottomans DID take Batum and Kars, DID take Azerbaijan (Russian AND Persian) and Armenia, were forestalled from occupying Georgia by a German declaration of protectorate, and were in the process of marching on Astrakhan when the war ended. And that's after 12 years of war while fighting on several other fronts.

That was after the treaty with Russia, no? As in, the Russians weren't actually fighting back? In this case, are they still not fighting back or is there an actual war between them?

...the Crimea is a real possibility. In OTL they did all I described above with the equivalent of a division. With their entire army available, it would be like a knife through butter.

What and who would get them there? As I said, gains from the Russians as per OTL in the Caucasus, and then years of political work and stabilizing the region. That's a given.

Crimea though? As part of intervention forces, maybe. As sole intervention forces, extremely unlikely. As a show of force, ASB or thereabouts.

In any case, neutrality for the Ottomans would be huge for them. The fear in OTL was that the victors would dismember the empire; that was a valid concern, but only if the war was brief. Once it was clear it would not be, then neutrality would have seemed "safer", in that the combatants would be to exhausted to take on such a project.

Neutrality is great for the Ottomans; they can certainly count on significant territorial gains and a much improved international standing once it's over.

What I don't understand is why Crimea and how on earth will they pull that off and why would they need to?
 
That depends. If the Ukraine could be supported against the Reds with a quid pro quo of acceptance of Ottoman occupation of the Crimea, then its conceivable, if not extremely likely.

So, wait, they're dealing with some Ukranian national government and hope they stay in power?

They're doomed to fail in that one, you do realize?

What your scenario requires is an even more dramatic collapse of the Russians (who start out with a better position this time around), totally pro-Ottoman Anglofrench (who would also be, likely, stronger this time around), and a Ukraine that can be propped up.

Please forgive me if I think "if not extremely likely" is a little too enthusiastic.
 
That was after the treaty with Russia, no? As in, the Russians weren't actually fighting back? In this case, are they still not fighting back or is there an actual war between them?

The Russian army in the Caucasus had evaporated. Gone. The troops had realised victory was impossible and headed home. The Russians signed a treaty despite still occupying Ottoman soil because it wasn't like they had an alternative.

Given that the Russians have presumably denuded the Caucasus as they struggle with Germany, I see no reason why there position is any better. The Ottomans, on the other hand, are obviously in a much better state without a log and bitter war still raging.

What and who would get them there? As I said, gains from the Russians as per OTL in the Caucasus, and then years of political work and stabilizing the region. That's a given.

Why does it take so much work? The Azeris were pro-Ottoman, as were the Muslim population of Kars. There's the Armenians, sure, but hopefully they will realise when to give in. There will be a lot less animosity without the war and all that it entailed: massacres by Fedayeen, the notorious relocation, and so on. And once the Ottomans build a railway (which the Russians can no longer veto), stablity is a hell of a lot easier.

Crimea though? As part of intervention forces, maybe. As sole intervention forces, extremely unlikely. As a show of force, ASB or thereabouts.

I think we've had this discussion. Have bene for some time.

Neutrality is great for the Ottomans; they can certainly count on significant territorial gains and a much improved international standing once it's over.

What I don't understand is why Crimea and how on earth will they pull that off and why would they need to?

We've had this discussion, yeah. And the reason to is, assuming circumstances allow them, it is a fairly defensible, highly strategic peninsula with a big Turkish population. Why not?
 
So, wait, they're dealing with some Ukranian national government and hope they stay in power?

They're doomed to fail in that one, you do realize?

What your scenario requires is an even more dramatic collapse of the Russians (who start out with a better position this time around), totally pro-Ottoman Anglofrench (who would also be, likely, stronger this time around), and a Ukraine that can be propped up.

Please forgive me if I think "if not extremely likely" is a little too enthusiastic.

In answer to your previous, there could be an interest in the large Turkish population that lives there. In this period, Crimean Tatar is virtually interchangeable with Ottoman Turkish. I think you'd find great support for an Ottoman occupation among the population - about 1M Tatars.

Ukraine is doomed on its own, but not necessarily if it is backed by the Powers. The Ottomans would have to do all the heavy lifting, but I don't think the Ukraine is quite as hopeless as you do, and I think you may be overestimating the ability of the Red Army to do too much about it at the conclusion of the war. Russia is devastated and exhausted, and the Red Army is not really that big or powerful. The Ottoman army in 1918 or so, not having to have fought for four years, will pretty badly outmatch it, although that won't happen in the Crimea without a lot of Entente logistical help.

The Reds were willing to make peace with Enver on his own in Central Asia (to buy time) - the Crimea and/or Ukraine stiffened by a few Ottoman divisions is probably not beatable by the Reds for a few years. If that's not enough time for the Ukraine to stabilize, then there would be a big problem. But even then, is the Ukraine THAT important to the Soviets?

IF the right diplomatic situation exists, I don't think it's that far-fetched. To summarize, it requires:

- A Russian collapse,
- such that the Black Sea Fleet is neutralized.
- Independent Ukraine

So far not too big a stretch. All these happened in OTL.

- Entente willingness to back an Ottoman move into the Crimea and support for an independent Ukraine.
- Logistical help for same

I'm really not sure how bad fear of communism was in 1918. If it was bad, this is conceivable. The Entente powers did launch some pretty serious interventions on behalf of White forces in OTL.

It seems to me that Britain and France are going to have a problem with the Ottomans extending their power so widely, but with the exception of Baku, there's not really much involved that are of particular interest to anyone. If the Ottomans are able to positions themselves as allies, it might be considered desirable to extend the Ottoman Empire, in which Britain and France would be fairly certain of having a dominant economic position.

So I think "unlikely" is pessimistic enough.
 
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