That sounds like you're saying the Germans advanced during trench warfare while it the magically changed to manoeuvre warfare a couple of months later when the allies attacked?

The German position was weaker as they had moved out of their heavily fortified defencive lines and exhausted a lot of their strength. However the latter was a result of their own offensive while I doubt, once the Germans had accepted their offensive had failed, that they didn't dig in as much as they can. Also, since the Hindenburg line was broken anyway, fairly comprensively OTL, despite the also heavy allied losses in the German offensive it's likely that it might have been anyway if attack directly. [Losses would probably have been heavier because the Germans wouldn't have weakened themselves by their own losses and also sapped their moral by realising the offensive had been basically for nothing. However the technical edge the allies were gathering, not just in armoured weapons, meant that a breakthrough was very likely.
First of all, let's distinguish whether were are talking about OTL or TTL. Here we are talking about OTL 1918, which will be significantly different from TTL.
Since the Germans had advanced beyond their trenches in many places and the allied counter offensives were focused not on established German trench lines, but on bulges without proper fortifications, I am flatly stating that the fighting was definitely maneuver warfare, not trench warfare. The Germans could not dig in in their newly won territory, other than some scratch lines, because the resources OTL were not available to hold the bulges. The Germans shifted their materials to support another offensive, then another, then another, flailing at the Entente to get them to surrender. This was under Ludendorff OTL. Zabecki cites numerous examples of army-level generals stating that OHL had no plan or idea what they were trying to accomplish. Instead of bringing up concrete, digging materials, and barbed wire they were more focused on trying to build up supply lines into the bulges and support other offensive. So no, the captured ground was not fortified into trench lines, which Zabecki talks about in his book.
Again OTL the Allies then could attack the Hindenburg line and breakthrough with little problem because the German army was already broken and surrendering because now they Americans were in the field and few wanted to die for a lost cause. I highly doubt that the German army of 1918 without the offensives would have been easily broken on the Hindenburg line even with the US, tanks, and artillery. OTL again the Allies suffered 1+ million casualties between August-November. The Germans less still (around 800,000) and that was with over 200,000 German surrendering.
This seems contradictory. You're saying that because they can't [in you're view] see victory as possible they will give up. Also however at the same time, that they will seek to attack if the Germans don't?

I would also disagree that the British especially could do what they did OTL, especially without the heavy losses of men and equipment during the spring offensives. Possibly if the Germans had put everything into a massive defencive position and sought to persuade their own men that no further offensives were planned, but that the central powers were now going to seek a balanced peace in the west.
I am not saying they would give up, but they would not return to the offensive, as they would see no reason to die when the government should be negotiating. I do think they would probably fight on the defensive, but many would either surrender or run away, which did happen quite a bit OTL in 1918 when the Germans attacked. More here even without the US in the war and there is nothing to hold out for.
You seem to be confused about this part:
Without the US it is very unlikely that morally the Entente would have waiting out the Germans in 1918 and then have been able to counter attack enough to break the Germans lines.
To clarify, I meant that I don't think the French could have morally withstood a German offensive like the OTL 1918 one without the understanding that the US was coming. In the aftermath I again am stating that due to morale concerns the French won't then be able to go on the counteroffensive to make up what was then just lost to the Germans.
So a series of fairly limited offensives to capture logistical centres, presumably seeking to dislodge the allies from defencive positions and possibly also separate British and French forces?
Yes. If the logistic hubs are lost the British cannot support their forces far from the ports on the Channel coast because of a very shallow series of rail lines that are focused on a few cities. Cutting the choke points will force the British to fall back closer to the ports and force them to abandon their established trench lines, meaning maneuver warfare is back north of the Somme river. This is the point that David Zabecki makes in his book on the German offensives, which seems to bear up based on reading I have done on British logistics during WW1.
I disagree on the production as most of that was in-house. Also while there would probably be some reduction as resources were switched elsewhere the shorter bombardments would also have helped. Furthermore, if they were deciding to win without US support was necessary then units like the armour which had the chance to be war changing, would have taken a higher priority.
Money from tanks has to come from somewhere. Artillery is still the most important army and the rolling barrage, what enabled the advance of infantry and tanks in 1917 and after, is still very shell intensive. Even after the shift to hurricane and surprise bombardments, shell usage went up, not down, which means any sort of reduction will hurt at the front. Shifting resources is not the answer, as it will mean something gets hurt, whether it is artillery, machine guns, tanks, air planes, etc. Combined arms is the name of the game and the tank is useless without artillery and infantry support, just as artillery is much less useful without airplanes (which will be in much shorter supply without the US making their 'liberty engines' the first quality mass produced engine for airplanes of sufficient power, whose absence here will be very painful).
If the government decided to attack then LG would by definition have changed his mind and the reserves would have been released. Similarly, if the decision was to stay on the defensive there would have been no need to keep them back.
Yes, but LG didn't want to attack because of being lied to by Haig about his intentions and will to stop is a certain numbers of losses were sustained. He held back too to make sure enough replacements were available to withstand the German attacks, not be frittered away in useless offensives. The only reason to keep these men back is to FORCE Haig to stand on the defensive. LG couldn't trust Haig not to do what he wanted, and he did not have the necessary political power to sack Haig at this time, otherwise he would have. So these men will be held back here too, though they will become available if LG decides finally to attack, which I'm not sure he could politically sustain, as Passchendaele had put his government in jeopardy.
Why couldn't they get steel, either ore, or finished metal, from Britain? It's definitely in Britain's interest to maintain it's main ally, even if having to cut back on some things itself.
Britain could only provide these by denying herself the supply. Sure Britain will help out France, but could only do so by limiting her own production. Here with France having such a high need, both will probably have to drop their production by half to sustain the war effort. That is half of the 1917 level, NOT the 1918 OTL level.
If America stops selling food to the allies then it will have a surplus that will depress the world markets. Should be able to find some markets if the dominions and empires can't supply all that is needed.
Mike answered this effectively
You seem to think that only private firms could produce such items? Or that if necessary, in a national crisis, government control wouldn't be possible. [As occurred in most countries in WWI and even to a large degree in the US in WWII]. It's going to be controversial but how many businessmen are going to say their profits are sacret when soldiers are dying on the front. Also if the government allocated resources to boost output in those industries [at some cost to production of arms] the owners have the chance of getting valuable resources on the cheap post-war.
Luxury items? Yes only private firms were. Trucks? The US had already monopolized those markets. No one in the world needs the items France has for sale from her government factories.
In WW1 no private business in any nation in any situation turned over their private profits, or limited them for the 'public good'. Find me an example and I'll play ball, but I've never seen even one. Just a lot of complaining about taxes and government inefficiency, which industry played off as attacks on their liberties.
There is a similar case in WWII. Given the degree of British commitment to the war and US restrictions on Britain's exports it wasn't able to export many manufactured goods. Hence some luxury products like whiskey provided very important in enabling some imports.
WWII was not a similar case, because the relationship from WW1 established US commitment to Britain. Here that does not yet exist. Whiskey and other luxury industries were already denied resources for the war effort in WW1. I'm not sure you could find an example of a public industry producing these at the cost of the war effort to raise money even OTL, nor were private industries even allowed to make them because they weren't allocated resources by the government, who was in charge of controlling foreign exchange at this point.
For most of the war France was fighting to avoid defeat, although the hope of victory was there. Given the moral factor I think a lot of French soldiers will still have hopes of Germany collapsing and a determination that they [France] won't quit before the Germans do. If the Germans are still seeking harsh terms, which would include further annexations or a punitive reparation, many could still decide to fight on to avoid such a defeat.
Hope that Germany collapses? The French soldier didn't have that OTL when there was a much better chance of that happening. Again OTL challenges you opinion on this.
http://www.amazon.com/France-Great-Approaches-European-History/dp/0521666317
The French OTL though considered a 'white peace' as the Germans giving back Alsace and paying reparations. Here they will likely be more tempered in their views thanks to the earlier fall of Russia and no US or loans. There is no long term hope for victory or even freeing the parts of France captured by the Germans. So better to cut a deal before the terms get worse. The fear too of the German offensive will be a major pressure on the French because the soldiers themselves don't even think they can go on the counter offensive to take back whatever the Germans grab. Then the peace deal is going to be even worse than before. Just better to bite the bullet and get back most of what the Germans hold even if it isn't everything.
OTL the French had the 'luxury' of knowing that they didn't have to negotiate because the US was coming to hand them the whole pie.
If the Germans go for a moderate peace, including a withdrawal from France and no reparations then there would be serious chance of French moral crumbling if the politicians refused to accept such terms.
True, but the French are probably going to have to tolerate and probably would tolerate a harsher peace because the deck was stacked against them
a) As I say above I don't see why the French government can't produce trade goods just as they did munitions - although that would take time, or put assets into [and establish controls if necessary] items for export.
They don't have time because they are running out of money fast and need every declining resource for the war...plus the Germans are getting ready to attack. Otherwise it would take months if not a year to do this, which might as well be 100 years in the future for all the time it would take. Plus there is the cost of retooling and retraining, which will all be taken away from the war effort, and then there is no guarantee they could compete with the US who had all the markets locked up because the Entente had shifted to war production instead of consumer goods.
b) I also think, with the size of the armaments industry and the experience gained they might well be useful in some trade markets. If necessary at low prices to out-compete rivals which will reduce the returns but it would make some funds possible.
Sure, but they don't have years to cultivate contacts and compete...they need money now while the Germans are getting ready to hand them their ass on a platter.
c) As I point out I think there is relatively little other than possibly some food that could be supplied from within the allied camp. Importing from external sources had been an option that had been useful before because it enabled more concentration on military production. However I think this could be converted to a far more awkonaic system.
What could be supplied without compromising British production? Britain still had to import raw materials too and needs foreign exchange for that.
d) Those steps would require some assets being diverted from military production but by late 1917 there is a lot of slack in the system and under the suggested scenario there will be no huge production for the Americans.
Sources? What slack was there? Without the $7 billion in American loans there is no way to expand production, or even convert it to consumer goods. Also there is no way to import the goods to do so without harming British production.
One point to make clear. I'm not saying France and Britain would definitely fight on to victory or to a negotiated peace. I'm saying I'm doubtful of you're certainty that France will collapse if it doesn't make peace quickly.
Steve
I'm not saying France would collapse, but be so impaired that not negotiating or accepting even a remotely fair peace deal would be suicide because once the Germans launch their attacks, there is no way to be certain that the French army wouldn't collapse like the Russians did in 1917. Either through surrender, desertion, or just plain retreating, once the army's morale goes there is no way to rehabilitate it.