Negotiated End to WW1

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring_Offensive
OTL Germany achieved the greatest penetration of the Western Front of any side during WW1 in 1918. The subsequent Allied advance was only possible because movement had been restored to the battlefield and the Americans had 2 million men in France to take advantage of the situation.

Actually of course the greatest penetration in 1918 was the allied counter-offensives that threw the Germans back quite a way beyond its start lines of the spring. Movement was restored on the battlefield partly because the German army had largely exhausted it's last strength with the desperate bid for overwhelming victory and because the allies had organised the weaponry and tactics to break the stalemate. I think the US forces in France reached 1.8M in November 1918 when the armistice was signed. Relatively few of those took part in the actions that broke the German lines in the earlier months so the allied advances then weren't dependent on them although they and the potential they represented was definitely useful.

Fact is that without the psychological advantage of the US presence and the financial support of the US banks (close to $7 Billion after US entry in the war in April 1917. This was at that time's currency value, which is ~$1.5 trillion in today's dollars. It was also the vast majority of money that the Entente received from the US), the French would have folded in 1918. According to http://www.amazon.com/Pyrrhic-Victory-French-Strategy-Operations/dp/0674027264
, which is the best book on the French war effort in English, the French even OTL nearly collapsed politically as the Germans broke the French lines after already launching several against the British. Only the knowledge that the US army was coming kept them in the war.
I can only see the pages made available on Amazon, which includes the summary at the end. This makes clear that although there was a point after the disastrous spring 1917 offensive when France wavered it continued with both politicians and soldiers determined to fight to the end. Noticeably that despite the appalying losses the proportion of conscripts refusing to serve declined throughout the war. The author suggests that the recovery from the period of wavering in 1917 was because of the entry of the US but no details are given in the summary.

Here that won't be an option and Falkenhayn is likely to focus on the French first. However, he won't go after purely tactical victories like Ludendorff, which was the point of my previous post, but strategic targets that would have forced the French out of the war.
What do you mean by strategtic as opposed to tactical targets? Other than Paris or the new industries which are far beyond the front I can't really see any. Given his past experience at Verdun Falkenhayn might go for Paris but I can't see him succeeding. As I think you say elsewhere it's a fortified city so even if driven back to it the French could put up a hell of a fight and with the desperately limited German reserves I would suspect they would be breaking 1st.

Also if the Germans target the French 1st that frees the bulk of the British forces to stage a counter-attack. Since they have the more developed armoured doctrine at this time that could also be very bad for the Germans.

ITTL the situation is not that of OTL 1918; there the French could not lose so long as they waited. Here they don't have the Americans coming to the rescue, all they have is the knowledge that they will have to pay in blood to reclaim everything the Germans have conquered, but don't have the manpower left to do so. Even OTL the French in November 1918 were physically incapable of taking the offensive again, as they were down to the last 1.5 million soldiers available to the nation; there were no reinforcements left. Here they won't have the US to make up the deficit. Also they won't have the tanks, trucks, airplanes, artillery, or shells of OTL because of lack of US money.
Why should they have any less weaponry? As the book you cite mentioned France was the biggest single producer on the allied side of war materials. In TTL they wouldn't be providing the bulk of the equipment for the US either. As you pointed out earlier stuff produced inside and by the country is far less important in the short term as it can be handled by internal loan. Given no US loans there would be problems with imports but there are options. It would be possible to convert some resources from war to export use to met some of the shortfall and there was slack in the allied camp that could have been tightened to cover more of it. Or there might be other exporters who would accept French loans to meet some import needs.

If there is no US dow in Apr 1917 then the situation is changed but the allies still have a war to wage and huge resources. They can change their strategies and might well do without the knowledge of American intervention.


As to the claim that the Entente could just sell war goods to raise money...who would buy them?
Who's said that? I suggested they could switch resources from war production to produce some exports. Or since a lot of the need was for foodstuff possibly move some men back to agriculture. On the other hand say surplus war goods, up to date and well tested, might well prove attractive trade products for supplies such as Argentina say.

Steve
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking, you had the single most plausible WWI ATL I've seen, and now you want to spoil it?

Sometimes I think there's some curse on the war making everybody want to play fantasy. Even the big historian Tuchman got it wrong, refusing to think some could've been evil. Communism was, of course, ASB; Fascism was old, proved inferior dictatorship coming for another round.

Did the glorious Spring Advance manage to advance a whole mile, at the cost of all that blood? Short of the whole French government being parked there and stupid enough to stay, HTF could it've won the war? And, hmm, it was then reversed JUST LIKE WHEN THE WESTERN ENTENTE WERE SO STUPID. Such an unheard of result - NOT.

The guns could fire fast enough since ACW there was no hope of enough unarmored soldiers making it to the other side to make enough difference. Well, except places that couldn't make or distribute bullets fast enough. Though my Russian grandad was given plenty of bullets; they just happened to be wrong for his gun.

I'm a bit confused by your post. What is the criticism of my scenario?
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/42/Western_front_1918_german.jpg
The Spring Advance was very costly, but advanced in some places over 40 miles, by far the largest advance in trench warfare since September 14th.
 

Deleted member 1487

Actually of course the greatest penetration in 1918 was the allied counter-offensives that threw the Germans back quite a way beyond its start lines of the spring. Movement was restored on the battlefield partly because the German army had largely exhausted it's last strength with the desperate bid for overwhelming victory and because the allies had organised the weaponry and tactics to break the stalemate. I think the US forces in France reached 1.8M in November 1918 when the armistice was signed. Relatively few of those took part in the actions that broke the German lines in the earlier months so the allied advances then weren't dependent on them although they and the potential they represented was definitely useful.
My point was that in trench warfare the Germans made the largest advances in the war, but as maneuver warfare had returned by the time of the allied counter attack and the Germans were not in the their trenches, just open ground, and were used up, the Allies were able to advance. It is not comparable really. Now if you were to compare the maneuver period in 1914 to that of 1918, I'd be more willing to argue that.

As to the American contribution, yes you are very right that they didn't really become a factor until the German offensives were already over, but they allowed the Allies to break the Germans when the attacks started in August. Without the US it is very unlikely that morally the Entente would have waiting out the Germans in 1918 and then have been able to counter attack enough to break the Germans lines. I might be willing to agree that they could have returned part of the lines back to their pre-German offensive positions, but that is debatable. Frankly the French would have folded if not for the knowledge that they could simply not lose the war if they just didn't surrender.

I can only see the pages made available on Amazon, which includes the summary at the end. This makes clear that although there was a point after the disastrous spring 1917 offensive when France wavered it continued with both politicians and soldiers determined to fight to the end. Noticeably that despite the appalying losses the proportion of conscripts refusing to serve declined throughout the war. The author suggests that the recovery from the period of wavering in 1917 was because of the entry of the US but no details are given in the summary.
Check google books, there might be more there. Otherwise interlibrary loan it, it is a tremendous book. Basically the French only returned to the offensive because of massive US loans and knowledge that the war will be won no matter what now that the US was involved. Also the promise that no major attacks would be launched until the Americans arrived boosted morale tremendously and allowed for even the minor attacks that occurred in late 1917.


What do you mean by strategtic as opposed to tactical targets? Other than Paris or the new industries which are far beyond the front I can't really see any. Given his past experience at Verdun Falkenhayn might go for Paris but I can't see him succeeding. As I think you say elsewhere it's a fortified city so even if driven back to it the French could put up a hell of a fight and with the desperately limited German reserves I would suspect they would be breaking 1st.
As I explained in an earlier post, there were important targets like logistics hubs that Ludendorff ignored, but Falkenhayn targeted. Ludendorff targeted armies with not goal other than to fight them. Falkenhayn went after important targets that could win them the war. Of course if he is around after 1917 his opinion of what these targets are would be altered from the Verdun, attrition era Falkenhayn. Flakenhayn was smart enough to know that Paris was out of the question, which is why he wanted close targets like Arras or Doullens, or even political targets like Amiens. Close and easy for weak forces to get to.

Also if the Germans target the French 1st that frees the bulk of the British forces to stage a counter-attack. Since they have the more developed armoured doctrine at this time that could also be very bad for the Germans.
Not really if they cannot afford to produce goods. Besides OTL the British were denied replacements after 3rd Ypres to prevent Haig from launching another wasteful offensive. Here Llyod George is probably even more anti-Haig and anti-war as the Entente cannot afford their large production after April 1917, nor the tanks to launch things like Cambrai.

Why should they have any less weaponry? As the book you cite mentioned France was the biggest single producer on the allied side of war materials. In TTL they wouldn't be providing the bulk of the equipment for the US either. As you pointed out earlier stuff produced inside and by the country is far less important in the short term as it can be handled by internal loan. Given no US loans there would be problems with imports but there are options. It would be possible to convert some resources from war to export use to met some of the shortfall and there was slack in the allied camp that could have been tightened to cover more of it. Or there might be other exporters who would accept French loans to meet some import needs.

ITTL they won't be getting access to the $7 billion in US unsecured 'liberty loans' that they got OTL. Also the US forced rationing on its population to feed France and Britain, which they won't ITTL either, especially as they cannot pay for it. Argentina had stopped exporting to the Entente in 1917 anyway, leaving the US as the major supplier for food in the world that the Entente could import from. Internal loans won't allow France to produce goods in their own country as 90% of their coal and iron deposits were behind German lines. The French could get coal from Britain, but would need steel from outside their alliance area. Without foreign money and currency they cannot buy steel or iron. That means no war goods.

Also what could the French export? They were only known for luxury items, but had little resources to produce them from internally, relying on foreign imports to produce those goods (silk, perfumes, cars), but these were private firms that made these and any profits would be private. The nation could not simply produce these in state factories, as these only produced war goods. Good luck telling private industry to turn over 100% of their profits to the government to fight a war.

Also the only nation capable of loaning the necessary money to France was the US. No other nation had enough money at the time.

If there is no US dow in Apr 1917 then the situation is changed but the allies still have a war to wage and huge resources. They can change their strategies and might well do without the knowledge of American intervention.
Or they can negotiate before they go broke. The French soldier now has no reason to stay in the war, as they have no faith in offensive victory. That only came from knowledge of the unlimited US manpower. Here Russia is going to drop out early, as they only stayed in as long as they did because of loans, which here won't exist. After that the French soldier will have no faith they could break the German lines and will demand that the war end, as ultimate victory was impossible.

Who's said that? I suggested they could switch resources from war production to produce some exports. Or since a lot of the need was for foodstuff possibly move some men back to agriculture. On the other hand say surplus war goods, up to date and well tested, might well prove attractive trade products for supplies such as Argentina say.

Steve
What would they shift it too and who would buy it? The US had monopolized the markets of the European powers after they stopped producing exports. Also there is that sticky issue of private vs. public companies and profits. Private companies that produced consumer goods, who here have lost their markets thanks to the US filling the gap, won't turn over their profits to the government to fight the war. Public factories can only produce war materials that other nations had no use for. France already had too few men for the army as it was, shifting men to any other industry, including agriculture, would mean thinning out the lines too much especially as the nation cannot afford to compensate by producing more artillery, tanks, or machines guns and munitions.

I do like arguing my points with you Steve, but you do need to provide more than vague options. Concrete solutions such as nations to trade with or how fast industry could convert to consumer goods are important to countering my points.
 
My criticism is that, unlike your original scenario of the first page, I'm afraid the idea that a massive, Spring-like offensive could win even in TTL is ignoring facts on the ground. How about answering my third and fourth paragraphs? Here they are again:

Did the glorious Spring Advance manage to advance a whole mile, at the cost of all that blood? Short of the whole French government being parked there and stupid enough to stay, HTF could it've won the war? And, hmm, it was then reversed JUST LIKE WHEN THE WESTERN ENTENTE WERE SO STUPID. Such an unheard of result - NOT.

The guns could fire fast enough since ACW there was no hope of enough unarmored soldiers making it to the other side to make enough difference. Well, except places that couldn't make or distribute bullets fast enough. Though my Russian grandad was given plenty of bullets; they just happened to be wrong for his gun.


Oh, and on morale:
When the Germans charged dumb, those they charged thought were happy, thinking, yay, their turn to be dumb and be slaughtered by stupid generals. Why'd that be different? Troops everywhere and everytime have loved that kind of helpful conduct by their enemy.

EDIT: Let me repeat again: vast charges, even with massive arty support, failed again and again in the west before the tank in this war. That's the kind of war it was. The French were unhappy because their generals had sent them in exactly that kind of DUMB charge too many times, not because they were ready to run. When the Germans did the same thing, it was equally dumb and hopeless; and the Entente were only happy about it, and liking the idea of their enemy machinegunning themselves en masse in turn.
 
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machine3589

Ah. It was unclear from what you said that you were referring to something other than Germany breaking France. I see what you meant now is somewhat different.

Steve

Steve, I dont want to sound like I want to make an argument over a simple misunderstanding, but the post you originally quoted is almost the same as my explenation.

if this "peace offensive" puts everyone at the negotiating table, in the minds of Europeans this negotiated peace would be indistinguishable from a German victory.

if France is forced to the negotiating table by the German offensive rather then broken as wiking predicts, then people will still see it as a German victory even to this day.
 
My criticism is that, unlike your original scenario of the first page, I'm afraid the idea that a massive, Spring-like offensive could win even in TTL is ignoring facts on the ground.

I very much agree with your uneasiness, though for different reasons. However, I understood the original post that the combination of a) no US DOW & no US loans to the Entente and b) the threat of an imminent attack with fresh reserves from the East would bring the Entente to the negotiation table.
I.e., in this scenario, the offensive can be ignored as it has become unnecessary.

Did the glorious Spring Advance manage to advance a whole mile, at the cost of all that blood? Short of the whole French government being parked there and stupid enough to stay, HTF could it've won the war? And, hmm, it was then reversed JUST LIKE WHEN THE WESTERN ENTENTE WERE SO STUPID. Such an unheard of result - NOT.

1. Not one mile, but forty, which is astonishing at that point of WW1.
2. Germany's WW1 leadership completely ignored one of Clausewitz's basic principles - that war is not only a continuation of policies with other means, but that the aim of war has to be the return to political solution-finding. OTL, the only message to the Entente was "Accept complete defeat!" - which is (except for the first days of near-panic during Operation Michael) ridiculous given the involvement of the United States, not so much in term of soldiers, but in term of economical commitment (an industrial output and financial wealth we have to imagine as having 2010's USA and China combined at your side).

In this timeline as I understand it, the political message is "You can come to the negotiation table at any time to have a reasonable deal". The offensive would add the message "While maybe we cannot have a total victory over you, let us show you that you cannot win the war either and additionally, it seems as if we can hurt you more than you can hurt us."

The guns could fire fast enough since ACW there was no hope of enough unarmored soldiers making it to the other side to make enough difference. Well, except places that couldn't make or distribute bullets fast enough.

When the Germans charged dumb, those they charged thought were happy, thinking, yay, their turn to be dumb and be slaughtered by stupid generals. Why'd that be different? Troops everywhere and everytime have loved that kind of helpful conduct by their enemy.

EDIT: Let me repeat again: vast charges, even with massive arty support, failed again and again in the west before the tank in this war. That's the kind of war it was. The French were unhappy because their generals had sent them in exactly that kind of DUMB charge too many times, not because they were ready to run. When the Germans did the same thing, it was equally dumb and hopeless; and the Entente were only happy about it, and liking the idea of their enemy machinegunning themselves en masse in turn.

As many people do, you at least halfway ignore the difference of 1918. Both sides had at this point resorted to different strategies which make the offensives of 1918 different than 1915/16/17.

The Entente had developed the tank. Now again, we mustn't overestimate the tank. It was not invulnerable, especially the British models were painfully slow.

The Germans had greatly improved their artillery tactics and completely changed its infrantry tactics. The initial stages of the Spring Offensive saw neither hours or even days of artillery preparation, nor the masses of men to be slaughtered in no-mans-land. Instead, they used their elite-troops (hand-picked men put into new formations) as stormtroopers to infiltrate, by-pass and destroy the valuable parts of the enemy's position in order to allow the less skilled and slower troops to come afterwards and swallow up the isolated parts of the overrun frontline.
One could call this a proto-Blitzkrieg "by foot". The problem is directly clear. Not only are you unable to gain a strategical success while still moving very fast when compared to 1915-17, but still very slow on the map. The second problem was that you do not use up your complete manpower as in the old-style-massed offensive, but you put your experienced, skillful and motivated soldiers into the furnace, quicker reducing the quality than the quantity of your army.

Both circumstances combined with more factors (again, the realization by the ordinary German soldier that the war cannot be won under these circumstances - but in OTL circumstances also very much influenced by the American contribution) led to the breakdown in German performance in late summer/autumn of 1918.

----

On morale: this scenario probably means no Wilsonian 14 points. One shouldn't underestimate their impact throughout Europe. The 14 points were fair enough that they made admitting defeat an alternative to the German leadership in late 1918 despite no German ground being occupied by Entente forces yet.
The scenario rather puts this diplomatic initiative on the Western Front into the German hands. If the German offer clearly states that a full re-establishment of Belgium and a return to Franco-German pre-war borders are the base of negotiations, the effect (again, under the changed overall circumstances) can be quite large.
 
I'm away from home currenbtly, so just a short post:-

Re French collapse - a lot of, justified, comments about the nature of the French army's state in 1917 is used to support the notion of French collapse, but very little is said about the mutiny of German units during their 1918 offensives and the impact of those on whether the Germans could continue in the war - probably due to the armistace being signed later on in the Year.

The Michael Offensive which led the grand opening of the 1918 German strategy to finish the war 'before' the US army was making an impact on the battlefield had as it objective to destroy the British army in France as a military force, this it failed to do; yes it did have successes, and good ones, against the two smallest British army groups, but, those army groups gave ground over what the Germans had retreated back from already in 1917. They failed utterly in destroying the BEF as a military force.
Ludendorf then having felt, for whatever reason, that he was better off launching the supplimentary offensives against the French army, again with some success, but it was the launching of the French counter-offensive in early June 1918 [might have been 1st week of July though?] that stopped ALL of the German plans in their tracks and ultimately led to the collapse of the Heer.

Do recall that these series of offensives were publicised to the Heer as the battle to end the war and was also the largest offensive that the Germans launched during the entire war (unless you count the initial launching of the Schliefen plan ) and all it resulted in, apart from massive casualties - the worst on the western front on day 1 suffered by the Heer during the war other than day 1 for the British on the Somme
- was the retaking of ground that the Germans had given up voluntarily.
 
Do recall that these series of offensives were publicised to the Heer as the battle to end the war and was also the largest offensive that the Germans launched during the entire war (unless you count the initial launching of the Schliefen plan ) and all it resulted in, apart from massive casualties - the worst on the western front on day 1 suffered by the Heer during the war other than day 1 for the British on the Somme
- was the retaking of ground that the Germans had given up voluntarily.

Exactly what I have been alluding to. To everyone involved, Ludendorff as well as the ordinary solider, it was win or bust. If the Spring Offensives don't win the war, it will be lost; that was the whole motive behind it. Shame on Ludendorff for not admitting it afterwards. The ordinary Landser knew better and (Re: Ferguson, Pity of War) became very ready to surrender afterwards.

Again, I am of the opinion that this thread shouldn't turn into a discussion of the early 1918 offensives. The scenario posits negotiations which occur without those happening, just under the imminent threat that the Germans try it.
 
Again, I am of the opinion that this thread shouldn't turn into a discussion of the early 1918 offensives. The scenario posits negotiations which occur without those happening, just under the imminent threat that the Germans try it.

In truth, nobody but wiking said much about the offensives. The thread is about a negotiated peace, and it should stay that way.

Also, if the Spring offensives were launched to defeat the Entente before the Yanks show up, there is little incentive to launch them here except some abstract hope of a total Endsieg. As wiking says, they could be launched to worsen the French position at the negotiating table and likewise strenghten the German one, but their hypothetical effect wont be a victory in the true sense of the word. The war might last well into 1918. before both sides start negotiating.
 
In truth, nobody but wiking said much about the offensives. The thread is about a negotiated peace, and it should stay that way.

Also, if the Spring offensives were launched to defeat the Entente before the Yanks show up, there is little incentive to launch them here except some abstract hope of a total Endsieg. As wiking says, they could be launched to worsen the French position at the negotiating table and likewise strenghten the German one, but their hypothetical effect wont be a victory in the true sense of the word. The war might last well into 1918. before both sides start negotiating.

Agreed. I would like to add that a ready and defensive posture as a prove that the frontlines cannot be moved any more might make an even greater impact at the negotiation table as it proves that war had become futile.
 

Deleted member 1487

In truth, nobody but wiking said much about the offensives. The thread is about a negotiated peace, and it should stay that way.

Also, if the Spring offensives were launched to defeat the Entente before the Yanks show up, there is little incentive to launch them here except some abstract hope of a total Endsieg. As wiking says, they could be launched to worsen the French position at the negotiating table and likewise strenghten the German one, but their hypothetical effect wont be a victory in the true sense of the word. The war might last well into 1918. before both sides start negotiating.

A peace of exhaustion was what I proposed initially, but some posters seemed to think that the threat of a German major offensive would not be enough to get the French to the peace table. I heavily disagreed, especially as said offensive is enough to cause the French major political and social problems, especially at the peace table. Yes, I should have specified that even an offensive as 'successful' as OTL would not be enough to outright win the war, the different OHL and CoS would change how it was conducted.

For the sake of argument, lets get beyond the offensive and presume that after the exit of Russia, the lack of loans, the smashing of Italy and the fall of the French government, and the refusal of French soldiers to return to the offensive the situation is ripe for negotiation. Clemenceau is not selected in November to lead the new government, rather Caillaux, the peace candidate, is given the nod. The mere threat of Germany attacks with Eastern troops is enough to scare France into negotiating.

Now if the French don't like what they are offered, then you could see a series of limited offensives to grab terrain and pressure the French, but nothing is guaranteed. Remember though that Falkenhayn is not Ludendorff; OTL Falkenhayn was counciling negotiations in 1917, but was ignored. Here he still is CoS and has the Kaiser's ear and probably power over the Reichstag, though informally like Ludendorff did.

A factor to remember that other seem to be forgetting: Germany is stronger ITTL because there was no Hindenburg program. The food situation is better too because of no coal strikes, which OTL were caused by Ludendorff trying to conscript labor into the war effort. No lack of coal means trains can have enough fuel to bring food to cities, which became a major problem in 1917 as there was not enough coal for the war effort and food transportation. So the home front, though not thrilled, is better fed and buoyed by the victories over Russia and Italy, making the German people and army more willing to wait out the war. There is no sword of Damocles in the form of American manpower waiting to bury Germany ITTL, rather, Germany seems to hold the trump card in the eyes of every combatant with her eastern armies.

The French know they cannot win the war even with Britain, so the time to negotiate is before Germany attacks. The fear is that the Germans will win outright (no one at the time had the benefit of hindsight to know that was impossible, rather the psychological impact is that Germany now outnumbers the Entente and France is the only remaining front for Germany to use her numbers). Even if the French hold out, there is still the very real fear that the Entente cannot recapture what the Germans take in an offensive, making their bargaining position even worse than it is in late 1917.

I think the French would try and cut a deal to avoid the dangerous unknown of trying to hold out against a German offensive.

One last message to Jkay: tanks were no more a decisive weapon than stormtroopers were. They had no strategic ability to win the war, however American manpower did, which won't be present here.
 
A peace of exhaustion was what I proposed initially, but some posters seemed to think that the threat of a German major offensive would not be enough to get the French to the peace table. I heavily disagreed, especially as said offensive is enough to cause the French major political and social problems, especially at the peace table. Yes, I should have specified that even an offensive as 'successful' as OTL would not be enough to outright win the war, the different OHL and CoS would change how it was conducted.

...

Wiking

If you're now talking about the threat of an offensive would that be that greatly feared by the allies? Without the evidence of it actually occurring and breaking through to a degree wouldn't the assume that the Germans would have no more effect than their attempts at Verdun in 1916, under the same leadership] of the allies own bids to break the line? I.e. that if the Germans threaten to launch an offensive to get more generous terms the allies would have been likely to call their bluff.

It might be the case that a couple of short strikes, although probably at heavy losses to the storm-troopers, would cause concern in France but done in such short steps it also gives chances to adopt to the new German tactics.

The French will know that without the Americans they can't win big. However their concern is not to lose big and if the Germans come up with terms too harsh they will be willing to fight on.

Steve
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking

If you're now talking about the threat of an offensive would that be that greatly feared by the allies? Without the evidence of it actually occurring and breaking through to a degree wouldn't the assume that the Germans would have no more effect than their attempts at Verdun in 1916, under the same leadership] of the allies own bids to break the line? I.e. that if the Germans threaten to launch an offensive to get more generous terms the allies would have been likely to call their bluff.

It might be the case that a couple of short strikes, although probably at heavy losses to the storm-troopers, would cause concern in France but done in such short steps it also gives chances to adopt to the new German tactics.

The French will know that without the Americans they can't win big. However their concern is not to lose big and if the Germans come up with terms too harsh they will be willing to fight on.

Steve

So much then hinges on the terms offered. As I stated before Falkenhayn is heavily for ending the war as soon as possible and wasn't interested in major annexations on the continent, as he saw Britain as the main enemy. As to French fears of a German offensive, OTL there was significant anxiety on the French side that the Germans would win in 1918 before the Americans arrived in numbers. This included soldiers, politicians, and generals. So I'd say that with the earlier end to Russia and the lack of the US or its loans, plus the shaky recovery of morale here, which isn't guaranteed without the US after the mutinies in 1917, there were major fears that the Germans would be able to force a total victory. In 2011 with hindsight and the files we have on all sides, we know that to be impossible, but the participants in the events at the time did not know that and were very afraid. The one voice that really saved France was Clemenceau, who stood firm in his belief of final victory, here he won't be in charge, nor will the pillar of the US be there to strengthen the nation's morale.

As to the offensives themselves...well there is the issue of what exactly a limited offensive entailed and how the Entente would react to German successes. I think that Falkenhayn would try and split the French and Brits like he wanted to do in 1915, so instead of Ludendorff just flailing at the Brits, Falkenhayn would target their infrastructure and go after Amiens or Doullens to cut their rail lines (again something he wanted to do in 1915). With the stormtroopers he can go after his preferred target of Doullens, which was well within range of OTL's penetration, but was not focused on.

http://books.google.com/books?id=sY...&resnum=4&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false
Here is a fantastic book on the subject, with the author picking out the vulnerable places in the Entente lines and going through the planning and execution of every offensive launched or planned, including how each went wrong, where it could have gone right, and how Ludendorff screwed it all up.

Even OTL the Entente was quite vulnerable and Falkenhayn ITTL can take advantage of a stronger German position (materially, politically, and proportionally) to target these vulnerabilities, which OTL he was aware of, but never got the chance to go after. ITTL by 1918 he would have achieved his goal of wearing France down to the point that success was possible. OTL German intelligence picked out the weaknesses in the Entente lines, both French and British, which is why the Germans were able to achieve the successes they did OTL.

ITTL launching an analogue Op. Michael with a similar level of success properly focused would be a disaster politically and morally for the Entente and could alone put enough pressure on France to concede to Germany's offer if negotiation are already underway.
 
My point was that in trench warfare the Germans made the largest advances in the war, but as maneuver warfare had returned by the time of the allied counter attack and the Germans were not in the their trenches, just open ground, and were used up, the Allies were able to advance. It is not comparable really. Now if you were to compare the maneuver period in 1914 to that of 1918, I'd be more willing to argue that.

That sounds like you're saying the Germans advanced during trench warfare while it the magically changed to manoeuvre warfare a couple of months later when the allies attacked?:confused: The German position was weaker as they had moved out of their heavily fortified defencive lines and exhausted a lot of their strength. However the latter was a result of their own offensive while I doubt, once the Germans had accepted their offensive had failed, that they didn't dig in as much as they can. Also, since the Hindenburg line was broken anyway, fairly comprensively OTL, despite the also heavy allied losses in the German offensive it's likely that it might have been anyway if attack directly. [Losses would probably have been heavier because the Germans wouldn't have weakened themselves by their own losses and also sapped their moral by realising the offensive had been basically for nothing. However the technical edge the allies were gathering, not just in armoured weapons, meant that a breakthrough was very likely.

As to the American contribution, yes you are very right that they didn't really become a factor until the German offensives were already over, but they allowed the Allies to break the Germans when the attacks started in August. Without the US it is very unlikely that morally the Entente would have waiting out the Germans in 1918 and then have been able to counter attack enough to break the Germans lines. I might be willing to agree that they could have returned part of the lines back to their pre-German offensive positions, but that is debatable. Frankly the French would have folded if not for the knowledge that they could simply not lose the war if they just didn't surrender.

This seems contradictory. You're saying that because they can't [in you're view] see victory as possible they will give up. Also however at the same time, that they will seek to attack if the Germans don't?:confused: I would also disagree that the British especially could do what they did OTL, especially without the heavy losses of men and equipment during the spring offensives. Possibly if the Germans had put everything into a massive defencive position and sought to persuade their own men that no further offensives were planned, but that the central powers were now going to seek a balanced peace in the west.


Check google books, there might be more there. Otherwise interlibrary loan it, it is a tremendous book. Basically the French only returned to the offensive because of massive US loans and knowledge that the war will be won no matter what now that the US was involved. Also the promise that no major attacks would be launched until the Americans arrived boosted morale tremendously and allowed for even the minor attacks that occurred in late 1917.

I will have a look thanks. - Doing so and seems a lot more of it on display here. Looks very interesting and may see if I can get it from the library or failing that possibly buy it.

As I explained in an earlier post, there were important targets like logistics hubs that Ludendorff ignored, but Falkenhayn targeted. Ludendorff targeted armies with not goal other than to fight them. Falkenhayn went after important targets that could win them the war. Of course if he is around after 1917 his opinion of what these targets are would be altered from the Verdun, attrition era Falkenhayn. Flakenhayn was smart enough to know that Paris was out of the question, which is why he wanted close targets like Arras or Doullens, or even political targets like Amiens. Close and easy for weak forces to get to.

So a series of fairly limited offensives to capture logistical centres, presumably seeking to dislodge the allies from defencive positions and possibly also separate British and French forces?


Not really if they cannot afford to produce goods. Besides OTL the British were denied replacements after 3rd Ypres to prevent Haig from launching another wasteful offensive. Here Llyod George is probably even more anti-Haig and anti-war as the Entente cannot afford their large production after April 1917, nor the tanks to launch things like Cambrai.

I disagree on the production as most of that was in-house. Also while there would probably be some reduction as resources were switched elsewhere the shorter bombardments would also have helped. Furthermore, if they were deciding to win without US support was necessary then units like the armour which had the chance to be war changing, would have taken a higher priority.

If the government decided to attack then LG would by definition have changed his mind and the reserves would have been released. Similarly, if the decision was to stay on the defensive there would have been no need to keep them back.


ITTL they won't be getting access to the $7 billion in US unsecured 'liberty loans' that they got OTL. Also the US forced rationing on its population to feed France and Britain, which they won't ITTL either, especially as they cannot pay for it. Argentina had stopped exporting to the Entente in 1917 anyway, leaving the US as the major supplier for food in the world that the Entente could import from. Internal loans won't allow France to produce goods in their own country as 90% of their coal and iron deposits were behind German lines. The French could get coal from Britain, but would need steel from outside their alliance area. Without foreign money and currency they cannot buy steel or iron. That means no war goods.

Why couldn't they get steel, either ore, or finished metal, from Britain? It's definitely in Britain's interest to maintain it's main ally, even if having to cut back on some things itself.

If America stops selling food to the allies then it will have a surplus that will depress the world markets. Should be able to find some markets if the dominions and empires can't supply all that is needed.

Also what could the French export? They were only known for luxury items, but had little resources to produce them from internally, relying on foreign imports to produce those goods (silk, perfumes, cars), but these were private firms that made these and any profits would be private. The nation could not simply produce these in state factories, as these only produced war goods. Good luck telling private industry to turn over 100% of their profits to the government to fight a war.

You seem to think that only private firms could produce such items? Or that if necessary, in a national crisis, government control wouldn't be possible. [As occurred in most countries in WWI and even to a large degree in the US in WWII]. It's going to be controversial but how many businessmen are going to say their profits are sacret when soldiers are dying on the front. Also if the government allocated resources to boost output in those industries [at some cost to production of arms] the owners have the chance of getting valuable resources on the cheap post-war.

There is a similar case in WWII. Given the degree of British commitment to the war and US restrictions on Britain's exports it wasn't able to export many manufactured goods. Hence some luxury products like whiskey provided very important in enabling some imports.

Or they can negotiate before they go broke. The French soldier now has no reason to stay in the war, as they have no faith in offensive victory. That only came from knowledge of the unlimited US manpower. Here Russia is going to drop out early, as they only stayed in as long as they did because of loans, which here won't exist. After that the French soldier will have no faith they could break the German lines and will demand that the war end, as ultimate victory was impossible.

For most of the war France was fighting to avoid defeat, although the hope of victory was there. Given the moral factor I think a lot of French soldiers will still have hopes of Germany collapsing and a determination that they [France] won't quit before the Germans do. If the Germans are still seeking harsh terms, which would include further annexations or a punitive reparation, many could still decide to fight on to avoid such a defeat.

If the Germans go for a moderate peace, including a withdrawal from France and no reparations then there would be serious chance of French moral crumbling if the politicians refused to accept such terms.

What would they shift it too and who would buy it? The US had monopolized the markets of the European powers after they stopped producing exports. Also there is that sticky issue of private vs. public companies and profits. Private companies that produced consumer goods, who here have lost their markets thanks to the US filling the gap, won't turn over their profits to the government to fight the war. Public factories can only produce war materials that other nations had no use for. France already had too few men for the army as it was, shifting men to any other industry, including agriculture, would mean thinning out the lines too much especially as the nation cannot afford to compensate by producing more artillery, tanks, or machines guns and munitions.

a) As I say above I don't see why the French government can't produce trade goods just as they did munitions - although that would take time, or put assets into [and establish controls if necessary] items for export.

b) I also think, with the size of the armaments industry and the experience gained they might well be useful in some trade markets. If necessary at low prices to out-compete rivals which will reduce the returns but it would make some funds possible.

c) As I point out I think there is relatively little other than possibly some food that could be supplied from within the allied camp. Importing from external sources had been an option that had been useful before because it enabled more concentration on military production. However I think this could be converted to a far more awkonaic system.

d) Those steps would require some assets being diverted from military production but by late 1917 there is a lot of slack in the system and under the suggested scenario there will be no huge production for the Americans.

I do like arguing my points with you Steve, but you do need to provide more than vague options. Concrete solutions such as nations to trade with or how fast industry could convert to consumer goods are important to countering my points.

One point to make clear. I'm not saying France and Britain would definitely fight on to victory or to a negotiated peace. I'm saying I'm doubtful of you're certainty that France will collapse if it doesn't make peace quickly.

Steve
 
If America stops selling food to the allies then it will have a surplus that will depress the world markets.


Actually no. America's 1916 harvest was 40% down on 1915, and 1917's was to be lower still.

Her food exports to the Allies in 1917/18 were made possible by "Hooverisation", the curtailment of domestic consumption through meatless, wheatless etc days, and a wartime ban on using foodstuffs to manufacture alcoholic beverages. Had American domestic consumption remained at peacetime levels, her exports would have been drastically curtailed even supposing that the Allies could still pay.
 
A collapse of France is not necessary in this scenario.

Only the possibility of it happening, which after the Russian Revolution(s), the soldier's strike and the -ITTL- very shaky Italian situation, cannot be denied. It's a game of risk assessment.

It is the same with the general military situation at this point of time. Though this one is a bit different, almost mathematical. An assortment of variables with, after Russia quitting, changed balances.
 

Deleted member 1487

That sounds like you're saying the Germans advanced during trench warfare while it the magically changed to manoeuvre warfare a couple of months later when the allies attacked?:confused: The German position was weaker as they had moved out of their heavily fortified defencive lines and exhausted a lot of their strength. However the latter was a result of their own offensive while I doubt, once the Germans had accepted their offensive had failed, that they didn't dig in as much as they can. Also, since the Hindenburg line was broken anyway, fairly comprensively OTL, despite the also heavy allied losses in the German offensive it's likely that it might have been anyway if attack directly. [Losses would probably have been heavier because the Germans wouldn't have weakened themselves by their own losses and also sapped their moral by realising the offensive had been basically for nothing. However the technical edge the allies were gathering, not just in armoured weapons, meant that a breakthrough was very likely.
First of all, let's distinguish whether were are talking about OTL or TTL. Here we are talking about OTL 1918, which will be significantly different from TTL.
Since the Germans had advanced beyond their trenches in many places and the allied counter offensives were focused not on established German trench lines, but on bulges without proper fortifications, I am flatly stating that the fighting was definitely maneuver warfare, not trench warfare. The Germans could not dig in in their newly won territory, other than some scratch lines, because the resources OTL were not available to hold the bulges. The Germans shifted their materials to support another offensive, then another, then another, flailing at the Entente to get them to surrender. This was under Ludendorff OTL. Zabecki cites numerous examples of army-level generals stating that OHL had no plan or idea what they were trying to accomplish. Instead of bringing up concrete, digging materials, and barbed wire they were more focused on trying to build up supply lines into the bulges and support other offensive. So no, the captured ground was not fortified into trench lines, which Zabecki talks about in his book.

Again OTL the Allies then could attack the Hindenburg line and breakthrough with little problem because the German army was already broken and surrendering because now they Americans were in the field and few wanted to die for a lost cause. I highly doubt that the German army of 1918 without the offensives would have been easily broken on the Hindenburg line even with the US, tanks, and artillery. OTL again the Allies suffered 1+ million casualties between August-November. The Germans less still (around 800,000) and that was with over 200,000 German surrendering.



This seems contradictory. You're saying that because they can't [in you're view] see victory as possible they will give up. Also however at the same time, that they will seek to attack if the Germans don't?:confused: I would also disagree that the British especially could do what they did OTL, especially without the heavy losses of men and equipment during the spring offensives. Possibly if the Germans had put everything into a massive defencive position and sought to persuade their own men that no further offensives were planned, but that the central powers were now going to seek a balanced peace in the west.
I am not saying they would give up, but they would not return to the offensive, as they would see no reason to die when the government should be negotiating. I do think they would probably fight on the defensive, but many would either surrender or run away, which did happen quite a bit OTL in 1918 when the Germans attacked. More here even without the US in the war and there is nothing to hold out for.
You seem to be confused about this part:
Without the US it is very unlikely that morally the Entente would have waiting out the Germans in 1918 and then have been able to counter attack enough to break the Germans lines.
To clarify, I meant that I don't think the French could have morally withstood a German offensive like the OTL 1918 one without the understanding that the US was coming. In the aftermath I again am stating that due to morale concerns the French won't then be able to go on the counteroffensive to make up what was then just lost to the Germans.



So a series of fairly limited offensives to capture logistical centres, presumably seeking to dislodge the allies from defencive positions and possibly also separate British and French forces?
Yes. If the logistic hubs are lost the British cannot support their forces far from the ports on the Channel coast because of a very shallow series of rail lines that are focused on a few cities. Cutting the choke points will force the British to fall back closer to the ports and force them to abandon their established trench lines, meaning maneuver warfare is back north of the Somme river. This is the point that David Zabecki makes in his book on the German offensives, which seems to bear up based on reading I have done on British logistics during WW1.



I disagree on the production as most of that was in-house. Also while there would probably be some reduction as resources were switched elsewhere the shorter bombardments would also have helped. Furthermore, if they were deciding to win without US support was necessary then units like the armour which had the chance to be war changing, would have taken a higher priority.
Money from tanks has to come from somewhere. Artillery is still the most important army and the rolling barrage, what enabled the advance of infantry and tanks in 1917 and after, is still very shell intensive. Even after the shift to hurricane and surprise bombardments, shell usage went up, not down, which means any sort of reduction will hurt at the front. Shifting resources is not the answer, as it will mean something gets hurt, whether it is artillery, machine guns, tanks, air planes, etc. Combined arms is the name of the game and the tank is useless without artillery and infantry support, just as artillery is much less useful without airplanes (which will be in much shorter supply without the US making their 'liberty engines' the first quality mass produced engine for airplanes of sufficient power, whose absence here will be very painful).


If the government decided to attack then LG would by definition have changed his mind and the reserves would have been released. Similarly, if the decision was to stay on the defensive there would have been no need to keep them back.
Yes, but LG didn't want to attack because of being lied to by Haig about his intentions and will to stop is a certain numbers of losses were sustained. He held back too to make sure enough replacements were available to withstand the German attacks, not be frittered away in useless offensives. The only reason to keep these men back is to FORCE Haig to stand on the defensive. LG couldn't trust Haig not to do what he wanted, and he did not have the necessary political power to sack Haig at this time, otherwise he would have. So these men will be held back here too, though they will become available if LG decides finally to attack, which I'm not sure he could politically sustain, as Passchendaele had put his government in jeopardy.



Why couldn't they get steel, either ore, or finished metal, from Britain? It's definitely in Britain's interest to maintain it's main ally, even if having to cut back on some things itself.
Britain could only provide these by denying herself the supply. Sure Britain will help out France, but could only do so by limiting her own production. Here with France having such a high need, both will probably have to drop their production by half to sustain the war effort. That is half of the 1917 level, NOT the 1918 OTL level.

If America stops selling food to the allies then it will have a surplus that will depress the world markets. Should be able to find some markets if the dominions and empires can't supply all that is needed.
Mike answered this effectively


You seem to think that only private firms could produce such items? Or that if necessary, in a national crisis, government control wouldn't be possible. [As occurred in most countries in WWI and even to a large degree in the US in WWII]. It's going to be controversial but how many businessmen are going to say their profits are sacret when soldiers are dying on the front. Also if the government allocated resources to boost output in those industries [at some cost to production of arms] the owners have the chance of getting valuable resources on the cheap post-war.
Luxury items? Yes only private firms were. Trucks? The US had already monopolized those markets. No one in the world needs the items France has for sale from her government factories.
In WW1 no private business in any nation in any situation turned over their private profits, or limited them for the 'public good'. Find me an example and I'll play ball, but I've never seen even one. Just a lot of complaining about taxes and government inefficiency, which industry played off as attacks on their liberties.

There is a similar case in WWII. Given the degree of British commitment to the war and US restrictions on Britain's exports it wasn't able to export many manufactured goods. Hence some luxury products like whiskey provided very important in enabling some imports.
WWII was not a similar case, because the relationship from WW1 established US commitment to Britain. Here that does not yet exist. Whiskey and other luxury industries were already denied resources for the war effort in WW1. I'm not sure you could find an example of a public industry producing these at the cost of the war effort to raise money even OTL, nor were private industries even allowed to make them because they weren't allocated resources by the government, who was in charge of controlling foreign exchange at this point.


For most of the war France was fighting to avoid defeat, although the hope of victory was there. Given the moral factor I think a lot of French soldiers will still have hopes of Germany collapsing and a determination that they [France] won't quit before the Germans do. If the Germans are still seeking harsh terms, which would include further annexations or a punitive reparation, many could still decide to fight on to avoid such a defeat.
Hope that Germany collapses? The French soldier didn't have that OTL when there was a much better chance of that happening. Again OTL challenges you opinion on this.http://www.amazon.com/France-Great-Approaches-European-History/dp/0521666317
The French OTL though considered a 'white peace' as the Germans giving back Alsace and paying reparations. Here they will likely be more tempered in their views thanks to the earlier fall of Russia and no US or loans. There is no long term hope for victory or even freeing the parts of France captured by the Germans. So better to cut a deal before the terms get worse. The fear too of the German offensive will be a major pressure on the French because the soldiers themselves don't even think they can go on the counter offensive to take back whatever the Germans grab. Then the peace deal is going to be even worse than before. Just better to bite the bullet and get back most of what the Germans hold even if it isn't everything.

OTL the French had the 'luxury' of knowing that they didn't have to negotiate because the US was coming to hand them the whole pie.

If the Germans go for a moderate peace, including a withdrawal from France and no reparations then there would be serious chance of French moral crumbling if the politicians refused to accept such terms.
True, but the French are probably going to have to tolerate and probably would tolerate a harsher peace because the deck was stacked against them


a) As I say above I don't see why the French government can't produce trade goods just as they did munitions - although that would take time, or put assets into [and establish controls if necessary] items for export.
They don't have time because they are running out of money fast and need every declining resource for the war...plus the Germans are getting ready to attack. Otherwise it would take months if not a year to do this, which might as well be 100 years in the future for all the time it would take. Plus there is the cost of retooling and retraining, which will all be taken away from the war effort, and then there is no guarantee they could compete with the US who had all the markets locked up because the Entente had shifted to war production instead of consumer goods.

b) I also think, with the size of the armaments industry and the experience gained they might well be useful in some trade markets. If necessary at low prices to out-compete rivals which will reduce the returns but it would make some funds possible.
Sure, but they don't have years to cultivate contacts and compete...they need money now while the Germans are getting ready to hand them their ass on a platter.

c) As I point out I think there is relatively little other than possibly some food that could be supplied from within the allied camp. Importing from external sources had been an option that had been useful before because it enabled more concentration on military production. However I think this could be converted to a far more awkonaic system.
What could be supplied without compromising British production? Britain still had to import raw materials too and needs foreign exchange for that.

d) Those steps would require some assets being diverted from military production but by late 1917 there is a lot of slack in the system and under the suggested scenario there will be no huge production for the Americans.
Sources? What slack was there? Without the $7 billion in American loans there is no way to expand production, or even convert it to consumer goods. Also there is no way to import the goods to do so without harming British production.

One point to make clear. I'm not saying France and Britain would definitely fight on to victory or to a negotiated peace. I'm saying I'm doubtful of you're certainty that France will collapse if it doesn't make peace quickly.

Steve
I'm not saying France would collapse, but be so impaired that not negotiating or accepting even a remotely fair peace deal would be suicide because once the Germans launch their attacks, there is no way to be certain that the French army wouldn't collapse like the Russians did in 1917. Either through surrender, desertion, or just plain retreating, once the army's morale goes there is no way to rehabilitate it.
 
To me, your original TL seems reasonable. Some might reasonably question if it's the most likely outcome, but it's certainly not ASB, as I see it.

It certainly seems far more reasonable to me, anyway, than a Spring-style win.
 
tanks were no more a decisive weapon than stormtroopers were. They had no strategic ability to win the war, however American manpower did, which won't be present here.

About tanks; I have heard a LOT of people claim a peace in 1917. would inadvertently cause war technology to lag behind OTL for about 5 years or so. Im wondering if the lack of American economic support would throw a wrench in the Entente`s tech development, and if the lack of 1918. fighting would slow the development of tanks and millitary aircraft in general.
 
About tanks; I have heard a LOT of people claim a peace in 1917. would inadvertently cause war technology to lag behind OTL for about 5 years or so. Im wondering if the lack of American economic support would throw a wrench in the Entente`s tech development, and if the lack of 1918. fighting would slow the development of tanks and millitary aircraft in general.

I think that the development of aircraft has already received such a boost by 1917 that further technological advances would still happen quickly. If a peace in 1917 happens without any nation being restricted concerning aircrafts, then the development in the following years might even be accelerated.
The main reason is that aerial technology has a high civilian benefit as well; and the earlier the war ends, the more wealth will be left in Europe to invest and to consume in the new adventure of air traevl.

I agree when it comes to the tank. A peace in 1917 would leave tank technology as an expensive project designed for a freak-situation which gave mixed results. Visioniaries of tank warfare would face harder times than OTL.

Of course, there could also be even more Douhet....

However, even if there were very little tank development in the following years, the general motorization of societies (esp. in America) would still lead all armies to use more and more motor vehicles for their logistics, transport...probably also self-propelled artillery and an emphasis on pioneers and engineers.

The idea just forming in my head is a doctrine which promises victory to those able to concentrate their troops and mobile artillery fastest to achieve key breakthrough and who are able to repair infrastructure fast enough in order to keep the engines running. Air Forces will, as in OTL, play still a key role in all plans for future wars.
 
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