Nazis invade Sweden

I agree, invoking Alien Space Bats should only be done when the POD is actually impossible and requires the intervention of some higher power to change the laws of physics, magically create things, teleport armies instantly, and other magical effects. Hitler deciding to invade Sweden is not ASB. He certainly had the capability to do it. There are many reasons why he did not, but ignoring them shouldn't be considered ASB. Unlikely, perhaps, but not ASB.

Now this I do agree with. We abuse our jargon ("ASB", "wank") quite attrociously.
 

Cook

Banned
Swedish neutrality is considered on this board to be as sancrosanct as Swiss Neutrality.

If the British plan of 1939 to invade Narvik and march overland and occupy the Swedish Iron Ore mines in the north of the country had gone ahead things would undoubtedly be different.

Fortunately the Finns, aiding who in the Winter War was the excuse for this debacle, made peace with Russia and the plan was shelved.
 
If the British plan of 1939 to invade Narvik and march overland and occupy the Swedish Iron Ore mines in the north of the country had gone ahead things would undoubtedly be different.

Fortunately the Finns, aiding who in the Winter War was the excuse for this debacle, made peace with Russia and the plan was shelved.

Now, if Britain had actually succeeding in invading any Swedish territory, no matter how peripheral, the prospects would be much better for Sweden to join the Axis voluntarily which is a hell of a much better scenario from Hitler's point of view.

Sweden OTL was on the knife edge as it was. I believe there were a great many Swedes who would strongly oppose being openly allied with Hitler (many of them were much more willing to be a friendly neutral as OTL). However there were pro-Nazi Swedes surely, and there were surely more who just did the math, looked at the maps, and figured the German side would be the smart one to be on. Things I have read suggest to me the King of Sweden rather preferred the German side himself, particularly once the Soviets were on the other side. If that is a slander of that monarch I apologize, but at any rate I gather he was rather more open to German friendship than the Kings of Denmark and Norway--the latter of course becoming an active leader of armed resistance, the former taking rather heroic risks to protect his people (of all persuasions and ancestries). Anyway, once the Russians attacked Finland the Swedes were generally quite hostile to the Soviets and friendly to whoever (besides themselves) helped the Finns. Once Hitler was no longer allied with the Soviets, the nation was in a rather delicate balance, and it was neutrality, not a pro-Allied stance, that was favored.

Of course had Sweden somehow tipped in a pro-Allied direction, they'd have been in big trouble at least until very late in the war. (And then, what help and hope they'd have, other than the general state of decimation and distraction of the German war machine, would have had to come from the East, from which direction it would be least welcome).

So, if the British plan to secure the Swedish iron fields had gone forward, I can see the right-wing forces in Sweden prevailing politically enough to actively throw in with Hitler, especially that early in the war. Many who might have much preferred not to be Hitler's ally would probably go along quietly both for patriotic reasons and out of a sense of self-preservation. Not to mention that after Barbarossa, they'd be quite free to help the Finns and Hitler, if he was half-smart by that point, would probably assign what token support Sweden could give to his total war effort to that sector--"Go save Finland and take as much from the Bolsheviks to the east as you can with their help!"

Of course the first Swedish priority would be to try and drive the British out of their own country and help the Germans take away their base at Narvik too. Without the Swedish iron, Hitler would have been hurting, so it would be a German priority too.

Voluntary Swedish help would be much more valuable to Hitler than trying to occupy the place against their will, and as things were OTL he got a certain amount of that for no cost at all. A Nazi-allied Sweden might need to police itself rather heavily--I daresay there would be some resistance--and that might even come to be a bit of a drain on even German resources, especially as the war was not going in his favor and many Swedes might be refiguring their options. (Including people in the military and police!) But even then not nearly as much as the cost of a hostile occupation would be from day one, even if the Germans could magically march in against no resistance at all from Sweden's own forces.

I heartily endorse the posts about the abuse of the term "ASB" by the way. At least once so far (and I've only been here since last summer) I've seen it used in the first post on someone's thread coupled with an appeal to moderators to move the thread forthwith. That thread's OP contained nothing that was in any way fantastical, silly, or to my mind even the least bit improbable. Obviously this first poster and I disagreed strongly, but it was an essentially political disagreement, having nothing to do with anything going even against "human nature," let alone the natural kind of nature.

If we allow standards like that to prevail, all threads would belong in ASB. If we do it inconsistently, it is arbitrary at best and systematic political bullying at worst.

I think this particular OP here is quite improbable, but only because one assumes Hitler had a lick of common sense. And only because he was in fact able to get a lot of what he wanted from Sweden without threatening them at all (save insofar as his actions elsewhere were inherently an implicit threat.) If the Swedes, given their position, had been foolhardy enough to defy him once he'd occupied Norway, I am sure he'd have invaded quite quickly, pre-existing plans or none.

Perhaps, had the Swedes had more foresight and had not some of them been bewildered enough to think Hitler's rise might be a good thing, they could have changed the picture for Norway and prevented that nation from being invaded successfully. If those two prideful neighbor nations had been cooperative enough in advance, that is.

If that help were not enough to save Norway, or at any rate not all of it and the Germans retained a foothold there, then the Swedes would be facing a very nasty fight indeed, and there would not have been a whole lot the British could have done to help them.

I am afraid there was really nothing the Swedes could do for Denmark, save try to prevent it from becoming a war zone by avoiding fighting the Germans completely. Which is of course what happened OTL.
 

Cook

Banned
Now, if Britain had actually succeeding in invading any Swedish territory, no matter how peripheral, the prospects would be much better for Sweden to join the Axis voluntarily which is a hell of a much better scenario from Hitler's point of view.

Yes, Sweden becoming a co-belligerent rather than allied with Germany would be the most likely, and I like the rest of your reasoning.
 
The major cons of the Germans including Sweden in Operation Weserübung was pre-war planning reaching back to WWI of naval strategic perception elaborated on during the inter-war years in which Denmark and Norway was to be occupied to improve German naval strategic position.

The second was the attitude of OKH-OKW which was counter to anything drawing off forces from the ever postponed attack on France; the perception was that everything was needed to defeat the French so nothing could be spared for an unnecessary sideshow. Von Falkenhorst worked on a shoe-string with only forces allocated that matched those expected to be met when invading.
Adding Sweden would mean allocating more forces which OKH-OKW strongly opposed.

Of strategic considerations was the supply of Swedish iron ore needed for the German war industry - at least until French supply became an option - thus jeopardising this would be folly to say the least.

Scania was devoid of troops on April 9, 1940 except the Danish infantry company marching off from Roskilde to Helsingør then boarding the ferry to Hälsingborg and being dispatch to guard Ljungbyhed airfield from possible German attack! ;)

Swedish troops were still in the north so don't expect a walkover allied expedition to Kiruna; considering allied achievements in Norway 1940 don't expect them getting near Kiruna! :eek:
 
Swedish troops were still in the north so don't expect a walkover allied expedition to Kiruna; considering allied achievements in Norway 1940 don't expect them getting near Kiruna! :eek:

There would be so many problems with going the Norway-Kiruna route. In the 1940s the area had no infrastructure to speak of (and even today it is quite lacking). Once you get over the mountains the terrain is hilly and swampy and sub-arctic, and devoid of settlements until you reach Kiruna which is quite a bit inland. Trying to march any real military force from there to take Kiruna, which as you pointed out would be defended by entrenched forces, would be impossible to achieve for the allies. Germany might do better coming from the south, though, if they decide to invade Sweden, but then the Swedish forces would flood the mines and blow up the train tracks well in advance of the German forces, and Germany would gain little of value. The Swedes might do the same if against all expectations it starts looking like the allies might take Kiruna as well.
 
Down Memory Lane...

This takes me back to my BA Honours dissertation on Swedish neutrality from 1984 - forgotten most of it since of course.

The obvious option for the Germans would have been, as in Norway, a series of coup de main style attacks to capture the main towns, bridges etc and some of that was possible.

The Swedes had plans to resist any invasion and the nature of the country would have made an active resistance possible. The sheer number of garrison troops in Norway for the size of the population means that a similar exercise in Sweden would not have been supported.

The Swedes had no option but to be pragmatic during 1940-43 and this drew a lot of crisicism from the USSR post June 1941. The Swedes were concerned about a possible Russian takeover of Finland (they didn't want the Red Army on their northern border).

The Soviet incursion into northern Norway in the autumn of 1944 was another big worry for Stockholm as were growing demands from Norway for intervention in the spring of 1945.

I do think Swedish neutrality ensured a quieter post-war environment for Scandinavia with an essentially neutral Finland and no nuclear weapons in Norway or Denmark. The Swedes openly pressed for a wholly neutral Scandinavia but that wasn't a runner.
 

Rubicon

Banned
Now, if Britain had actually succeeding in invading any Swedish territory, no matter how peripheral, the prospects would be much better for Sweden to join the Axis voluntarily which is a hell of a much better scenario from Hitler's point of view.

Better, well yes if the chances increase from 0.0% to 0.1% chance of occurring you can call it better but still not good.
The chances of Sweden joining the Axis, even if invaded by the Western Allies is infinitely small. While I do not doubt Sweden would accept aid from Germany and maybe, maybe accept a token German ‘volunteer’ force. The same way that Finland fought in the war. For your information Finland never joined the Axis, Finland was co-belligerent with Germany against the Soviet Union.


Sweden OTL was on the knife edge as it was. I believe there were a great many Swedes who would strongly oppose being openly allied with Hitler (many of them were much more willing to be a friendly neutral as OTL). However there were pro-Nazi Swedes surely, and there were surely more who just did the math, looked at the maps, and figured the German side would be the smart one to be on.

The Swedish National Socialist Worker Party got about 0,3% of the popular votes in Swedish elections, even at the height of Hitler’s prestige. Sweden was a staunchly Social Democratic country. The numbers of those that wanted an alliance with Nazi-Germany was negligible.

Things I have read suggest to me the King of Sweden rather preferred the German side himself, particularly once the Soviets were on the other side.

Pro-German? Yes
Pro-nazi? Absolutely No!
The king had been interested with an alliance with Germany during WW1, not WW2. Of course the politicians merely listened to the opinions of the king out of courtesy and then did whatever they felt like anyway.

Of course the first Swedish priority would be to try and drive the British out of their own country

This would be the Swedish governments only priority, after which they would attempt to negotiate peace with the Western Allies.
 

Redbeard

Banned
There would be so many problems with going the Norway-Kiruna route. In the 1940s the area had no infrastructure to speak of (and even today it is quite lacking). Once you get over the mountains the terrain is hilly and swampy and sub-arctic, and devoid of settlements until you reach Kiruna which is quite a bit inland. Trying to march any real military force from there to take Kiruna, which as you pointed out would be defended by entrenched forces, would be impossible to achieve for the allies. Germany might do better coming from the south, though, if they decide to invade Sweden, but then the Swedish forces would flood the mines and blow up the train tracks well in advance of the German forces, and Germany would gain little of value. The Swedes might do the same if against all expectations it starts looking like the allies might take Kiruna as well.

Wouldn't it actually be much easier to reach Kiruna from Narvik along the railway line than from any other direction?

IMHO this opens for some interesting options: Let's say the Finns for some reason holding out a few months extra and the allies actually executing an operation from Narvik to Finland over Kiruna. With or without Swedish cooperation that would greatly increase the risk/chance of Germany entering Swedish teritory - with or without Swedish concent.

The wise decision would be to ignore and focus on France being taken out, but for some reason I'm not at all sure Hitler has enough strategic focus power. Very soon we might have a big enough part of the Wehrmacht being bogged down in Scandinavia to have the attack of France being postponed.

As others have already remarked, the French rearmament was accelerating in 1940 and IMHO postponing Fall Gelb (the attack on France) for just a month might be enough for the Germans to bog down (or loose their nerve) before the French collapse.

If that happens Hitler and WWII probably ends soon thereafter, but WWIII might be quite close...
 
Wouldn't it actually be much easier to reach Kiruna from Narvik along the railway line than from any other direction?

There was equally valid railway lines going south at the time, plus actual roads and such.

The problem with the Narvik railway is that there was just one of them around. The Swedes could easily sabotage or destroy it in advance (as I'm sure they had plans to), and there would be no alternative for the allies but trying to repair it, which would be damn near impossible once winter comes along.
 
Let's say the Finns for some reason holding out a few months extra and the allies actually executing an operation from Narvik to Finland over Kiruna. .

That the Finns survived as long as they did IOTL was highly unlikely in the first place. Without an early POD two months more is really pushing it. Even three weeks would have been unlikely.

There were several major reasons the Winter War ended without Allied intervention. First, the Finnish government knew the army was on its last legs and needed to make peace as soon as possible. Second, by February 20th or so they knew any forthcoming Allied help would be a) too little and b) too late. Third, they had all the reasons to believe Sweden would make war against the Allies in case of their intervention. And fourth, despite many TLs on this board arguing to the contrary, Stalin really did not want to go to war against the Allies. The Soviet peace bid in late February reflected that sentiment: Stalin was ready to make a very sub-optimal peace mainly to avoid the escalation of the war.

The immediate reason the Allied intervention did not happen was that Finland did not make an official demand for help to the British and the French. Without it, the Allies would have no pretext for the intervention. Now, based on the memoirs of the Finnish Foreign Minister, Tanner, the fact that the Swedish were adamant not to allow the transit of Allied troops was the most immediate reason not to make that demand for help. Not when there was a peace offer from the USSR on the table, and the Allied intervention might have plunged the whole Nordic region to war. On the other hand, on February 22nd Hermann Göring informed the Finnish Ambassador that Finland should make peace "on any terms that save the army to fight another day" and that there might be a chance to recoup any lost territories later.

What ever the final reason to make the peace was, it seems that by late February everyone except the Allies wanted the Finns to call it quits.
 
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