Wiking wrote:
Me262. Intercepts nearly exclusively happened on landing or take off
Wimble Toot wrote:
In your fantasy world, perhaps. Reality was rather different. An aircraft that can be shot down returning to its home airfield is largely useless, anyway.
Going to point out that this pretty much proves you don't understand war, or logistics, or tactics, or even simple strategy because any aircraft destroyed at any point in its mission is a PLUS as it removes that aircraft (and quite possibly the crew) from further combat operations until and unless it is replaced. Shot down on take-off, landing, or during the mission does not significantly matter anymore than if it was destroyed on the ground or before it reaches operation.
ANY aircraft during landing and/or take-off is vulnerable as it has to reduce speed, lower flaps and gear and the pilot has to concentrate on what he is doing and not his surroundings. By your 'assertion' ALL aircraft are "largely useless" under that definition.
Same goes for the Me163, Ar234, both of which were stunningly easy to shoot down, in a Mustang or Tempest or Spit XIV that was 100 mph slower.
Under the right circumstances and with a lot of luck you can/could shoot down a jet with a standard jeep mounted machine gun the same applied to air-to-air kills of which the MAJORITY were intercepts where the jet aircraft was moving at below average speeds in situations where it could not easily accelerate away from the attacker. NO after action report of the period asserts that any were "stunningly easy" to shoot down.
Your own examples prove this out:
So Col John C Meyer, of the 352nd FG imagined shooting down a Ar234, and his gun camera footage was faked,
Caught the Ar234 low and slow pulling up from a failed bomb run, turned inside him and shot out the right engine on the first pass, (without which he could no longer accelerate away from the Mustang) and killed it during the second pass. Pilot himself admitted he got lucky.
http://crazyhorseap.be/Mustangs/Aces/Donald Bryan/DonaldBryan3.htm
Lt Urban L Drew of the 361st FG imagined shooting down two Me262s in one sortie, and his gun camera footage was faked,
He'd been tasked to lead an attack on their airfield as he'd had prior experience with "combat" (no kills) with them previously, (no gun camera footage as his had malfunctioned and his wingman WAS shot down and captured) in fact Drew caught his two Me262s as they took off and lacked airspeed to maneuver and managed to put both down in the first pass.
[/quote]Capt Louis H Norley of the 4th FG, and Lt Col John B Murphy and Capt Raymond Wetmore of the 359th FG all imagined shooting down an Me 163 each, all in P-51D/Ks?[/quote]
Norley himself reported that the Me163 was 'dropping down' apparently after tried attack passes on the bomber stream Norley was assigned to. The vehicle only used its engine once during the encounter which lends credence to the assertion it was heading back with limited propellant and no way to outrun the Mustang for any length of time. (In fact a second Me163 of that group was probably downed by bomber defensive fire as it made several passes on the bomber stream before he spun into the ground)
So you're equating an rocket powered glider which had severely limited fuel to a fast jet aircraft that routinely left allied fighters behind due to its speed? Your claims that German jets were "easy" to shoot down is not supported by either your "evidence" nor testimony or facts from that period. The proof of course is how the allies all stayed with the 'superior' and far more capable piston engine aircraft instead of switching to jets... Oh wait...
It doesn't matter. They were destroyed. That's all that matters.
No, no, lets at least be consistent in that ONLY "aircraft that can be shot down while landing" are useless and any OTHER time they must matter quite a bit...
You're attempting to argue that because an aircraft was shot down it does not matter what its combat capabilities were, and then reverse when it is pointed out that circumstances DO in fact matter and claim this "also" proves your point.
Let's be honest this is about the only part you got partially right:
It doesn't matter. They were destroyed. That's all that matters.
It cost the Nazis more to replace an Me262 and its pilot than it did the USAAF to replace a Mustang and its pilot.
True to a point but:
-The allies had more planes and pilots than the Germans by the point of the Me262's introduction
-Jet pilots required more training and of course a twin engine aircraft of any type is usually more expensive than a single engine type and a jet powered aircraft even more so
-Records, pilot logs, group and wing records all state that the allied piston engine fighters were capable of shooting down the German jets but ONLY under conditions where the jets could not use their superior speed and where the allied fighters could use full advantage of their turning radius. Those same records state unequivocally that the MAJORITY of shoot-downs were when those jets were landing and/or taking off or when they were used in manners that did not take advantage of their speed and propulsion. (Bombing runs or ground attack)
If anyone has stats for how many Mustangs were shot down by Me262s, I would like to know
Total allied aircraft shot down by the Me262 from the records is 542, of that, about 200 listed as fighters including P51s, and Spitfires, about the same number of 'attack/fighter-bombers' like the Typhoon and P47 and the rest bombers.
Note that rapidly after introduction the Germans learned the "Pacific Lesson" that in order to defeat a more maneuverable and numerous foe you adapt "boom-and-zoom" tactics which they put to good use. So much so that, as documents and biographies of the time note, that specific tactics were developed to COUNTER jet aircraft. Most especially the method of attacking them when they were most vulnerable, (during take-off and landing or when they were coming off a run on a bomber stream where they would have to slow down to be effective due to the limited range of their cannon) which in itself became outdated when the Germans lined the area of the air fields with AAA weapons and made this too dangerous.
The majority of 'tactics' (and again this is documented at the time) was to attempt to gain a 'credible angle' and fire as the jets passed in the hopes of 'spoiling' the jets attack run and (hopefully) forcing it into a turning fight where the allied aircraft had a chance to actually hit them.
Consider for a moment that this major shift in doctrine and tactics took place over a year, (introduction April 1944, VE in April 1945) with only about 1,400 Me262s produced and only about 200 operational at any point in time that says something. And keep in mind that despite fuel and critical materials shortages (and quality and other issues with using extensive slave labor) the ALLIES confirmed German estimates that they were on track to produce over 500 airframes PER MONTH in 1945 which would more than replace the losses suffered. (Pilots would have been a bottleneck but there were enough experienced pilots transferable from advanced piston types to "cover" for several months)
Also before you assume the "superiority" of allied "wunderwaffes" consider that post war both the British Meteor and American P80 were found to be inferior in most respect to the Me262 with only a few advantages. The key "disadvantages" found for the Me262 were its short range and unreliable engines in almost every other aspect it was superior to similar generation jet aircraft.
Zachariah wrote:
How about the potential wonder weapons developed at Mario Zippermayr's research lab? In particular, the Hexenkessel (Witch's Cauldron) project, which developed the world's first thermobaric explosive warheads? It's not exactly cans of instant sunshine, but it'd be a hell of a lot cheaper, easier and quicker to mass produce, and they could have provided a huge force multiplier, especially if focused upon the development of highly effective detonation charges which could be used as the warheads of conventional bombs, instead of (or as well as) for surface-to-air missiles like the Taifun and Wasserfall. If they were developed in the very early stages of the war, and were ready for the Nazi bombers to use against the British during The Blitz, effectively quadrupling the Luftwaffe bombers' effective bomb tonnage, would it be out of the question for them to potentially inflict enough damage to win a strategic victory, and to force the UK into surrender? And mightn't fitting them with thermobaric explosive warheads make the Wunderwaffe delivery systems, such as the V-1s and V-2s, far more destructive and terrifying weapons of war?
While he had some experimental success actual practical use was problematic as the required materials and tech were not as "simple" as people seem to think. His two recorded, (and as far as I can find he had the only records and his "father/inventor of the aerosol bomb" title is for published not practical work) 'success' required adding liquid air, (first) and liquid oxygen (second) to get credible detonations.
Further they require relatively low-speed dispersal and mixing to work at all and that's pretty much the opposite of the initial intention, (anti-air explosion) conditions. Which is why they've only been used in surface-to-surface and air-to-surface applications in practice. Yes they'd have made air-dropped bombs more effective in general (added incendiary effect) in theory anyway but in practice even by the end of the war his practical effects were not on par with more conventional bombs. (Claimed 'destruction' radius' don't match physical evidence not could they be replicated using the listed materials*)
So "quicker/easier/cheaper" isn't as clear as would be thought. It also took until the mid-1960s for either the US or USSR to get credible results and not until the mid-70s were any developed for deployment so it is not really practical to assume they could have been developed to operational status in Germany during WWII.
*It should be noted that in MODERN practice these weapons can't be used in close proximity to each other as unless the timing is PERFECT the first blast will render ineffective other fuel-air mixtures due to shock dispersal. A half dozen HE bombs will have overlapping blast/shock waves while a half dozen FAE's in close proximity will have only one 'blast' which will render the other "clouds" useless. Granted IF everything works out exactly right, (and at the time of 42-45+ this was not a given) that single blast and incendiary effect would be on par with the half-dozen HE bombs but the OVERALL effect might be far less due to things such as dispersed blast wave and non-linear mixing.
I'd rate his work on the Do335 and L40 air-drop torpedo as higher than his aerosol bomb work.
We need to keep in mind several things. One is the 'definition' of "Wunderwaffes" which is rather 'flexible' shall we say

and two is the OP's original concept is that they come "early, not destroyed/captured or War is longer in Nazi favor".
Taken in context I think the answer to "War longer" itself is not going to change much other than how badly Germany ends up getting towards the end. However the addition of "in Nazi favor" would tend towards the Germans doing 'better' earlier on to drag things out. The variables are pretty much up in the air but 'better' earlier could translate into more resources being horded which could extend the war in its later phases.
That does lead to the Allies sticking with the original planning of using A-Bombs on Germany and all that entails. (It won't be the 'cake-walk' bombing Japan was in comparison but the Allies will eventually reduce at least a couple of cities to ash)
The "end" will still remain the same overall, (barring ASB's like a plausible Sea Lion et-al) so my take is 'no' the Germans don't "still win" (???still not getting that???) and in fact they end up worse off in the long run.
The "not destroyed/captured" is another puzzler as the 'destruction' was from various Allied efforts that ranged from attacks on various resource extraction and production operations to disruption of transport systems to point-target destruction of 'wunderwaffes' testing, development and production sources. Once Germany is cut off from outside supply the 'end-result' is pretty inevitable with few ways to change the outcome. (Even the deployment of an German A-Bomb after D-day won't change the outcome, only the aftermath) "Captured" pretty much would require that Germany has already lost and capitulated as the 'wunderwaffes' was no use for 'them' after that point and was the point where the Allies captured the technology, examples and people who worked on them, No help there.
"Earlier" however does have some possible points. Both official (BMW/Junkers) and unofficial work on jet aircraft, (to take one possible example) started in 1939 and was getting to the point of operational readiness by mid-to-late 1943. The decision to re-purpose the Me-262 as a fighter bomber instead of the interceptor/fighter it had been designed as is credited* with delaying its entry into service by at least a year, (June-ish-43 to April-44) so what happens really if it stays on schedule?
Germany at this point, (call it July 1943) is beginning to retreat in the East, losing in North Africa and rumblings of more 'proactive' Allied involvement in the West is a given rather than assumed so while it's not 'obvious' things are going downhill the possibility is there. So, what say that instead of greenlighting the V2, (about July 7) full production of the Me-262 is authorized. (Note that somewhere around late-June Willy Messerschmitt had talked to Hitler to caution him NOT to go into full production on "jet" aircraft due to fuel consumption fears. Maybe that doesn't happen?)
So assuming the other issues can be resolved as well, (*engine vibrations have been said to be as lengthy to resolve as the re-design but this assumes more effort is spent resolving rather than redesigning) serial production we can assume would be similar but earlier so the first squadron (test/training) should be stood-up around June or July and the first operational squadron around November or December of 1943 with around two more training to be ready in early 1944.
So the Nazi's have a "Christmas Present" for the Allies that year the main question is who gets to see it in operation first?
Arguably the 'best' option is to start using it against the Allied bombers hitting Germany as they "seem" more loss sensitive as after the second raid on Schweinfurt deep daylight bombing had been suspended till the P-51 arrived in theatre in early 1944. And logically this would be best considering the short range and design nature of the Me262, but 'logic' and 'best decision' are not a given with the Nazi high command, but I'll go with it.
Other options could include introduction in Italy to support German counter-attacks against the Allied invasion but again the Me262's range and operational needs would probably preclude this. Similar for the Russian front.
So assuming that the Germans held off committing the single Me262 operational squadron between December 1943 and say February 1944, (when they should have three squadrons ready) and assuming the "fighter sweeps" don't kill to many on the ground as the Allies start gaining air supremacy over France in the run up to D-day then introduction during the "Big Week" bombing campaign would find the Allies in a similar situation to what they faced OTL about a year later.
In general while a surprise and generally effective it will take a few months for both sides to learn effective tactics against each other. The difference at this point is the Allies don't have the same effective "air superiority" as they do in late 1944 OTL and there is still a somewhat effective conventional Luftwaffe force available to 'protect' the Me262 airfields to reduce the vulnerability during takeoff and landing.
Problems to be addressed on the Allied side is at this point there are a lot more airfields in the theater than in Germany alone in 1945, along with more aircraft which means the airfield attack policy while effective enough will not specifically reduce the Me262 threat and therefore bomber losses on deep penetration raids will be higher. More aggressive fighter sweeps will be more effective than adding more escorts as the latter would take P-51s away from those fighter sweeps but if the Me262s are base in and operating out of Germany that is going to be more dangerous and lead to higher losses of planes and pilots. On the German side once it is clear that the Me262 is most vulnerable on takeoff and landing then there will be a requirement to protect the operational airfields which will mean moving 'conventional' aircraft and AAA guns to positions to protect the Me262s which will actually make the conventional aircraft more vulnerable. On the other hand the early ability to mount 'credible' attacks against Allied bombers and escorts will naturally result in more allied losses.
(Note: During April 1945 OTL Me262 units were able to mount large scale attacks on Allied bomber formations and achieve an average 4:1 kill ratio. This is around eight months after the Me262 became "operational" so while in a similar timeframe TTL that would be around July 44 give or take couple of months due to Germany's 'better' situation here. OTL this was "worrying" because Germany was on the back foot, TTL and a year earlier that would be VERY worrying because while Germany is still pressed hard there is an event planned for June 1944 that requires the Luftwaffe be beat back into Germany itself. TTL that can still mostly happen but one 'happy' side-effect was bomber losses over Germany dropped whereas here they will likely climb instead as the Allies have no effective direct counter. Deploying the Allied jets will not have much effect as noted above they had no real advantage over the Allies piston aircraft versus the Me262 and OTL the encounters between the Mosquito, {generally similar performance} and the Me262 were inconclusive at best. This IS going to affect Allied and German thinking in the months to come)
My take is that while Allied losses are in fact higher with the early introduction of the Me262 it alone can't really affect the outcome though the 'butterflies' can be significant. Deployment of the B-29 to Europe is far more likely in this case for example as is the deployment of Allied jet aircraft. This will push forward other projects like the Ar234 though I doubt it would have that much affect overall if it can be used against the D-Day beaches it will be a definite PTA factor. I suspect that the Me163 would not be built TTL as it really is less effective and operationally limited than the Me262, similarly the Natter as well. It could possible push forward some of the various German "light fighter" designs but I've yet to see a way they could have been operated effectively with minimally trained pilots. On the other hand replacing some older fighters with small jets would have been somewhat more effective with trained pilots. On the gripping hand the increasing need to protect the Me262 airfields could force a 're-think' away from 'emergency' jets to effective small piston aircraft. Using the Ethanol fuel the V2 didn't and non-critical engines and parts THAT I can see putting in the hands of minimally trained pilot. (I also see horrendous losses but possibly less than the OTL plan)
Randy