Nazis develop/mass produce Wunderwaffes early, not destroyed/captured or War is longer in Nazi Favor

thought the Flettner was actually fairly developed craft? http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/flettner_kolibri.php (that article mentions early tethered craft also, which would have been useful for u-boats and raiders)
The tethered craft idea might have worked for raiders but U-boat captains were opposed to the idea because of the time they would have to spend prepping and retrieving craft (un-powered auto gyro), time were they would have been vulnerable to enemy ships and aircraft. If the enemy showed up while the craft was in the air, the craft would have to be abandoned to its fate.

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I think the Type XXI along with Junkers Ju 290 or Junkers Ju 390. these 2 if available of large number at the start of the war have a chance of winning the battle of the Atlantic and forcing the British to the peace table before the Americans can join the war.

This might result in a longer war, I think Germans would lose in the long term on the eastern front.
The Type XX1 I'll grant but not necessarily the Ju-290 or Ju-390. There are countermeasures the British can adopt, as they did OTL, such as the MACs or even the CAMs. A greater force of long range recce/bombers will provoke that response earlier. Could the XXI be kept secret before the war as well as being built in useful numbers?

For that matter, as always when discussing pre-1939 PODs, resources spent on extra or better equipment for one arm of the German armed forces, means less for others. What would the resource needs of a fleet of Type XXI U-boats compared to those built pre-war? Or a force of Ju-290s compared to one of Ju-88s? What would have to be sacrificed to build a decisive quantity of each?
 
The Type XX1 I'll grant but not necessarily the Ju-290 or Ju-390. There are countermeasures the British can adopt, as they did OTL, such as the MACs or even the CAMs. A greater force of long range recce/bombers will provoke that response earlier. Could the XXI be kept secret before the war as well as being built in useful numbers?

For that matter, as always when discussing pre-1939 PODs, resources spent on extra or better equipment for one arm of the German armed forces, means less for others. What would the resource needs of a fleet of Type XXI U-boats compared to those built pre-war? Or a force of Ju-290s compared to one of Ju-88s? What would have to be sacrificed to build a decisive quantity of each?
The V-2?
 
How much work was being done prior to the war on the V2? Very little bar basic research. IF you want the Type XX1 and the Ju-290/390 to be available in force in 1940 or 1941 they'll have to be put in production in 1939 at the latest.

However, if you mean make the resources used in its production phase available, well that was really only from mid-1943. So the better U-boats and LRMP force will be available from early 1944 at the earliest. Long after the Battle of the Atlantic is won and the forces for D-Day are ensconced in the UK.

They can cause higher shipping losses and divert extra resources, especially the U-boats. Given the number of CVEs and other aircraft carrying vessels on the convoy routes, it may be an open question as to whether the Ju-290/390s remain a significant force by the time their bases are overrun in August 1944. They may prolong the war but not win it for Germany, if introduced after 1943. IMHO of course
 
I think the Type XXI along with Junkers Ju 290 or Junkers Ju 390. these 2 if available of large number at the start of the war have a chance of winning the battle of the Atlantic and forcing the British to the peace table before the Americans can join the war.

If the Typ XXI had been available in large numbers in 1939, then these large numbers would have spent the next couple of years in tests, trials, and shipyards under repairs. As it was, they were only ready by the end of the war because they were very seriously defective and had to be repeatedly modified. So no, they wouldn't change a thing until 1941, and by then the cat is out of the bag.
IOW, the Typ XXI is yet another one of the numerous examples of late-war Nazi vaporware. Yes, they featured break-through innovations, which would later, in due time, come in handy - once they matured. After all, Da Vinci's helicopter also was a great innovation, and yet it wasn't very useful in any actual war, as designed.
 

Archibald

Banned
The tethered craft idea might have worked for raiders but U-boat captains were opposed to the idea because of the time they would have to spend prepping and retrieving craft (un-powered auto gyro), time were they would have been vulnerable to enemy ships and aircraft. If the enemy showed up while the craft was in the air, the craft would have to be abandoned to its fate.

An open cockpit, unpowered autogyro on a submarine.
...
(shudders at the thing utter unpractability and pilot killer potential, particularly in North Atlantic weather)
...
only the proverbial crazy, egghead nazi scientist with thick eyeglasses could invent such a stupid thing...

"Ach so, zi is Professor Zundapp veapon to win ze war, wunderbar !"
 
How much work was being done prior to the war on the V2? Very little bar basic research. IF you want the Type XX1 and the Ju-290/390 to be available in force in 1940 or 1941 they'll have to be put in production in 1939 at the latest.

However, if you mean make the resources used in its production phase available, well that was really only from mid-1943. So the better U-boats and LRMP force will be available from early 1944 at the earliest. Long after the Battle of the Atlantic is won and the forces for D-Day are ensconced in the UK.

They can cause higher shipping losses and divert extra resources, especially the U-boats. Given the number of CVEs and other aircraft carrying vessels on the convoy routes, it may be an open question as to whether the Ju-290/390s remain a significant force by the time their bases are overrun in August 1944. They may prolong the war but not win it for Germany, if introduced after 1943. IMHO of course

as you say they need to be in mass production by 1939. Hard to see that happening without asb.
even if they won the battle of the Atlantic they will still lose to the soviets.
 
as you say they need to be in mass production by 1939. Hard to see that happening without asb.
even if they won the battle of the Atlantic they will still lose to the soviets.
And as Michele said above, mass production before the bugs are sorted out will result in the KM submarine force being less effective than iOTL!

Did Arthur C Clarke play any role in evaluating Nazi Wunderwaffen? I've a feeling personal experience with them, or reading the classified reports, might well have inspired his excellent tale Superiority. It should be required reading for any proponent of how the Nazis could gave done so much better if they'd only got the XXX in service earlier. It was required reading at MIT for a while I gather.
 

Archibald

Banned
Did Arthur C Clarke play any role in evaluating Nazi Wunderwaffen? I've a feeling personal experience with them, or reading the classified reports, might well have inspired his excellent tale Superiority. It should be required reading for any proponent of how the Nazis could gave done so much better if they'd only got the XXX in service earlier. It was required reading at MIT for a while I gather.

This.is.great.
Thanks for sharing.
Arthur Clarke as its very best. I started reading and thought "that Norden is straight out of Futurama (Pr. Farnsworth best ennemy, the one with the ponytail- Ogden Wenstrom )"

and then

"oh boy, that sounds more and more like the F-35 unending issues, with Norden a very convincing Lockheed " :p

The different "superweapons" piling up and failing one after another looks like the F-35 "VSTOL + supersonic + stealth"

while the ennemy simpler and cheaper spacecrafts are either F-16s or MiG-21.
 
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Arthur C Clark piece is definitely insightful and reminds me of the prewar battle over the U-Boat fleet. Every one in the KM agreed Donitz 300 U-Boat fleet was KM best approach to war, but few could agree on what was next, most fought over the size of surface fleet & ships to support it in war. The Grand Admiral push things to the limit by demanding a balanced fleet. Meanwhile efforts to expand Donitz 300 U-Boat fleet stumbled against treaty industry and how much is enough.

In a brave attempt to prove its worth Donitz , staged a fake battle with 20 U-Boats Vs a Convoy, with predictable results re-establishing its importance.
However post exercise criticism was launched by Donitz colleague Furbringer ,who pointed out that such a U-Boat fleet would work until the enemy ASW efforts grew to such a size that it drove the fleet underwater , thus neutralizing its operational effectiveness. Furbringer argued that the U-Boat fleet needed to be integrated into a LW Maritime patrol bomber fleet to locate convoys and guide U=Boats to attack,and get around such ASW defences with combined attack.

Furbringer warned against the U-Boat fleet using excessive radio coms to bridge this gap.
 

Deleted member 1487

In a brave attempt to prove its worth Donitz , staged a fake battle with 20 U-Boats Vs a Convoy, with predictable results re-establishing its importance.
However post exercise criticism was launched by Donitz colleague Furbringer ,who pointed out that such a U-Boat fleet would work until the enemy ASW efforts grew to such a size that it drove the fleet underwater , thus neutralizing its operational effectiveness. Furbringer argued that the U-Boat fleet needed to be integrated into a LW Maritime patrol bomber fleet to locate convoys and guide U=Boats to attack,and get around such ASW defences with combined attack.

Furbringer warned against the U-Boat fleet using excessive radio coms to bridge this gap.
Do you have info about this test and argument about it?
 
On the subject of U-boats: snorkel. The germans captured it from the dutch in 1940, but only implemented it in 1943!! Imagine if it had been installed in the U-boat fleet from, say, 1941 onwards...
 
i agree with Viking here. WWII helicopters were death traps, and would have made large, fat targets even against Tito resistance (which were not armed with sticks and stones, but had some very real and deadly fire weapons, probably enough to shot any german early helicopter). This no freakkin' Rambo chased by Mi-24s.

So not much different than the VC/NVA who got to shoot at 2nd and then 3rd gen choppers, 1960-75.

Tracers point both ways.

Shooting at transports exposes your position to both armed rotary and fixed wing assets
 
there are some pretty convincing scenarios for an evolution of u-boats, improved batteries and electric motors, etc. rather than revolutionary Elektroboot design (which in typical fashion was coupled with "revolutionary" building technique)

on helicopters my previous post highlighting the Flettner was implied criticism of Focke-Achgelis, the former best use of nascent technology as spotter (and maybe employ depth charges) and not as large or fragile a target.
 
On the subject of U-boats: snorkel. The germans captured it from the dutch in 1940, but only implemented it in 1943!! Imagine if it had been installed in the U-boat fleet from, say, 1941 onwards...


Well that was another "own goal" for the KM. Dr Walther developed the high speed 'fish boat' design in 1934 , but the pursuit of a workable reliable turbine system needed, was just a little too difficult to manage and only a few coastal boat versions were ready by wars end.....ten years later . the turbines ran at up to 2000oC and might have worked with better metallurgy - as was the problem with high temp/pressure steam turbines for the warships. Reduce the pressure & temp a bit and reliably shot up- as did endurance.


Anyway the issue of schnorkeling surfaced with the fish boats designs. Walther developed an large schnorkel that allowed a 'closed cycle drive' boat to dash at 25 knots submerged while using air at periscope depth .This was extendable but mostly used as 'surface travel' since the fish boat hull was 'awash on the surface even at low speed]. So all the air intake & exhaust was on this extendable mast, that still allowed the boat to run on air just below the surface. .

Mid war Walther suggests a simple version of this mast could be back fitted to the fleet to help avoid allied airpower. Because of the rushed design 6 knots was the best they could manage, but a better version was ready at wars end that could manage 11 knots in trials.
 
there are some pretty convincing scenarios for an evolution of u-boats, improved batteries and electric motors, etc. rather than revolutionary Elektroboot design (which in typical fashion was coupled with "revolutionary" building technique)

on helicopters my previous post highlighting the Flettner was implied criticism of Focke-Achgelis, the former best use of nascent technology as spotter (and maybe employ depth charges) and not as large or fragile a target.


Walther jet propelled U-Boat and Flettner's helicopter, show a similar problem in German hi tech weaponry development. In both cases the design was left in the hands of scientist just too long and not handed over to companies for weaponizing. Flettner blocked repeated attempts to down grade the design to make it more producible for the armed forces. Instead he tinkered with the design improving it. Walther had similar control over the turbine U-Boats resisting efforts to weaponize the boats. KM stepped into to produce the ideas , but the prototypes all fell short of the targets. Still light years ahead of the actual boats they were building.

When Junkers resisted licensing agreements in the mid 1930s ,the Nazi just forcibly seized the company and were able to build thousands and thousands of JU-88 as well as Stuka dive-bombers and Jumo jet engines through the war, making it the backbone of the LW. Flettner's helicopter was ready in 1940 with the FL-265 and Admiral Raeder had already placed an order in 1938 to develop ASW scouts for the fleet. There was nothing in the way except funding priorities. Instead Flettner continued to tinker with the design to make the 'perfect helicopter' . Walther showed what it would take to increase submerged U-boat speed and endurance, but it wasn't until the panic buttons were pushed by Donitz in 1943 before all Walther's ideas would come together in the 'perfect Type XXI & XXIII designs' at the end of the war.
 
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and might have worked with better metallurgy - as was the problem with high temp/pressure steam turbines for the warships

Note RN Nicknames for their experimental HOOH boats HMS Excalibur and HMS Explorer, Excruiator and Exploder. They had better metallurgy, too.
 
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