Nazis' assurances to Japan in 1941

Flubber

Banned
Oh, I agree, but why should Hitler intend it before his other enemies give up? If they ever do. Other than insanity,of course, which IMHO is why he declared war on the USA when he did.


It has been repeatedly explained on this board and usertron even explained it again in this very thread all of three posts before yours.

With Japan attacking the USA and the British Empire, that makes the USA a full military Ally of the UK, and therefore (assuming "neutrality" holds) an Associate Power of the Allies in Europe. The USA will be fully free to ship as many convoys as they can stuffed with L-L to the UK in the name of supporting their Ally in their war effort (against Japan:rolleyes:). And if the British want to use those supplies and arms for closer to home...:p Then there isn't a bloody thing the Germans can do about it. Except launch unrestricted submarine warfare against the USA. And we all know how that worked out in WWI. Or, he could just DoW the USA.
 
It has been repeatedly explained on this board and usertron even explained it again in this very thread all of three posts before yours.

Cute. But then why would the public prefer all those resources go to Europe instead of being used aginst Japan? Your way might get Lindberg elected POTUS someday yet.
 

Flubber

Banned
But then why would the public prefer all those resources go to Europe instead of being used aginst Japan?


As has also been repeatedly explained on these boards, Lend Lease won't and didn't effect the war against Japan one whit while the navy and shipping the US needs to take the war to Japan won't arrive until 1943.

Germany's choice is to either do nothing while US flagged shipping supplies her ally Britain and turns the island into Airbase One or to attack the US at a time and place of Germany's choosing and before the US' rearmament kicks into gear.

Your way might get Lindberg elected POTUS someday yet.
You seriously need to read more. Seriously. The support for isolationism in '41 is not what you believe it was.

As you first assignment, check out US public opinion polls at various points in 1941 concerning the prospect of going to war with Japan and/or in Europe. They've been posted here recently so they shouldn't be too hard for you to find. You'll be surprised.

Edit: I decided to do your homework for you. Here are a few poll results from this link.

Interviewing Date 11/15-20/41
Survey #253-K Question #13
Which of these two things do you think is the more important — that this country keep out of war, or that Germany be defeated?
Keep out of war..................... 32%
Defeat Germany..................... 68


That's mid-November mind you. A fortnight before Pearl or Germany's DoW and two thirds of those polled think it's more important to defeat Germany than to stay out of the war.


Interviewing Date 10/24-29/41
Survey #251-K Question #9
Should the United States take steps now to prevent Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means risking a war with Japan?
Yes................................ 64%
No................................ 25
No opinion......................... 11


Late October this time and 64% of those polled think the US should prevent Japan from gaining more power even if it means war.


Those are some real isolationists you're counting on...
 
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Cute. But then why would the public prefer all those resources go to Europe instead of being used aginst Japan? Your way might get Lindberg elected POTUS someday yet.

American sailors were already dying in the Atlantic as a result of German submarine warfare before Pearl Harbour, thanks to the US escorting convoys. Even if Hitler hadn't declared war in December 1941, there would have been enough US-German incidents to provoke public opinion to the point that the US would have entered the war with Germany with about the same degree of unanimity as in 1917 (i.e. not universal support to the extent of OTL 1941, but more than sufficient for the purpose of waging war against the Germans). In such a scenario, I'd put the over/under on a US declaration of war on Germany as the summer of 1942.

In other words, the only way Hitler can avoid war with the US over the long haul would be to completely withdraw the U-Boat force from the Atlantic to avoid any possibility of US-German incidents. Which, of course, was never going to happen.
 
Cute. But then why would the public prefer all those resources go to Europe instead of being used aginst Japan? Your way might get Lindberg elected POTUS someday yet.

Um, read up on Lindberg more, and see the kind of public statements he had made by 1940 regarding Hitler, the Nazis, Fascism et al, and...Jews.:( He was in Henry Ford territory, and worse by far than Joseph Kennedy Sr. And even Kennedy was a political dead duck by 1940 with his statements about America having to "save herself" by going Fascist.

John Q. Public knew what the America Firsters were. That if you ripped open their suit jackets, often enough, you'd find underneath a brown shirt.:(

As has also been repeatedly explained on these boards, Lend Lease won't and didn't effect the war against Japan one whit while the navy and shipping the US needs to take the war to Japan won't arrive until 1943. (1)

Germany's choice is to either do nothing while US flagged shipping supplies her ally Britain and turns the island into Airbase One or to attack the US at a time and place of Germany's choosing and before the US' rearmament kicks into gear. (2)

You seriously need to read more. Seriously. The support for isolationism in '41 is not what you believe it was. (3)

As you first assignment, check out US public opinion polls at various points in 1941 concerning the prospect of going to war with Japan and/or in Europe. They've been posted here recently so they shouldn't be too hard for you to find. You'll be surprised. (4)

1) While air and ground forces for fighting in Europe (OTL) can be made available more quickly.

2) Same formula for the Japanese ignoring the Philippines while the US is building up its navy and air forces.

3) I've noticed over the years that as time goes by people born in later decades appreciate less the changing political climate in the USA before its entry into WWII because of events going on in Europe, especially after the French surrender. Also, for young people today, events like the Rape of Nanking seem to be either forgotten, or dismissed. Like if the USA did nothing for Rwanda, then they must not have really wanted to do anything for China 60 years ago either.

Isolationism was a BIG issue until June 1940. It took a huge hit then, and never fully recovered. Barbarossa also bucked up the Interventionists.

So by Pearl Harbor, pretty much anyone in the know politically could sense it was only a matter of time. But everyone was expecting some unilateral crazy action by Hitler, not Japanese Warlords who were pre-doomed to fail. Even with all their OTL successes, it was like a champion flyweight boxer getting in a flurry of punches on a super-heavyweight. But the super-heavyweight only had to land one punch...:mad:

4) Especially regarding Japan. The American People seemed to think it would be as easy as going after a Fascistic Mexico!:rolleyes:

Your second assignment is to find out Lindberg's standing in terms of his political popularity in 1937-38 versus 1940-41. The luster of herodom tends to fade when you develop political opinions. Incessantly attacking America's greatest 20th century POTUS (and third overall, after Lincoln and Washington in that order) turns that luster to tarnish.

EDIT: Ninja'd by Flubber's EDIT
 
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Is it? The big one, the inseparability of Britain & the U.S. (thanks to Lend-Lease & Neutrality Patrol), isn't in play yet. So, too, the embargoes on steel & oil haven't happened yet (IIRC; oil for sure). That being so, the U.S. isn't a guaranteed enemy. Yes, ignoring the P.I. is a gamble, but not a crazy one.

If Japan doesn't secure the Philippines, a year later she's left with a hostile fortress sitting right across the supply lines to not only the resources that she's just gone to war to secure her access to, but also to her forces still fighting in Burma, New Guinea etc.

This is a knife across Japan's throat, figuratively speaking. It doesn't even need to be used - when someone has a knife at your throat, you feel a strange compulsion to do what you're told, even if you're not entirely sure that the knife will really be used. Well, either that or you attack the knifewielder. And that with US forces only on the Philippines. If the US decides to let British submarines base themselves there, supported by US recon aircraft able to track Japanese naval activity with impunity, Japan finds herself in an even bigger strategic hole.
 
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Better German war plan:
Rather than declaring war on 10 Dec 41, wait a while. Gather all the long range U-Boats fully fueled and supplied off the U.S. East Coast, then declare war and unleash them. (or unleash them, then declare war). How much better would Operation Drumbeat had gone if it had 2-3 months prep time instead of being launched on the fly?
 
Better German war plan:
Rather than declaring war on 10 Dec 41, wait a while. Gather all the long range U-Boats fully fueled and supplied off the U.S. East Coast, then declare war and unleash them. (or unleash them, then declare war). How much better would Operation Drumbeat had gone if it had 2-3 months prep time instead of being launched on the fly?

THAT idea has some merit to it. The problem was, Adolph Hitler was not a man for good impulse control. And its not like the Japanese informed him before they hit Pearl Harbor. Also, the Kriegsmarine underestimated how vulnerable the US was to attacks on their coastal shipping. They had simply assumed the USA would have blackout conditions imposed overnight.
 
usertron2020 said:
THAT idea has some merit to it. The problem was, Adolph Hitler was not a man for good impulse control.
It has quite a lot, actually. Trouble was, Dönitz didn't have a lot of Type IXs to begin with (not least because Friend Adolph declared war in '39:rolleyes:), & because Adolph was busy diverting U-boats to every other damn theatre but Russia (& if he could've got them into the Black Sea, you can bet he would have:rolleyes:;)).

This is compounded by Dönitz not concentrating on the most valuable targets, tankers, & in the most vulnerable areas, the Gulf, from the very get-go. Had he done so, he could've provoked the "tanker crisis" a year or two sooner, & possibly aided Japan's efforts in India (by creating famine, which was a result of Britain diverting shipping from Asia in response to {mainly tanker} losses off the U.S. East Coast).
usertron2020 said:
And its not like the Japanese informed him before they hit Pearl Harbor.
Very true. And yet, the impact had Germany delayed even a couple of weeks could have been pretty serious.
usertron2020 said:
Also, the Kriegsmarine underestimated how vulnerable the US was to attacks on their coastal shipping. They had simply assumed the USA would have blackout conditions imposed overnight.
Absolutely right. This was borderline criminal negligence for the U.S.

Add to that a dismal lack of ASW a/c, no co-ordination of ASW assets, & poor ASW doctrine...despite two years of British experience to draw on.:confused::rolleyes:
King Augeas said:
If Japan doesn't secure the Philippines, a year later she's left with a hostile fortress sitting right across the supply lines to not only the resources that she's just gone to war to secure her access to, but also to her forces still fighting in Burma, New Guinea etc.
And the U.S. is still looking for an excuse to act...which Japan isn't giving her.
King Augeas said:
If the US decides to let British submarines base themselves there, supported by US recon aircraft able to track Japanese naval activity with impunity, Japan finds herself in an even bigger strategic hole.
That is most assuredly not the act of a neutral, & gives Japan sufficient excuse to attack in her own defense, & the Congress can't then cry "Foul!".

Besides, there's half a chance the P.I. government would claim neutrality, & tell the U.S. forces (never mind Brits) to get out. Quezon tried--after the war started, no less.:rolleyes:

Even if that doesn't happen, there's doubt (as already said) the U.S. would feel compelled to come to the defense of the P.I. It's by no means as certain as it appears OTL.
 
And the U.S. is still looking for an excuse to act...which Japan isn't giving her. That is most assuredly not the act of a neutral, & gives Japan sufficient excuse to attack in her own defense, & the Congress can't then cry "Foul!".

The problem is, warlordism in Japan meant that the "failure" of Japan to eliminate the American threat in the Philippines means assassinations galore in Tokyo. Not that that would happen, anymore than that the Imperial Japanese could act as rationally as you suggest. Stupid overconfidence was not wholly a reserve for racist White Americans. Japan had more than their fair share of such thinking.

A government that responded to a limited oil embargo with high level peace talks that ultimately only to served to mask their genuine intentions is not going to assume that the United States is incapable of launching aggressive war themselves. Especially if they think they will be going up against a bunch of people so near-sighted that they can't fly aircraft!:rolleyes: Oh yes, the Japanese heard that shit too. Which is why they knew they were going in with the advantage of being incredibly underestimated. They just couldn't understand that the concept of underestimation could be a two-edged sword.

Besides, there's half a chance the P.I. government would claim neutrality, & tell the U.S. forces (never mind Brits) to get out. Quezon tried--after the war started, no less.:rolleyes:

The Philippines were not yet a sovereign nation. That was years away. It wasn't up to Quezon to try to do that, and his VP Osmena (and eventual successor) was ready to denounce him for it anyway.

Even if that doesn't happen, there's doubt (as already said) the U.S. would feel compelled to come to the defense of the P.I. It's by no means as certain as it appears OTL. (1)

How about to save the 100000+ US troops marooned there in prison camps? And the US citizens trapped there? And the Philippine people themselves, who we were treaty bound to save from a life of servitude under the Imperial Japanese?

1) Uh, yes, it is. Don't let more recent history (Taiwan) fool you. The Philippines were supposed to be the one nation that the US had as a colonial dependency, and the US was determined to see them free and independent. Not hand them over to a far worse master. If our attitude was as you suggest, then there was no reason to stay after 1898. And especially after the start of the War of Philippine Insurrection.:(
 

Flubber

Banned
Add to that a dismal lack of ASW a/c, no co-ordination of ASW assets, & poor ASW doctrine...despite two years of British experience to draw on.:confused::rolleyes:


That's been explained here too many times to count. You can also find the explanation in both Blair and Gannon's books on the Battle of the Atlantic.

The ASW failure was wholly political in nature. During the lean budgets of the 30s, the strategic defense of the US coastline was parceled up into different bundles and divvied up among the armed services much like would be done with nuclear weapons in the 50s. Each branch had their own specific jobs, with the budgets attached, and those jobs, along with the money they meant, were ferociously defended by both those in uniform and their supporters on Capital Hill.

A unified "coastal command" was thus politically impossible no matter what experiences and examples the UK's battle against the U-boats produced. A swift kick in the proverbial ass was needed to break this log jam and the Happy Time provided that kick.

Senator Foghorn and Representative Assclown could no longer complain about the operational control of patrol aircraft being removed from the USAAF and given to the USN or otherwise obstruct such a move when U-boats were sinking tankers off Atlantic City in broad daylight.
 
That is most assuredly not the act of a neutral, & gives Japan sufficient excuse to attack in her own defense, & the Congress can't then cry "Foul!".

Besides, there's half a chance the P.I. government would claim neutrality, & tell the U.S. forces (never mind Brits) to get out. Quezon tried--after the war started, no less.:rolleyes:

Even if that doesn't happen, there's doubt (as already said) the U.S. would feel compelled to come to the defense of the P.I. It's by no means as certain as it appears OTL.

Yes, it's well known that the US was acting decidedly un-neutral in 1941, so basing RN and Dutch submarines out of the Philippines would be a logical extension. If Japan gets upset and attacks the Philippines, then the US will and UK will be happy because, in this situation, both countries' governments would want the US and Japan to be at war.

I've no idea what you mean why Congress not being able to cry "Foul!". Why would you think that this matter when US servicemen are being killed by Japan? The US isn't coming to the defence of the Philippines per se, it's coming for revenge on the US personnel killed by Japan.

The "government" in the Philippines might try claiming neutrality? Er, good luck with that. :rolleyes:
 
King Augeas said:
If Japan gets upset and attacks the Philippines, then the US will and UK will be happy
You do know the idea was to not have a war with Japan?:rolleyes:
King Augeas said:
The "government" in the Philippines might try claiming neutrality? Er, good luck with that. :rolleyes:
So what does that make what Quezon did do? Fantasy? Pipedream?:rolleyes:
 
If Japan gets upset and attacks the Philippines, then the US will and UK will be happy because, in this situation, both countries' governments would want the US and Japan to be at war.

You do know the idea was to not have a war with Japan?:rolleyes:

I left in the part you deleted which answered the very question you are asking. Because frankly, who are you talking about not wanting to have a war with Japan? At least, in an ATL where they have already gone to war with the Dutch and British while maintaining an all out war with China AND keeping their biggest army up in Manchuria defending against the Soviets. The Japanese would be seen by both Churchill and FDR as being fantastically overextended. And they'd be right. So why worry?

So what does that make what Quezon did do? Fantasy? Pipedream?:rolleyes:

Pipedream.:rolleyes::p

AS I SAID, Quezon was attempting to employ powers HE DID NOT POSSESS. It was not as bad as if the Territorial Governor of Hawaii had attempted to "declare neutrality",:rolleyes: since after all the Philippines were only five years from their scheduled independence; BUT THEY DIDN'T HAVE IT YET!:mad: Quezon DID NOT have legal control of a "Philippine foreign policy". They were still in a state of what the British would call a limited "Home Rule".
 
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