There are a number of issues with these sorts of scenarios.
Hitler wanted two things out of the war (the elimination of the untermench was not an actual war aim, but a by-product of goal #1 being put into effect) :
1. Living space for the German people, or more properly, the vastly increased German population that Hitler envisioned
2. The complete elimination of the Bolsheviks and Communism in Europe
An on-going war with the British aimed at their destruction was never an aim. If anything Hitler didn't really want to fight the British at all. The French, yes, he needed their resources for the big fight against the Soviets, but the British were at best a secondary concern. This is possibly best illustrated by the fact that there was virtually no planning done to invade Great Britain until France was teetering toward defeat. The Heer had no plan, the KM had no plan, the Luftwaffe had no plan (not that Goring admitted that to Hitler), and OKW had no plan. All one needs do is look at See Lowe and it is obvious that the planners were making stuff up as the went.
The Reich had, at most, a 60 day window following the Fall of France to establish a defensible bridgehead in Britain before the British managed to rearm their formations, even then the chances were minimal. By mid September the number of daylight hours four hours less than in July, by the end of October it is below 10 hours. That simply isn't enough time to conduct anything close to an actual landing while weather gets progressively worse as the seasons change. After that you're beached until May, maybe later. Worse, unlike the Wallies IOTL, the Reich has very limited access to weather data in the Atlantic (there was a constant, very deadly, cat & mouse game in the North Atlantic and Denmark Strait where KM weather ships would try to transmit and not die in the process while the RCAF and later the USN would hunt them mercilessly). Without that data on a regular basis it is more or less impossible circa 1940 to accurately predict the weather over the channel more than half a day in advance.
By the start of 1941 the British were in a position to defend Britain nearly indefinitely. The U-boat attack never came close to starving out the British Isles (unlike the later U.S. air-sea blockade of Japan that had managed to begin that process by late summer of 1945) and was entirely unsuccessful in preventing both raw materials and finished goods to Britain (a scenario that would be even worse of the British and later the U.S. were not trying to supply the Soviets via the Murmansk route). As well as reconstituted British formations there was also the 1st Canadian Division fully equipped, and the RAF was receiving aircraft as a rate that ensured at least parity with the Luftwaffe. Once the Japanese attacked in the Pacific, it was over. As America's co-belligerent the UK was going to get massive support (to, of course, prepare to fight the Common enemy, the empire of Japan) including massive convoys escorted by USN warships that are untouchable unless Hitler decides to go to war with the U.S. (as was the case IOTL).
A quick comment regarding North Africa. The Wehrmacht was simply incapable of supporting a major offensive in Africa. It doesn't matter how many more trucks and tanks are available if they wind up sitting on the dock on the wrong side of the Med/The Axis lacked sufficient sealift to support a force much larger than OTL Africa Corps, and the number of useful ports are limited in both capacity and logistical transport toward the battlefield to support a major force. Africa was always a Fool's Errand for the Reich
tl;dr: Hitler didn't WANT to ignore the USSR & invading the UK was functionally impossible
Hitler wanted two things out of the war (the elimination of the untermench was not an actual war aim, but a by-product of goal #1 being put into effect) :
1. Living space for the German people, or more properly, the vastly increased German population that Hitler envisioned
2. The complete elimination of the Bolsheviks and Communism in Europe
An on-going war with the British aimed at their destruction was never an aim. If anything Hitler didn't really want to fight the British at all. The French, yes, he needed their resources for the big fight against the Soviets, but the British were at best a secondary concern. This is possibly best illustrated by the fact that there was virtually no planning done to invade Great Britain until France was teetering toward defeat. The Heer had no plan, the KM had no plan, the Luftwaffe had no plan (not that Goring admitted that to Hitler), and OKW had no plan. All one needs do is look at See Lowe and it is obvious that the planners were making stuff up as the went.
The Reich had, at most, a 60 day window following the Fall of France to establish a defensible bridgehead in Britain before the British managed to rearm their formations, even then the chances were minimal. By mid September the number of daylight hours four hours less than in July, by the end of October it is below 10 hours. That simply isn't enough time to conduct anything close to an actual landing while weather gets progressively worse as the seasons change. After that you're beached until May, maybe later. Worse, unlike the Wallies IOTL, the Reich has very limited access to weather data in the Atlantic (there was a constant, very deadly, cat & mouse game in the North Atlantic and Denmark Strait where KM weather ships would try to transmit and not die in the process while the RCAF and later the USN would hunt them mercilessly). Without that data on a regular basis it is more or less impossible circa 1940 to accurately predict the weather over the channel more than half a day in advance.
By the start of 1941 the British were in a position to defend Britain nearly indefinitely. The U-boat attack never came close to starving out the British Isles (unlike the later U.S. air-sea blockade of Japan that had managed to begin that process by late summer of 1945) and was entirely unsuccessful in preventing both raw materials and finished goods to Britain (a scenario that would be even worse of the British and later the U.S. were not trying to supply the Soviets via the Murmansk route). As well as reconstituted British formations there was also the 1st Canadian Division fully equipped, and the RAF was receiving aircraft as a rate that ensured at least parity with the Luftwaffe. Once the Japanese attacked in the Pacific, it was over. As America's co-belligerent the UK was going to get massive support (to, of course, prepare to fight the Common enemy, the empire of Japan) including massive convoys escorted by USN warships that are untouchable unless Hitler decides to go to war with the U.S. (as was the case IOTL).
A quick comment regarding North Africa. The Wehrmacht was simply incapable of supporting a major offensive in Africa. It doesn't matter how many more trucks and tanks are available if they wind up sitting on the dock on the wrong side of the Med/The Axis lacked sufficient sealift to support a force much larger than OTL Africa Corps, and the number of useful ports are limited in both capacity and logistical transport toward the battlefield to support a major force. Africa was always a Fool's Errand for the Reich
tl;dr: Hitler didn't WANT to ignore the USSR & invading the UK was functionally impossible