Nazi German attitudes towards Caucaus ethnicities

If Germany is (stretch but bear with me) able to win at Stalingrad and eventually occupy the Caucasus up to the Iranian and Turkish borders, what were their plans to deal with Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, and other ethnic groups? They go unmentioned in most discussions of Generalplan Ost.
 

trurle

Banned
If Germany is (stretch but bear with me) able to win at Stalingrad and eventually occupy the Caucasus up to the Iranian and Turkish borders, what were their plans to deal with Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, and other ethnic groups? They go unmentioned in most discussions of Generalplan Ost.
I think this link is relevant:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1940–44_insurgency_in_Chechnya

Overall, in Caucasus you can observe the same pattern as in Baltic States: some of local people attitudes were pro-German, but German mindset of era did prevent the effective alliance.
 

Deleted member 94680

If Germany is (stretch but bear with me) able to win at Stalingrad and eventually occupy the Caucasus up to the Iranian and Turkish borders, what were their plans to deal with Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, and other ethnic groups? They go unmentioned in most discussions of Generalplan Ost.


Information on Reichskommissariat Kaukasus would probably be what you're after.

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Alfred Rosenberg argued that the Reich Commissar of Caucasus should be instead called "Reich Resident" (resident-general), because he deemed the former name being 'too drastic ' and unnecessary; and that each component commissariat such as Georgia and Armenia should be called a Land and be given statuses of "state entities" under German protection. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, plans were also made for the creation of pro-German client states in the Caucasus, and the "Liberation Committees" of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia were set up. Regarded as embryonic governments of these future satellites by the Nazi government, they were granted the status of "full-right allies" of Germany on April 15, 1942. These three proto-governments, and those of the North Caucasus were ordered to settle their territorial differences by Adolf Hitler during the German advance into the Caucasus. Furthermore, in the event that Turkey was drawn into the war against Germany, Alfred Rosenberg promised these governments territorial extension at the expense of Turkey as well.

Rosenberg stated that the primary German objective in the region was to attain unlimited access to the oil supplies of Maikop and Groznyi. While Hitler agreed with this assessment, he rejected the proposals for the establishment of a loosely controlled confederacy in the Caucasus. Instead he believed that the region, with its history of mutually warring states and peoples would have to be subjected to a very rigid type of control.
 

Deleted member 1487

A lot depended on whether or not the Nazis planned on occupying that territory or not. If they weren't, then they supported the nationalist causes and pushed propaganda to that effect. If they planned on occupying them, they might push some nationalist ideas and support collaborators, but in the end planned to betray them like they did with the first Ukrainian organization they were working with pre-war; later in 1941 after Ukraine was largely occupied and they came into conflict with the Ukrainian nationalists over living up to their promises, the Nazis basically massacred the entire leadership. That is one of the more extreme cases, but was illustrative of their attitude when they thought they'd win. Attitudes changed a lot over the course of the war as things got worse, which led to the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian survivors (though this eventually led to them attacking the Germans later in the war for control over territory the Germans were going to scorch earth) and the establishment of things like the Russian liberation army. In general with the Caucasus region initially the Germans planned to use the local peoples and promise them things that they had no intention of delivering on and many of the anti-Soviet groups in the region welcomed German help, but were wary about their long term intentions. As the war went on attitudes changed, as it was clear they weren't going to occupy the region, so with the intention of getting their help they planned on supporting the nationalist causes of the various peoples of the Caucasus. This shift is talked about in this paper on Nazi agents deployed in the East, with a fair bit of mention about the Caucasus and policy toward those peoples:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/153592
 
It depends on which shit-weasel was going to end up running the region.

First of all, Rosenberg didn't know shit from apple butter when it came to the Caucasus. He was a Baltic-German, and while he could wax poetic about personal experiences in "The East," he really could only speak to the Baltics as a half-ass expert. But there were Nazi Party Caucasus-Germans with real life experience in the region and some of them were in position of power and could effect policy on some pretty scary results.

The other thing, nobody in the Nazi Government took Alfred Rosenberg seriously after a while. He had the unerring ability to piss off everyone around him, including those who professed to share his worldview, but different people had different time-limits of being able to deal with him. Some could not stand him after meeting him in five minutes, other had the patience to last five years. Hitler was in the latter category. And Hitler was prone to monologuing about everything and anything as the mood struck him. Some monologues were consistent. Others were contradictory. Which meant Hitler's views were only translated into actual policy if someone bothered to write it down and then pass the message along if suited their interests. That was the truly terrifying effective power of Bormann, jotting down all these Hitler after-belches and then showing some of them as Hitler's Official Government Policy to functionaries with Hitler nodding it through.

Add to this witch's brew of awful: SS and the Army. There is no way Himmler, pedantic and myopic as he was, would not see the potential to exploit a region with oil in it. And also, bright boys in the Army would have wanted a say, and as the Victorious German Army Fighting the Greatest War the German People Have Ever Seen, they would had a say. How much? Well, that's also debatable.

The unsatisfying answer is that "I don't know," but I would not read too much into Rosenberg. Hitler certainly didn't.
 

thaddeus

Donor
read an amusing example of their thinking, when organizing "Turkic" legions, they almost immediately began to have a problem with "Pan-Turkism" taking hold so ordered Armenian legion(s) to be formed to balance the situation!!

of course this is before they have conquered the region? and they are plotting how to manipulate the next conflict?
 

Deleted member 92195

In the end I think they just wanted to exterminate everyone regardless of ethnicity. A long time ago, 2010-12, when I was studying Hitler’s personality I came up with the very disturbing idea that Hitler came up with a policy of killing every person in Eastern Europe. That is not far from the truth, Goring had what the Nuremberg trials called ‘Goring’s Green Folder’. I even calculated it. There was just over 100 million in the entire region at that time. You would had very large concentration camps, extermination camps and what I called ‘burning factories’. This is basically the Holocaust multiplied by 25. (See link)

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Göring's_Green_Folder

I must add because of the very disturbing and disgusting nature of this post. I became very liberal after studying Hitler’s personality.
 
Hermann Neubacher, who was the driving force behind the German exploitation of Romanian and Hungarian oil reserves in OTL (He negotiated the Oil/Arms pact in 1940 and remained a prominent figure in Balkan politics going on to alleviate hyperinflation and famine in Greece in 1942/3) was slated to have a large role in any occupation of the region up until early 1943. He was a strong proponent of encouraging national divisions in a "divide and rule" strategy to pacify the region. Given his connections within the party and OTL achievements (Became 2nd highest ranking figure in the Foreign Ministry, effectively subdued the Balkans from Sept 1943-August 1944 using similar strategies) I'd wager that he would have played a large role in the development of German policies there especially during the initial occupation.

Assuming that the Reich is able to stabilize it's control over the region and defeat both the USSR and UK for the sake of the argument, Neubacher's allies in the region would have outlived their usefulness and would find themselves facing exponentially increasing levels of German interference and control.
 
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