That's a difficult question - but I'd probably say 'yes' myself. By 1939, Hitler is absolutely convinced that some form of war between the great powers is inevitable (even if he doesn't necessarily desire war with Britain - yet).
Actually, he is not. He is absolutely convinced he must swiftly proceed on his timetable to bring rump Czechoslovakia and Poland under his control, and establish a sphere of influence over Eastern Europe in 1939-40, as the proper springboard for Barbarossa in 1941. War with Britain and France was contemplated, if ever, in 1942-43, after the Russians were subdued (albeit he always hoped to be able and convince Britain to become an ally). War with Britain and France in 1939-40 about his expansion in Central and Eastern Europe was something he contemplated and was prepared to accept, rather than giving up his expansionist schedule, but did not actively and purposefully seek it, as he did for war with the USSR.
Hitler is 'forced' into war in 1939 by two factors - one) his own demented assumption that war is inevitable and two) the fact that by 1939 Germany has NOTHING to gain by delaying that war. Combined British and French industrial capacity not only exceeded that of Germany in 1939, but what’s more they both had massive and accelerating rearmament programmes that German industry couldn’t match. By delaying the war, Hitler slowly sacrifices the military lead on the ground and in the air that he has painstakingly built up over the previous four years. So why wait?
Hitler is "forced" into war into war in 1939 by his unwillingness to compromise on his Barbarossa plans, which require him to control Cezchoslovakia, Poland, and Romania (Hungary is already in his pocket) one way or the other, since the Soviets are rearming at a breakneck pace, and the German advantage shall close after 1941-42, his failure to acknowledge that post-Munich rump Czechoslovakia might be made a satellite by other, less brutal means and invading it shall completely wreck his international credibility, and his complete inability to set up a decent casus belli with Poland.
According to his original plans, he would, if Britain cannot be persuaded to become a partner, turn on the Western Democracies after Russia has been conquered and its resources made available for the Reich economy. The issue in 1939 from Hitler's PoV was Britain's unwillingness, after the invasion of Czechia, to continue the strategy of appeasement towards German expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, and in perspective, friendly neutrality in Germany's struggle with the USSR. If Britain turns hostile, indeed better to fight them in 1939 than later. If not, he is not going to pick a major fight that only delays the main objective, Barbarossa. Hitler knows that 1930s-1940s France shall never backstab him without British support, the French just don't have that much will to fight.