Nazi better weapons enter service a year earlier.

And at the same time, since the first operational 262 squadron (which was a test squadron as much as anything else) was withdrawn from combat after it's commander was shot down, and the first truly operational squadrons were only formed in Jan. 1945, why do the Germans not have similar issues with an accelerated 262 development? And let's not forget that the Germans did have teething problems throughout the test program, and by your own admission those were only fully worked out after the planes had entered service (and also I don't really think that going from engines that need to be severely overhauled after 10 hours to 20-25 hours in Germany's position is exactly something to brag about). And as mentioned later, given the substantial problems with attrition that the Luftwaffe experienced starting in the summer of 1943, by the time 262's start being available in significant numbers in 1944 (by the way, is this assumed to be OTL production numbers moved back a year or greater?), more likely than not they'll end up being flown by pilots with only 100-150 total hours flying time on any aircraft before joining their squadrons, if they're lucky. So in other words, pilots who would be as much or more of a risk to themselves than they would be to the enemy.

The reason the Soviets went with the more advanced Nene was because the first generation German jet engines that the Soviet's had were about as powerful as they could be made to be and the second generation designs were underpowered technical dead ends (notice the problems that the Germans had with the HeS 011 during the war, the engine that was supposed to power their entire next generation of jets). Meanwhile, the British had designs that could actually provide the requisite thrust and were capable of further development in the future, so the Soviets simply went for the expedient of getting their hands on the British designs rather than trying to figure it out from scratch. This wasn't a Russian or German problem alone by the way, the U.S. had a dud of an engine with the Westinghouse J40, which lead to the planes that used it either being grounded or redesigned to take an engine that gave an acceptable amount of thrust.

Given the technical capabilities and competencies of the various Allied powers, why wouldn't they be able to develop countermeasures to German developments and accelerate the pace of their own programs? I mean, as but one example, the main reason why the P-80 never saw combat or mass production during the war was that the U.S. didn't feel the need to deploy an aircraft like it until all the bugs got worked out. Unlike Germany which was desperate to deploy anything they felt could give them an edge over the Allies (most infamously such as the Me-163). If the 262 is flying in large numbers by 1944 and is actually having a major impact on the Allied bomber offensive, why wouldn't the U.S. start to rush development of the P-80 (and become more willing to accept casualties in the development process, or have rushed it sufficiently given intelligence that significant numbers are starting to be produced by that point in time)?

By the way, given that by that point in time the Luftwaffe was on the ropes when it comes to having access to trained personnel, if more 262's than were produced OTL are available to the Germans and in significant numbers to truly put a dent in the CBO, where are the pilots coming from exactly? OTL by mid-44 a new Luftwaffe pilot had about 20 hours flying time in his aircraft and maybe 100 some odd hours total before reaching combat where as Allied pilots regularly had several hundred hours total. And while Allied air superiority made it harder to train pilots, the Germans didn't do themselves any favors in the way they ran their training system either, since they had entered into the war thinking it would be quick enough that they could engage in all sorts of expedients that wrecked their training program (like Goering stripping several hundred Ju-52's from the training command to support the Stalingrad airlift and seeing 488 getting shot down, or severely limiting the availability of fuel to the training command) (https://charles-oneill.com/projects/lf.html).

Finally, even if the 262's are available by late '43 as you mentioned in a previous post (albeit in limited numbers if the dates are merely being moved back a year), the Luftwaffe started to get torn apart during the summer/fall of 1943 (suffering no less than a 30% loss rate between July '43 and Oct. 43, hitting 40% in Oct. '43) (http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/aureview/1983/mar-apr/murray.htm). And while at the start of 1944 the Germans had, for example, 2395 single engine fighter pilots total after the losses that had already been inflicted by the Allies (and of those 1495 considered operational, 291 partially ready, and not operational under any circumstance), by May they had lost 2262 pilots. Even with 262's entering into service, the numbers involved still likely mean that the majority of the Luftwaffe's fighter force, which would still be flying piston engine fighters of one kind or another, gets utterly hammered during the spring of 1944. So how much of a change happens from OTL with 262's available in numbers large enough that they're put in the hands of pilots who can't safely fly them, and faced with an enemy aircraft are likely to bail out?

Overall, the biggest issue that I'm seeing with this is the belief that somehow the Germans will get all of these wonder weapons in good working order (better working order than in OTL actually given the numbers being apparently envisioned) and the Allies will simply sit on their asses and do nothing to counter these developments. This despite the fact that in many areas, the Allies were most assuredly technically equal if not superior to the Germans and, once again, if the need arose should be able to develop and deploy countermeasures (and even non-technical ones, like simply focusing bombing on factories producing these wunderwaffe, which will both slow production and screw with the production of other things the Germans need). And also, the idea that these weapons can be brought into combat a year earlier without any sacrifices having to be made on the part of German industry, which was already limited in it's capacity to begin with, but now would have to deal with significant changes to production in several different categories of weapons, while under constant bombardment by the Western Allies and by 1943 the need to replace losses occurring in the East.


No they wouldn't use a single unescorted B-29, but then why use it in daylight or unescorted? Why not fly it in with an RAF night raid, or sneak it in as part of a standard B-29 raid (since if we're assuming the Germans are that much more capable of holding out presumably B-29's would have been diverted to the European theater)

Agreed, for some reason he seems to assume the Allied war effort was run by complete idiots. The Allies had more money and manpower and were very technologically advanced themselves. They wouldn't be twiddling their thumbs if/when such "wonder weapons" became actual threats.
 
Now the OP is totally ASB IMHO just moving everything up without any justification, so what is being discussed isn't really applicable to OTL, because the Germans are getting a magical 12 month technological leap that was impossible IOTL for all categories, baring perhaps the Germans opting to produce the Jumo 004A...which mean a very different engine that used as many strategic metals as a BMW801 engine, which totally wiped out the economic simplicity of the Jumo 004B that was cheap and easy to make.

Then this belongs in the ASB section not the After 1900 section.
 
In any event this study on the history of cruise missiles notes the enormous disproportionate impact of the weapon on Britain:
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a162646.pdf
Apparently they evacuated some 500-800k people from London, spent over 73k tons of bombs on V-1 targets, several orders higher explosive weight than even in all the V-1 missiles built. That's not even counting the vast investment of defensive resources to intercept them either.


Reading the article it reports 800,000 to 1500,000 Londoners had to be evacuated.[PP47] . It also confirms the poor accuracy of the weapon, both in Germany and postwar testing. I have no doubts about the defence against the V-I was 3 times the overall cost of the Program. Does any one know the overall cost of the V-1 program?
 
Then this belongs in the ASB section not the After 1900 section.

It's all balanced out nicely by the British year early and 1943 FAA in 1939 threads. Both the German and British are 11 pages as of now, even though the German one started a month early. One could start a thread where the British thread was a month earlier than the German thread.
 

Deleted member 1487

Reading the article it reports 800,000 to 1500,000 Londoners had to be evacuated.[PP47] . It also confirms the poor accuracy of the weapon, both in Germany and postwar testing. I have no doubts about the defence against the V-I was 3 times the overall cost of the Program. Does any one know the overall cost of the V-1 program?
Another report I read, but cannot find ATM, said about 500 million RM, which included all aspects from R&D to production to the launch sites. It was about 1/5th the cost of the V-2 program. Accuracy doesn't need to be high to get massive results.

Then this belongs in the ASB section not the After 1900 section.
Take it up with the mods. They've allowed it to stay.
 
Another report I read, but cannot find ATM, said about 500 million RM, which included all aspects from R&D to production to the launch sites. It was about 1/5th the cost of the V-2 program. Accuracy doesn't need to be high to get massive results.


Take it up with the mods. They've allowed it to stay.

You yourself said it was magic, that makes it ASB.
 
Don't move it since there is still more info out their.

One potential cost could be seen by USA JB2 copy. According to Winking article [BTW BIG thanks for that!] USAAF calculated that American mass production plans would require


The program met criticism stateside as well. In September, some expressed
concern that the missile program would adversly affect the production of artillery
shells and heavy artillery pieces. A report in late 1944 concluded that the program
would cut field artillery production by 25 percent and bomb production by 17
percen
t." In January 1945, General Myers learned that the proposed missile
program would not only cost $1.5 billion but would require one-fourth of Allies'
ETO shipping assets.


Shipping losses would be a big deal
another point .....


One British estimate asserted that the V-Is were eight times as difficult to attack as a
manned aircraft, even though they flew straight and level." While that estimate
may be somewhat exaggerated, the V-Is undoubtedly were a difficult target to
destroy.


http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a162646.pdf
 
You yourself said it was magic, that makes it ASB.
Before asking for a move, keep in mind that it does not invoke ASB. The how is left blank.
ASB is just the easiest Way to explain it while keeping everything else the same.
Off course thats impossible, but its a good thought experiment. Its a Way of looking at the contribution of individual things in isolation. Actually the Way a scientist would try to address the contribution of a particular component in a system.
Let me try an example: if Germany was a mouse, the pod would be a tech development transgene. If development had been stopped (an even better questionn IMHO), it would be a tech development knock out.
Cf. The Real life approach here:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetically_modified_mouse

If there was a specific pod, this would be all we were discussing now on page 50.
 

Deleted member 1487

Don't move it since there is still more info out their.

One potential cost could be seen by USA JB2 copy. According to Winking article [BTW BIG thanks for that!] USAAF calculated that American mass production plans would require

Shipping losses would be a big deal
another point .....

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a162646.pdf
Sure, but if it is moved it would just be in the ASB section and still accessible. So it seems like your numbers are supporting that it was very cost effect for the Germans, but due to the need for the US to ship them overseas they were not a viable weapon for them.

There were several other studies done about the V-weapons during and after WW2 by the US military, but I cannot seem to find them, though I know I've read the PDFs of them before.
There is some info in here:
https://www.amazon.com/V-1-Flying-B...ks&ie=UTF8&qid=1496003141&sr=1-1&keywords=v-1
 
I won't ask for it to be moved as people don't want it moved there, I just want it noted that upping German tech a year without any apparent cost in doing so is ASB.
 
The original question was without Nazi infighting or things like Hitler changing the role of the Me 262 some Nazi weapons enter service a year earlier? So it wasn't ASB. But like all things it took a life of its own. People have posted variants like the British or Japanese weapons entering service a year earlier. But without the mentioned infighting, etc.
 
The original question was without Nazi infighting or things like Hitler changing the role of the Me 262 some Nazi weapons enter service a year earlier? So it wasn't ASB. But like all things it took a life of its own. People have posted variants like the British or Japanese weapons entering service a year earlier. But without the mentioned infighting, etc.
 

Deleted member 1487

The original question was without Nazi infighting or things like Hitler changing the role of the Me 262 some Nazi weapons enter service a year earlier? So it wasn't ASB. But like all things it took a life of its own. People have posted variants like the British or Japanese weapons entering service a year earlier. But without the mentioned infighting, etc.
In terms of the Me262 the fighter-bomber conversion didn't really delay things, because the hold up was the engine, not the airframe.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_004#Design_and_development
It was not until early 1944 that full production could finally begin. These sorts of engineering detail challenges for the 109-004-series of jet engine designs, formed the setbacks that were the principal factor delaying the Luftwaffe's introduction of the Me 262 into squadron service.
 
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