And at the same time, since the first operational 262 squadron (which was a test squadron as much as anything else) was withdrawn from combat after it's commander was shot down, and the first truly operational squadrons were only formed in Jan. 1945, why do the Germans not have similar issues with an accelerated 262 development? And let's not forget that the Germans did have teething problems throughout the test program, and by your own admission those were only fully worked out after the planes had entered service (and also I don't really think that going from engines that need to be severely overhauled after 10 hours to 20-25 hours in Germany's position is exactly something to brag about). And as mentioned later, given the substantial problems with attrition that the Luftwaffe experienced starting in the summer of 1943, by the time 262's start being available in significant numbers in 1944 (by the way, is this assumed to be OTL production numbers moved back a year or greater?), more likely than not they'll end up being flown by pilots with only 100-150 total hours flying time on any aircraft before joining their squadrons, if they're lucky. So in other words, pilots who would be as much or more of a risk to themselves than they would be to the enemy.
The reason the Soviets went with the more advanced Nene was because the first generation German jet engines that the Soviet's had were about as powerful as they could be made to be and the second generation designs were underpowered technical dead ends (notice the problems that the Germans had with the HeS 011 during the war, the engine that was supposed to power their entire next generation of jets). Meanwhile, the British had designs that could actually provide the requisite thrust and were capable of further development in the future, so the Soviets simply went for the expedient of getting their hands on the British designs rather than trying to figure it out from scratch. This wasn't a Russian or German problem alone by the way, the U.S. had a dud of an engine with the Westinghouse J40, which lead to the planes that used it either being grounded or redesigned to take an engine that gave an acceptable amount of thrust.
Given the technical capabilities and competencies of the various Allied powers, why wouldn't they be able to develop countermeasures to German developments and accelerate the pace of their own programs? I mean, as but one example, the main reason why the P-80 never saw combat or mass production during the war was that the U.S. didn't feel the need to deploy an aircraft like it until all the bugs got worked out. Unlike Germany which was desperate to deploy anything they felt could give them an edge over the Allies (most infamously such as the Me-163). If the 262 is flying in large numbers by 1944 and is actually having a major impact on the Allied bomber offensive, why wouldn't the U.S. start to rush development of the P-80 (and become more willing to accept casualties in the development process, or have rushed it sufficiently given intelligence that significant numbers are starting to be produced by that point in time)?
By the way, given that by that point in time the Luftwaffe was on the ropes when it comes to having access to trained personnel, if more 262's than were produced OTL are available to the Germans and in significant numbers to truly put a dent in the CBO, where are the pilots coming from exactly? OTL by mid-44 a new Luftwaffe pilot had about 20 hours flying time in his aircraft and maybe 100 some odd hours total before reaching combat where as Allied pilots regularly had several hundred hours total. And while Allied air superiority made it harder to train pilots, the Germans didn't do themselves any favors in the way they ran their training system either, since they had entered into the war thinking it would be quick enough that they could engage in all sorts of expedients that wrecked their training program (like Goering stripping several hundred Ju-52's from the training command to support the Stalingrad airlift and seeing 488 getting shot down, or severely limiting the availability of fuel to the training command) (https://charles-oneill.com/projects/lf.html).
Finally, even if the 262's are available by late '43 as you mentioned in a previous post (albeit in limited numbers if the dates are merely being moved back a year), the Luftwaffe started to get torn apart during the summer/fall of 1943 (suffering no less than a 30% loss rate between July '43 and Oct. 43, hitting 40% in Oct. '43) (http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/aureview/1983/mar-apr/murray.htm). And while at the start of 1944 the Germans had, for example, 2395 single engine fighter pilots total after the losses that had already been inflicted by the Allies (and of those 1495 considered operational, 291 partially ready, and not operational under any circumstance), by May they had lost 2262 pilots. Even with 262's entering into service, the numbers involved still likely mean that the majority of the Luftwaffe's fighter force, which would still be flying piston engine fighters of one kind or another, gets utterly hammered during the spring of 1944. So how much of a change happens from OTL with 262's available in numbers large enough that they're put in the hands of pilots who can't safely fly them, and faced with an enemy aircraft are likely to bail out?
Overall, the biggest issue that I'm seeing with this is the belief that somehow the Germans will get all of these wonder weapons in good working order (better working order than in OTL actually given the numbers being apparently envisioned) and the Allies will simply sit on their asses and do nothing to counter these developments. This despite the fact that in many areas, the Allies were most assuredly technically equal if not superior to the Germans and, once again, if the need arose should be able to develop and deploy countermeasures (and even non-technical ones, like simply focusing bombing on factories producing these wunderwaffe, which will both slow production and screw with the production of other things the Germans need). And also, the idea that these weapons can be brought into combat a year earlier without any sacrifices having to be made on the part of German industry, which was already limited in it's capacity to begin with, but now would have to deal with significant changes to production in several different categories of weapons, while under constant bombardment by the Western Allies and by 1943 the need to replace losses occurring in the East.
No they wouldn't use a single unescorted B-29, but then why use it in daylight or unescorted? Why not fly it in with an RAF night raid, or sneak it in as part of a standard B-29 raid (since if we're assuming the Germans are that much more capable of holding out presumably B-29's would have been diverted to the European theater)
Agreed, for some reason he seems to assume the Allied war effort was run by complete idiots. The Allies had more money and manpower and were very technologically advanced themselves. They wouldn't be twiddling their thumbs if/when such "wonder weapons" became actual threats.