The infighting and program shifts so common in Nazi Germany were limited and the Type XXI and Type XXIII u-boats, Messerschmitt Me 262A jet fighter and Arado Ar 234C jet bomber, StG 44 rifle and finally the Panther F tank enter service a year earlier, all enter service no later than January 1944. How much longer could the war have been prolonged?
Nazi better weapons enter service a year earlier.
- Thread starter Musketeer513
- Start date
Obergruppenführer Smith
Banned
And how are you going to get the resources to manufacture and fuel them?
if the ME-262 are available in sufficient numbers, they could halt the day light bombing campaign.
marathag
Banned
Or Hitler has more configured for Schnellbombers.
Don't forget that the still have half the fuel economy of piston engines, they are thirsty, and Greater Germany doesn't have unlimited amounts of Kerosene a year earlier. They used about a .8 gallon of fuel for each mile of range. That's ar cruise speed. Top speed is worse.
If German paratroopers had FG42 rifles BEFORE their invasion of Crete, they could have captured the island with far fewer casualties.
For example: the Luftwaffe might have retained enough Junkers 52 transports to seriously re-supply troops on the Eastern Front.
Then again, if Junkers 252 or 352 transports arrived a year or two earlier ......
For example: the Luftwaffe might have retained enough Junkers 52 transports to seriously re-supply troops on the Eastern Front.
Then again, if Junkers 252 or 352 transports arrived a year or two earlier ......
Also, given the awful reliability of the Panther for example (final drive train that breaks down after 500 km and turns the tank into a bunker, estimates by Guderian to Hitler that Panthers in the East can function for 1000 km without trouble, while Sherman's and T-34' can manage 2000-2500 km), the bigger question with all of this is how well do these things actually work? And remember that it took until the end of 1944/beginning of 1945 for Panther readiness rates to reach acceptable levels (when the German's started using the things, they could only manage about a 30% readiness rate), so even if these weapons were accelerated how would German both the German maintenance and supply apparatus (which would have to handle a whole host of new weapons systems being brought into service all at once) manage to handle the logistical needs of these super weapons.
And finally don't forget that, especially in the case of the Panthers and other big cats, Allied inferiority is far over sold compared to what was actually the case. With tanks, by 1944 Allied forces simply had better doctrine, supply, and training than German forces and were regularly able to defeat German armor. According to post-war U.S. Army operation research conducted by the Ballistic Research Lab IIRC, the Sherman maintained a positive exchange rate against Panther's throughout the war and was over three times more effective a tank than the Panther was. So in short, on the ground, even if the German's get these weapons into mass production, how much good does it do them when their in the hands of kids fresh out of the Hitler Youth?
In the air, things might be a bit better for the German's, since aircraft like the 262 would be a genuine leap in capability over Allied capabilities, but how many 262's would be built in this scenario? OTL, in the hands of the best pilots the Germans had, the 262 only managed to down something like 300 bombers and 150 fighters, at the cost of 100 fighters. So how many more 262's would be built and further how many planes would they actually manage to shoot down? And how many would the Germans be able to keep in the air even if they had them, since the materials needed to build and maintain the 262's engines weren't exactly in ample supply OTL, and more 262's and other jets could only exacerbate that problem and all the downstream problems flowing from that. Finally, at sea, all that I can say is that by 1942 Allied ASW techniques were what really broke German attempts to blockade Britain via U-Boat by inflicting a level of losses on the part of the U-Boat force attacking shipping that was unacceptable. Would these new U-Boats be so superior as to successfully counter American and British ASW?
And finally don't forget that, especially in the case of the Panthers and other big cats, Allied inferiority is far over sold compared to what was actually the case. With tanks, by 1944 Allied forces simply had better doctrine, supply, and training than German forces and were regularly able to defeat German armor. According to post-war U.S. Army operation research conducted by the Ballistic Research Lab IIRC, the Sherman maintained a positive exchange rate against Panther's throughout the war and was over three times more effective a tank than the Panther was. So in short, on the ground, even if the German's get these weapons into mass production, how much good does it do them when their in the hands of kids fresh out of the Hitler Youth?
In the air, things might be a bit better for the German's, since aircraft like the 262 would be a genuine leap in capability over Allied capabilities, but how many 262's would be built in this scenario? OTL, in the hands of the best pilots the Germans had, the 262 only managed to down something like 300 bombers and 150 fighters, at the cost of 100 fighters. So how many more 262's would be built and further how many planes would they actually manage to shoot down? And how many would the Germans be able to keep in the air even if they had them, since the materials needed to build and maintain the 262's engines weren't exactly in ample supply OTL, and more 262's and other jets could only exacerbate that problem and all the downstream problems flowing from that. Finally, at sea, all that I can say is that by 1942 Allied ASW techniques were what really broke German attempts to blockade Britain via U-Boat by inflicting a level of losses on the part of the U-Boat force attacking shipping that was unacceptable. Would these new U-Boats be so superior as to successfully counter American and British ASW?
Last edited:
gaijin
Banned
They will be supplied by the company Pluck&Daring GmbH. A daughter company of the Bullscheissen Gruppe. They are the global market leader in the field of wishful think management. If anyone can pull it of its them.
At work.
Just a question about fuel.
The synthetic coal=>fuel system?
A) Just what where its efficiencys/inefficiencys?
B) Of the types/grades of fuel that were produced what were their levels/amounts?
Any nice/good links?
Cheers!
Just a question about fuel.
The synthetic coal=>fuel system?
A) Just what where its efficiencys/inefficiencys?
B) Of the types/grades of fuel that were produced what were their levels/amounts?
Any nice/good links?
Cheers!
Insider
Banned
Well they had some fuel for messerschmits and fockewulfs in the 1943, the amount of fuel isn't going to change, just the type of airplanes to use them. Same goes with production capacity. Had Me 262 were available earlier I am sure they would be build at expense of other types of fighters.
Deleted member 1487
Same way they got the resources to manufacture what they made IOTL from 1944-45.
See above. Add in that if they are introduced in numbers prior to the May 1944 start of the oil campaign they would have plenty of fuel. As it was Me262 engines were extraordinarily cheap in terms of materials (using non-strategic metals, which made that FAR cheaper than a FW190 engine) and labor (only 300 manhours to make, a tiny fraction of what was needed for say a DB605 or BMW 801 piston engine), so could be made in much greater numbers than existing piston engines for fighters. They also ran on a kerosene/diesel mix, which was in relative abundant supply compared to Avgas. So there was plenty of resources in late 1943-early 1944 to make and field them. The one issue really might just be pilots, but that is less of one in late 1943 than in late 1944.
Keep in mind that the kill-loss rates of Me262s was in late 1944-early 1945 when the war was already long lost and air dominance over Germany was held by the Wallies and Soviets. In late 1943 (OP said technology is a year early, the first 262s were fielded in 2nd half of 1944) when the Germans still held air superiority over their own country and the Big Week massacre of the Luftwaffe had not yet happened and Schweinfurt was coming up still then loss rates of jets will be minimal and limited to defensive fires of bomber boxes, not enemy fighters bouncing them on take off and landing. As it was even 100 fighters lost to kill 300 bombers and fighters is a massive win for the Germans compared to even OTL 1943, but would be even better given that major factors for the loss of Me262s in OTL late 1944-45 won't be present in late 1943. In fact if JG 7 is operational at the time of Schweinfurt, replacing the Bf110s/Me410s (I'm assuming the Me410 isn't even produced as of January 1943 because of the advent of early jets), then the losses for the 2nd Schweinfurt raid might well get into entire bomber groups being downed. As it was in late 1944 an Me262 could do 10 passes on a bomber box before having to breakoff for refueling/reload of ammo and with 4x 30mm cannons in the nose if they can even kill 5 bombers per sortie in late 1943 without having to deal with Wallied fighters and having free runs on unescorted bombers they will do pretty extreme damage and let the swarms of piston engine fighters then be able to pick off individual bombers as the boxes are broken up.
Me262 engines BTW were mostly simple steel and used FAR less strategic materials than a Me109 engine. In fact they only took about 300 unskilled manhours to make compared to about 1800 skilled manpower for a BMW 801 engine. The push for jet engines in 1944 wasn't just because of performance, it was due to them being dirt cheap in terms of manhours, material, and type of fuel used. For the cost of one DB605 engine they could make something like 4 Jumo 004s. In mid-1943 (12 months earlier than IOTL) they'd be much more easier to phase into production, especially if it prevented late war heavy fighters like the Me410 and old Bf110 daylight bomber interceptors from being built. You'd have heaps of resources to make, maintain, supply, and pilot them compared to late 1944 when they were first combat operational. They'd dramatically simplify German production issues IOTL by replacing both the Bf110 and Me410, plus preventing silly things like the Sturmböcke Fw190 and reduce losses enormous to enemy fighters (don't need to form big wings that got slaughtered in Big Week, can use piston engine fighters to defend landing/take off of jets and airfields in general while single engine piston fighters can optimize to fight enemy fighters not shoot down bombers with a bunch of really heavy cannons and rockets). In fact in terms of production you'd avoid a ton of really wasteful projects like the Me163, the He162, the Napkinwaffe, bunches of heavy fighter projects and stand off rocket systems, etc. while saving the lives a tons of pilots that won't be lost to P-51s as they try and shoot up bomber boxes in heavy fighters or laden with heavy weapons and can't maneuver.
I don't get where you think that ME262s would create huge problems, in fact they'd remarkably simplify the bomber problem by rationalizing research, production, pilot training, maintenance, supply issues, pilot survival, etc. It's a VAST resource savings compared to the historical situation by late 1943 and into 1944. By the time the P-51 shows up the Me262 is relatively matured in combat and is unable to catch them in the air, while the Luftwaffe can utilize it's fighters to defend against the P-51 threats to airfields and other projects, while the Me262s don't need escorts to intercept bombers and like in the BoB can wear down bombers groups with incessant individual attacks, rather than needing to wait for a big formation to form up (generally bounced by P-51 and other escort fighters before they were ready for combat), which, when they even worked, would only got 1 go at a bomber formation and were enormously wasteful of fuel and time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Wing
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Week
https://books.google.com/books?id=z...I#v=onepage&q=Luftwaffe big wing 1944&f=false
Last edited by a moderator:
Obergruppenführer Smith
Banned
One problem here: The OP also has the submarines, Panther F, and Ar 234C thrown into the mix. I was asking how all of those could be completed.
Sure, I can see StG being made, and perhaps just the Me 262. But added that many other elements on top of those?
Deleted member 1487
Again, by not having to make the alternatives that were historically made; if the Elektroboot was ready to be deployed in 1944, it would have had to be started to be built in 1942. So instead of Type VII and XI Uboats laid down in 1942 they are making Elektroboote. The lead time for any Uboat is something like 18-24 months, so instead of having 1944 complete Uboats laid down in 1942 IOTL they laid down the advanced boats instead, so production changed over in 1942 when the resources were much more abundant and they enter combat in 1944. Same thing with the Panther F, the idea is that it would be conceived say in 1940 based on the experience with the French heavy tanks and the A and D series Panthers are ready and in combat in late 1942, so that the F series is conceived and ready in late 1943/early 1944. Same with the AR234C, it is ordered in 1942 based on the advances in the jet engine program based on earlier research and is combat operational in early 1944 based on early work done in 1943 with the A and B series. Instead of making the OTL 1942-43 equipment (Panzer III or IV for the Panther, He111/Ju88/Me410/Ju87G for the AR234) they make the more advanced types. In terms of resources that isn't the problem. The problem is getting the technology ready that early. Like you I can see the StG and Me262, but the rest is just too early for the technology and even concept for say the Panther to be ready by 1944.
in 1944 80,000 sortie were flown by the LW attempting to halt the day time bomber streams. They managed to down 1 enemy plane per 20 sortie , while the 6000 Me-262 sortie managed 1 enemy plane shot down for ever 8 sortie. The fuel for Me-262 was JP-2 which was a mixture of kerosene /diesel. 80,000 sortie = 160,000 tons of diesel/kerosene , which would be ~ 1/6th of the annual diesel/kerosene consumption in 1944.
Last edited:
Deleted member 1487
80,000 sorties + 1 plane destroyed per 8 sorties = 10,000 aircraft destroyed. 10,000 bombers had something like 100,000 crew (going by 10 men per B-17). IOTL the USAAF lost 18,000 aircraft attacking Germany from 1942-45:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_the_Reich
10,000 aircraft lost in one year would probably double OTL 1944 aircraft losses over Germany...not counting losses to FLAK. Nor is that assuming that more Me262s earlier with better pilots, more time for the technology to mature and pilots to gain experience, etc. would result in higher kill rates than 1 per 8 sorties.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_262#Introduction
Assuming the ME262 is ready 12 months earlier that means the first unit gets operational in August 1943...which is right in time for the 1st Schweinfurt raid:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schweinfurt–Regensburg_mission
If the USAAF doesn't stop unescorted raids after that come the 2nd Schweinfurt raid a full Wing of the Me262s should be available, which would dramatically ratchet up the kill rates for that mission. Does the USAAF persist then? If so then 1944 is going to get a really nasty for them. It also means that with the jet engines available night fighter jet designs become available, like the AR234P. Which then means Mosquito bombers are touchable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arado_Ar_234#Ar_234P
How well does the RAF do when it has jet night fighters swatting their pathfinders and heavy bombers? How about if this early technology also then potentially meaning the Berlin microwave airborne radar is also ready in 1944:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FuG_240_Berlin
The 1943-44 RAF "Battle of Berlin" would be pretty bloody too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_(RAF_campaign)
With jets available in daylight perhaps then the Normandy landings have to deal with jet fighter intercepts of bombers in daylight, which would hurt their ground support abilities.
Beyond that is OP also suggesting that technology like the V-1 and V-2 and V-3 getting into service a year earlier? That means V-1 attacks in mid-1943 before proximity fuses are in full use or microwave guidance radar with automated 90mm AA guns. AR234Cs with bomber abilities in 1944 could well hit the Channel Ports too. That makes WW2 and altogether bloodier war.
trajen777
Banned
Good POD :
If you add in the R4M your kill ratio of the ME 262 goes way up with most likely fewer losses, since the R4M was fired beyond the range of the 50 cal guns on the B24 or B17. If you then combine this weapons system to its anti tank function then u have serious increases in tank kill on the eastern front
The R4M was developed in order to deal with the increasing weight of anti-bomber weapons being deployed by Luftwaffe fighters. The primary anti-bomber weapon of the Luftwaffe for much of the war was the 20 mm MG 151/20 autocannon, which was compact enough to be mounted in an internal wing bay mounting in the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 (up to 4 cannon, or 6 with optional twin-gun underwing pods) and also fitted on the centerline of Bf 109G fighters, firing through the propeller spinner as a Motorkanone. This could be supplemented by an additional pair of cannon in drag-inducing underwing gun pods, but it was found that it took an average of twenty 20 mm hits to shoot down a typical four-engined Allied bomber. The MG 151/20 was subsequently supplemented with or replaced by the 30 mm MK 108 cannon, which replaced the centerline Motorkanone-mount MG 151/20 on many Bf 109's, and could be fit into slightly larger underwing pods, which could be used on either the Bf 109 or Fw 190. This heavier-caliber cannon could bring down a bomber with an average of one to three hits. However the MK 108 was much heavier and the larger calibre ammunition made it difficult to carry more than one or two "passes" worth. Worse, the low muzzle velocity of this gun meant it had a very short range and suffered a ballistic drop of over 41 metres at 1,000 metres range after firing. In approaching close enough to get hits, the fighters placed themselves within the range of the dozens of AN/M2 "light barrel" Browning defensive machine guns that a combat box formation of a typical USAAF heavy bomber raid possessed, from nearly any approach direction. The more powerful MK 103 cannon had higher muzzle velocity and increased range, at the cost of greatly increased weight, size (barrel length of 1.34 meters, or 52-3/4 inches) and much lower rate of fire: 380-420 RPM vs. 600-650 RPM for the MK 108.
The solution was to replace the underwing gun pods, and the excessively drag-producing large-calibre underwing rocket launch tubes, with a small-diameter solid-fuel rocket-engine-propelled projectile, mounting a warhead similar to that of the cannon shell. Although each "round" was heavier than the corresponding gun-fired shell, the absence of a gun reduced the overall weight considerably. The weight difference was so great that even a much larger and longer-ranged rocket was still lighter than the guns it could replace, although the total number of rounds carried was also reduced from 65 rounds of 30 mm ammunition to only 24 rockets.
The anti-aircraft version of the R4M used a large warhead of 55 mm with 520 g. (17.6 ounces) of the strongly brisant Hexogen explosive charge, nearly guaranteeing a fighter kill with one hit, from the "shattering" force of its explosive warhead — this was the same explosive used in the shells fired by both the MK 103 (30 x 184 mm cartridge) and MK 108 (30 x 90 mm cartridge) autocannons. Each R4M weighed 3.2 kg and was provided with enough fuel to be fired from 1000 m, just outside the range of the bomber's defensive guns. The main body of the rocket consisted of a simple steel tube with eight base-hinged flip-out fins on the tail for stabilisation, deployed immediately after launch. A battery typically consisted of two groups of 12 rockets and when all 24 were salvoed in an attack, they would fill an area about 15 by 30 m at 1000 m, a density that made it almost certain that the target would be hit. The R4Ms were usually fired in four salvos of six missiles at intervals of 70 milliseconds from a range of 600 m, and would supersonically streak towards their target at a sixty percent higher velocity than the Wfr. Gr. 21's rockets would (the BR 21's projectile travelled at some 1150 km/h post-launch), as the R4M typically had a flight speed of roughly 1,890 km/h (1,175 mph). Two warheads were available for the R4M, the common PB-3 with a 0.4 kg charge for anti-aircraft use and the larger shaped charge, similar in construction to the Panzerschreck, the Panzerblitz (PB-2/3), for anti-tank use. The Panzerblitz III, mounting a gigantic 210 mm hollow charge warhead (the same calibre as the BR 21), can be seen as the ultimate development of the basic Orkan rocket. It was intended to be carried (six or eight rockets per plane) by the tank-busting B model of the Henschel Hs 132 jet dive-bomber - however, neither the missile nor the warplane it was exclusively intended for got beyond the prototype stage before the end of the war.
If you add in the R4M your kill ratio of the ME 262 goes way up with most likely fewer losses, since the R4M was fired beyond the range of the 50 cal guns on the B24 or B17. If you then combine this weapons system to its anti tank function then u have serious increases in tank kill on the eastern front
The R4M was developed in order to deal with the increasing weight of anti-bomber weapons being deployed by Luftwaffe fighters. The primary anti-bomber weapon of the Luftwaffe for much of the war was the 20 mm MG 151/20 autocannon, which was compact enough to be mounted in an internal wing bay mounting in the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 (up to 4 cannon, or 6 with optional twin-gun underwing pods) and also fitted on the centerline of Bf 109G fighters, firing through the propeller spinner as a Motorkanone. This could be supplemented by an additional pair of cannon in drag-inducing underwing gun pods, but it was found that it took an average of twenty 20 mm hits to shoot down a typical four-engined Allied bomber. The MG 151/20 was subsequently supplemented with or replaced by the 30 mm MK 108 cannon, which replaced the centerline Motorkanone-mount MG 151/20 on many Bf 109's, and could be fit into slightly larger underwing pods, which could be used on either the Bf 109 or Fw 190. This heavier-caliber cannon could bring down a bomber with an average of one to three hits. However the MK 108 was much heavier and the larger calibre ammunition made it difficult to carry more than one or two "passes" worth. Worse, the low muzzle velocity of this gun meant it had a very short range and suffered a ballistic drop of over 41 metres at 1,000 metres range after firing. In approaching close enough to get hits, the fighters placed themselves within the range of the dozens of AN/M2 "light barrel" Browning defensive machine guns that a combat box formation of a typical USAAF heavy bomber raid possessed, from nearly any approach direction. The more powerful MK 103 cannon had higher muzzle velocity and increased range, at the cost of greatly increased weight, size (barrel length of 1.34 meters, or 52-3/4 inches) and much lower rate of fire: 380-420 RPM vs. 600-650 RPM for the MK 108.
The solution was to replace the underwing gun pods, and the excessively drag-producing large-calibre underwing rocket launch tubes, with a small-diameter solid-fuel rocket-engine-propelled projectile, mounting a warhead similar to that of the cannon shell. Although each "round" was heavier than the corresponding gun-fired shell, the absence of a gun reduced the overall weight considerably. The weight difference was so great that even a much larger and longer-ranged rocket was still lighter than the guns it could replace, although the total number of rounds carried was also reduced from 65 rounds of 30 mm ammunition to only 24 rockets.
The anti-aircraft version of the R4M used a large warhead of 55 mm with 520 g. (17.6 ounces) of the strongly brisant Hexogen explosive charge, nearly guaranteeing a fighter kill with one hit, from the "shattering" force of its explosive warhead — this was the same explosive used in the shells fired by both the MK 103 (30 x 184 mm cartridge) and MK 108 (30 x 90 mm cartridge) autocannons. Each R4M weighed 3.2 kg and was provided with enough fuel to be fired from 1000 m, just outside the range of the bomber's defensive guns. The main body of the rocket consisted of a simple steel tube with eight base-hinged flip-out fins on the tail for stabilisation, deployed immediately after launch. A battery typically consisted of two groups of 12 rockets and when all 24 were salvoed in an attack, they would fill an area about 15 by 30 m at 1000 m, a density that made it almost certain that the target would be hit. The R4Ms were usually fired in four salvos of six missiles at intervals of 70 milliseconds from a range of 600 m, and would supersonically streak towards their target at a sixty percent higher velocity than the Wfr. Gr. 21's rockets would (the BR 21's projectile travelled at some 1150 km/h post-launch), as the R4M typically had a flight speed of roughly 1,890 km/h (1,175 mph). Two warheads were available for the R4M, the common PB-3 with a 0.4 kg charge for anti-aircraft use and the larger shaped charge, similar in construction to the Panzerschreck, the Panzerblitz (PB-2/3), for anti-tank use. The Panzerblitz III, mounting a gigantic 210 mm hollow charge warhead (the same calibre as the BR 21), can be seen as the ultimate development of the basic Orkan rocket. It was intended to be carried (six or eight rockets per plane) by the tank-busting B model of the Henschel Hs 132 jet dive-bomber - however, neither the missile nor the warplane it was exclusively intended for got beyond the prototype stage before the end of the war.
It still ends in 1945, probably November/December, with the US using the atomic bomb.