Naval WI: Earliest possible RN without carriers?

As of today the RN is in succesful process of destroying itself by clinging into aircraft carriers which probably will not have aircraft, crew or escorts when they will be completed.

Now, WI RN had got rid of the aircraft carriers already after exiting East of Suez in 1967? No through deck cruisers but a honest surface combatant force. What kind of large surface combatants (large number of enlengthened Type 42's perhaps?) would have been completed? Falklands would have been won by RN anyway? How large RN would be nowadays?
 
The UK would have to require American and/or French assistance in the Falklands, and by assistance I mean aircraft carriers.
By forfeiting the carriers, they've essentially forfeit any chance of projecting military power by themselves.
 

Tovarich

Banned
The UK would have to require American and/or French assistance in the Falklands, and by assistance I mean aircraft carriers.
By forfeiting the carriers, they've essentially forfeit any chance of projecting military power by themselves.

I dunno, at least in regard to the Falklands.
Could an earlier acquisition of naval Tomahawks (or even an independently developed equivalent?) have replaced the role played by Harrier strikes? (and Vulcan strikes on Pt Stanley runway, come to that!)

In addition, could an earlier emphasis on ship-to-air defensive missiles have saved the HMS Sheffield?

I am presuming here that ASW helicopters on a ship does not count as an 'aircraft carrier', I can see there'd still be a need for those (at least three, for triangulation, I believe?)
 
The UK would have to require American and/or French assistance in the Falklands, and by assistance I mean aircraft carriers.
By forfeiting the carriers, they've essentially forfeit any chance of projecting military power by themselves.

Ditto this with current technology.

The only thing likely to replace the carrier will be something like a mixed drone launcher vessel complete with huge magazines filled with multi purpose/function missiles. (or could utilise satellite guidance assuming that satalite tech is up to the 'inspection capabilty' of the target area(s).

The main reason, and its a huge one, why the 'big gun' warship was displaced by the aircraft carrier was the range at which they could inflict damage on their targets (as well as 'find' the target as far as naval warfare is concerned).
 
RN Admiral: "Of course, lads! A small helicopter carrier out alone in the middle of the ocean is completely invulnerable." ;)
 
The UK would have to require American and/or French assistance in the Falklands, and by assistance I mean aircraft carriers.
By forfeiting the carriers, they've essentially forfeit any chance of projecting military power by themselves.

I wouldn't be so sure about it. A carrier-less RN might well have had more and better AD ships (maybe some 20 more) After all, it was the air defence of the ships which broke the back of Argentinian Air Forces, SSN's which broke the will of the Argentinian Navy and British Marines and Paras which broke the will of the Argentinian Land Forces.

I'm having hard time seeing that Shar's were critical, irreplaceable assets. They certainly did no good for RN or Britain after the Falklands. They were very marginal assets at best for NATO tasks or the post-cold War crisis.

Luckily for the RN, there will be no more RN carriers at foreseeable future.
 
In addition, could an earlier emphasis on ship-to-air defensive missiles have saved the HMS Sheffield?

In case of Falklands are larger calibre NGFS system (such as MK 71 tested during 1970's by the USN) could have been used as substitutes. This kind of system might have been very tempting for a carrier-less major navy. As for AD's, the Type 42's (more of them, remember) as it should have been with both Sea Dart and Sea Wolf, would have probably slaughtered any Argentinian attempts to strike against the Task Force.
 
I wouldn't be so sure about it. A carrier-less RN might well have had more and better AD ships (maybe some 20 more) After all, it was the air defence of the ships which broke the back of Argentinian Air Forces, SSN's which broke the will of the Argentinian Navy and British Marines and Paras which broke the will of the Argentinian Land Forces.

I'm having hard time seeing that Shar's were critical, irreplaceable assets. They certainly did no good for RN or Britain after the Falklands. They were very marginal assets at best for NATO tasks or the post-cold War crisis.

Luckily for the RN, there will be no more RN carriers at foreseeable future.
Perhaps, but you're forfeiting air support. Which general would want to wage war without it?
I dunno, at least in regard to the Falklands.
Could an earlier acquisition of naval Tomahawks (or even an independently developed equivalent?) have replaced the role played by Harrier strikes? (and Vulcan strikes on Pt Stanley runway, come to that!)
The thing is, cruise missiles carry rather limited warheads. Then again, so do Harriers, and Tomahawks have a longer range, thus enabling the RN to target the Argentinean airbases in the continent. However, cruise missiles don't have the versatility aircraft have.
 

Cook

Banned
I wouldn't be so sure about it. A carrier-less RN might well have had more and better AD ships (maybe some 20 more) After all, it was the air defence of the ships which broke the back of Argentinian Air Forces, SSN's which broke the will of the Argentinian Navy and British Marines and Paras which broke the will of the Argentinian Land Forces.

I'm having hard time seeing that Shar's were critical, irreplaceable assets. They certainly did no good for RN or Britain after the Falklands. They were very marginal assets at best for NATO tasks or the post-cold War crisis.

Luckily for the RN, there will be no more RN carriers at foreseeable future.

I will use the Pommie word that seems most appropriate here: Bollocks!

There were a string of air to air engagements between British Harriers and Argentine aircraft, all won by the Harriers.

As importantly, the very presence and threat of the Harriers restricted Argentine actions. The Argentine electronic surveillance aircraft had to keep out of range of the Harriers while trying to monitor the location of the Task Force. This hampered and greatly reduced the amount of information they were able to channel to the Argentine Super Entondards that were conducting the air attacks on the T.F.

Without organic air defence the Argentines would have been able to press home their air attacks to a far greater extent.

Britain’s decision to end its aircraft carrier arm is not because they have ‘seen the light’, it is because they are cash strapped and cannot afford to maintain a fleet with carriers any more. Britain is on the verge of bankruptcy; the alternatives for them now are to rapidly, ruthlessly shrink the fleet, or see the Royal Navy ships rust and sink at the docks just as the Soviet navy did in the early ‘90s.
 
Perhaps, but you're forfeiting air support. Which general would want to wage war without it?

In case of Falklands, the air support provided by Sea Harriers was extremely limited and in no ways decisive.

There were a string of air to air engagements between British Harriers and Argentine aircraft, all won by the Harriers.

Yes, but compared to value what additional 10-20 surface combatants might have had the value was rather limited...

As importantly, the very presence and threat of the Harriers restricted Argentine actions. The Argentine electronic surveillance aircraft had to keep out of range of the Harriers while trying to monitor the location of the Task Force.

TF relied on picket ships, which, in case of no carrier RN, might well have had SAM's with decent range enough instead of medium range Sea Darts.

Without organic air defence the Argentines would have been able to press home their air attacks to a far greater extent.

I'm having hard time seeing more successes against larger SAM coverage.

Britain’s decision to end its aircraft carrier arm is not because they have ‘seen the light’, it is because they are cash strapped and cannot afford to maintain a fleet with carriers any more.

Definitely, but it's questionable whether the amount of resources spent for a few minor carriers was worthwhile even during 1970's to 2000's period compared to whatever else could have been bought and maintained instead. Carriers are expensive and it's rather questionable that anything but full fleet carriers with capable escorts and full UNREP structure (a la USN) have been worth having instead of being just resource drains.

Anyone willing to speculate what kind of a navy Argentinians might have had for 1982 if they had not invested in upkeep of General Belgrano and Veintecinco de Mayo?
 
You're making the mistake of assuming money saved in carriers would be spent on other ships. If several billion can be cut from the Navy's budget by scrapping carriers, thats several billion gone from the defence budget, period. As Cook said, the carriers arent being scrapped for strategic reasons, they've kept 1000s of Labour voters in jobs, so their main task has been accomplished. How anyone can see a situation where the Navy will consist of 6 destroyers, 7 ssns, 14 frigates if we're lucky, and a couple of old amphibious assault ships, assuming they arent sold off, as "seeing the light" is beyond me. The SDR and the majority of defence reviews in the past several decades have been led by politics, not defence needs, and they will continue to be led this way until the end of time, or until Britain gets a competent government and a general public that cares about defence. (so its most likely option a).
 
You're making the mistake of assuming money saved in carriers would be spent on other ships. If several billion can be cut from the Navy's budget by scrapping carriers, thats several billion gone from the defence budget, period.

On the other hand, by clinging on to carriers the RN has allowed itself to be eliminated as cuts have been directed to other surface and submarine forces. Besides, making surface combatants keeps voters in jobs as well as building a carrier or two so I doubt procurement would be cut. One advantage of making smaller ships instead of larger ones, from employment viewpoint, is the fact that projects can be more evenly distributed to make for long term employment.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
In case of Falklands, the air support provided by Sea Harriers was extremely limited and in no ways decisive.

Except against the Exocet-carrying Super Etendards and their air cover, right?





Definitely, but it's questionable whether the amount of resources spent for a few minor carriers was worthwhile even during 1970's to 2000's period compared to whatever else could have been bought and maintained instead. Carriers are expensive and it's rather questionable that anything but full fleet carriers with capable escorts and full UNREP structure (a la USN) have been worth having instead of being just resource drains.
Minor carriers compared to what? The US Navy's super carriers? If that's your definition of what a carrier should be, then the rest of the world should just get out of the flat top game right now.

And while we're on the subject, the whole reason UN peacekeeping missions from the 50s to the 90s were able to be rapidly deployed was because the British and French had carriers that could carry helos, aircraft, and troops quickly.

You can't carry half a dozen helos with ASW ships.
 
The structure and composition of the RN, like any force, will depend on the mission. If the parameters of what the RN is expected to do are altered sufficiently, then there is a possibility.

In the immediate postwar era, it is difficult to lose the carriers, as they are very new and there is not a comparable naval weapons system that can control the sea and strike over long distances.

The window of opportunity would be around the late 1950s. This is when we see the RN start to settle into two sorts of mission - hot war and cold war. Carriers, amphibs and frigates were seen as useful for cold war missions, such as flying the flag.

Removing the capacity for 'cold war' missions that could not be carried out by frigates would involve a much earlier retreat from Empire, particularly East of Suez. This would require a point of departure in the 1940s or early 1950s, such as a complete economic meltdown or similar radical change to what Britain saw as her role in the world.

We would also have to change the role of the RN in regards to ASW in the North Atlantic, which is one driver for persisting with the through deck cruiser even after it's original raison d'etre as an escort cruiser for CVA-01 is gone. That would require Britain to take a backward step within NATO, or even leave the alliance structure.

Some combination of those two circumstances would be required for the RN to totally and utterly get out of the carrier game, and not to explore the helicopter cruiser game as the Italians and French did

In such a case, it is not going to be the same type of force in @, but with a greater number of more capable ships. It would be a very different looking fleet. Without the requirement for a 'cold war' mission, the 4.5" guns are out, and won't be replaced by a US gun that would take a rather larger ship, but rather with ASW missiles or Exocets later on.

Area air defence ships in a non-carrier fleet were not that heavy on the ground at the time, so it is unlikely we'd see something much more capable than a Type 42.

It is difficult to postulate what a fleet would be like without knowing what its mission and area of operation will be.

Like others, I don't see the savings from not having carriers being channeled into the surface fleet; at best, it would go into getting a fifth SSBN, but more likely be cut from defence altogether.

In a situation where the RN doesn't have carriers, I can't see the Falklands happening as there would be no reason to retain an amphibious capacity in such a very different scenario; the butterflies from what I see as the early enough PoD tend to indicate that the Falklands themselves would not be kept; and a purely surface fleet of the type that the ATL RN would likely deploy would lack a lot of the RFA/support ships that are required for such a long range operation.

Many smaller ships are only better than a few larger ones when the larger ones do not bring unique capabilities into play. In this case, those capabilities include carrying a commando and their helicopters or striking a target 500nm away. Up until the mid-late 80s, there aren't any non-aviation assets that can do the latter that aren't nuclear missiles.
 
The RN was planning on building the Type 43-a double ended super dooper destroyer with 2 Sea Dart launchers, 4 sets of Seas Wolf, midships helicopter flight deck, 8 Harpoon, 2x3 STWS with Stingray, Mk8 4.5" gun, various LAA and more likely than not at least 2 CIWS. They were also thinking of a cheaper sister-Type 44. However Batch 3 Type 22 were ordered instead.
 
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