There are two flaws in his calculation. First he based it on Japan's economic output in 1937, not 1941, and there is a big difference. In fact Japanese industrial output increased ten times between 1931 to 1941. One of the reasons the Japanese decided to go to war with the US was due to the overconfidence in this economic trend continuing.
By 1940 according to the timeline of this scenario, Japan would be stronger than that chart showed. Probably on par with France, and growing rapidly. With little threat of air raid on its industrial heartland, no war in China to bog it down, and being geographically closer to the action, Japan cannot be counted on to lose the war.
The second flaw is presenting the case as total war. Total war rarely exists. The US was not nearly as mobilized in WWII as the Soviets or Japanese. To say that "every ounce" of American might was put into the war effort is incorrect. Americans never had to face the kind of deprivation others did. Milk still got delivered, beef was still what's for dinner. Fact is, America didn't need to mobilize every ounce to win the war since it had such a massive industrial advantage.
So would a war between Japan and the Anglo-French alliance be a total war? It might be for Japan, but it's hard to see the alliance as committed to defeating Japan as they did with Germany. The threat just wasn't there.