Naval history WI: Less carrier orientated USN post 1950's

Now, considering such beauties as USS Albany post her modification a WI sprang into my mind: What if USN decided to become more surface combatant orientated and less carrier orientated in 1950's? As there's numerous WI's about continuation of battleships, this is a continuation of those ideas. This is probably full of holes, but I'd appreciate comments.

POD: As New Look sets in during early 1950's the USN decides, on basis on several analytical points, that construction of more carriers should be restricted. The reasons are, that projected ballistic and cruise missiles are more viable for nuclear strike missions than strike missions. Additionally, as H-bombs loom, a carrier strike groups is seen vulnerable against them. Against projected Soviet cruise missiles and supersonic combat aircraft it is viewed that forthcoming 3-T missiles are more effective. Moreover, existing Essex-class ships will be usable to 1970's and Forrestall-class ships under construction will be usable for even longer time.

An idea of new kind of surface combatant, a missile cruiser or battleship is developed. These ships would be armed with tactical missiles capable of striking land and naval targets and powerful armory of air defense missiles.
For ASW they would have ASROC's and ASW helos. As much more of them than carriers can be built they will have more coverage. With nuclear propulsion they will be not very dependant upon replenishment.

With many hulls at hand for conversion, the first prototype missile cruisers will be three Alaska-class large cruisers. The USS Alaska will retain her forward 12" turret for NGFS and surface combat as missile technology is still under development. 4x2 5" turrets will be also retained. Otherwise the superstructure will be completely remade. Her armament includes two twin-armed Talos-missile launchers, two twin-armed Tartar launchers, ASROC launcher, Regulus-launcher and also space for four Polaris missiles (never fielded due to success of SSBN's). There is also a hangar for four S-34, later S-61, ASW helos.

USS Alaska emerges from the Boston Naval Shipyard in 1960. (the tech is slightly accelerated because of more money available for missile systems).

The first combat test of the concept comes after the Gulf of Tonkin incident. In operation Pierce Arrow surface action groups led by USS Alaska and USS Guam destroy five North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and an oil depot in Vinh.

The next, purpose built nuclear powered large missile cruiser class is authorized in 1955. Meanwhile, modification plans for USS Illinois and USS Kentucky are debated...
 

CalBear

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It's hard to image why the USN would abandon such a useful tool, especially after their utility in "small" wars had been demonstrated so well with Korea.
 
It's hard to image why the USN would abandon such a useful tool, especially after their utility in "small" wars had been demonstrated so well with Korea.

Exactly, large, nuclear equipped surface vessels has only one use in that era: as the launching perform of nuclear missiles in WWIII.
 
Exactly, large, nuclear equipped surface vessels has only one use in that era: as the launching perform of nuclear missiles in WWIII.

To CalBear too, this is a end result oriented WI, so here's the reasoning. The decision made by USN was surprising, but was decided on following points:

First, duties in genera war were the most important. Primary mission of attack carriers was to provide nuclear firepower. Even in small wars it's the nuclear firepower which counts. Missiles can deliver tactical nukes as well as aircraft. In very limited conflict (as proposed intervention to Dien Bien Phu) the remaining carriers are sufficient.

Second, Midways and Forrestals would be still available for CVA's for long term, and a number of Essexes too.

Third, looking at the missions of Korea USN analyzes that it's the bombs on target which count, not the amount of bombload. In small wars US POW's have proven to be irritating as they can be used as bargaining points. Also, by this point is becoming clear that forthcoming Mach 2 or even Mach 3 aircraft will be enormously expensive.

Thus a series of missiles will be developed to strike land targets beyond reach of naval gunfire.

First are ballistic versions of Talos missiles which can be used against land targets as well as aerial targets via surface platform guidance, aerial beaming guidance or guidance beam provided by FO party. They will have a range of about 50nm's and can be also used against radars (as they were in OTL). The range is expected to increase to 100nm with RIM-8C (some other designation in this ATL).

Second is the deep strike missile, conventional version of Regulus II missile. This missile will have 1000nm range, mach 2 speed and a primitive radar TERCOM guidance. For precision strikes a TV link is developed, but this is fairly complex operation with relay aircraft or missile included. This leads into development of UAV version of Regulus II with slightly longer range. (Regulus II was remotely flown throughout the tests).

Third is the land attack version of future USN surface target missile, something between Harpoon and Styx (is there OTL candidates?). It will have radar or IR guidance against ship targets and IR and inertial guidance against land targets.

These missiles are very demanding for 1950's to 1960's tech, but with more emphasis on guided missile development they are becoming truly operational by mid 1960's.
 
Jukra, the problem of your suggestion is that the risk of escalation from a small clash to nuclear exchange will be very high...and the US Armed Force will needed to accept a completely nuclear based operational doctrine.
 
Jukra, the problem of your suggestion is that the risk of escalation from a small clash to nuclear exchange will be very high...and the US Armed Force will needed to accept a completely nuclear based operational doctrine.

Which they, in OTL 1950's, did.
 
True, but now I've serious doubt as to whether the missile tech of that era is capable of producing a missile big enough to be nuclear but small enough to put aboard....
I know that the Regulus missile was launched off the deck of submarines in tests during the 1950's. The BOMARC missile was also test-launched off of small platforms. A ship a quarter to a third of a mile long and 75 to 100 feet wide should be plenty big enough to launch 20 ton, or so, missiles. Even in the late 1950's, the technology could have supported an expanded BCG (Battle Cruiser, Guided missile) component to the USN. There were many hot and heavy debates in the Navy after WWII and the carrier guys won out. The submarine guys and the big-gun guys came in second and last. If missiles could be substituted, successfully, for big guns in those arguments, then maybe you could see a larger percentage of missile platforms. After all, that's what the Soviets did.
 
If the Navy is less carrier oriented, then maybethe Seamaster makes it .
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:P6M_SeaMaster.jpg

Although P6M SeaMaster is definitely one of the coolest aircraft of the 1950's, I think SeaMaster is only feasible if US ballistic missile program hits serious trouble. Naturally, if SeaMasters are included we should see SeaDarts too!

Back to the topic, USN role in Vietnam would be different with more focus on surface combatants. If and when cruise missiles capable of destroying hard targets are developed (ie. Regulus II with TV-guidance, coming in at Mach 2 with perhaps 4000lbs warhead might be quite devastating). First candidate target for this technology might be Thanh Hoa bridge, which in OTL was bombed at many times without results until LGB's arrived.

As North Vietnam is fairly small with a number of targets close to shoreline, it might be contemplated that most of the strike missions flown by aircraft could well be achieved by missile strikes and NGFS.

There would be role for carrier aircraft too providing CAS for ground troops in South Vietnam as well as all sorts of recon over North Vietnam. I think I'll try to write somekind of "storyline" ATL with few episodes with this background.
 
I'll try to take a look on another aspect, or how the USN carrier planes develop.

As the USN decides to rely primarily upon missiles on air defense and strike missions the acquisition budget for aircraft will be smaller.

The winner for new fleet fighter aircraft (not fleet defence fighter as in OTL) is F8U-3 Crusader III, which is branded as an improvement over existing Crusader, not an entirely new airplane. The decision to purchase Crusader over Phantom is partly due to fact that USN naval air arm presses more for manouverability instead of ability to carry missiles, as the new fighter will have to act as an escort for strike packages in a limited war.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XF8U-3_Crusader_III

For strike missions A4 was to be modernized and further developed, thus there will be no RA-5 or A-6.

As Robert McNamara entered his reign into position of Secretary of Defence, he ordered various Navy aircraft projects to be cut and merged with USMC requirements. While Essex-class was still providing worthwhile service, it was clear that these ships would be gone by the end of 1970's. While Forrestals might be kept in service even for half a century, the Navy was scheduled to built large assault ships with a flightdeck for Marines instead of dedicated aircraft carriers.

These multipurpose ships would house significant Marine helicopter wing, would have to be also able to provide AEW coverage for a large area as well as close support aircraft to provide fire support for Marines. After design studies of a design with catapults were flushed, a VTOL option for close support aircraft was taken instead. The USN took co-operation with the British and developed P.1154 to a USN version:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P.1154

Although dubbed CAS aircraft, this aircraft in fact was to have fairly good air combat and strike capabilities as well.
 
Why would the USN change a proven doctrine with fail safes built in to something that is going to be sub-standard for a whole weapons development cycle or 2.Even when the bugs are worked out,at best mid 60's,You still have a sustainable operations shortfall as even the largest CG/BCG will not have the magazine capacity of CV with CAG embarked nor would it have the range of said CAG with air to air refueling.As for ICBM deployment using a BC/BB for a launch platform lets see basically hard to track SSBN easy to track and target BC/BB and the Backfires would have a field day and bye bye deterrent.

There is a reason the USN developed as it did it's effective and flexible and missiles until quite recently were neither.
 
Why would the USN change a proven doctrine with fail safes built in to something that is going to be sub-standard for a whole weapons development cycle or 2.Even when the bugs are worked out,at best mid 60's,You still have a sustainable operations shortfall as even the largest CG/BCG will not have the magazine capacity of CV with CAG embarked nor would it have the range of said CAG with air to air refueling.As for ICBM deployment using a BC/BB for a launch platform lets see basically hard to track SSBN easy to track and target BC/BB and the Backfires would have a field day and bye bye deterrent.

There is a reason the USN developed as it did it's effective and flexible and missiles until quite recently were neither.

Like I said, I had a purpose with this WI with an end result in sight merely trying to make it somewhat plausible. As an answer to reason number 1: USN still has 3 Midways, 4 Forrestals and a massive number of Essex-class carriers to serve it through the transitional period and also as a backup as USN aviation awaits the new doctrine to fail.

For number 2, magazine capacity isn't as important in context of atom-crazed 1950's, dispersion and ability to launch single devastating strike are. For limited war scenarios one has to consider that much more surface combatants can be procured and manned compared to CBG, which includes of course not the carrier alone but the whole task force. One can use virtually all of the missile arsenal of a surface ships within a very short period, or in limited war scenario rotate numerous surface ships for tasks.

And this brings back the original logic; USN leadership considers the threat of large H-bombs very severe to it's carrier battle groups. An air defense is never 100% perfect. With enough dispersion the threat can be countered, but then the defense of CBG is even more difficult and requires even more resources. As it's known already during early 1950's, by the next decade most of the huge arsenal of carrier escorts (DD's) will be worn out, and even if not worn out, cannot accept the new volume and power hungry missiles, helicopters etc. Thus concept of smaller surface action groups, maybe even independent, surface combatants (role originally conceived for OTL USS Long Beach) appears to be more viable. Less will be lost due to single H-bomb.

As for ballistic missiles, there were severe considerations about fielding Polaris missiles aboard surface ships, not only USN but also NATO ships. In the end submarine concept provided to be fairly perfect answer, as in this OTL.

Against Soviet missiles, even in OTL the missiles were considered to be primary defense element against them due to high speed and long range of the missiles.

For the range of CBG's, even today the range of CBG strikes without land-based tanker support is fairly short.

Finally, there's the constabulary actions to be considered. USN during early Cold War was waking up to a situation where there was need to permamently employ sizable naval forces all around the globe. There's only limited number of CBG's, while smaller surface action groups have far larger footprints.

The logic above is naturally filled with holes, as is the logic for making CBG's. :)
 
Against Soviet missiles, even in OTL the missiles were considered to be primary defense element against them due to high speed and long range of the missiles.

For the range of CBG's, even today the range of CBG strikes without land-based tanker support is fairly short.

Finally, there's the constabulary actions to be considered. USN during early Cold War was waking up to a situation where there was need to permamently employ sizable naval forces all around the globe. There's only limited number of CBG's, while smaller surface action groups have far larger footprints.

The logic above is naturally filled with holes, as is the logic for making CBG's. :)

The countermeasures to Soviet missiles is much more than just missiles. Missiles are just armaments, not a weapon system. The CBGs relied on layered defence, using the combination of E-2s, fighters, surface ships SAMs, point defences and carrier- based tankes. CBGs do not rely on land- based tankers and the value of CBGs is to provide aerial assets where US don't have any land- based aerial assets.

The problem with a USN less carrier oriented is that this is a less vasatile force. The number of surface ships needed to acheive the same firepower density projected by a CBG with missiles means prohibitive costs. Also, resupply of missiles at sea is problematic at best. Rotation of ship is not a feasible solution.
 
The countermeasures to Soviet missiles is much more than just missiles. Missiles are just armaments, not a weapon system. The CBGs relied on layered defence, using the combination of E-2s, fighters, surface ships SAMs, point defences and carrier- based tankes. CBGs do not rely on land- based tankers and the value of CBGs is to provide aerial assets where US don't have any land- based aerial assets.

Poor choice of words, I'm sorry, what I meant was that SAM's were considered to be the primary means of defence of a CBG. Even after introduction of a dedicated long range interceptor with long range missiles (F-14) this was the case. CBG's did have both organic tanker resources and option of buddy refuelling but utilizing these meant eating up hangar space and sorties from result-achievers, strike packages.

The problem with a USN less carrier oriented is that this is a less vasatile force. The number of surface ships needed to acheive the same firepower density projected by a CBG with missiles means prohibitive costs. Also, resupply of missiles at sea is problematic at best. Rotation of ship is not a feasible solution.

Not necessarily. After all, although flaws of early missiles can be easily pointed out, aircraft as conventional strike platforms weren't that accurate either. Strike packages which destroyed targets in North Vietnam were massive and had to employ significant part of themselves to SEAD, escort, tanker, jamming etc. duties. In final count, it's not the matter sorties flown but targets destroyed. Read about Thanh Hoa bridge, for example:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thanh_Hoa_Bridge

USN strikes were often Alpha strikes, ie. employing the whole carrier air wing against single target. USAF strikes often employed some 80 planes.

With less CBG's (in essence by 1960's no Enterprise and no Kitty Hawk class) not only the expense of constructing these ships, but also their airwing and above all their escorts, can be directed to other procurement options.

As for underway replenishment, with more effort put upon it I wouldn't count it out.

I'll try to question effectiveness of this ATL stance when writing next post on USN experiences during Vietnam War, both in the South providing CAS and in North providing strike capabilities against heavily defended targets. Different force use will also mean that NVA will gain somewhat more capabilities. By late 1960's some innovative new gunnery technologies will also be available, boosting effectiveness of NGFS.
 
The experience of Vietnam

After initial operation Flaming Dart the Navy made both aerial and surface ship attacks upon North Vietnam. Later on, when president Johnson approved sustained bombing campaign of the North Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder, USN developed a system of Route Packages in co-operation with the USAF in which targets closer to coastline were deemed to be USN territory. Deepest target areas were some 60nm inland. (As in OTL) All targets were under Talos or Regulus range, but in practice most of the targets were also under range of heavy surface firepower, 12" and 16" guns.

By 1966 USN ships were, however, facing new threats. On June 1, 1966 USS Coontz, a Farragutt-class guided missile destroyer was suddenly hit by two Soviet made Styx-missile in close succession. The destroyer had not received missile warning, as the investigation explained, due to laxness in positive air identification. Two Styx-missiles were somehow mistaken for an USAF F-105 heading out to air-sea rescue area. Additionally, repeative operational patterns were cited as one reason for the surprise. Whatever the reasons were, the destroyer was soon engulfed in a massive fire caused by total of 1000kg's of high explosive and just 107 out of her crew of 377 survived from the magazine explosion which followed.

Loss of USS Coontz was a shock for the USN leadership and USN aviators were quick to exploit the drama. From USN's viewpoint this incident alerted the Navy against threat of anti-ship missiles. The BPDMS program, utilizing Sparrow missile was accelerated and a new anti-missile weapon "Phalanx" utilizing 20mm Gatling gun was to be developed on a crash basis. On more urgent basis, tactics and techniques were developed to meet the new threat. As P-15 Termit, or Styx, was fairly large, slow and high flying missile the new techniques worked. Only three missiles hit US surface combatants later on during the conflict.

The Coontz incident almost covered the most spectacular USN success thus far, destruction of Thanh Hoa bridge. The bridge had been repeatedly bombed by USAF with large strike packages with up to 80 planes but still stood. As the precision guidance for Regulus II land attack missile was still somewhat troubled, a new method was found out. Some dual seat F8U3's were fitted with television guidance kits to guide the missile right into the target. On 15 May 1966 a total of 15 Regulus II missiles were fired on Thanh Hoa bridge. Only three hits were scored, but the results were spectacular. Thanh Hoa bridge was destructed for good. The land attack techniques were further improved and by 1968 the reliable relay TV-system was operational.

In regards to USN aviation the Vietnam conflict proved that aviation had very important place even with new operational concept. Air reconnaissance proved crucial for both designating targets, guidance of munitions to the targets and battle damage assesments. Moreover, USN A4's were welcome sight providing close air support for USMC. Additionally, after Coontz incident the value of AEW was again highlighted. In ROE restricted environment the procurement of Crusader III was also proven to be right decision, as this manouverable fighter had more than fair chance engaging nimble MiG's.

While firing of gee-whiz missiles upon guerrillas with sandals (as public viewed targets in North Vietnam) was questioned, it was the human cost for the US which was greatly lessened with use of surface gunfire and missiles against North Vietnamese targets. After years of bombing USAF hulks littered North Vietnamese countryside, USN plane casualties were much fewer. Hanoi Hilton received much more USAF quests than those from the Navy. USN air operations also greatly benefited from surface fires participation. Talos missile was good, quick response anti-radar missile which the USAF lacked while ballistic versions of it were ideal for suppressing the deadly North Vietnamese AAA.

Peace protestors protested against use of these "robot" weapons against North Vietnam, which were viewed as particularly unfair and unethical. USN studies, however, showed that USN strikes were more efficient than USAF ones as they did not have to rely on massive amounts of ordnance to put down single targets. There were naturally still much collateral damage and suffering to Vietnamese civilians.

However, whether or not more efficient than a mostly air asset based campaign against North Vietnam, the bombing of North Vietnam was cut off during November 1968. The USN knew that it would probably some day be called back upon to attack North Vietnamese shores and this day came as President Nixon ordered to begin Operation Linebacker in 1972. By this time North Vietnam had constructed a formidable coastal defense network to rival it's complex air defenses of Hanoi-Haiphong -area.
 
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