Naval guns on an airship?

BlondieBC

Banned
Learning Curve.

OK, B-17 from Wiki is 268K each. Taking your figure of 12.5 B-17 to CL, this means a CL cost 3,350K. This may not be perfectly correct, but to keep the analysis apples to apple, I will assume it is correct. Taking the 0.43 from previous post, this means first Macon class is 1,440K.

Now take the B-17. We produce 11K, but lets pull back some for model changes and only use a run of 5000 for costing and the 85% learning curve. This means the first B-17 cost 2,000K to make, which is more than the Macon. The only reason the airship is more expensive is the short production run. Now I know we would never built 5000 airships, but if the run jumps to a few hundred ships, we could have easily afford to escort EVERY merchant convoy in WW2 with an airship at a quite reasonable cost, and actually made PROFIT compared to the save cargo that does not go to the bottom of the sea.

But from the above numbers and the previous post, an airship with a modest run of 40-70 gets us a ratio of about 2-3 bombers per airship. And since the airship can spend days above the convoy/port and a B-17 hours, the capital cost for full daylight protection is lower with airship than B-17. The USA missed a real opportunity by not funding airships in the 1920's and 1930's in a serious manner.
 
But from the above numbers and the previous post, an airship with a modest run of 40-70 gets us a ratio of about 2-3 bombers per airship. And since the airship can spend days above the convoy/port and a B-17 hours, the capital cost for full daylight protection is lower with airship than B-17. The USA missed a real opportunity by not funding airships in the 1920's and 1930's in a serious manner.

For the sake of discussion, I'll accept your cost analysis. The figures I quoted were taken from congressional testimony presented by naval personnel in the early 1930's comparing the relative costs of small scout crusiers, Akron-type airships, and long-range flying boats (which I took to be roughly equivalent in concept to B-17s). I also may have misspoke. The guestimates were 2-3 airships per cruiser, and 10-12 airplanes per airship. Interestingly all personnel - even those who supported the airships - said that if they had to chose between a large number of flying boats and one airship, they'd choose the airplanes. Even in 1930, airplanes were seen as the proven technology.

The other issue with a "modest run" of 40-70 rigid airships is that the USA was never prepaired to do this. In the 1930's the extraction of helium was still very expensive - and back then, we didn't just print money to feed the defense industry. Until WW2 forced the issue (for blimps not zeps), the USN never had helium enough to keep more than a handful of its airships operational at any one time. Also, building and operating 40-70 ZRCV type airships would require a mssive investiment in the very specialized infrastructure of huge fabricating sheds and hangars (the largest open-support buildings in the world before the moon launch facility was built). To go from basically scratch in 1935 to having a force of 50-60 airships in 1942 would require a a massive outlay for this infrastructure. At best, if the US airship disasters never occurred and the USN airship program was accelerated as desired by the airships' most aggressive proponents, I have a hard time imagining a situation in which the USN would have many more than 10 large rigid airships in service (a mix of the Akrons and some ZRCVs) when the US entered WW2. It is possible that several of these ships based in Hawaii might have observed the approach of the Japanese fleet if operated wisely. Just as likely though, given US preparadness,they would all be sitting in their hangars on Dec 7 when the first Kates and Vals attacked.

Good discussion, by the way.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
... Even in 1930, airplanes were seen as the proven technology.

The other issue with a "modest run" of 40-70 rigid airships is that the USA was never prepaired to do this. In the 1930's the extraction of helium was still very expensive - and back then, we didn't just print money to feed the defense industry. Until WW2 forced the issue (for blimps not zeps), the USN never had helium enough to keep more than a handful of its airships operational at any one time. Also, building and operating 40-70 ZRCV type airships would require a mssive investiment in the very specialized infrastructure of huge fabricating sheds and hangars (the largest open-support buildings in the world before the moon launch facility was built). To go from basically scratch in 1935 to having a force of 50-60 airships in 1942 would require a a massive outlay for this infrastructure. At best, if the US airship disasters never occurred and the USN airship program was accelerated as desired by the airships' most aggressive proponents, I have a hard time imagining a situation in which the USN would have many more than 10 large rigid airships in service (a mix of the Akrons and some ZRCVs) when the US entered WW2. It is possible that several of these ships based in Hawaii might have observed the approach of the Japanese fleet if operated wisely. Just as likely though, given US preparadness,they would all be sitting in their hangars on Dec 7 when the first Kates and Vals attacked.

Good discussion, by the way.

Yes, by 1930's it is too late for airships. They were still using 1918 technology on airships, compared to 1935 mono-wing metal bombers. While I think rigid/partially rigid airships would have been a great investment for the USA, by the 1937 time frame, I would not recommend starting a new program. There are a lot of support technologies, training, and doctrine that need to be worked out. But this is no unique to airships.

Wave ASB wand, and only 10 metal, mono-wing bombers are built from 1920-1935. There is no serious strategic bombing campaign in WW2. Or Wave wand, and Washington naval treaty scraps all aircraft carriers, the Battleships dominate WW2. Investment choices on R&D and training and industrial infrastructure can force decisions leading up to war. From memory, it was either 1937 or 1938 when the US Navy was desperately fighting to avoid budget CUTS, and congress was seriously considering reducing the number of ships. So in the very short window leading up to WW2 where we could have realistically made different choices (1939-1941), it is hard for any unfunded technology to make it to mass production.

Now for a USA timeline where they committed to airship, I see about 1 built a year until 1938, for a total of around 16 (20ish built, 4+ losses). It would not be a budget breaker. I think you are right on helium, so many of these ships use hydrogen, but besides the Hindenburg and one A-H airships, there were few lost to hydrogen. I am not sure A-H ones survives even with Helium, so they probably have to use hydrogen in peace time, and save the Helium for the war and maybe 3-5 ships nearest to enemy forces. I this type of scenario, we might get 2 in 1939, 4 in 1940, 10+ in 1941, 20+ in 1942. And we would have some good John Wayne airship movies to watch.

But again, if the USA waits to 1938 and realizes the need, it is probably too late to do much more than what we did IOTL. Just the issue of training quality aviators in numbers who can operate from airships would be a challenge, and there are simpler solutions to issue like Pearl Harbor such as just building B-17 a bit faster, or keep the fleet in San Diego until enough airpower is at Pearl.

I have a bit different opinion on say 6 airships in the Hawaii. I think they do keep at least 1-2 up on any given day, and the knowledge that the Zeppelin have a good chance of detecting he Japanese TF the day before the attack, means Pearl does not happen. And if the Japanese decide to attack, there is a 50/50 chance they are spotted. The flaw I see is not they are all in the hanger, but Kimmel decides that the attack is more likely from the West (Marshall Islands), the Japanese know this, and just go around the too easy to predict USA deployment pattern.
 
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