Naval Equipment that should and shouldn't have entered service
- Thread starter Spencersj345.346
- Start date
The perks of the navy paying for the conversation effort. Alas Congress is way too cheap to pay for the entire museum fleet so inevitably we lose some and a lot of the others really really need some yard time. Indeed we'll have lost two within the last decade the Barry and the Clamagore will be scrapped and sunk as an artificial reef respectively.
The Zumwalts should have kept the original vertical gun system instead of going for the AGS had that happened the system could be swapped out for VLS depending on mission giving a real example of effective modular design and implementation it would have also kept costs down and opened the door for a more extensive Zumwalt buy reducing the costs of the programs ammunition designs over many more ships
McPherson
Banned
HMS Victoria (1887) - Wikipedia
and
IJN Matsushima-class Protected Cruiser – The Armored Patrol
Things to lesson learn enroute before embarking toward a naval disaster.
1. Does your stupid idea have any historical successful precedent? *In this case Venetian gun galleys. They actually did not work at Lepanto, you know?
(Lissa does not count either, because those were two brand new amateur navies with noobs trying to duplicate Hampton Roads and it did not work for the Americans, either, in that case, you might remember.)
2. See if your stupid idea has recent application by someone else and study their experiences with it.
(Sinking is a rather good indication that your stupid idea might need a rethink.)
3. See what happened to the previous example of your stupid idea in tactical application as a simulated wargame. In this case did guns too heavy for the bow make their example of your stupid idea impossible to rudder control under extreme conditions? How about gun charging times. Did the foreign navy predecessor to your stupid idea take a half hour to charge those honking big guns it had, and therefore would only get one chance to shoot and miss with them before it was sunk by a competent opponent or in this case get own goaled by its own incompetent navy after a botched wargame?
USS Brooklyn (ACR-3) - Wikipedia
I am not sure that I get it.
Victoria is one of a series of battleships suffering from the effects of pre-dating Harvey Steel and QF guns. Design options were... limited. The problems were known and accepted as necessary. Sans
The Matsushimas, if you had linked to Wikipedia rather than a photo site, are described as cruisers bought by a navy that needed to fight battleships but couldn't afford to. So they went French which is always going to be creative. Maybe torps would have worked better than a big gun, but the class as a whole seems to have been successful.
What is wrong with Brooklyn? She is basically a test to see if French concepts work. Lessons learned. No more cruisers.
Victoria is one of a series of battleships suffering from the effects of pre-dating Harvey Steel and QF guns. Design options were... limited. The problems were known and accepted as necessary. Sans
The Matsushimas, if you had linked to Wikipedia rather than a photo site, are described as cruisers bought by a navy that needed to fight battleships but couldn't afford to. So they went French which is always going to be creative. Maybe torps would have worked better than a big gun, but the class as a whole seems to have been successful.
What is wrong with Brooklyn? She is basically a test to see if French concepts work. Lessons learned. No more cruisers.
The Victorias were not great ships, no. The choice of 16.25" guns was... suboptimal, to say the least. But they got those guns partly due to not having enough of the preferred 13.5" guns available, so I'm not sure what was to be done about it. And I'm going to blame George Tryon's arrogance long before the design of the ships involved.
The Matshushimas I agree were a bad idea that shouldn't have been tried, though Japan was sufficiently inexperienced with this whole navy thing that I'm not going to kill them for it.
Brooklyn... I got nothing.
The Matshushimas I agree were a bad idea that shouldn't have been tried, though Japan was sufficiently inexperienced with this whole navy thing that I'm not going to kill them for it.
Brooklyn... I got nothing.
McPherson
Banned
I will explain.
The design limitations were not so much material limitations as a lack of understanding of how powered flatirons are going to work. Design is by necessity, trial by error. The inspiration for the Victoria was the Venetian war galley. One shot from the bow guns, then ram. It never worked, but the 19th naval architects, who knew it, tried it anyway, and one sees from the tactical catastrophes and accidents for a nose point inadequate tail or rudder control that the Emile Bertins of the period did not attend to the historical lessons laid before them.
See previous comment about Emile Bertin and my comments about "lessons ignored".
Actually Brooklyn worked spectacularly well, as an "all big gun ship" example banging it out broadside to broadside with Infanta Maria Teresa, Vasquaya and even Cristobol Colon, which were more "British" as armored cruisers in concept with chaser guns and quick fire broadsiders. The Brooklyn's tumblehome was known to be a major floatation reserve problem as it could be a capsize hazard if she was holed under the waterline.
IOW Brooklyn was the proof of the all big gun ship principle as her main hitting was with her 20.3 cm/35 guns against her opponents. The USNWC noticed the shooting results in the post action analysis and as I have commented before, started to make noises about "all big gun battleships" as a result. This was an unexpected lesson learned.
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Vanguard was still around until 1960 albeit in reserve so its possible
I have to admit the Battleships of the 1870's - Early 1890's confuse me. In 1871 Britain builds HMS Devastation in all respects a prototype classic Pre Dreadnought and then wastes the next 20 years building oddball one or two ship classes of dead end and flawed designs. It makes no sense to me, why faf about when you have a good basic template that can be continuously improved and refined into ever better ships?
To quote Clowes:
"Other ideas, also, were abroad as to the best methods of compromising the claims of the various new factors which, as time went on, seemed to demand inclusion in the ideal fighting ship, yet which, it was amply evident, could not all receive equal consideration. Very heavy guns were called for by some; very thick armour was considered indispensable by others; and while one party asked for a complete water-line belt, another party urged the naval architects to devote even more attention to the protection of the armament than to the protection of the life of the ship. Yet other conflicting and almost irreconcilable claims were put forward on behalf of high speed, of great coal-capacity, of large sail-power, of lofty free- board, of seaworthiness and steadiness of gun-platform, and of small size, shallow draught, and comparative invisibility to an enemy's gunners. "
It was a time of experimenting. With fairly few actual engagements to draw on and many powerful personalities pushing their own personal hobby horse. It would have been very nice if they could have sorted it out and completed a fairly smooth evolution but that would require sorting out Victorian Admiralty politics. And that would be quite a feat.
For one, HMS Captain. Her sinking engendered a longstanding distrust of turret vessels in both the Royal Navy and among the very vocal navy-watching public. Hence why the reverted to central battery ships for the next few classes.
The bigger issue was freeboard. Devastation was a low-freeboard ship not a great seaboat, and then en-echelon turret ships of the Inflexible, Agamemnon, and Colossus classes were in large part an attempt to solve that. I'm also 95% sure that partially motivated the reversion to a central battery setup.
Most of the real oddballs were foreign ships taken over during construction during various war scares.
Economic reasons also pinched; the Conqueror-class turret rams were economy ships, and this heavily impacted the barbette ships of the late 1880s that reverted back to the Devastation layout. The Victorias, as I mentioned, were designed the way they were in large part due to shortages of the 13.5" gun.
McPherson
Banned
Clowes was always one for gobbledygook and obfuscation. Depending on the "faction" and the "politics" the actual shipwrights tried to work with the money, the politicians and the idiots (HMS Captain was urged forward by a Whackjob, Cowper Phipps Coles, who claimed to know better than the professionals; Robert Spencer Robinson and James Edward Reed about freeboard and stability.), they were saddled with to create something that would 'maybe' work. Of course the abominations they produced to the demanded criteria would see the way down the weighs, some would sink, some would prove useless, and occasionally, just occasionally in those strange days, as in the case of the USS New York *(William Cramp and Sons) and USS Brooklyn (William Cramp and Sons) a confluence of the experts at Construction and Repair and builders, who knew what they were doing, will get it half-way right after a couple of debacles (USS Texas of Norfolk Navy Yard and USS Maine of Brooklyn Navy Yard.).
Of course it helps, if the navy in question has arranged for its Whackjob (Rear Admiral Danial Amman (retired), USS Katahdin designer) to retire in comfort and has assigned him a caregiver who makes sure that the Whackjob in question has a nice comfortable farm and assorted farm animals and French visitors to talk to about mythical canals through Nicaragua and then that navy sort of shoves the mistake (USS Katahdin) off into a naval harbor somewhere hopefully to be unnoticed by Congress.
How was the Royal Navy doing with the HMS Polyphemus?
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They were in a cycle where you CAN armor against the weapons of the day. But said armor is heavy.
So guns grow to defeat the armor. Again they are heavy.
Given the lack of alternative solutions it is a cycle that lends itself to gigantism. No QF guns so you can't burn them out. Not torps so you can go under. All these big weights up high encourage lowering the freeboard with the bonus of reducing the area needing to be armoured. Even Victoria's single turret is a reaction to the increasing masses.
The Italia class arguably showed the ultimate evolution of this by giving up on belt armor altogether in favour of floating, and could have worked given the weapons that existed when it was designed. But then they invented QF weapons...
So guns grow to defeat the armor. Again they are heavy.
Given the lack of alternative solutions it is a cycle that lends itself to gigantism. No QF guns so you can't burn them out. Not torps so you can go under. All these big weights up high encourage lowering the freeboard with the bonus of reducing the area needing to be armoured. Even Victoria's single turret is a reaction to the increasing masses.
The Italia class arguably showed the ultimate evolution of this by giving up on belt armor altogether in favour of floating, and could have worked given the weapons that existed when it was designed. But then they invented QF weapons...
QF weapons were a genuine paradigm shift and fucked up all kinds of designs. See the HMS Polyphemus McPherson mentioned.
To be more accurate QF weapons when combined with reliablish shell of both the AP and especially the HE variety were the big game changers
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McPherson
Banned
To take these observations in order...
Nasty and DANGEROUS to the senders as well as to the receivers. The armor worked because the shells were no good. We, moderns, have examples of some navies, (Chinese and Spanish) actually adjudging that "sawdust filled slugs" were better than the shoddy explosive filled ammunition their governments bought. Were they right? The Japanese made their own cast iron and later mild steel shells with Shimose, explode on second shock impact filler. It was extremely dangerous shock sensitive stuff to fire, but it worked for them. The Americans accepted a high dud count instead and used STEEL shells and British style fuses and stabilized fill that needed a detonator. Lots of clangers.
Anyway, the US 15.2 cm steel shells did bounce off the Cruesot steel plate on the IMTs which shows that bad fuses and French steel mean you are somewhat safe until the 20.3 cm *(8 inch) stuff hits. Then it is time to beach and abandon, boys. The British laughed at the Brooklyn and the Indianas, you know?
And of course the Ansaldo compound iron plate scheme with the thin steel facer was BRITTLE. Too much sulfur in the iron. Hence imported Harvey plate from the UK and US when the (Giuseppe Garibaldi) GGs were a thing.
Shrug. 50% dud rate in those days was "outstanding".
BTW... The thought has occurred to me that a shootout between Brooklyn and Cristobol Colon would have shown interesting lessons to be learned.
The CC had a top hat scheme about 15 cm on the belt and 3.8 cm on the flat deck. The belt thinned to the ends to about 8 cm. Conn was 15 cm and gunhouses' mantlet faces same with other faces and guns shields 5 cm.
The Brooklyn had a derby scheme with a 7.6 cm belt and behind that a turtle-deck armor topper over machinery at 15 cm thick on the slope presents and 7.6 cm at the flat thinning to 5 cm at the ends just beyond the barbettes. Gunhouses were 14 cm mantlet and sides and 10 cm roofs. Hoists were 7.5 cm. The barbettes were 20 cm to 10 cm depending on present face. The Conn was 21 cm uniform.
Float reserve was an astounding 50%. No wonder Spanish shells did almost nothing. She was better protected than an Immortalite.
Anyway, IF the CC had been armed as planned (from Wiki)
vs Brooklyn (also from Wiki)
I suspect the outcome would have been much the same, but would have impelled the Americans even more away from a Marceau type layout and toward the all big gun double enders they will build instead of the European wing turret abortions that grow out of the last PDNs they will build (See illuustrations), I have seen as RTL evolved in the South Carolinas. Maybe a full decade earlier. How about them apples?
hms dreadnought 1909 battleship - BlueprintBox.com - Free ...
A detailed look at SMS Nassau - General Game Discussion ...
The armor rough rule of thumb in that era was a WAG in that plate thickness of the compound/composite layered thin hard steel faced thick wrought or soft iron/steel backer equals the shell cross section diameter plus 10%. Remember the shells are still mostly Paixhan shell based type bombs with assorted French derived or British nose fuses. The shell bodies in the 1870s to 1890s were CAST IRON with at best guncotton filler.
Nasty and DANGEROUS to the senders as well as to the receivers. The armor worked because the shells were no good. We, moderns, have examples of some navies, (Chinese and Spanish) actually adjudging that "sawdust filled slugs" were better than the shoddy explosive filled ammunition their governments bought. Were they right? The Japanese made their own cast iron and later mild steel shells with Shimose, explode on second shock impact filler. It was extremely dangerous shock sensitive stuff to fire, but it worked for them. The Americans accepted a high dud count instead and used STEEL shells and British style fuses and stabilized fill that needed a detonator. Lots of clangers.
To deliver massive cargo shells with sufficient filler to explode against the plate, not necessarily punch through it. There is some question (depending on which navy and who made the plate.) whether the armor or the shell would shatter under the impact. Cross your fingers and pray?
There comes a time when one has to play the %s. The Italians figured that being hit by chaser guns was a low % so they deliberately thinned the (Harvey) armor in the Giuseppe Garribaldis to just handle 15 cm and below QFNR shots by using a new idea called shatter-gap. Smart guys. When the Cristobol Colon was shot up, how did it work out? NTG. It turns out 20.3 cm STEEL shell, the few (4) that punched through and delayed just enough to explode INSIDE the hull was enough. What a mess. The 33 cm hits did not help either.
Anyway, the US 15.2 cm steel shells did bounce off the Cruesot steel plate on the IMTs which shows that bad fuses and French steel mean you are somewhat safe until the 20.3 cm *(8 inch) stuff hits. Then it is time to beach and abandon, boys. The British laughed at the Brooklyn and the Indianas, you know?
And of course the Ansaldo compound iron plate scheme with the thin steel facer was BRITTLE. Too much sulfur in the iron. Hence imported Harvey plate from the UK and US when the (Giuseppe Garibaldi) GGs were a thing.
Yeah. The admirals who proposed these modernized Davids were just one gun armor cycle behind the curve. Refer to the Giuseppe Garibaldi comments above.
Shrug. 50% dud rate in those days was "outstanding".
BTW... The thought has occurred to me that a shootout between Brooklyn and Cristobol Colon would have shown interesting lessons to be learned.
The CC had a top hat scheme about 15 cm on the belt and 3.8 cm on the flat deck. The belt thinned to the ends to about 8 cm. Conn was 15 cm and gunhouses' mantlet faces same with other faces and guns shields 5 cm.
The Brooklyn had a derby scheme with a 7.6 cm belt and behind that a turtle-deck armor topper over machinery at 15 cm thick on the slope presents and 7.6 cm at the flat thinning to 5 cm at the ends just beyond the barbettes. Gunhouses were 14 cm mantlet and sides and 10 cm roofs. Hoists were 7.5 cm. The barbettes were 20 cm to 10 cm depending on present face. The Conn was 21 cm uniform.
Float reserve was an astounding 50%. No wonder Spanish shells did almost nothing. She was better protected than an Immortalite.
Anyway, IF the CC had been armed as planned (from Wiki)
|
vs Brooklyn (also from Wiki)
- 8 × 8 in (203 mm)/35 caliber Mark 3 and/or Mark 4 breech-loading rifles (4 × 2)
- 12 × 5 in (127 mm)/40 caliber rapid fire (RF) guns
- 12 × 6-pounder (57 mm (2.2 in)) Driggs-Schroeder RF guns
- 4 × 1-pounder (37 mm (1.5 in)) Driggs-Schroeder saluting guns
- 5 × 18 inch (450 mm) torpedo tube
I suspect the outcome would have been much the same, but would have impelled the Americans even more away from a Marceau type layout and toward the all big gun double enders they will build instead of the European wing turret abortions that grow out of the last PDNs they will build (See illuustrations), I have seen as RTL evolved in the South Carolinas. Maybe a full decade earlier. How about them apples?
hms dreadnought 1909 battleship - BlueprintBox.com - Free ...
A detailed look at SMS Nassau - General Game Discussion ...
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It might have happened earlier, but there's only so fast the US Navy can digest the lessons of Santiago de Cuba. And also only so fast they can build ships, their construction times weren't as bad as the French but they can only be described as "leisurely" in comparison to the British.
The most likely point for it to happen is instead of the OTL Virginias we get a ship with a uniform 10" battery, the Virginias being the first ships to utilize the lessons of Santiago de Cuba.
McPherson
Banned
(From the Blueprints.com with additional work by McPherson)
I figure the Connecticut class RTL. 2 year build times.
Driftless
Donor
How good of a gun was the 10"/40 Mk3 in service? (I know they weren't historically used against peers) Looking at the NavWeaps data, I see the projectile weights and performances basically split the difference (on paper) between the then current 12" and 8" guns in US service, and the gun weights more-or-less split the differences as well.