Naval Equipment that should and shouldn't have entered service

Huh just occurred to me that theoretically (with a lot of handwaving) the HMS Roberts could have provided NGS off of Vietnam. Weird.
RAN buys her in 1965 for scrap value, she's refurbished in the US while the USN trains gunners for her and she commissions in at the end of 1966. Joins the naval forces off Vietnam in 1967.
 
RAN buys her in 1965 for scrap value, she's refurbished in the US while the USN trains gunners for her and she commissions in at the end of 1966. Joins the naval forces off Vietnam in 1967.
Would there still be viable 15" shells and powder for her at that stage?
 
Would there still be viable 15" shells and powder for her at that stage?
Depends, while the BL 15" Mark I was out of service, the Vickers-Armstrong 15" B gun was in service until 2008, so if the weapons can share ammunition then that may be an option, have to deal with Franco of course
 
The Oliver Hazard Perry/Adelaide class FFG in RAN service.

The RAN rated it as a 2nd rate escort compared to the British Type 42 and Dutch Tromp classes when the Labor govt cancelled the DDL project, yet it was cheap so we got 6.
 

Imagine what that will be when she is ready? 2035... Maybe the Americans are crazy to do it, but Hampton Roads was one of those key moments in history. Worth it.
The perks of the navy paying for the conversation effort. Alas Congress is way too cheap to pay for the entire museum fleet so inevitably we lose some and a lot of the others really really need some yard time. Indeed we'll have lost two within the last decade the Barry and the Clamagore will be scrapped and sunk as an artificial reef respectively.
 
The Zumwalts should have kept the original vertical gun system instead of going for the AGS had that happened the system could be swapped out for VLS depending on mission giving a real example of effective modular design and implementation it would have also kept costs down and opened the door for a more extensive Zumwalt buy reducing the costs of the programs ammunition designs over many more ships
 


HMS Victoria (1887) - Wikipedia

and



IJN Matsushima-class Protected Cruiser – The Armored Patrol

Things to lesson learn enroute before embarking toward a naval disaster.

1. Does your stupid idea have any historical successful precedent? *In this case Venetian gun galleys. They actually did not work at Lepanto, you know?
(Lissa does not count either, because those were two brand new amateur navies with noobs trying to duplicate Hampton Roads and it did not work for the Americans, either, in that case, you might remember.)
2. See if your stupid idea has recent application by someone else and study their experiences with it.
(Sinking is a rather good indication that your stupid idea might need a rethink.)
3. See what happened to the previous example of your stupid idea in tactical application as a simulated wargame. In this case did guns too heavy for the bow make their example of your stupid idea impossible to rudder control under extreme conditions? How about gun charging times. Did the foreign navy predecessor to your stupid idea take a half hour to charge those honking big guns it had, and therefore would only get one chance to shoot and miss with them before it was sunk by a competent opponent or in this case get own goaled by its own incompetent navy after a botched wargame?



USS Brooklyn (ACR-3) - Wikipedia
 
I am not sure that I get it.
Victoria is one of a series of battleships suffering from the effects of pre-dating Harvey Steel and QF guns. Design options were... limited. The problems were known and accepted as necessary. Sans

The Matsushimas, if you had linked to Wikipedia rather than a photo site, are described as cruisers bought by a navy that needed to fight battleships but couldn't afford to. So they went French which is always going to be creative. Maybe torps would have worked better than a big gun, but the class as a whole seems to have been successful.

What is wrong with Brooklyn? She is basically a test to see if French concepts work. Lessons learned. No more cruisers.
 
The Victorias were not great ships, no. The choice of 16.25" guns was... suboptimal, to say the least. But they got those guns partly due to not having enough of the preferred 13.5" guns available, so I'm not sure what was to be done about it. And I'm going to blame George Tryon's arrogance long before the design of the ships involved.

The Matshushimas I agree were a bad idea that shouldn't have been tried, though Japan was sufficiently inexperienced with this whole navy thing that I'm not going to kill them for it.

Brooklyn... I got nothing.
 
I am not sure that I get it.
I will explain.

Victoria is one of a series of battleships suffering from the effects of pre-dating Harvey Steel and QF guns. Design options were... limited. The problems were known and accepted as necessary. Sans
The design limitations were not so much material limitations as a lack of understanding of how powered flatirons are going to work. Design is by necessity, trial by error. The inspiration for the Victoria was the Venetian war galley. One shot from the bow guns, then ram. It never worked, but the 19th naval architects, who knew it, tried it anyway, and one sees from the tactical catastrophes and accidents for a nose point inadequate tail or rudder control that the Emile Bertins of the period did not attend to the historical lessons laid before them.

The Matsushimas, if you had linked to Wikipedia rather than a photo site, are described as cruisers bought by a navy that needed to fight battleships but couldn't afford to. So they went French which is always going to be creative. Maybe torps would have worked better than a big gun, but the class as a whole seems to have been successful.
See previous comment about Emile Bertin and my comments about "lessons ignored".

What is wrong with Brooklyn? She is basically a test to see if French concepts work. Lessons learned. No more cruisers.
Actually Brooklyn worked spectacularly well, as an "all big gun ship" example banging it out broadside to broadside with Infanta Maria Teresa, Vasquaya and even Cristobol Colon, which were more "British" as armored cruisers in concept with chaser guns and quick fire broadsiders. The Brooklyn's tumblehome was known to be a major floatation reserve problem as it could be a capsize hazard if she was holed under the waterline.

IOW Brooklyn was the proof of the all big gun ship principle as her main hitting was with her 20.3 cm/35 guns against her opponents. The USNWC noticed the shooting results in the post action analysis and as I have commented before, started to make noises about "all big gun battleships" as a result. This was an unexpected lesson learned.
 
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I have to admit the Battleships of the 1870's - Early 1890's confuse me. In 1871 Britain builds HMS Devastation in all respects a prototype classic Pre Dreadnought and then wastes the next 20 years building oddball one or two ship classes of dead end and flawed designs. It makes no sense to me, why faf about when you have a good basic template that can be continuously improved and refined into ever better ships?
 
I have to admit the Battleships of the 1870's - Early 1890's confuse me. In 1871 Britain builds HMS Devastation in all respects a prototype classic Pre Dreadnought and then wastes the next 20 years building oddball one or two ship classes of dead end and flawed designs. It makes no sense to me, why faf about when you have a good basic template that can be continuously improved and refined into ever better ships?
To quote Clowes:

"Other ideas, also, were abroad as to the best methods of compromising the claims of the various new factors which, as time went on, seemed to demand inclusion in the ideal fighting ship, yet which, it was amply evident, could not all receive equal consideration. Very heavy guns were called for by some; very thick armour was considered indispensable by others; and while one party asked for a complete water-line belt, another party urged the naval architects to devote even more attention to the protection of the armament than to the protection of the life of the ship. Yet other conflicting and almost irreconcilable claims were put forward on behalf of high speed, of great coal-capacity, of large sail-power, of lofty free- board, of seaworthiness and steadiness of gun-platform, and of small size, shallow draught, and comparative invisibility to an enemy's gunners. "

It was a time of experimenting. With fairly few actual engagements to draw on and many powerful personalities pushing their own personal hobby horse. It would have been very nice if they could have sorted it out and completed a fairly smooth evolution but that would require sorting out Victorian Admiralty politics. And that would be quite a feat.
 
I have to admit the Battleships of the 1870's - Early 1890's confuse me. In 1871 Britain builds HMS Devastation in all respects a prototype classic Pre Dreadnought and then wastes the next 20 years building oddball one or two ship classes of dead end and flawed designs. It makes no sense to me, why faf about when you have a good basic template that can be continuously improved and refined into ever better ships?
For one, HMS Captain. Her sinking engendered a longstanding distrust of turret vessels in both the Royal Navy and among the very vocal navy-watching public. Hence why the reverted to central battery ships for the next few classes.

The bigger issue was freeboard. Devastation was a low-freeboard ship not a great seaboat, and then en-echelon turret ships of the Inflexible, Agamemnon, and Colossus classes were in large part an attempt to solve that. I'm also 95% sure that partially motivated the reversion to a central battery setup.

Most of the real oddballs were foreign ships taken over during construction during various war scares.

Economic reasons also pinched; the Conqueror-class turret rams were economy ships, and this heavily impacted the barbette ships of the late 1880s that reverted back to the Devastation layout. The Victorias, as I mentioned, were designed the way they were in large part due to shortages of the 13.5" gun.
 
"Other ideas, also, were abroad as to the best methods of compromising the claims of the various new factors which, as time went on, seemed to demand inclusion in the ideal fighting ship, yet which, it was amply evident, could not all receive equal consideration. Very heavy guns were called for by some; very thick armour was considered indispensable by others; and while one party asked for a complete water-line belt, another party urged the naval architects to devote even more attention to the protection of the armament than to the protection of the life of the ship. Yet other conflicting and almost irreconcilable claims were put forward on behalf of high speed, of great coal-capacity, of large sail-power, of lofty free- board, of seaworthiness and steadiness of gun-platform, and of small size, shallow draught, and comparative invisibility to an enemy's gunners. "
Clowes was always one for gobbledygook and obfuscation. Depending on the "faction" and the "politics" the actual shipwrights tried to work with the money, the politicians and the idiots (HMS Captain was urged forward by a Whackjob, Cowper Phipps Coles, who claimed to know better than the professionals; Robert Spencer Robinson and James Edward Reed about freeboard and stability.), they were saddled with to create something that would 'maybe' work. Of course the abominations they produced to the demanded criteria would see the way down the weighs, some would sink, some would prove useless, and occasionally, just occasionally in those strange days, as in the case of the USS New York *(William Cramp and Sons) and USS Brooklyn (William Cramp and Sons) a confluence of the experts at Construction and Repair and builders, who knew what they were doing, will get it half-way right after a couple of debacles (USS Texas of Norfolk Navy Yard and USS Maine of Brooklyn Navy Yard.).

Of course it helps, if the navy in question has arranged for its Whackjob (Rear Admiral Danial Amman (retired), USS Katahdin designer) to retire in comfort and has assigned him a caregiver who makes sure that the Whackjob in question has a nice comfortable farm and assorted farm animals and French visitors to talk to about mythical canals through Nicaragua and then that navy sort of shoves the mistake (USS Katahdin) off into a naval harbor somewhere hopefully to be unnoticed by Congress.

How was the Royal Navy doing with the HMS Polyphemus?
 
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They were in a cycle where you CAN armor against the weapons of the day. But said armor is heavy.
So guns grow to defeat the armor. Again they are heavy.
Given the lack of alternative solutions it is a cycle that lends itself to gigantism. No QF guns so you can't burn them out. Not torps so you can go under. All these big weights up high encourage lowering the freeboard with the bonus of reducing the area needing to be armoured. Even Victoria's single turret is a reaction to the increasing masses.
The Italia class arguably showed the ultimate evolution of this by giving up on belt armor altogether in favour of floating, and could have worked given the weapons that existed when it was designed. But then they invented QF weapons...
 
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