Nato vs Warsaw pact: The first battle of the last war

It's sad, they're cancelled M6 Linebacker. Would've been great SAM...

The Linebacker wasn't cancelled, it was in service with the US army between 1997 and 2006 when the last of them were converted back into standard Bradleys. They wouldn't be available for a Cold War conflict though.
 
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How would the soviets have eliminated the superior E-3 sentry and NATO's C2 structure? Would there have been a way to eliminate the airfields key to NATO's defensive strategy?

NATO's C2 structure is only superior to the Soviet one if one is looking at below the regimental level. Above the regimental level, that calculus shifts solidly in the Soviets favor. During much of the Cold War NATO made a critique of the Soviet's strong central control because it was something they didn't have. The lack of strong operational command was thus made into a virtue. By the mid-1980s NATO had realize that this was wishful thinking and moved away from this, adopting much stronger central control, but they were still playing catch-up at the time figuring out concepts the Soviets had been working with since the end of the WW2.

Could the Su-25 engage Nato ground units with effect? Would Nato aircraft survive the amount of SAMs and AAA the reds brought to bear? Would air superiority shift between air forces or would one dominate the other?

CAS from both sides would undoubtedly be run and undoubtedly inflict some casualties, but is unlikely to be decisive given the sheer scale of the fighting and attrition will be intense. Neither side is likely to have a decisive advantage in the air until after the ground war has already been decided.

Could reforger occur quickly enough to prevent allied units from disengaging due to lack of supplies? What is the soviets neutralized the sosus line with a guided non nuclear missile strike from a submarine? Or a red storm rising like operation to capture and utilize iceland to strike NATO convoys?

It might, it might not.

Would the VDV have dropped beyond enemy lines to destroy enemy installations (presypply depos, communications stations, C2 structures) and cause chaos in Natos rear so that Nato is forces to fight on two fronts?

Possibly yes, although it would be entirely to facilitate the movement of ground forces, not work as independent front openers.

How would initial plans change as the battles occur with air support on both sides coming into play? Would the soviets abandon the big push for multiple fronts stretching Nato to cover multiple threat axis'? Would NATO's plan of combined defense work or change ? Could they be overrun by the number of Soviet aggressors?

Air power isn't likely to be any sort of big game changer. The main questions that will decide the battle is whether NATO's inexperience in coordinating forces on the required scale and the politically necessary but militarily poor forward deployment would have been more of a hindrance than the Soviets stultified tactical command structure and how much the changes in the actual norms would fit with the Soviets paper norms (and how well the STAVKA could adjust the latter to meet the former).
 
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Ian_W

Banned
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Air power isn't likely to be any sort of big game changer. The main questions that will decide the battle is whether NATO's inexperience in coordinating forces on the required scale and the politically necessary but militarily poor forward deployment would have been more of a hindrance than the Soviets stultified tactical command structure and how much the changes in the actual norms would fit with the Soviets paper norms (and how well the STAVKA could adjust the latter to meet the former).

The other big question is 'how much warning does NATO have, really ?

Traditionally, Russian armies are bad at short-warning operations, and you've also got assets like Oleg Godievsky, so it's not impossible that you'd have NATO mobilising first.
 
Traditionally, Russian armies are bad at short-warning operations,

Kinda. The GSFG was organized and trained relentlessly for do short-warning ops, since they were expected to be able to parry a surprise NATO offensive or at least be able to put up enough of a fight that the rest of the army had time to get into gear. The catch is twofold: first, that training steadily slipped during the 80’s. And secondly, save for a handful of VDV formations, the same couldn’t be said for the rest of the Soviet army. So while in theory, the Soviets could (especially if we’re talking a 60’s or 70’s scenario) try to surprise NATO by using the GSFG to immediately force a decisive battle in the border region, that isn’t an option their likely to take and are less able to do so the longer the 80’s wear on in any case. They’d much rather have the forces available to run a deeply-echelons attack ready to go at the outset in case the attempt to force a decisive battle in the border regions to fail. And that certainly isn’t a short-warning proposition...

and you've also got assets like Oleg Godievsky, so it's not impossible that you'd have NATO mobilising first.

Realistically speaking, a war’s most liable to come when both sides have ratcheted up their readiness and prepared forces as part of a time of crisis, whether in Europe or elsewhere. The OP flatted in three days of NATO warning for some reason, but that’s more realistic. That sort of scenario wouldn’t necessarily eliminate the possibility of the Soviets taking NATO by surprise, but it would at least reduce, if not eliminate, the possibility of taking them unprepared (or at least, any more unprepared then the Soviets are).
 
I woder how much of the WP forces command structure would survive an attack with cruise Missiles

three days of warning for the NATO would mean the immediate line up would be 0.7 Mio Bundeswehr (on the move from peacetime 0.5 to wartime 1.1) 0.2 Benelux troops 0.3 US troops and 0.2 rest of the NATO (DK, BAOR some Canadian) against 0.4 Russian, 0.3 GDR (same as FRG) plus 0.2 CSSR and 0.2 rest (some hungarian and some Polish)

Nato 1.4 against WP 1.1.

Next 5 days will see (assuming both sides go at the maximum they can get) 0.4 Bundeswehr 0.4 Canadian and USA 0.2 Benelux 0.2 GB) vs. 0.1 GDR, 0.3 CSSR and Poland and max 1 Mio Russian,

Nato 1.2 against WP 1.4

While at the same time at the bulgarian border you have Turkish and Greek armies (1.2) mobilised against Bulgarian plus some Russian (0.4)

So on the central front ist is 2.6 NATO against 2.5 WP with the WP desperately trying to scramble troops to shore up Bulgaria. And NATO still has a couple 100k soldiers in the USA, Canada, Spain, Italy and France...
 
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Only if t is discovered before the Army, Army Group and maybe even divisional headqarters are hit. And then you have the F 117 doing strikes with hardly a counter from the WP
 
If I were a WP commander I would have sought to achieve smaller break throughs immidiately followed up with resupply and reinforcements without providing NATO the supply lines and rear echelones they sought to interdict with air and artillery. My second echelon units would be under friendly air cover with first echelon having CAS assigned and SAM/Spaag following.

These small pockets would leapfrog from one point with reinforcements rushing up after a successful attack that broke through.

Let my strategy have it but a chnage in strategy amd doctrine is the only way a victory could be achieved without resorting to attrition warfare
 
A discussion of how the battle of Germany would have unfolded in 1985 between warsaw and Nato given that warsaw attacks with no more than 3 days warning to Nato given that both sides are coming back from yearly exercises. For the purpose of this discussion lets say no wmd's are used.

How would the soviets have eliminated the superior E-3 sentry and NATO's C2 structure? Would there have been a way to eliminate the airfields key to NATO's defensive strategy?

Could the Su-25 engage Nato ground units with effect? Would Nato aircraft survive the amount of SAMs and AAA the reds brought to bear? Would air superiority shift between air forces or would one dominate the other?

Could reforger occur quickly enough to prevent allied units from disengaging due to lack of supplies? What is the soviets neutralized the sosus line with a guided non nuclear missile strike from a submarine? Or a red storm rising like operation to capture and utilize iceland to strike NATO convoys?

Would the VDV have dropped beyond enemy lines to destroy enemy installations (presypply depos, communications stations, C2 structures) and cause chaos in Natos rear so that Nato is forces to fight on two fronts?

How would initial plans change as the battles occur with air support on both sides coming into play? Would the soviets abandon the big push for multiple fronts stretching Nato to cover multiple threat axis'? Would NATO's plan of combined defense work or change ? Could they be overrun by the number of Soviet aggressors?

Just looking for a fun in depth discussion comparing weapons systems,strategies,tactics and doctrines and the key rule of warfare: no plan survives contact with the enemy.
 
Did a stint in the FRG in the early 80s. The general line of thought was that the Soviets could not attack NATO as long as they were tied up in Afghanistan. Although that campaign took only a small part of the Soviet Army it took a disproportionate amount of supply and transportation. Even before 1980 and the use of the M1 Abrams it was considered that a Soviet attack into the FRG would be the biggest live-fire exercise NATO ever had. Unlikely the Soviets cold have pulled off a surprise attack due to allied counter-intelligence. The intel site in West Berlin pulled in virtually every WP communication. Referring back to to logistics the WP lacked trucks and depended on trains for movement combat units, very detectable. Personally, I think the WP airforces could have done some damage even though they had some real dogs - some very old dogs - Mig 17s and 19s. I suspect results would have been like the Luftwaffe's Operation Boden platte. Regarding armies, the Bundes Wehr was the backbone of NATO with 12 BIG divisions (5 Panzer, 5 PG, 1 Jager and 1 FSJager.) This was backed up by a massive body of trained men since they had conscription since 1955. Some of these were in reserve Brigades assigned to existing divisions and the defense battalions. The US had four heavy divisions, 2 Arm. Cav Regs and four forward brigades for CONUS units. The goal was 10 divisions in 10 days! The UK had three small Armored Divisions with units in Britain to form another division in a week.The Belgium's and Dutch each had two under strength Mech Inf Divisions with reserve brigades but well equipped and trained.The Danes had two small divisions to defend their peninsula and the main island. They also had a dozen or more reserve inf. brigades well armed with AT weapons. Interestingly I read an article a few years ago about a defense pact between Denmark, Sweden and the US! If the WP attacked Denmark Sweden would enter the war (4th largest airforce in the world ) The French Army in SW Germany was small but well armed. Their four division were actually brigade size units. Also 1980 was a period of great unrest in WP members, check out Poland and the strikes at the Gdansk shipyards. After 1968 the Soviets never trusted the Czechs. I recomment the books by Col. Viktor Suvarov esp. "Inside the Soviet Army. Suvarov was a defector and helped wit "The Third War War" by Sir John Hackett.
 
While the Soviets could attack with the forces in a "normal" deployment mode, this includes naval and air forces as well. If the Soviet submarine force does not substantially surge before the fighting starts, their ability to get in to the North Atlantic and disrupt supply reinforcement to NATO is severely limited. Similarly a lot of the Soviet aviation assets that would be wanted for such a strike cannot operate from their normal bases, aside from the flight times aerial refueling capability was limited so they could not fly missions without forward deploying. Surging of Soviet subs, and forward deployment of aviation units would be noticed and quickly. Especially with subs to get from Northern Fleet home ports through the GIUK Gap will take some time. Aircraft can fly forward pretty quickly, but you need to move maintainers and others forward as well. To get the sort of numerical advantage the Soviets need on the ground and in the air, and to get any use out of their submarine force, there will have to be movements that cannot be missed. The sort of preparations that were noted in the buildup phase of "Red Storm Rising" are pretty accurate. Now how NATO responds to all of this is another question - getting REFORGER going, calling up all sorts of reserve and NG units in the USA does take time, and if you put it off too long "to avoid being provocative" you are screwing the pooch.
 
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