Nato vs Warsaw pact: The first battle of the last war

A discussion of how the battle of Germany would have unfolded in 1985 between warsaw and Nato given that warsaw attacks with no more than 3 days warning to Nato given that both sides are coming back from yearly exercises. For the purpose of this discussion lets say no wmd's are used.

How would the soviets have eliminated the superior E-3 sentry and NATO's C2 structure? Would there have been a way to eliminate the airfields key to NATO's defensive strategy?

Could the Su-25 engage Nato ground units with effect? Would Nato aircraft survive the amount of SAMs and AAA the reds brought to bear? Would air superiority shift between air forces or would one dominate the other?

Could reforger occur quickly enough to prevent allied units from disengaging due to lack of supplies? What is the soviets neutralized the sosus line with a guided non nuclear missile strike from a submarine? Or a red storm rising like operation to capture and utilize iceland to strike NATO convoys?

Would the VDV have dropped beyond enemy lines to destroy enemy installations (presypply depos, communications stations, C2 structures) and cause chaos in Natos rear so that Nato is forces to fight on two fronts?

How would initial plans change as the battles occur with air support on both sides coming into play? Would the soviets abandon the big push for multiple fronts stretching Nato to cover multiple threat axis'? Would NATO's plan of combined defense work or change ? Could they be overrun by the number of Soviet aggressors?

Just looking for a fun in depth discussion comparing weapons systems,strategies,tactics and doctrines and the key rule of warfare: no plan survives contact with the enemy.
 
Depends on how long the pact takes to prepare. If I remember correctly, there were supposed to be Spetnatz teams infiltrated into the west, to attack airfields, HQs, etc. But this infiltration would takes weeks.
 
Depends on how long the pact takes to prepare. If I remember correctly, there were supposed to be Spetnatz teams infiltrated into the west, to attack airfields, HQs, etc. But this infiltration would takes weeks.


That brings in a different Perspective...if that happens would Nato intelligence pick it up? Red spies were good,sometimes. These teams could majorly disrupt the initial Nato response
 
That brings in a different Perspective...if that happens would Nato intelligence pick it up? Red spies were good,sometimes. These teams could majorly disrupt the initial Nato response
The longer (and extensive) any preparations are, the greater the chances of the other side finding out. Tbh, for such a large scale invasion, I don't think this kind of short term surprise is possible. NATO and US Intel would pick up the massive movements of troops and equipment required, or signals traffic.
 
How would the soviets have eliminated the superior E-3 sentry and NATO's C2 structure?
The fighting in the air over Germany would probably require two E-3s airborne at any one time, so eight would be required to maintain comprehensive 24/7 coverage. NATO began receiving their 20 in 1982, but I don't know how many they would have had in 1985. Even if they are all destroyed in the opening Soviet strikes (incredibly unlikely), the US Air Force had their own fleet based in the US that would be deployed as replacements and likely based in western France or Britain (almost impossible to get at). Soviet weakness in PGMs means that their impact on NATO's well-dispersed C2 infrastructure would be relatively minimal. I don't want to downplay the Soviet threat here, but the NATO C2 net was far more flexible than the Soviet one, and the Soviets were far less able to strike at NATO's C2 net than vice versa.

Would there have been a way to eliminate the airfields key to NATO's defensive strategy?
Given three days of warning, NATO aircraft would be dispersed enough to keep this from happening at most sites. Airfields would certainly be hit but maintenance equipment (though not personnel) is generally replaceable. An attack with literally zero warning would have a good chance, but even a few hours of warning would get a lot of planes in the air.

Could the Su-25 engage Nato ground units with effect?
The Su-25 is a fairly generalized CAS aircraft compared to the A-10. Most importantly, it lacks the A-10's battlefield standoff range, which allowed the A-10 to engage and destroy enemy tanks from beyond the range of dense Soviet MANPADS and SPAAG fire (engage from 2,000 m to 1,500 m and then turn away before coming within 1,000 m). Even with rockets, the Su-25 would have to get really close, so I doubt it would be as survivable as the A-10. Of course, the entire A-10 fleet was only expected to last through seven days of fighting (420 planes losing 60 per day).

Would Nato aircraft survive the amount of SAMs and AAA the reds brought to bear?
In a word, yes. The Soviet SAM belts would put huge limitations on the freedom of movement of both NATO and WarPac aircraft because the Soviets had to deploy their SAMs inside free-fire zones while NATO SAMs were better (not perfect) at IFF. However, NATO pilots had been used to treetop-level penetration flying for a decade, so they were definitely aware of the threat.

Would air superiority shift between air forces or would one dominate the other?
Over West Germany, the Soviets would be able to achieve, at most, localized and temporary air superiority in support of ground attacks. Their method for air-control relied primarily on deploying long-range SAMs close to the front, which was effectively an admission that their aircraft did not compete well with NATO aircraft (not that it makes it a bad tactic, SAMs are just less effective than other aircraft at air control). Eventually (I don't know how long), the odds of NATO achieving air superiority over East Germany was higher than the Soviets achieving air superiority over West Germany.

Could reforger occur quickly enough to prevent allied units from disengaging due to lack of supplies?
The purpose of REFORGER was to deploy several divisions of American and Canadian soldiers to Germany to meet up with their equipment and move to the front within days. This was a separate effort from the necessary transatlantic supply convoys. The answer to the logistics question depends on how long the war takes; a Seven Days to the Rhine scenario (I know it's a nuclear plan) would mean that the Soviets either win or are stopped before any convoys would even leave, and a Red Storm Rising scenario with a war lasting about four months is very different. It would probably take about a week (from the war warning three days before the fighting starts) to get some ships loaded up and on the way across the Atlantic. Of course, they wouldn't arrive until the third week after the war starts. Before then, transatlantic support would require an airlift like Operation Nickel Grass, utilizing Air Force and CRAF aircraft. This would probably be moving something on the order of 10,000 tons per week across the Atlantic; I don't know what kind of impact that would have on the situation.

What is the soviets neutralized the sosus line with a guided non nuclear missile strike from a submarine?
The ground stations at places like Keflavik would certainly be vulnerable, but I don't think (just my speculation) that there wouldn't be more defensible back ups in place or ready to be installed. Of course, there's no way the Soviets are getting at the sensor network, so the ground stations would be the only vulnerability.

Or a red storm rising like operation to capture and utilize iceland to strike NATO convoys?
I would consider this possible but extraordinarily unlikely. Soviet airborne forces would already be stretched thin by requirements in Central Europe, and stopping the NATO convoys only becomes a problem in the second and third weeks of the war, well after the Soviets thought their window for winning would be over. As for basing bombers there, its far too vulnerable and they can already reach the shipping lanes from far safer bases on the Kola Peninsula.

Would the VDV have dropped beyond enemy lines to destroy enemy installations (presypply depos, communications stations, C2 structures) and cause chaos in Natos rear so that Nato is forces to fight on two fronts?
The Soviets had something like ten division equivalents of airborne (planes) and air assault (helicopters) troops. However, with three days of warning and the capability of NATO air defenses, I doubt the Soviets would be able to deploy that entire force into the NATO rear areas. However, the ability of the Soviets to move huge numbers of airmobile troops by helicopter into the rear of the FEBA (within a few kilometers of the front) should not be underestimated. I would consider the chance of the Soviets taking and developing an airhead to be minimal if there are E-3s in the air when they try, and Northern Germany and Denmark would be the best location for that. It would be important for the Soviets to take and control the Danish straits and the Baltic coast, using both VDV and naval infantry. The attacks against logistics and C3 stations would be carried out by GRU Spetsnaz, while VDV Spetsnaz would be used to take crossroads and bridges (and the like) behind NATO lines. My personal opinion is that the GRU Spetsnaz attacks would be harder to stop and more damaging than the Soviet air strikes, but would likely be limited to the first few hours of the war before they get mostly cleaned up.

How would initial plans change as the battles occur with air support on both sides coming into play?
Not sure what you mean here. The plans were made to include air support. NATO's reliance on air power was heavier than the Soviets because NATO's biggest advantages were in the air. As we saw in Iraq and Yugoslavia, the ability of aircraft to interdict against ground targets is generally overblown, but NATO CAS capabilities were not (as much?). Of course, the Soviet C3 network has to be transmitting to be working, so the transmitters can be found and destroyed. The Serbs didn't have to worry about that because they weren't fighting a ground war against NATO at the same time.

Would the soviets abandon the big push for multiple fronts stretching Nato to cover multiple threat axis'?
Only if the big offensive in Northern Germany doesn't work. Trying to fight into Central Germany and Bavaria is going to be a much more difficult prospect, especially because of the higher proportion of American units they would be facing. The schwerpunkt of the entire war is Germany, so extending to other fronts like Italy, Greece, or Turkey would probably be more distracting for the Soviets than for NATO.

Would NATO's plan of combined defense work or change ?
The plan for forward defense would probably collapse very quickly (within hours) when it becomes apparent that the Soviets are going for envelopments wherever they can. The forward defense was the official line but I think everybody (especially the Americans and British) was trying to prepare for a mobile war hinging more on mobility choke points (mountain passes and river crossings) than fighting for every single town. The Germans would probably be the most committed to the forward defense, but they would not be trying to fight to the last man for every terrain feature. The Germans would probably be the most vulnerable to being surrounded on the company or battalion level, but breaking out would be a highly variable thing.

Could they be overrun by the number of Soviet aggressors?
In the first days of the war, the Soviet offensive would be (trying to be) highly fluid, reinforcing success at NATO's weak points rather than trying to grind down every NATO position they come across. Unless NATO misses the deployment of huge numbers of top-line Soviet forces, GSFG's numerical advantage was not as high as you might think. They recognized the efficacy of flexibility over the difficulty of directing huge, preplanned assaults, and were trying to replicate NATO's fighting style as best they could.
 
Not sure what you mean here. The plans were made to include air support. NATO's reliance on air power was heavier than the Soviets because NATO's biggest advantages were in the air. As we saw in Iraq and Yugoslavia, the ability of aircraft to interdict against ground targets is generally overblown, but NATO CAS capabilities were not (as much?). Of course, the Soviet C3 network has to be transmitting to be working, so the transmitters can be found and destroyed. The Serbs didn't have to worry about that because they weren't fighting a ground war against NATO at the same time.

I mean as the different tactics and doctrines of air war influenced the ground war. Nato pilots hugging the ground would obviously lead to a change of tactics or deployment by soviet AA forces. Deploying old tanks or mock ups to lure Nato planes in and then target them with their own air force or AA?

The tactics and strategy would have to evolve. How would day 1 strategies and deployments compare to say day 7 as they sides adjust to one anothers plans?
 
The Su-25 is a fairly generalized CAS aircraft compared to the A-10. Most importantly, it lacks the A-10's battlefield standoff range, which allowed the A-10 to engage and destroy enemy tanks from beyond the range of dense Soviet MANPADS and SPAAG fire (engage from 2,000 m to 1,500 m and then turn away before coming within 1,000 m). Even with rockets, the Su-25 would have to get really close, so I doubt it would be as survivable as the A-10. Of course, the entire A-10 fleet was only expected to last through seven days of fighting (420 planes losing 60 per day)

Alot of people see the Su-25 as a rather venerable aircraft with a better suited gun than the gau-8. Can't really speak myself but on quora there is quite a discussion comparing the merits of both.

I hear what you say about stand off but again I wonder how tactics would adjust to counter this?
 
SU-25 seemed unremarkable in Afghanistan, as did most RU air power not unlike America in Vietnam! Attack Helo are always deadly - but so too was the Stinger SAM.

I though America preference was for medium altitude operations ...after the radar suppression takes effect. This choice over LLL Tornado patterns in Gulf -seemed like a statement of intent, all be it a decade later.

For what its worth; "Forward defence" was Korps battle plan to establish FOEB [forward edge of Battle] in each Korps sectors to start attrition early and more effectively vector long range smart munitions from jet /helicopter & ground rocket/missile units etc etc. FO & Drones would be needed to target such strikes and vector in armored cavalry strikes.

I never worried about American forces, or German/BAOR . I did worry about Dutch/Belgian sector and just how effective a 'safety' the French would actually be.
 
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SU-25 seemed unremarkable in Afghanistan, as did most RU air power not unlike America in Vietnam! Attack Helo are always deadly - but so too was the Stinger SAM.

AFAIK a high percentage of Stinger kills in Afghanistan were ambush kills; the locals would ambush a convoy or attack an outpost, and Stinger crews would sit back and wait for the inevitable incoming air support to arrive. Which could be seen coming from miles away. Not what would happen in an European war. And the US was critically short on battlefield air defence.
While the rest of NATO had modern mobile SAMs or AAA to follow the troops, the US was stuck with the M163 Vulcan and the Chaparral, thanks to the disaster of the Sergeant York.
 
AFAIK a high percentage of Stinger kills in Afghanistan were ambush kills; the locals would ambush a convoy or attack an outpost, and Stinger crews would sit back and wait for the inevitable incoming air support to arrive. Which could be seen coming from miles away. Not what would happen in an European war. And the US was critically short on battlefield air defence.
While the rest of NATO had modern mobile SAMs or AAA to follow the troops, the US was stuck with the M163 Vulcan and the Chaparral, thanks to the disaster of the Sergeant York.


All that's on one side and on the other side ...... the Afghan WERE rebels and not a fully trained functioning army. I would expect the NATO troops with Stingers -to do their part.
 
All that's on one side and on the other side ...... the Afghan WERE rebels and not a fully trained functioning army. I would expect the NATO troops with Stingers -to do their part.

Not entirely sure. The problem is how long the operator has to react to a threat, specially if he's on foot. Not the missile reaction time, the operator. He has to see the plane coming, recognize it as hostile, shoulder and turn the SAM, arm, search, get a lock and fire. Been trying to find the scan of an old article from the 1980s but, in an European theater, with hills and forests, if something pops up at high subsonic, the plane will be in and out in a handfull of seconds. Most likely the Stinger would be fired at the retreating fighter... assuming the shooter isn't dead allready. In Afghanistan none of this was a problem: anything flying was enemy, and the operators set up to cover those ups would allready be prepared to shoot.

I've read articles on MANPDAD operators (west and east) being trained to ride the top of IVF/APCs, with a shouldered SAM, to cut on the rection time. It's also one of the reasons why the french (Mistral) and the UK (Javelin) set up firing pedestals for fixed positions: it cuts down on the deployment/reaction time
 
Victory or Defeat in Western Europe would be decided out in the Atlantic . The convoys of reinforcements , ammunition and spare parts would be needed by day 7 . By day 10 units would be screaming for new gun barrels for surviving tanks etc . The leadup to war would see Merchants loaded with all of the weapons of war and sorted into fast and slow convoys . The USN would then in conjunction with it's NATO allies provide either a protected route or individual escorts . The Carrier Groups would begin gathering to go after the Kola airfields and support Norway . The Soviet Navy would rapidly find itself losing subs , ships and aircraft . Yes they would attrite the convoys and cause losses . Heck even a CVN could be sunk , however the Nato units had an individual superiority in ASW that was scary . The Backfire and AS-6 was awesome in performance but no match to an F-14 if it got within 100 miles . Nato Ground forces would trade land for time and defend hard . Every metre of land would be contested with local counterattacks and air strikes . Soviet Artillery would begin losing effectiveness as the counterbattery radar units get them wiped out . SAM units would face regular artillery barrages and anti-radar missiles . Bridges would be destroyed and the pontoon bridges that replace them attacked with long range artillery . Yes the Warsaw Pact armies will advance and cause losses . I do not see then achieving their goals however . The USSR lost it's chance int he 1970's to make it happen . By the early 1980's the technology gap was just too wide .
 
In the Soviet Army doctrine the Operational Manoeuvre Groups would be inserted to exploit a breakthrough by a Front during a potential war against NATO in Europe. In the Soviet doctrine, after the motor-rifle units, heavily supported by artillery, helicopters and Close Air Support aircraft would have broken NATO front, the operational manoeuvre groups would be inserted to exploit the breakthrough using elements of, or whole tank armies.[1]

I would imagine mech infantry having a hard time smashing NATO's defenses. However depending on the air war they might be able to as NATO didn't have the AA/AD except in the air.

If a breakthrough was achieved would it ne possible to envelope and cut off the OMG ?

Then again having a tank army running around your rear or in between you front lines is not ideal. If the Soviets got close enough to "hug the enemy" as in WW2 it would make CAS alot more difficult for both sides but it would hamper Nato more i think?

I also understand what people are saying about Nato counter battering Red arty but wouldn't the reds copy this tactic and employ it themselves? As far as I know they had alot more rocket artillery, not nearly as advanced but this is great shock weapon and would decimate infantry if set to airburst...

I also read that the rockets used by the Su-25 is superior to those used by the A-10 as some are beam riding and carry a big punch. Maybe enough to m kill a Bradley or destroy artillery pieces. Alot of it comes down to the air war over the Feba...
 
AFAIK a high percentage of Stinger kills in Afghanistan were ambush kills; the locals would ambush a convoy or attack an outpost, and Stinger crews would sit back and wait for the inevitable incoming air support to arrive. Which could be seen coming from miles away. Not what would happen in an European war. And the US was critically short on battlefield air defence.
While the rest of NATO had modern mobile SAMs or AAA to follow the troops, the US was stuck with the M163 Vulcan and the Chaparral, thanks to the disaster of the Sergeant York.
Sorry, but you forgot I-Hawk/Hawk, Avenger...
 
This is all a moot point because we now know that any Soviet attack on Western Europe would have started with a massive nuclear attack on European targets.
 

cpip

Gone Fishin'
Sorry, but you forgot I-Hawk/Hawk, Avenger...

Avenger was a bit too late for OP, since it didn't enter service until 1990.

I had thought that Hawk/I-Hawk wasn't a fire-on-the-go system, not like the Chapparal or Avenger were, and had to be moved into position and set up.
 

cpip

Gone Fishin'
Idk, but I saw Avenger photo in Germany. Dated 1989. WTF then?

1989 was initial operating testing for Avenger. It's possible there were some field exercises with a few over there just starting out, but actual deployment didn't begin until 1990.
 
1989 was initial operating testing for Avenger. It's possible there were some field exercises with a few over there just starting out, but actual deployment didn't begin until 1990.

This. Afaik, the contract is from 1987.
 
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