I would not be surprised if it was a third world country even in 2019. It did not get its economic boost thanks to the Korean war, it went through a civil war and it had another city wiped out. I think that they are fucked.Japan's troubles are far from over, that's for sure. Japan in TTL (even in the year 2019) will be a much darker place...
Couldn't have put it better myself. Anime will not exist in TTL, for the record.I would not be surprised if it was a third world country even in 2019. It did not get its economic boost thanks to the Korean war, it went through a civil war and it had another city wiped out. I think that they are fucked.
Why would Japan be a third world country? What exactly is preventing the Japanese government from taking out some IMF loans to fund investments into their industry like West Germany did in OTL?I would not be surprised if it was a third world country even in 2019. It did not get its economic boost thanks to the Korean war, it went through a civil war and it had another city wiped out. I think that they are fucked.
A fair question. The reason is that the Japanese government is really, really unpopular with the people, as they see it as a useless stooge, and Hirohito as incompetent for losing the Pacific War, their current poverty, and having three cities nuked. So even though reconstruction funds from the IMF and the like are available, it will take time for the government to redeem itself in the eyes of its people.Why would Japan be a third world country? What exactly is preventing the Japanese government from taking out some IMF loans to fund investments into their industry like West Germany did in OTL?
Ah, the "Chiang lost because Marshall pressured him to accept a cease-fire in June" myth. I addressed that in an old soc.history.what-if post (sorry for any links that no longer work):In this TL, the point of divergence comes when Chiang Kai-shek ignores George Marshall's call for a cease-fire and continues the offensive against Mao and his Communists in Manchuria. .
June 4, 1946: US Secretary of State George Marshall proposes a cease-fire in the conflict. He demands that Chiang agree to a two-week armistice with Mao, on pain of having all American equipment and aid revoked.
Marshall's ultimatum sparks fierce debate amongst the Nationalists. The prospect of being without American aid or equipment is deeply unappetising, and as such some in the Nationalist camp advocate for accepting the Marshall ceasefire. The most prominent of these figures is Wei Lihuang, who Chiang suspects is a Communist sleeper agent. However, Chiang reasons that the Communists are so close to defeat that even in the event that US aid is cut off, they can be crushed and it will be worth it. The Chinese Civil War will continue. (2)
(2) POD, obviously in OTL Chiang agreed to the ceasefire
Ah, the "Chiang lost because Marshall pressured him to accept a cease-fire in June" myth. I addressed that in an old soc.history.what-if post (sorry for any links that no longer work):
Here I would like to note three points about this question made by Jay Taylor
in his recent book *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for
Modern China,* (Harvard UP 2009), a book which incidentally is generally
sympathetic to Chiang and somewhat critical of Marshall:
(1) During his June 3 meeting with Marshall in Nanking, Chiang "with little
or no pressure from Marshall...agreed to halt 'advances, attacks or pursuits'
by his troops in Manchuria for fifteen days." (p. 353)
(2) "Three days later, Chiang and Mao issued separate announcements of
another cease-fire. As ordered, Sun Liren halted his advance and withdrew
south of the Sungari. Years later, Chiang wrote that this cease-fire sapped
morale and was the beginning of the government 'debacle in Manchuria.' But
even if General Sun had captured Harbin, the CCP and its troops would have
escaped into the hinterland, which they almost totally controlled, and
probably into Russia if necessary..." (p. 353) (Rob Harris made this point
in the above-mentioned thread at
(3) "Despite his continued optimism and provocative Communist attacks during
the cease-fire, in late June Chiang confirmed in his journal that he did not
intend 'to push very far north.' He thought this strategy would avoid a
confrontation with the Soviet Union and would free government troops both to
deploy into the huge Manchurian landscape behind their lines and to
concentrate on eliminating the Communist forces in North China." (p. 354)
In short, the significance of this particular event seems to have been
overblown. Marshall did not coerce a reluctant Chiang into losing a golden
opportunity to wipe out Lin Biao's troops; rather, Chiang as well as Marshall
was worried that going too far north could be provocative to Stalin, and
anyway capturing Harbin would not have made that much of a difference,
militarily speaking, for the KMT. (It might have been a psychological boost,
but if psychological boosts were all that the KMT needed you would think
that, for example, capturing the Communist capital of Yan'an in 1947 would
have helped them more than it did...)…
Indeed, the whole business about Chiang's strategy in Manchuria in 1946 being hamstrung by Marshal is IMO a myth. As I wrote at https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-pc-us-allies-go-all-in-for-nationalist-china.388943/#post-12423321
"The notion that Chiang was on the verge of a decisive victory in Manchuria in 1946 and was prevented from winning only by a cease-fire imposed by Marshall is not supported by the evidence. See Harold M. Tanner, *The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China: Siping, 1946* the conclusion of which is summarized by one reviewer as follows: "The major question concerns the decisiveness of the battle of Siping. In retrospect, many Nationalists have looked on this battle as a lost chance to win the war. According to this view, the Nationalists had the Communists in full retreat until the Americans interfered with the cease-fire that halted pursuit of Mao’s armies. The pause allowed the Communists to rebuild their forces and eventually win control of Manchuria. Without a cease-fire, supporters of this argument believe that Nationalists would have secured control of Manchuria and eventually defeated the Communists across China. In response, Tanner argues that Siping did not set the stage for a possible Nationalist victory in Manchuria. Chiang’s armies faced logistical and manpower problems and that further advance might have fatally exposed Nationalist forces to Communist hit-and-run attacks." http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=39472 Another review (not available in full to non-subscribers): "Tanner systematically refutes such charges against Marshall...Using a variety of recently available archival materials, he demonstrates that leadership on both sides had military reasons for accepting the ceasefire at that time. In reality, Marshall's maneuvers were peripheral to their strategic decision making. The latter was shaped by perceptions of the changing facts on the battlefield. *Chiang had no intention at the time of pursuing the communists beyond the Songhua River.* [emphasis added]. Although Western and Taiwan-based historians have argued in hindsight that pursuing and annihilating the communists is what he should have done, Chiang was focused on consolidating his hold on southern Manchuria by moving north to capture Changchun. Tanner quotes Chiang's diary to make this point. As for Marshall, both the communist and nationalist leaders considered him a nuisance...to be humored and outmanuevered at the negotiating table... "
http://ahr.oxfordjournals.org/content/118/5/1500.extract The notion that Marshall prevented Chiang from gaining a decisive victory by taking Harbin is also false: see my post at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/gRV99OKh4jc/hMSaSkGkCeQJ where I point out that "In short, the significance of this particular event seems to have been overblown. Marshall did not coerce a reluctant Chiang into losing a golden opportunity to wipe out Lin Biao's troops; rather, Chiang as well as Marshall was worried that going too far north could be provocative to Stalin, and anyway capturing Harbin would not have made that much of a difference, militarily speaking, for the KMT.""
Indonesia? Fairly similar to OTL. The Indonesian Communist Party doesn't get the chance to expand nearly as much as OTL, so the bloody 1965 purge is butterflied away. Right now, a number of Chinese companies are investing in the oilfields. There is some fear in Indonesia that they will meet the fate of South Korea, with their economy dependent on the ROC, but living standards are a bit higher than OTL...How is Indonesia doing ITTL?
This is a very valid criticism. ITTL, the massive ROC economy means that there is no room for the Asian Tigers. Obviously, this does not affect Taiwan, which is even better off than OTL. Some East Asian countries enjoy levels of prosperity akin to OTL, such as South Korea and Singapore. This is due to their successfully attracting Chinese loans and investment. The price for high living standards is tying the health of their economies to Nanjing, however.Do remember that nations will develop irrespective of any imagined overlord, much to the distress of those self-imagined overlords. ROK (and indeed, DPRK too), Japan, and the various other nations of Asia shouldn't be third-world hellholes just because Mao lost in China. Also, why did the RoC invade Tibet? The Republicans didn't recognize Tibet but afaik they weren't antagonistic to it either??