Nationalist china mistakes

What were the mistakes nationalist china made that lost her the civil war with communist china?

-Not getting to the people and peasntry fast enough, ineffective land reforms allowed the communists to win them over with false hope and empty promises.

-Not completely crushing the CCP even when it had the chance multiple times before the war with Japan started.

-Fough the Japanese by its lonesome on the faulty assumption that foreign powers will help, allowed the CCP to strengthen itself considerably during the war.

-Being worse at hiding corruption than the CCP.

Other factors that contributed are more unlucky circumstances forced upon the KMT rather than any particular mistake made.
 

raharris1973

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Counting 1945 and later, I would say: Overextending Nationalist military resources trying to simultaneously occupy east, north and northeast (Manchuria) China. This prevented decisive campaigns to crush and uproot the Reds, allowed the Reds to eventually take the initiative, the eventual piecemeal defeat of nationalist armies, and even worse, the absorption of ex-nationalist soldiers and weapons into the communist armies. If the Chinese nationalist just focused on reclaiming everything up to the Lunghai railway (the railway running a couple hundred miles north of the Yangzi), or at most focused on reclaiming everything up to the Great Wall, but not beyond, the likelihood of the ChiNat forces being ground down and thrown out in just 5 years is greatly reduced.
 
Counting 1945 and later, I would say: Overextending Nationalist military resources trying to simultaneously occupy east, north and northeast (Manchuria) China. This prevented decisive campaigns to crush and uproot the Reds, allowed the Reds to eventually take the initiative, the eventual piecemeal defeat of nationalist armies, and even worse, the absorption of ex-nationalist soldiers and weapons into the communist armies. If the Chinese nationalist just focused on reclaiming everything up to the Lunghai railway (the railway running a couple hundred miles north of the Yangzi), or at most focused on reclaiming everything up to the Great Wall, but not beyond, the likelihood of the ChiNat forces being ground down and thrown out in just 5 years is greatly reduced.

But wouldn't leaving Manchuria in Communist hands be unwise? It was the industrial heart of China, after all. Maybe take the US airlift but rather than fighting for Manchuria, either performing Scorched Earth or try to evacuate the industry. Would that work?
 
-Not completely crushing the CCP even when it had the chance multiple times before the war with Japan started.

This, inlcuding after 1945 where they had to opportunity again but were halted by the Americans when trying to take Manchuria.

But wouldn't leaving Manchuria in Communist hands be unwise? It was the industrial heart of China, after all. Maybe take the US airlift but rather than fighting for Manchuria, either performing Scorched Earth or try to evacuate the industry. Would that work?

industrial heart? I thought it was the main barnyard for China(much like Nebraska is for the USA?)?
 
industrial heart? I thought it was the main barnyard for China(much like Nebraska is for the USA?)?

it has been argued by Martin Bernal that Chiang "*had* to send troops to Manchuria. In war-devastated China the relatively undamaged plant in Manchuria probably made up over 80 percent of Chinese heavy industrial capacity. He was also convinced-—wrongly—-that the Russians who were occupying Manchuria were working hand in glove with the Chinese Communists. Finally, and in my view this was crucial, Chiang had to be a national leader or he was nothing. If he failed in this he would be seen by China and the world to be a mere warlord. As 'leader of China' it was essential he assert himself in Manchuria which foreigners had been trying to prize away from China for the previous fifty years. If he was to stake a claim in Manchuria only his best American trained troops could make good use of the American air transport provided and only these could hope to withstand the Communists." http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1971/02/25/how-mao-won/ Personally, I think this argument is dubious--whatever prestige or industries Chiang temporarily gained by sending troops to Manchuria were hardly worse the huge costs involved. The Manchurian campaign mandated impossibly high taxes and requisitions from the peasants, and when these failed, the regime resorted to finance by hyperinflation, which made things worse...
 
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raharris1973

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But wouldn't leaving Manchuria in Communist hands be unwise? It was the industrial heart of China, after all. Maybe take the US airlift but rather than fighting for Manchuria, either performing Scorched Earth or try to evacuate the industry. Would that work?

On Manchuria as the "industrial heart of China". Well China was the mineral extraction heart of China, but when the Soviets left they evacuated all the movable industrial plant they could. So, Manchuria still had its soil and coal and mineral deposits, but getting any taxable value from them was dependent on replacing the stolen industrial plant, a process taking many years, and likely not a good investment to make in a distant, highly contested area, while there is a Civil War going on or a looming Civil War going on, and when many core areas of regime control or more accessible areas liberated from Japanese occupation also required reconstruction and/or reestablishment of Central Government authority.

-Not completely crushing the CCP even when it had the chance multiple times before the war with Japan started.

They didn't do *too* bad at it, up until 1936 they backed had progressively shrunk communist forces and pushed them out of most base areas.

This, inlcuding after 1945 where they had to opportunity again but were halted by the Americans when trying to take Manchuria.

This is a bit mythical. Even if Chinese Nationalists kept advancing in Manchuria, does that guarantee that the Communists are wiped out to the last man in all Manchuria? No. Does even a sweep of Manchuria mean that the communist troops and base areas throughout other regions of China just evaporate? No. The problem with the "we almost got 'em" argument is that the Communists had a lot of areas in which to operate and hide, eventually any government offensive would run out steam, and the Communists had the resilience and savvy to counterattack and defeat Nationalist forces in detail whenever that happened.

it has been argued by Mariin Bernal that Chiang "*had* to send troops to Manchuria. .... Finally, and in my view this was crucial, Chiang had to be a national leader or he was nothing. If he failed in this he would be seen by China and the world to be a mere warlord. As 'leader of China' it was essential he assert himself in Manchuria which foreigners had been trying to prize away from China for the previous fifty years..."

Let's interrogate Bernal's arguments and assumptions with the right questions-

Chiang does not send troops to Manchuria. Does this require him to renounce the Central Government's formal claim to sovereignty over the region? No.

Does not sending troops undermine the credibility of the claim to rule the whole country? Yes

Does Chiang look a bit less national and more warlord-like? Maybe

But who's still the biggest, baddest warlord in all China who nobody else outguns or outnumbers? Chiang Kai-shek

Would this dent in Chiang's reputation cause anyone of importance who previously did not favor Communist Party rule to favor the Communists? Probably not. With the exception of some local and low-level folks in areas where the Communists are stronger and it becomes people's survival interest to "support" the Communists.

Even if as a result of territorial restraint the Chinese Communists soon militarily dominate northeast China (north of the Great Wall) or even northern China (north the Huai river or Lunghai railway), do the Communists have the military strength to overpower the undiminished Nationalist armies in southern and western China, the way that the Chinese Communists overpowered the depleted Chinese Nationalist Armies in southern and western China from April to November 1945 in OTL? I don't see why the Communists would be able to, at least not with any haste. In fact I very much doubt if the Chinese Communists of 1945 would see conquest of Nationalist areas as an achieveable near or medium term objective.

Would Chinese liberals complain about lack of unity and try to take advantage of any diminution of Chiang's national image? I guess so, but they complained about the Civil War and its side effects also. In the ATL, if the Communists are high-handed in liberated areas uncontested by the ChiNats, liberals may get mad at them. But in the end, do unhappy liberals command a lot of troops? Not really?

Would conservative and reactionary Nationalists be upset with Chiang on both anticommunist grounds for not crushing the Communists and Nationalist grounds for not occupying some of the national territory? Sure

Would any of these upsets Nationalists be able to accumulate the necessary support to launch a coup or a successful political movement to take over from Chiang? Doubtful. Coup-proofing, inter-elite politics and intrigue were what Chiang Kai-shek excelled at, far more than he excelled at military command, grassroots politics or administrative leadership.

So yeah, Bernal's argument is "dubious" at best about what Chiang "had" to do.
 
The stop order when moving north at the behest of the Americans. Remember that General Stillwell hated Chiang Kai Check with a passion (calling him the "little peanut" IIRC)
 
What were the mistakes nationalist china made that lost her the civil war with communist china?
Starting the war in the first place, for one. The Nationalists should have consolidated a more powerful position over China by destroying the warlords first with the First United Front. But instead Chiang hated everything commie and uprooted leftist elements - both moderate and radical - in the Coup of 1928.
 
What were the mistakes nationalist china made that lost her the civil war with communist china?

1. Nationalist left the economy to Soong Tse-Ven, who was clueless about China. If they had rebuilt the national economy and started with infrastructure, they would have the public support.
2. Nationalist army was poorly led, trained, equipped and fed. On the paper, it was impressive with 4 million soldiers. Some were forced to join.
3. Nationalist had a very weak vision. The party was poorly organized. The party did not appeal to urban population, younger generation and peasants. They viewed the party as a ruling elite.
 

raharris1973

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Easy- Delay the atomic bomb by several months. But keep Soviet entry (it was scheduled and prepared already, but with a kick-off date set for one week later than OTL].

In this way, the Soviet Manchurian campaign continues on and on and crosses into northern China. Soviet offensives there converge with Chinese Communist offensives. Japanese forces get crushed by the Soviets but may need to redeploy all aircraft and mobile elements northward to try to hold back the Soviets, this makes more successful offensives possible for the Chinese Nationalists in southern and central China. Additionally, despite MacArthur's commitment to Olympic, the sweeping Soviet campaigns in China Proper force Washington, of its own inclination and by request of Chiang Kai-shek, to support Sino-American operations to get to at least Shanghai and Nanjing before the Soviets and ChiComs do. With the Sino-American forces meeting up with Sino-Soviet forces at the Lunghai railway or Huai river in October 1945 most likely, each superpower predominates in half of China. With the additional blood sacrifices made in the mainland war, Stalin is more insistent on having a friendly government in northern China. Chiang is unable to get into north or northeastern China to overextend his forces, so his forces remain intact guarding southern and western China. Meanwhile, the Soviets, not wanting to get into WWIII or take bigger risks, especially after the US demonstrates an A-Bomb capability [possibly tactically in Kyushu or Honshu], restrains the Communists from aggressively moving south. The ChiComs own need to build-up their own forces, absorb and reorganize to use captured modern arms, the need and temptation to settle scores locally and possibly to implement land reform, combined with vigorous anti-communist campaigns in Nationalist territory solidifies a de facto division of China along north-south lines.
 
^ The trouble here is that, Stalin distrusted and disliked Mao, who had long since purged the Party of Soviet advisers. He understood that should China be united under one government of any ideology, it would inevitably turn hostile to the USSR. He also understood that Mao was a nationalist (small n), and won't be "restrained" from reuniting China. So ITTL, he won't allow Mao to become head of a Soviet-backed North Chinese government. Mao will tragically die in an accident, and a factionalized North Chinese leadership replaces him. Soviet troops GTFO, but not before gifting weapons to every faction of the Revolution.

It achieves Stalin's every goal: land reform has already been implemented in North China, and the peasants of South China will have been aware. KMT South China is now destabilized by peasants. Meanwhile, North China is consumed by communist factions who hate each other and the KMT in equal measure. Chiang continuously demands aid from the Americans to take back the north, yet the Americans insist that he hold off these dreams in favour of reforming the south. Above all, China's warlord era is extended for decades. All in all, a very messy situation. Except for Stalin.
 

raharris1973

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EternalCynic, your take on my proposed PoD reinforces its strength as an answer to MrStrategy's request. At the end of the day Chiang doesn't make his OTL mistakes mainly because the US isn't helping him make those mistakes. Even with all the instability in all Chinese sections you posit, you still end up with Chiang Kai-shek being the leader owning more of China than any other.

So, Chiang's mistakes that led him to lose the mainland are gone. Does it make China a happy, shiny, stable place? No. But that was never the request put out there by the OP.
 
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