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In the OTL 1990s, disappointed at the lack of support and validation he was receiving from Arab states while under sanctions and threat from the west, Moammar Qadhafi, deemphasized pan-Arab and pan-Islamic agendas and increased emphasis on a pan-African agenda.

The Libyan dictator found that his money and influence could go further in Africa than in the Arab world.

----What if Nasser had a similar disillusionment from the Arab world, and shifted his main emphasis to Pan-Africanism?

The best time for this strategic reorientation would probably be the early 1960s, specifically, right after the Syrians seceded from the United Arab Republic (September 1961) and Egypt dissolved its loose union with Yemen (December 1961).

Over the winter of 1961-1962, Nasser reevaluates his position and strategy and predicament, which has worsened since its height right after the Suez crisis.

Nasser lays out his new, African-focused, vision to his Free Officers and to engaged segments of the public.

Influence over, and close ties with, Sudan and Libya seem to have much more to offer to Egypt and its national development, in terms of water and oil resources, than unification with Syria, liberation of Palestinian or unification with the poor, hilly Yemen, even though Egypt does have a long imperial tradition of ruling these territories in Pharoanic and Islamic times.

Nasser is outraged at Syrian ingratitude and rejection of the UAR. Rather than redouble his competitive role in the intra-Arab struggle, he begins to dismiss the importance of Arab southwest Asia as if its territories were a batch of sour grapes.

Nasser, who has bad blood with the Saudis, and a history of supporting Saudi opposition, decides that competing with the Al-Saud will be unrewarding, thus changing a great deal of the inter-Arab political dynamic in the 1960s.

He does not doubt (at least not in discussions with his inner circle and some of the intelligentsia) that ultimately Egypt can be strong enough to renew the territorial sway Muhammad Ali held over Syria, Yemen and the Hijaz in the early 19th century, and that he believes the inhabitants of those regions would be best off under Cairo’s protection, but he laments that the really useful parts of Arabia where the oil is happen to be on the wrong side of the peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, and out of Egypt’s reach. He asks his fellow free officers rhetorically, why absorb the liabilities of deserts, tribes and religious fanatics, without getting the benefits of oil wealth?

Nasser feels as betrayed by the various Arab nationalists who failed to be loyal to him, like the Baathists and Iraqi revolutionary ruler Karim Qasim, as he feels alienated from the Saudi and Hashemite (Jordanian) monarchs. Far better, he believes, to basically let the Iraqis, Syrians, Saudis, Jordanians and Zionists fight it out amongst themselves without expenditure of Egyptian resources, because these ingrates, nomads and imperialists all deserve each other. Meanwhile Egypt will develop its national strength in Africa, and perhaps, decide to reengage with Arabia and Syria in later times if they come to seriously appreciate how lost they are without Cairo’s guidance.

Syria in particular is not entitled to Cairo’s favors. Since the Saudis supported conservatives there who split from the UAR, let them pay for the territory’s upkeep, after all, their contributions and sacrifices in the wars against Israel were miniscule compared to Egypt’s.

Meanwhile, Africa beckons. There’s an immediate material interest in Libya and the source countries of the Nile, Sudan and Ethiopia. The French are on the verge of admitting defeat in Algeria, and the colonial powers are weakening or rapidly ceding independence to colonies throughout Africa. However, they are not entirely gone, and Egypt can still pose of the champion of North African and Sub-Saharan African states against colonialism, neocolonialism and its mercenaries. For instance, Egypt can make a big rhetorical stand and provide token assistance to Congolese resisting western forces during the first half of the 1960s.

Nasser hopes to sell Egypt to both Cold War blocs as being a particularly influential player in Africa, and hopes for some advantageous deals in working with the continents’ mineral wealth.
He avoids reengagement in the Arabian peninsula and Persian Gulf (ie, like when Egypt and other Arab states intervened to deter Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1961), but in Africa, he still finds ample scope to “twist the lion’s tail” and act on his anti-British instincts regardless.

When republican officers overthrow the Imam of Yemen in 1962, Egypt largely steers clear, although congratulating them. He essentially tells the Iraqis and Syrians, the other republican bearers of Arab nationalism, that supporting nationalists in Yemen is at least as much their job as Egypt’s. What’s more, he tells the Saudis and Jordanians that this is his thinking.

Nasser is still anti-Zionist and in no mood to convert the armistice with Israel into a peace treaty. In this, Egypt is much like any other third world or Muslim country. However, Nasser and his loyal free officers do not do much to increase the propaganda stakes of the Israel-Palestine issue, or to increase expectations that Egypt will lead the struggle to redeem it, nor does he harp so much as in our own real history about failures of other Arab states to take decisive action. If we really want to have him parallel Qadhafi, he might just propose some fantastical schemes like the merger or Israel, Lebanon and Jordan (Qadhafi proposed a one-state solution for Israel-Palestine, called “Israstine”).

This leaves Arab states like Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia somewhat more critical of Nasser, but less convinced that decisive action can be possible against the Zionists. The Syrians are confirmed in their approach of using only guerrilla methods against Israel.

As in OTL, Nasser forbids Palestinian fedayeen raids from Egyptian territory, but unlike OTL, he does not support fedayeen bands who seek to infiltrate through Israel’s other borders. PLO and Fatah type organizations are still formed eventually, but they are likely more beholden to Syria and Iraq. Gaza is an impoverished Egyptian-ruled territory that provides recruits for those groups, but Nasser gladly also recruits Palestinians who are motivated to serve for economic reasons in his African adventures.

This attitude helps scramble inter-Arab politics a bit.

Among the nationalists, Iraq’s Karim Qasim may find himself drawn in as the leading supporter of the Yemeni republicans, and may gain Arab nationalist street cred as a result, which may help deter others from launching a coup against him, because they lack Nasserist support or encouragement. Iraq has fewer resources in terms of people and Yemen is more remote from them, however, Baghdad has more money per capita to subsidize their allies with. Likewise, Nasser does not take the lead supporting anti-British rebels in Aden, South Yemen, and Iraq or Syria may have a greater role, and the communist faction may have a reduced chance of taking over the territory in the face of tribal resistance.

Also, at some point in the 60s, the absence of Egyptian engagement may make Baghdad think that domination of Kuwait is more of a real option. So perhaps that frontier will be much less quiet, and there will be some crises in the 60s and 70s with any one of a number of possible results, including Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, or Saudi and Iranian resistance to and Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, or even an early version of Desert Storm or Desert Shield, probably on a more limited basis.

Iraq, rather than Egypt, becomes regarded as the leading threat to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia is a bit more circumspect in supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, though of course this ideological tendency still exists based on a nontrivial native constituency. In our real history, throughout Nasser’s last decade, he aggressively supported anti-Saudi nationalist dissidents, including an exiled Saudi prince and fought proxy wars against Riyadh in Yemen. In turn, the Saudis, with Washington’s backing, vigorously supported and protected conservative Islamist opponents of Nasser and his regional allies. In this scenario where Cairo is more African and less Arab focused, there simply is far less tit-for-tat meddling between Cairo and Riyadh.

Other than feeling somewhat deserted, for the most part other Arab League members find Nasser’s reorientation benign compared to his real historical behavior, as it makes them far less fearful of his meddling. And although Nasser pulls back support in part in a spirit of bitterness, Cairo radio simply ends up saying much less about the politics of other Arab states (except in Africa) than it did in the OTL 1960s, including much less that is negative.

Nasser is even a bit more vocal than in OTL tweaking Uncle Sam’s beard over civil rights for American blacks.(this was in any case an actual propaganda point he used) Through the 60s he mounts strong criticisms of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese imperialism, providing at least some support to insurgents.

Cairo does not have much money to spend or key know-how to share with Nasser’s African allies, but it can re-funnel some of the humanitarian aid it receives from America and military-industrial aid it receives from the USSR to African clients. While still a poor, developing country, Egypt still has trained soldiers, engineers and medical personnel that various African leaders would find would help them in building up their regimes.

Nasser’s lackluster commitment to pan-Arabism is a mark against him in public and army opinion, but as in the case of Libya for over a decade, it is not decisively so to the point of endangering his rule. He has Islamist and far-leftist critics in any case, but his Islamist and Pan-Arab critics are less well-supported by the Saudis or other Arab states compared to OTL. His popularity in his last decades and at death may well be less than in our real history, but, as with Qadhafi, Nasser could use African mercenaries as a praetorian guard if he ends up needing one to serve as his last line of ddefense against coup or assassination.

--Israel still has clashes with Fedayeen intruders and conducts raids on their camps in Jordan and Lebanon. Israel has air battles with the Syrians as well as artillery duels and disputes over water.

However, the 6 Day War as we know it is unlikely to happen as the Syrians are likely to keep their threats limited to shelling and guerrilla infiltration, not any large scale military reactions that provide the Israelis an excuse to attack. If fighting escalates on these fronts, Israel does not enjoy any perceived underdog status in Europe or North America, because Egypt is not engaged.

There will be much discussion of the need for Syrian-Iraqi unity to resist Zionism and imperialism, and to make up for Cairo’s reduced support. However, it will almost certainly founder on the inability to decide which country should dominate such a federation. Saudi Arabia will make maintaining Syrian independence from Iraq and Jordan a key objective. This could result in the Muslim Brotherhood becoming a stronger element in the Syrian political mix, but could also make for alliances of strange bedfellows, where Riyadh is willing to support radical nationalists in Syria to some degree to keep them out of Iraqi clutches.

Syrian rulers though, if they choose, will also be better able to justify aggressively seeking and accepting Soviet support on Moscow’s terms. Likewise the Iraqis. Although not of much practical value, they may also voice solidarity with China to encourage Soviet and western appreciation of their worth.

We have sketched out Nasser’s initiatives and goals, but not how well he will do at them. Morocco and Algeria will have the wherewithal to keep Egyptian influence on them in check. Tunisia will probably be very susceptible to his influence. King Idris of Libya may be overthrown earlier under pro-Nasserite pressure, and Egyptian troops may become directly engaged there or in Sudan. If Nasser is smart and lucky, he may be able to have a level of influence he can live with, without having to invade or occupy these neighbors. However, he may need to undertake large military interventions in both, and Nasser may suffer some ups and downs as Libya and Sudan break away from Cairo’s influence and Nasser needs to manipulate things to restore Egyptian power.

Of all Egypt’s neighbors in Africa, Libya is more likely to be kept firmly under heel as a satellite or federation partner with Egypt than Sudan is, largely because of its lesser population and powers of resistance.

To the extent the stresses of 6 Day War and War of Attrition with Israel sent Nasser to the grave early in OTL, he may live until later in the 1970s in the ATL. Sadat is probably as likely as anyone to succeed him, and to maintain his African-focused policies and aloofness from the Arab arena. If he parallels his OTL moderating tendency, Sadat would likely move to reconcile with the west and a more diverse set of players in Africa, even if they may be ideologically more conservative, like the kingdom of Morrocco or the Ethiopian empire. If Islamist opposition crests excessively, Sadat will suppress it and possibly become a victim of assassination. However, without a 6 Day War, Islamism may not gain as much of an edge in Egypt, and Egypt will have no reason at all to make a peace treaty with Israel and provoke domestic outrage over that.
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