Narvik 1942

perfectgeneral

Donor
Monthly Donor
I’m not.

It’s the fjords man, the fjords!
:)

There are fjords all over. It is a fractal coastline par excellence, but no bridges or land routes at all? Even a ferry crossing would hardly be called transport by ship in the interdiction sense.
 
Politically, its a much different story. After all the early defeats, its by no means certain the 8th Army can go all the way, so by going to Norway you risk NA dragging on.

But would prolonging the North Africa struggle actually be bad for the Allies?
Surely it would mean, that they could't land as fast as they wanted in Italy, but it does have some positive effects as well.
By 1942 the Med was a very unpleasant spot for the Axis. The Italian Fleet had already been routed several times and Malta was secure. Forcing the Germans to keep an open supply chain to North Africa and devoting Luftwaffe assets to keep that supply chain open and put pressure on Malta could have been quite beneficial for the Allies in the long run.
Imagine of all the Wehrmacht equipment, ammo and fuel that would make its way to the bottom of the Med after the ships and aircraft carrying it would be attacked by Allied forces.
Securing Narvik and securing the Murmansk bound convoys could work wonders for the Allies. It would also make the Germans finally deploy their Kriegsmarike remnants, thus probably losing the Tirpitz and the Scharnhorst.

If the Allies were to keep moving to the South and were determined to liberate Norway, then we might have seen Allied heavy bombers operating out of Norway against Germany in 1944.


With the disaster of Stalingrad becoming apparent plus the war in Norway I don't think the Germans will send much to save North Africa.

You are forgetting that Adolf Hitler was in charge.
He would probably get stubborn again and order more men sent to North Africa.
 

Oddball

Monthly Donor
..., but no bridges or land routes at all? Even a ferry crossing would hardly be called transport by ship in the interdiction sense.

In 1942, no. Hardly any roads or ferries either. The main road (E6) that is still in use was buildt by the Germans. :eek:

Almost every journey back then was by coastal ships with connections into the fjords. :)
 
But would prolonging the North Africa struggle actually be bad for the Allies?
Surely it would mean, that they could't land as fast as they wanted in Italy, but it does have some positive effects as well.
By 1942 the Med was a very unpleasant spot for the Axis. The Italian Fleet had already been routed several times and Malta was secure. Forcing the Germans to keep an open supply chain to North Africa and devoting Luftwaffe assets to keep that supply chain open and put pressure on Malta could have been quite beneficial for the Allies in the long run.
Imagine of all the Wehrmacht equipment, ammo and fuel that would make its way to the bottom of the Med after the ships and aircraft carrying it would be attacked by Allied forces.
Securing Narvik and securing the Murmansk bound convoys could work wonders for the Allies. It would also make the Germans finally deploy their Kriegsmarike remnants, thus probably losing the Tirpitz and the Scharnhorst.


You are forgetting that Adolf Hitler was in charge.
He would probably get stubborn again and order more men sent to North Africa.

I am sure that Hitler would still want more men to N Africa to save the situation but an attack on Norway (which always seemed to scare him) would mean that only minimal forces would be able to go.

The 8th Army is going to win at Alamein with or without Operation torch. They are too strong to stop after November 1942. Tripoli is going to fall.

The Axis would have to violate Vichy territory to continue the fight or quit Africa. If they do then French North Africa would probably come over to the Allies without any special deals. It is likely that the Axis would take Tunisia but Morocco and Algeria would be beyond them and would come over to the Allies.
 

Cook

Banned
If the Allies were to keep moving to the South and were determined to liberate Norway, then we might have seen Allied heavy bombers operating out of Norway against Germany in 1944.

From airfields with the worst weather in Europe?

Securing Narvik and securing the Murmansk bound convoys could work wonders for the Allies.

No. At best it would gain a grudging thankyou from Stalin. The resources expended taking Norway would far exceed the number of ships gained from securing Narvik. And while Narvik would not be available for German aircraft, the U-boats would still be able to hit the convoys.

By 1942 the Med was a very unpleasant spot for the Axis.

The Mediterranean was still very much in dispute. The ease with which the Axis could operate in the central Mediterranean is demonstrated by the speed with which they deployed to Tunisia.
 
From airfields with the worst weather in Europe?

Read, what I typed.
After the Allies advance to the South of Norway, they could use the airfields there for raids against Germany.
Southern Norway has good weather.
Sometimes, better than Great Britain actually.

]No. At best it would gain a grudging thankyou from Stalin. The resources expended taking Norway would far exceed the number of ships gained from securing Narvik. And while Narvik would not be available for German aircraft, the U-boats would still be able to hit the convoys.
But the resources put into securing Norway, would have been "wasted" in North Africa instead. The point is, that by opening a new front, Germany would be forced to divert forces to a yet new front, thus making its situation more difficult.


The Mediterranean was still very much in dispute. The ease with which the Axis could operate in the central Mediterranean is demonstrated by the speed with which they deployed to Tunisia.
It would have taken a more committed attempt by the Allies, but it can be done.
And the Germans deployed to Tunisia with losses too. The big point is however, not the deployment, but the upkeep of forces. Its the supply chains, that are vulnerable and can be hit hard by the Allies.
 

Peisander

Banned
Hitler took Narvik more because he feared Britain and France were sending aircraft, AA guns and a mecenary force to Finland in March 1940 in support of Finland's war against Russia.

Hitler feared an alliance of Britain and France with Finland threatened it's raw materials from the petsamo region of northern Finland. Remember that war was already declared after the invasion of Poland in September 1939.

Recapture of Narvik did not threaten these supply lines in 1942, however Finland's capitulation to Russia enforced by a threat of Bombing by US bombers late in 1944 finally denied raw materials.
 
Its the supply chains, that are vulnerable and can be hit hard by the Allies.


That's a very important point, which makes it a shame that you failed to apply it in any manner to your analysis of a Norway landing versus a North African landing.

In North Africa, the Allies are going to be able to interdict Axis supply lines much more easily and protect their own supply lines much more easily. The opposite is true in Norway.

While the North Sea and Skagerrak are smaller than the Med, the Med is larger than the North Sea, the Allies control more of the Med than the North Sea, and the Allies control more of the land bordering the Med than they do bordering the North Sea. When supplying North Africa, the Axis must employ actual shipping to carry supplies hundreds of miles the between Italian ports and North Africa while, when supplying Norway, the Axis can use ferries to carry supplies the dozens of miles between Denmark and Oslo.

While Norway is closer to Germany, thus allowing German naval and aerial units to deploy there faster and more easily, Norway is a strategic dead end. No invasion of continental Europe is going to be launched from Norway, unlike the multiple invasions of continental Europe that were launched from the Med.

As for bombing, the differences in distance between southern Norway and East Anglia are not substantial, East Anglia can be supplied far more easily (an important factor when you remember how logistically intensive any bombing campaign is), and air bases in East Anglia are already protected by assets defending Britain itself while that defense in Norway would have to be set up.

There are many sound reasons why the Allies examined and discarded the idea of invading Norway several times after 1940. While it may look like a good option to a Risk or Axis & Allies player, in any realistic strategic assessment it amounts to little more than a diversion.
 

elkarlo

Banned
If you want to confuse the Germans as to where you are going to invade next, it is so much easier to find someone that has died of pneumonia, dress his corpse in a uniform, handcuff a briefcase containing fake invasion plans to his wrist and drop him from a submarine off the coast of a neutral, but Axis friendly country.
:)

True, their spies did suck.

I was just wondering what more Deippe type raids would have done in 42'. As the USSR was in desperate need of help, and some mild distractions on the West may have come from Stalin's pleas.
 
Don Lardo - agreed!

Churchill seemed to have a fixation about Norway, much to the horror of the British Service chiefs - especially Brooke. The US didn't think much of it either.

It was a dead end, even easier to defend then Italy, with a terrain that was the opposite of what the mechanised Allies wanted.

Whereas, North-West Africa gave them French resources in men, ships, and airfields to base the 15th Air Force e.g. attacks of Ploestti.
It gave them options where to attack next, which meant that the germans had to spread the divisions - withdrawing them from France in the process.
It gave the US on-the-job traning e.g. Kasserine, for similar situations that they may face in North-Western France.
 

Cook

Banned
True, their spies did suck.

I was just wondering what more Deippe type raids would have done in 42'. As the USSR was in desperate need of help, and some mild distractions on the West may have come from Stalin's pleas.

What more another Dieppe style raid could do?

Probably result in the killing or capture of a few thousand more Allied troops if you try hard enough. Not to mention destroying all confidence partisan movements on the continent would have that you were ever going to stay and fight the Germans.

Dieppe was an unmitigated disaster and demonstrated that pinprick raids of no strategic value were to be avoided.
 

Cook

Banned
There were 9 Divisions based in Norway in July 1944

LW Field Div, 18.

Infantry divisions 199, 214,269,270, 274, 280, 295,

Static Garrison Division 710.

Total number of Germans in Norway, including Kriegsmarine and Luffwaffe, at the end of the war of 372,000.

None of whom were able to influence the War at all as long as they remained in Norway.
 
Securing Narvik and securing the Murmansk bound convoys could work wonders for the Allies. It would also make the Germans finally deploy their Kriegsmarike remnants, thus probably losing the Tirpitz and the Scharnhorst.
Before the US got into the war, it would have made a bigger difference.

If you read Churchill, you get the impression that most or all of Lend-Lease to Russia went through Murmansk, which is simply not the case. (Or was only true when it was Britain, not the US, providing the goods.)

By the time frame we're looking at here, far more went through Vladivostok or Persia.
 
In Soviet hulls I take it?
Nope, US ones! Sailing past Japan.

I don't remember whether they flew Soviet flags or not, but Japan knew that if they stopped those ships, that the Soviets would enter the war against them.

A weird, and not widely known bit of WWII history.
 
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